 [Text extracted, machine translated, polished by BackToLuther] [1750 edition]

JOHANN WILHELM BAIER

COMPENDIUM
OF POSITIVE THEOLOGY,
WITH EXPANDED NOTES,

IN WHICH

THE ORTHODOX DOCTRINE IS SET FORTH FOR ACADEMIC EDUCATION AND CONFIRMED FROM HOLY SCRIPTURE AND FROM THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS GROUNDED THEREIN —

NEWLY PREPARED FOR PUBLICATION BY

CARL FERDINAND WILHELM WALTHER,

DOCTOR AND PROFESSOR OF SACRED THEOLOGY.

ENLARGED AND CORRECTED EDITION.

VOL. I.

PROLEGOMENA.

IN THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS
FROM THE PRESS OF THE LUTHERAN SYNOD OF MISSOURI.
(Luth. Concordia – Verlag.)
1879.

TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME ONE.

M. Joh. Casp. Zeumeri *The Life of Johann Wilhelm Baier,*
Preface III

PROLEGOMENA

CHAPTER I. On the nature and constitution of theology 1
where specifically on natural theology 6
of the revealed 30
CHAPTER II. On the Principle of Revealed Theology, or on Holy Scripture 79

III

M. JOH. CASP. ZEUMERI

THE LIFE OF JOHANN WILHELM BAIER. ^

This great theologian, although he felt the rays of a benign fortune throughout his life, nevertheless sometimes experienced opposing mists and clouds. For immediately those around him at the time of his life, in which *he was born in Nuremberg* on the 11th… He was born on November 11, 1647, and from the very beginning it seemed that his destiny was to oppose the blessed Baier, for his own father, *Johann Wilhelm Baier,* a most upright man, *a citizen and merchant* of the said city, had departed this life before his little son's birth, and the grieving mother, *Susanna Schroeck*, a pious and honorable matron, . shaken by the death of her husband and by other adverse circumstances, terrors, and afflictions, she had given birth to such a weak infant that anyone would have doubted he could survive. But God kindly preserved both mother and child, so that he was consecrated to his Savior by Baptism on the following 12th of November. After this, the pious mother made every effort to ensure that her son would be properly educated and would one day serve God in the Church. To this end, desiring spiritual gifts over physical ones, she was careful to instill the principles of piety in him from his very earliest years. So that he might also attain knowledge of the liberal arts, she sent him to the great theologian, *Johann Michael Dilherr,* as well as the most illustrious *Martin Beer,* both now of blessed memory, and he followed their counsel. For at their suggestion, our blessed Baier, faithful as he was, was instructed at home by a certain teacher, and then, sent to the School of the Holy Spirit and entrusted to the discipline of Master *Johann Jacob Widero*, then teacher of the third class but later rector, and was so educated in the rudiments of Latin and Greek literature, as well as in poetry, that he advanced to the higher classes in a short time. In the year 1659. He began to attend the gymnasium there, using as his teachers the conrector *Georg Wiedemann* and, the following year, the principal Master *John Held,* from whom he was so instructed in Greek, Hebrew, logic, rhetoric, poetry, ethics, geography,

spherics [*doctrina sphaerica*], and theology that he laid a sufficient foundation. In 1662 and following years, he publicly attended the celebrated *Dilherr* in Hebrew, ethics, and politics*;* the most distinguished theologian and philosopher*, Daniel Wuelffer,* in logic, metaphysics, and physics; and *Martin Beer* in universal and pontifical history; in oratory, the most celebrated philologist, *Christoph. Arnold*; and finally, in disputation and other subjects*,* the most eminent Dr. *Johann Georg Fuchs,* later rector of the Aegidian Lecture Hall. In the year 1664, at the age of 17, he went to Altdorf, where, admitted to the student body, he attended the lectures of the magnificent *Johann. Paulus Felwinger,* the academy's chancellor; the excellent *Ja. Conrad Duerr,* on theology and morals; Prof. P. *Abdia Treu*, on mathematics; *Georg. Matthiae Koenig,* on history and Greek; *Christoph. Molitor,* on Hebrew, Chaldean, Syriac, and Arabic. Furthermore, he devoted great effort to philosophical and rabbinical studies, especially on January 16, 1667, when he presented *Socrates as an Idea of the Philosopher and Statesman* in a public oration, which the esteemed *Duerr,* then dean, judged worthy of public light. On the following May 11th, he submitted a dissertation *On the Conflict Between Reason and the Passions* to the formal examination of the learned, and finally, his learning having been thoroughly tested, he received the highest honors in philosophy. But so that he might not stray from his goal, he was also early concerned with theological studies. He therefore often listened to the aforementioned *Duerr*, who was explaining *Dieterich's* catechetical institutions and the classical passages of Holy Scripture; Dr. *Johann Weinmann* commenting on *the 1st Epistle to the Corinthians 3*and Dr. *Lucas Friedrich Reinhard* presenting his synopsis of theology. In August 1669, he went to Jena and was admitted among the students by the magnificent rector of the university*, Sebastian Niemann,* Doctor of Sacred Theology, Professor, as well as General Superintendent. Having been thus received, he especially loved and desired the instruction of the most reverend Dr. *Musaeus*, primary Professor of Theology, and participated in various disputational colloquia against the Reformed, Socinians, etc., as well as in the lectures on our domestic controversies. In homiletics, he followed the guidance of the blessed *Georg Goerius*, Professor of Morals and finally General Superintendent and Principal Pastor. Although he did not neglect philosophy in the least, but cultivated it so as to teach others and to serve twice as presiding officer in public disputations, he nevertheless devoted the greatest part of his labor to theology, so that he not only heard the aforementioned theologians Musaeus and Niemann, but also the most reverend D. Bechmann, the most celebrated Professor of Theology, and privately directed his meditations toward divine things. This, among other things, is evident from that excellent dissertation *On the Authority of the First Council of Nicaea and the Ecumenical Councils, Against Daniel Zwicker* the Socinian and *Christ. Sandius* the Arian, etc., under the presidency of Dr. Niemann, was debated

in 1671, both morning and afternoon. In the year 1673, by order of the most serene prince of Saxony-Gotha, who had most graciously promised him the professorship, he duly petitioned the most reverend theological faculty for the highest honors in theology, and so that this desire might be satisfied, the candidate (received on 25 July), he was admitted to the preliminary examination, which they call *the probation*, followed by the public demonstrations, namely, on the 27th of the same month, a cursory lecture*;* on the 11th Sunday after Trinity, a probationary *(δοκιμαστική)* sermon; on the July 29th, an inaugural disputation, on the 30th undergoes a rigorous examination, and finally receives the reward, namely the degree of Master of Arts proclaimed in a solemn assembly. When, toward the end of the aforementioned year, Dr. *Niemann* was called to Sleswick in Holstein, our blessed Baier was most graciously granted not only the ordinary professorship of theology, but also the chair of church history with a salary. Thus confirmed in his office, on June 2, 1674, he began his public lectures. However, just as (from which the continuation of his tireless labors is apparent) he did not visit the halls of princes, unless most graciously summoned by the most serene princes, so he obeyed their commands and appeared on several occasions, especially in the year 1682. when he conferred with *the Bishop of Tinensi [Tinos?]*, the papal legate, about the matter of union between Protestants and Roman Catholics. The Most Serene Abbess of Quedlinburg also often used the counsel of our blessed Baier and always most graciously approved his undertakings. From these things, anyone can gather how faithful he was to both God and the princes. In addition, he often served as dean and, on three occasions, as rector, performing his duties with such skill and prudence that his reputation spread far and wide. Therefore, when the new university of Halle in Saxony was founded and inaugurated in 1694, our Baier was most graciously called by the most serene founder to be the first primary professor of theology and first rector, a call which, with the consent of the most serene patrons of the University of Jena, he accepted, and throughout the entire term of his new office he proved himself faithful and prudent until the following year, 1695, when he was recalled to Weimar by the most serene prince and lord, *Wilhelm Ernst*, Duke of Saxony, etc. There he was appointed *ecclesiastical counselor, supreme court chaplain, general superintendent, and also primary pastor of Sts. Peter and Paul*; On July 16, he went to Weimar, on the 21st. of the same, he was ordained and installed on the ninth Sunday after Trinity, but on account of ill health he did not preach his preparatory or introductory sermon, as it is called, until the thirteenth Sunday after Trinity. As for his marriage, with the consent of both sets of parents, he was married on August 31, 1674, he celebrated his nuptials at Jena with the most chaste virgin *Anna Catharina,* the second daughter of the most reverend, often-praised Dr. Musaeus, from whom he had six sons, three of whom died in infancy

and as many nephews, among them Master *Johann Wilhelm,* of the illustrious faculty of philosophy, adjunct to the Jena chair, a genuine emulator of his blessed parent, *Johann Jacob,* Doctor of Medicine and Praefect, now residing in Nuremberg, and *Johann David,* Master of Arts and student of theology, are still living. And just as it is certain that he was a true Christian, so he had to be a true sufferer. For God imposed upon him a cross composed of the weapons of his adversaries and the infirmities of his body; for not only was he weak in body from birth, as is evident from the foregoing, but he was also often wasted by more severe illnesses, which happened especially on October 24, 169, when he was closest to death. Likewise, when he bade farewell to the Friedrich Academy in 1695, he suffered severe pains from colic and kidney stones, and having scarcely reached Weimar, he was severely afflicted by wandering, scurvy-like arthritic pains. And although he began to recover, so that he was able to preside over his duties for a short time, his health was nevertheless unstable, for on October 11 he began to suffer from a catarrhal fever, which, although the most excellent and experienced physicians administered the best remedies, felt the force of none of them due to the transformation of the catarrhal fever into a malignant one. Therefore, having received the Body and Blood of his Savior as the best viaticum, on the 19th. of the said month and year, at seven o'clock in the evening, he peacefully fell asleep.

The treatises and dissertations that he had printed are the following:

TRACTATES IN QUARTO:

A Thorough Demonstration and Defense of the Pure Doctrine Concerning the Necessity of the faithful Knowledge of Christ, as well as the Necessity and Power of the External Word of God and the Sacrament of Holy Baptism, against the Modern Heretics or so-called Quakers; together with a Sermon Preached in the City Church at Jena on the Second Day of Christmas, etc. 1681.

Comparison of the Doctrine of the Papists and Protestants, 1686.

A Comparison of the Doctrine of the Quakers and Protestants, together with a Harmony of the Errors of the Quakers and Other Heterodox. 1694.

OCTAVO:

Compendium of Homiletic Theology. 1677.

Compendium of Positive Theology, ed. 1686, 1691, and 1694.

A Thorough Demonstration that Luther and those who sided with him are not guilty of either the separation of the churches or the heresies attributed to them, etc. Halle. 1691.

Compendium of Moral Theology. Jen. 1698.

Compendium of Exegetical Theology. Jen. 1698.

VII

DISSERTATIONS:

a. *Philosophical:*

On the Struggle of Affect and Reason. Altdorf. 1667.
On the Knowledge and Ignorance of Sinners. Jen. 1670.
On the Mixture of Virtues and Vices. 1672.

b. Theological:

Five Dissertations on the Synopsis and Examination of the Theology of the Recent Enthusiasts, or Quakers:

1. On the Principle of Revealed Theology. 1682.
2. On the Principle of True Knowledge of God. 1683.
3. On the Consistency and Harmony of Immediate Revelation with the Use of Holy Scripture and Other Means, etc. 1686.
4. On the Rule and Judge of Controversies of the Doctrine of Faith and Morals, earlier. 1691.
5. On the Rule and Judge of Controversies, etc., later edition. 1691.

A Decade of Theological Disputations held in the Jena Academy, reprinted in 1695, containing the following disputations:

1. On the Authority of the First Ecumenical Council of Nicaea, etc. 1671.
2. On the Council of Gamaliel, Acts 5:38-39, 1680;
3. On Paul of Samosata, his heresy, examination, etc. 1680.
4. On Impanation and Consubstantiation, in opposition to the accusations of certain Popes and Reformers. 1677.
5. On the Agony of Death. 1683.
6. On the Foretaste of Eternal Life against G. Keith, Quaker. 1684.
7. On the foretaste of eternal damnation. 1684.
8. On the State and Place of souls once more restored to natural life. 1681.
9. On the glorious Kingdom of the Church to be erected on this Earth through Christ, against the Chiliasts, etc. 1678.
10. On Faith, Hardly to Be Found in the Return of Christ, from Euc. 18, 8. 1686.

The remaining dissertations, in chronological order, are as follows:

Examination of Erbermann's Dialogue between Luther and Arius. *For a License.* 1673. *Presented* to *Dr. Sebastian Niemann.*

Examination of Erbermann's Dialogue between Dr. John Musaeus and the Chinese Philosopher. 1674.

On the Universality of Divine Grace, from 1 Tim. 2:4. 1675.

On the falsely boasted dignity and power of the Roman Pontiffs in the time of the Emperor Justinian, against Arnold Corneliu a Belderen. 1675.

Synopsis of Natural Theology Compared with Revealed Theology. 1676. *(Inaug. Dissertation of M. Henry of Lithe, Pastor of the Church of Onoldof-Brandenburg and Councilor of the Consistory.)*

On the Principle of Theology. 1678.

Discussion of the Arguments of Nicolas Steno, for abandoning the Lutheran-Evangelical Religion and embracing the Papal Religion. 1678.

On the Purgatory of the Papists, whether it can be proven from St. Augustine? Against an Anonymous (Nicolas Steno). 1678.

On the Question, Whether the Papists or Our Side Better Consult Their Conscience in Religious Matters? Against an Anonymous Author (Nicolas Steno). 1680.

A Prologue to the Vindications, for the legitimate calling of the Ministers of our Church against the Papists. 1681. *(Inaug. of M. Veltheim*.)

On Superstition or Vain Observance. 1682.

VIII

On the Existence and Essence of Original Sin. 1683.
Summary of the Sermons of Christ, Matthew 4:17 and Mark 1:15. 1683. *(Inaug. Joh. Mart. Coleri.)*
On the Day and Night Pestilence, on Psalm 91:5-6. 1683.
On the Use of the Meritorious Cause in Theological Controversies. 1684.
Examination of the Examiner, against an Anonymous Pontiff. 1686.
On the False Claim of the Church's Perpetual Light and Visibility, Against An Anonymous Pontiff. 1685.
On the Propagation of Faith by the Force of Arms, Alien to the Practice of the Church. 1686.
On the Peaceful State of the Pious Departed, from Isa. 26:20. 1686.
On the End of Life. 1686.
On the Connection of Faith and Works. 1686.
On the Propagation of the Faith by Fictitious Revelations, Alien to the Practice of the Church. 1686.
Concerning the Ministers of the Churches of the Augsburg Confession, rightly called and ordained, against the Papacy. 1686. *(Inaug. M. David Rupert. Erythropel. Rev. and Seren. Bishop of Osnabr. by the Court Chaplains*.)
On *Rational Worship,* on Romans 12:1. 1687.
On the Right and Privilege of the Firstborn from Gen. 49:3 and Deut. 21:17. 1687.
On the Visitation of Divine Grace, to Luke 19:44. 1687.
On Those Who Aspire to the Parish Office from 1 Tim. 3:1.
Jesus Christ alone and unique Priest and expiatory sacrifice of the World. 1688.
Of God's Providential Care Concerning the Sins of Men. 1688.
On Pontifical Flagellations. 1688.
On the State of the Emptying of Christ, *the God-man (θεανθρώπινον)*. 1688.
On Sinners Who Sin unto Death: Should One Pray for Them? (1 John 5:16). 1688.
On the Difference Between Dispensation and Tolerance in Ecclesiastical Cases, Especially Matrimonial ones. 1688.
On the Method of Finding the True Church by the Light of Reason, Against the Writings of the Ex-Calvinist Pontiff. 1688.
On the Rapture of Christ into Heaven before the Assumption of His Prophetic Office, against the Socinians. 1688.
On the Royal Priesthood of Christians from 1 Peter 2:9. 1689.
On the Malicious Resistance of Men in the Work of Conversion. 1689.
On Christ preaching in Hell, from 1 Pet. 3:18-20. 1689.
On the Adoration of Christ according to His Human Nature from Philippians 2:9. 1690.
Of the knowledge of God and Christ, from John 17:3. 1690.
Of the Prey snatched from the Mighty, from Isa. 49:24-25. 1690.
On the Great Religion of the Romans. 1691.
Of the Omnipresence of Christ in the Flesh. 1691.
On the Spiritual Kingdom of Christians from Revelation 1:6. 1691.
On Prophecies through Ignorance and Fortuitous Prophecies. 1691,
On the Gospel Law. 1692.
Johannine *Christology* from John 1. 1692. *(Inaug. M. Christoph. Staender*.)
On the Examination of Faith and Christ in Us, from 2 Cor. 13:5. 1692.
On the Nazarenes: Christ, Christians, and Heretics, on Acts 24:5. 1692.
On the Love of God Poured Out in Us, to Rom. 5:5. 1692.
On the False Assumptions [*Ψευδυπόθεσι*] of the Jews, from John 7:27. 1692.
On the Pontifical Lustral Water (from the Holy Water). 1692.
On Ambition, the Cause of Heresies. 1692.
On the Confirmation of not conforming to the world, to Rom. 12:2. 1693.
On the Assumption of Abraham's Seed, to Heb. 2:16. 1693.
On the Connection and Distinction of Justification and Renewal, from 1 John 1:7. 1694.

On the Migration of Christians to the Town of Pella in view of the impending destruction of Jerusalem. 1694.

On the State of Christ's Death and Resurrection for our justification, on Rom. 4:25. 1694.

These six were published at the University of Halle.

On the Inability of Fulfilling the Law. 1694. (*Inaugural dissertation of Master Wolfgang Melchior Stisser, Electoral Brandenburg Inspector and Pastor at St. Ulrich in Halle, etc)*

On the Effectiveness of the Church's Ministry when Administered by Wicked Men, on Article VIII of the Augsburg Confession. 1694. *(Inaugural dissertation of Master Johann Michael Lang, Pastor at Vohenstrauß.*)

On the Controversies between Chauvin and Urigny on Natural Religion. 1694. *(Inaug. M. Joh. Mich. Franc. Buddei, Pr. P.)*

The Evangelical Minister Rightly Called. 1694.

On the Ancient and Recent Antitrinitarian Monarchians, to Article I of the Augsburg Confession, 1695.

On Passing from One Extreme to the Other in Theological Matters: 12 *Theses*. 1695.

Writings of others, publicly examined under Baier's presidency are:

The blessed Martin Chemnitz's Judgment on the Controversies which were debated in earlier times concerning certain articles of the Augsburg Confession, newly edited and treated in 12 Disputations. 1676..

A Collection of Decades of Theological Disputations by the Blessed Johann Ernst Gerhard, Newly Submitted to the Press and Public Examination by M. Johann Ernst Gerhard. 1691.

X

TO THE MOST SERENE
PRINCE and LORD,
HIS LORDSHIP

FREDERICK,

DUKE OF SAXONY, JULICH, CLEVES AND MONTENGER, LANDGRAVIE
of THURINGIA, MARQUESS OF MISNIA, PRINCE-COUNT OF HENNEBERG,
DUKE OF RAVENSTEIN AND TONNA

My most Gracious,

PRINCE and LORD—
LONG LIFE AND HAPPINESS!

MOST SERENE DUKE,

MOST GRACIOUS LORD.

Permit your servant, who lives a life in the academic shade, to invite you, a prince endowed with august power, to survey literary works. For you, while you live in high station, do not disdain the workshops of the Muses. Nor can the affairs of secular government so occupy your sublime mind that those things which pertain to the schools, especially *of the fear of God*, do not also come into the number of your cares, since under your auspices no less than under the other Most Serene Nurturers, This academy daily professes that it owes its bloom and happiness to you. Through you, the vast volumes of the ancient and most distinguished church doctors are brought to light and animated with a new spirit, which will also be monuments of your piety and *magnificence*, more enduring than bronze and imperishable through the countless ages to come. I, however, who can claim neither the praise of genius, nor the breadth of learning and merit, nor the sheer volume of those writings, nevertheless offer this present little book to YOUR SERENITY, my LORD, not that I trust I can

in any way merit anything, but to testify that I owe myself entirely to YOU. Nor, I believe, will you find fault if I more openly explain what counsel was in my mind and moved me to this undertaking.

Fourteen years have passed since YOUR FATHER, To His Most Glorious and Everlasting Memory, Ernest Augustus, I most humbly offered a historical-theological dissertation, written to vindicate the innocence and authority of the First Ecumenical Council of Nicaea from the accusations of the Monarchian *Daniel Zwinger* and the Arian *Christopher Sandius*, and presented for public examination at this Jena Lyceum; But I received, by grace and the kindness of the most laudable prince—indeed, as I had wished, but in a manner far beyond my hope and my deserts—a favor so remarkable and singular that I soon perceived not only that this small token of my most devoted mind had been most graciously accepted, but that an increase of my fortunes was also promised to me, And it so happened that, first, when the matter of entrusting me with the extraordinary professorship of theology was being discussed, and the plans were communicated to the other most serene patrons of this academy, and later, with the intervention of the ordinary professor, now *the blessed,* Upon the departure of *Dr. Sebastian Niemann*, who left this academy to assume the highest ecclesiastical office in the Duchy of Schleswig-Holstein, by the free consent and common authority of all the MOST SERENE PATRONS, the office left by him was entrusted to me, which, with divine grace strengthening my weak mind and body and through various trials, as if by an outstretched hand guiding me, I have now sustained for nearly twelve years and, though not without an awareness of my own infirmity, Yet, relying on divine assistance and the protection and favor of those whom I honor as God's viceregents on earth, I carry out the work of my calling, though not perfectly, yet faithfully and with a mind daily concerned by the gravity of the office and the sense of its dangers, yet also promptly and willingly.

Since the time, however, that I have held this province, I have soon been assisted by the then senior member of the theological college, my father-in-law, *Johann Musaeus*, *now in glory,*

XIII

I was entrusted with the task of completing a certain compendium of positive theology, which, long ago, had been ordered by YOUR MOST SERENE PRINCE'S FATHER, then living and now most blessed. And indeed, I confess, I was for a time deterred from this work, especially from exposing it to public view, not only by the nature of the labor itself, which, although it may seem to contain the rudiments of theology, is in truth directed toward this end, that, as a philosopher once said, *the beginning* is *half of the whole*, but also by the fact that, attending to the mores of our age and to foreign examples, I realized that it would be difficult to publish anything so solid and polished without incurring the censure of others and becoming material for the furtherance of disputes. However, so that I might not neglect my duty and the growing desire of our colleagues, I began to present in public lectures a compendium of positive theology, contained in a few quarto volumes. Now at last, after nearly ten years, since in the meantime many times I had been urged by promoters of sacred learning to bring this work to its conclusion, I gave way to their entreaties, who, partly wishing to decline the barren labor of transcription, and partly judging that the errors of the pens with which others had already transcribed seemed to multiply rather than always be recognized, they advised that what had once been destined for the use of academic youth should be committed to the press, by sending it to the labor-saving compendium. Therefore, with renewed care and with a more ample explanation of those things which had previously been contained in a few brief theses and notes, I decided to publish it.

But since I also understood that the labors of our blessed *Musaeus* in this study had not, with the body of the deceased, departed from the eyes and minds of men, but rather that many, coming to this academy, relying on the counsel or exhortations of their patrons, were demanding, that they would soon turn to the writings of the man that exist and imbue themselves more fully with his doctrine, I thought it would not be amiss, in this compendium of positive theology, to present a kind of summary of those things which the aforementioned doctor, in his various writings, had scattered here and there, according to the diversity of the subjects he was treating,

had delivered, so that in this way the minds of young men might be prepared for a more accurate treatment of positive theology, which, by its polemical study of the various controversies with different sects, would, God willing, be of no little service. Although I cannot deny that I have always disliked the practice of those who prefer to turn another's work to the praise of themselves, rather than sincerely professing what they owe to others. I, for my part, confess that I am bound and persuaded by the law of piety to erect a public monument of gratitude for the merits of the illustrious blessed *Musaeus*, not only on my own behalf but also on behalf of our church and the literary world, especially since certain obstacles have thus far stood in the way of publishing his unpublished writings (*ἄνεκδοτα*), which many distinguished men have long desired to see brought to light. This present little work, placed before the publication of those writings of the blessed Musaeus which still lie hidden, may testify not so much to my intention as to my inability to render full repayment (*ἀντιπελάργησις*)..

Moreover, I have also added in the notes of this compendium the names and places, and not infrequently the very words of various native theologians and those celebrated for *their orthodoxy*; from which their agreement with our own and with those things which the blessed *Musaeus* had already taught may be discerned. For I could have been content to have fortified the very doctrines by the passages of Holy Scripture and the theological reasoning built upon them, and to have shown that the modes of expression, or the terms of the academic school, are appropriate to the underlying material, as they call it, and are free from heterodox sense or collusion with adversaries: for nevertheless, the agreement of the doctors of one church, even with regard to those things which do not enter into the foundation of the faith, but to the so-called secondary questions, or to the use of terms and phrases, it is pleasant to know and sometimes useful, and furthermore, since the good wish to be free not only from the fault but also from the suspicion of affectation in novelty and singularity, I did not shun that labor by which the *agreement* (*ὁμοδοξία*) of other doctors with this form of teaching would be shown.

Therefore, receive, MOST GRACIOUS LORD, this humble little book dedicated to YOUR SERENITY, which, with the auspices of the most blessed and immortal memory of YOUR FATHER, and consecrated to him, should have long since come forth, but now, belatedly, it is directed to YOU, the SON of so great a prince, and

most worthy successor. And just as You have been pleased to dignify me with Your grace, and to cherish and restore me thus far, not with less grace, so also permit me to continue to enjoy Your protection and munificence. May God, to whom your soul and all your affairs are dear, and whom I never cease to invoke for your safety with the prayers of the most devoted heart, grant you a life and strength ever vigorous, a most prosperous reign, a most flourishing household, and whatever blessings the prayers of the most beloved prince of God can wish for!

Written at the Ducal University of Saxony-Jena, on the 13th of March, A.D. 1686.

TO YOUR SERENITY,

most humbly dedicated to prayers and service, your devoted servant,
JOHANN WILHELM BAIER.

TO THE KIND READER,

grace, mercy, and peace from God the Father and our Lord Jesus Christ

is wished by

JOHANN WILHELM BAIER, Doctor

The compendium of positive theology which I first published in the year 1686, and then issued in a second, enlarged edition in 1691, I now present for a third time, not only more carefully corrected of typographical errors, but also enriched with an index of subjects and words. In this latter task, however, I was ably and deservedly assisted by the very reverend and most illustrious gentleman, Mr. Henry Christopher Ludwig, a most deserving deacon of the Christian church of Rudolstadt in that illustrious seat of the Counts of Schwarzburg, and our friend to be honored in many ways, who, having once, for the first edition, roused me among other colleagues, and having himself used the very compendium so familiarly until now, he was all the more ready, and even more suitable than others, to prepare the accurate index, which he has compiled without weariness and offers to the use of others. But divine goodness has certainly surpassed our expectations, granting this little book—not composed for pomp or luxury or the detriment of others, but intended to preserve and defend the purity of academic doctrine and pedagogy—many good supporters, whom I myself, living with them, and partly ignorant of the arts by which the favor and applause of others are usually won, and partly alienated from them by a religious fear, I could have neither sought nor obtained them. However, it so happened that not only did this compendium have to be discussed repeatedly with the studious academic youth and the members of private colleges, but it also had to be subjected to thirty public disputations.

To this latter institution, indeed, the most noble and learned Mr. Justus Christopher Boehmer of Hanover, then a student of sacred theology with us, a man to be counted among the most outstanding, gave occasion. He, being no less successful in all things noble than his naturally gifted and by learning instructed mind was suited for such exercises, chose to perfect it even in these; as our program, here below, by which we then invited the academic youth to hear the disputations, still testifies.

XVII

For although, at the close of that year, the divine hand cast me into a severe illness, and not only were those disputations suspended for a time, but the hope of a longer life for both myself and my friends was also dashed in our minds: it nevertheless pleased God, *who delivered us from such a death*, to restore me to other duties of my office, so as to enable me at the same time to complete that course, in which *Boehmer,* in sixty contests with antagonists chosen from the most learned youth, proved himself so tried to the very end, that the vivid force of his mind and his promptness and dexterity in weighing and solving doubtful objections, combined with elegant modesty, not only became known to the great number of students who flocked together, but also would, as with a rallying cry, inflame the minds of the students who flocked in great numbers, to noble endeavors.

However, with the copies of the compendium from both editions scattered, and a third one to be prepared, I thought it should be conformed to the second rather than extended with new additions. Indeed, someone had given cause to vindicate two assertions which we share with the blessed Musaeus, and he himself, very recently, wrote on both names to the blessed Doctor, as I shall call him; the first, namely, *concerning the regeneration of infants born to Christian parents but who die before baptism, and* the second *concerning the efficacy of Scripture,* as *God's organ* or *instrument,* exalted by God to produce supernatural effects by divine power. Regarding the former, he reports *that Musaeus held that it is only a pious opinion to assert that God works regeneration and faith extraordinarily in the infants of faithful parents who die before baptism, and that this cannot be proven from Scripture or the Word of God.* He refers to the latter, that Musaeus had used this phrase, *namely that the Holy Scripture is elevated by God's supernatural concurrence to immediately cause its own assent by itself*, and that *the nature and proper power of the preached word is not sufficient to produce a man's conversion*, He taught *that*, *since it is a cooperative instrument or even an instrumental cause, whose native and proper power, or δύναμις, by which it can influence the effect, is too weak to produce the effect unless the operation of the Holy Spirit were to add itself.* Thus, on a double count, he accuses the blessed Musaeus of *heterodoxy*. The reason I do not think it necessary to put forth a new work in examining these censures is that I perceive it has already been sufficiently done in our compendium of the first and second editions. For concerning the infants of faithful parents who die without baptism, in part III, chapter *on baptism,* which in the first edition is the ninth, in the other the tenth, § 8, note *b,* I showed, b. I would not deny that the regeneration of these infants by extraordinary grace can be proven from Scripture (for he would not say *there* is *no doubt* about it, unless he acknowledged the foundation of hope in the divine revelation contained in the Scriptures);

but that he speaks of a certain way of acting and regenerating them by extraordinary grace; about which way he finds nothing determined in Scripture. And since these things were sufficiently clear, both from our own writings and from the discourses of Musaeus himself, as is indeed common in theology, *the "that"* (*ὅτι*) is said to be believed, although *the "how"* (*πῶς*), or by what means something is accomplished, is not believed in the same way, being regarded as unrevealed. Not to mention that the censor himself, in the very place where he attacks Musaeus, writes: "*By what way and how God makes something out of infants is so obscure to us that we speak of their regeneration only in a few words, and even then with little understanding."* As for the latter accusation, it will be evident from our summary, chap. II. proleg. § 39, note m., that it is not so much directed against the *Musaeus* as against his predecessors, orthodox men and most worthy of the church of Christ, *Dr. J. Major, Dr. J. Gerhard* and *Dr. J. Himmelius,* whose marked footsteps he followed in the Dedekennian counsels, indeed *the Augsburg Confession and the Formula of Concord* themselves, and finally *Dr. S. Glassius, G. Cundisius, Chr. Chemnitius, J. E. Gerhard, C. Schluesselburg, Th. Thummio, and the theologians of Lübeck, Hamburg, and Düneburg.* I would say it is written, because by all of them the distinction *between God and His word* or the Holy Scriptures, as *the principal and instrumental cause,* and the fact that that infinite power is indeed essential to God, but to the word, which is not God Himself but *the spoken word (λόγος προφορικός),* is not equally essential and proper or cannot be, is carefully emphasized. For although it is said on the contrary that *it is not so much an instrument* (the Word of God) *as a medium, if we wish to speak with precision (ἀκριβολογεῖν)*; nevertheless, neither *Musaeus* nor we see any cause for accusing the aforementioned theologians of neglecting precision (*ἀχριβολογία*); especially since they, in their dispute with the Enthusiasts, advised that the term *'organ'* or *'instrument'* should be retained for weighty reasons, as we have indicated. For *the elevation* of Scripture, see what is said on p. 138. *) (previously p. 143) are found, where we have explained both the genuine sense of the phrase and the agreement *Gerhard* and *Chr. Chemnitz*. We also hope that, with these observations, the censor, having perhaps not seen them until now, will judge our blessed doctor more favorably. But you, benevolent reader, use these things, which we present with a good conscience, in such a way that you may remember that human frailties are not alien to man, and that what has been rightly said ought to be turned to the glory of God; to whose grace I piously commend you along with myself.

Written on the 29th day of December in the year of Christ 1693.

---

*) note of the third edition.

XIX

JOHANN WILHELM BAIER

On the

Συζήτησις (Discussion) of the Jerusalem Council

Acts 15:2 and 7.

AN INVITATORY PROGRAM FOR PUBLIC THEOLOGICAL DISPUTATIONS.

The greater the dignity of that first council, which was celebrated in the age of the apostles in that mother of churches, Jerusalem, the more worthwhile it is to consider that *συζήτησις* (discussion), which partly gave the occasion for holding the council and partly is said to have taken place in it once it had already begun. Luke already mentions long before that in Antioch there arose a *στάσις καὶ συζήτησις οὐκ ὀλίγη—a sedition* (as it is commonly translated) *and no small disputation, Acts 15:2*; and further, when the apostles and elders had gathered to consider the matter presented to them, he makes mention of *πολλῆς συζητήσεως γενομένης* (*much discussion having arisen*), v. 7. Although in the former place the Vulgate translator read only *στάσιν,* not likewise *συζήτησιν*, making *a not small sedition*, nevertheless the consensus of ancient Greek manuscripts and of Eastern interpreters joins both words, and from the Roman Catholic authorities also *Erasmus* and *Bartholomaeus Petra* judged the latter word to be necessarily read here. For *συζήτησις*, however, in verse 7, the Vulgate has *conquisitio,* a rendering almost literally of the simple words. *Erasmus, Arias Montanus, Beza, Schmid,* and others rendered it more Latinly and according to usage as *disputatio* or *inquisitio*. *Martin* also rightly says in his lexicon: *συζητεῖν,* he says, *is used among pagan writers and in the New Testament for discussions, conferences, and sometimes altercations. But for the Latins this is not "to inquire" (conquirere).* But so that we may have a distinct account of the cited verses from both parts of chapter 15 of Acts, it must first be seen in what sense it is said that *στάσις καὶ συζήτησις γενομένη τῷ Παύλῳ καὶ τῷ Βαρνάβα* (a sedition and discussion arose for Paul and Barnabas). Authors commonly render *στάσις as sedition* and, with *Suidas,* equate it with *civil strife*. Yet it must be admitted that Paul and Barnabas were by no means seditious or contentious, but rather *servants of the Lord, not quarrelsome, but gentle toward all, patient with the wicked, and teaching with gentleness those who are of a contrary mind:* such as Paul himself commands others to be *(2 Tim. 2:24–25).*

Therefore, in the interpretation of Acts 15:2, the author *of the interlinear gloss in Acts 15* wrote that a sedition was stirred up

by the Jews against Paul and against Barnabas. Erasmus also therefore thinks that the word *συζητήσεως,* omitted by the Vulgate, should be joined to the word *στάσεως*, because *otherwise what follows would not fit with Paul and Barnabas.* But because the text says that a *disturbance* and a *discussion* arose *against Paul and Barnabas by them,* that is, *by those* about whom verse 1 speaks where it was said that they had come *from Judea,* not that a dispute had arisen *among them* (the Jews, or from the Jews) *against Paul and Barnabas,* therefore, long ago others, with the *ordinary gloss,* rendered it as having been done *by Paul and Barnabas, against those who were saying these things* (namely: *unless you are circumcised according to the rite of Moses, you cannot be saved, v. 1.).* And Caspar Sanctius in his commentary on this passage, page 287, writes: *"Paul and Barnabas* (he understands the names) *are in the dative, and have the force of the agent, which among the Latins is more often expressed in the passive voice in the ablative. Therefore the sense is that Paul and Barnabas undertook the dispute against those who thought circumcision was necessary."* But so that no difficulty concerning the guilt of sedition or tumult be imputed to Paul and Barnabas on this account, Sanctius warns that *the sedition here signifies nothing proceeding from hatred, but only the zeal and effort to defend the truth against the contention and violence of its opponents.* And *Barth. Peter Lintrensis* ad h. 1.: *This word (στάσις,* which the Vulgate renders *seditio*) *is almost always taken in a bad sense among the Latins, and yet it cannot be taken in a bad sense here; therefore it must be understood not according to its usage, but according to the force of its origin, so that it is a secession, a separation, a dissension. Beza* also leans the same way, who translated the word *στάσεως* as *'repugnance,'* as if it were written *ἀνθιστάσεως;* but he judges *that* the name *'sedition' in no way suits this passage*. But *Cornelius a Lapide, Louis de Dieu,* and others also think that it denotes not sedition, but *secession, dissent, a dispute*, or *controversy* . Our own blessed Luther, retaining the common meaning of sedition in an indeterminate sense, believes that, because of the persons involved, mention is made and that only *a discussion (συζήτησις)* is attributed *to Paul and Barnabas.* For he translated it thus: "Now a disturbance arose, and Paul and Barnabas had no small quarrel with them, etc." *The Weimar interpreters*, however, in explaining the sense not expressed in the text, say that that sedition arose *between the converts from the Jews and from the Gentiles,* since *the former would not acknowledge the latter as genuine Christians.* Likewise in his paraphrase, *Lucas Osiander.* But *Hugo Grotius* also in his annotations says: *These datives* (of persons, *τῷ Παύλῳ, καὶ τῷ Βαρνάβα*) *pertain to the discussion, not to the sedition.* And he adds: *Paul and Barnabas were compelled to dispute with those men.* Nor is it foreign to the usage of speech for two nouns of things to be joined with a single verb or participle, yet for neither of them to apply equally to the person or persons that follow; and for this reason, in this passage, it can be said that *α*

XXI

στάσιν, a sedition, was caused by the Jews, contentious as they were by nature; but that *a συζήτησιν, a dispute,* took place, *not a blameworthy one, between Paul and Barnabas* on one side and those *false teachers* from among the converted Jews on the other: since, with these people causing a tumult and seeking to impose the yoke of the law on the unwilling populace, Paul and Barnabas could not help but contradict them, or vindicate the sincerity of their teaching along with Christian liberty. Thus, the dispute is attributed to Paul and Barnabas, not a culpable sedition. And what Luther rendered as "no small *dispute* or *quarrel*" (*nicht einen geringen Zank*), with these and their adversaries, this very thing the glossators also did not poorly explain as follows: eine heftige Disputation und öffentliches Gespräch (a vigorous disputation and public discussion); and to verse 7, and to the words, da man sich nun lange mit einander gezankt ("when they had quarreled with one another for a long time,"), they add: through speech and rebuttal they had spoken with one another about this matter. For when we more closely contemplate the very form *of the discussion* held by these holy men, we easily observe that it was done so that first the controversial *question* would be clearly proposed; from there, the *arguments* presented by both sides would be compared and weighed. Indeed, it must be admitted that a confused manner of conversation, even if you say it was most pleasing to seducing antagonists, was alien to the men of God. Nor will we suppose that the matter was settled by shouting or by poorly coherent statements. Rather, the very word *συζητεῖν* is the same as *to inquire into something by disputing with arguments and opinions through mutual questions and answers,* as even blessed Martin Chemnitz observed on *Mark 1:27, Harmony of the Gospels*, ch. 37, p. 504. And they answer with several passages: *Mark 8:11; 9:10, 14, 16; 12:28; Luke 22:23; 24:15; Acts 6:9; 9:29.* Nor does *συζήτησις* degenerate into altercation except by accident. Thus, indeed, it is now clear that the dispute in verse 2 and in verse 7 was on the part of the orthodox. Nor does *Arias Montanus* err in his commentary on v. 7, *when*, about to explain that *great inquiry* which the Vulgate had called a dispute, he says it was *a discussion* and *argumentation drawn from various passages of divine Scripture and from reasons and consequences deduced from a comparison of the Gentiles and the Jews, the two peoples.* And the oft-praised *Bartholomew Petri*, p. 396, teaches that *the Judaizers then strenuously contended for their opinion;* that *Paul and Barnabas, with other wise men, affirmed the contrary and refuted the arguments of the Judaizers.* With these things observed, the masters of the new art among the papal scholars, especially *the brethren of Walenburg,* who in the *Methodus Augustana* p. 168, wrote: *Proofs and consequences are not a sufficient foundation for faith, if they are considered in themselves, apart from the supernatural authority of Christ and the apostles,* as if, of course, the *consequences* must always be made *in the terms* used by Christ or the apostles, who would assert their *authority* in forming them. Indeed, here, Paul, though an apostle, did not appeal to his own authority in that *discussion*.

XXII

But Peter and James, when they gave way to Paul and Barnabas, are not perceived to be simply pressing their own authority; rather, assuming the truth of the Old Testament Scripture, which was confessed, they teach that one must insist on and acquiesce in the proofs drawn from it and the firm law of consequence. As for the controversy itself, which concerned not only the precise observance of the ceremonial law or circumcision, but also the application of the moral as well as the ceremonial law to justification, and therefore the necessity and use of observance and fulfillment, it is no longer permitted to treat the matter at length. We note only an example of a theological dispute, which, having been undertaken by the most holy men, should admonish us that it is not enough in the church, if we strive to lead or move men to the exercises of piety by teaching, exhorting, and admonishing, while we neglect those things which pertain to vindicating heavenly doctrine and confuting errors. The apostles, however, surely thought otherwise, who, when errors arose, did not believe that the church's welfare could be served by remaining silent, yielding, flattering, or by seeking tranquility, peace, or immunity from disputes by any means, but rather chose to enter into and sustain *a considerable dispute*. And in our time, with errors now greatly increased, multiplied, and painted with various colors, it is by no means permissible for us to be idle or secure, as if heresies would collapse of their own accord, so long as we occupy ourselves with the ascetic practices of piety and command others to do the same. Rather, following the example of the Israelites, it is necessary to build with one hand and bear arms with the other. Nor should it be thought that the very art of waging war against heretics—which pertains to the state of controversies that vary in so many ways, to the opponents' *primary falsehoods*, and to the detection of their manifold deceptions—will be immediately taught to us, or that it will be immediately revealed to us, or provided through us as passive instruments, by divine providence. On the contrary, since God has granted us the benefit of being able to use the restored liberal arts and sciences as aids to weaken heresies and to overcome them, as it were, with their own weapons, those who refuse the opportunity to cultivate their minds in such matters and to turn that skill to the use of the Church show themselves ungrateful to God. But it is well that even in this academy there are better souls, who, though they are not ignorant that theology is practical, nay, that whatever is sacred learning, judge that it is to be applied entirely to the edification of themselves and others in faith and morals; yet they do not disdain the exercises of polemical theology, but in these, having long since laid aside their early training, they prepare themselves for surer contests, to be waged in the public arena, if so it shall please God, with no less a holy than a diligent zeal. Thus, I must now bring forward a most noble and learned young man

XXIII

MR. JUSTUS CHRISTOPHER BOEHMER,

OF HANOVER,

cultivator of sacred theology, altogether to be praised for the goodness of his intellect, elegance of manners, alacrity of study, and already the progress made in doctrine, who, about to fulfill (if God wills, ἐὰν ὁ θεὸς θελήσῃ) the hopes conceived of him by his uncle, the most reverend lord Gerhard, abbot of the free and imperial monastery of Loccum and most excellent director of the churches throughout the duchies of Grubenhagen, Calenberg, and Göttingen, but also having contemplated in mind many distinguished examples of a family resplendent with every praise, is now at the point that, after public and private lectures and meditations and frequent exercises according to the thread of *our theological compendium*, he undertakes in himself to defend publicly in *thirty disputations* the sum of the whole sacred doctrine, and this, using our presidency, he has wished this to be signified by this public notice. And it is certainly my duty, not only not to be absent from such pious and beneficial endeavors for the Christian cause, but above all to see to it that, the academic sparring matches being eliminated, the Church does not suffer from a shortage of soldiers in the very decisive contest with its adversaries. For we must steer a course between the Scylla of those who dispute needlessly and the Charybdis of a vain or superstitious abstention from necessary and useful discussions. And He will not be wanting, the God most high and best, who governs our affairs with His wisdom and goodness, whom we call upon in our vows and prayers. Confident in His aid, I now officially invite the most illustrious, noble, and distinguished lords, fellow-soldiers, partners, and arbiters, to this exercise, to be begun on the 29th day of this month and continued weekly thereafter, in my own name and that of the lauded Boehmer, and I pledge my everlasting love and devotion. Printed and published on the 16th day of August in the year of Christ 1691.

XXIV

I. N. I.
COMPENDIUM OF POSITIVE THEOLOGY.

PROLEGOMENON
Chapter I.
ON THE NATURE AND CONSTITUTION OF THEOLOGY.

§ 1.

Theology [a] by the force of the word [b] denotes *λόγον περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ,* that is, discourse or rational account [c] about God. However, in usage it implies the habit [d] of knowing God and divine matters and of teaching them [e], confirming and defending them—such a habit as is conformed to the object [f] and suited to men according to the state of this [g] life.[h] [i]

a) It was already long ago called by this name by the Greek Fathers, as *Clement of Alexandria*, in Book IV of his *Stromata*, at the beginning (p. 475 A), calls it *ἐπιδρομὴ τῆς θεολογίας*, which the Latins would call a theological course. And *Justin Martyr*, in his *Exhortation to the Greeks*, p. 4, calls it *θεολογία τῶν ποιητῶν*, "the theology of the poets.". However*, Valesius* does not firmly prove what he notes in his annotation on Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*, Book I, Chapter 1, writing that "*the ancients called 'theologicen,' what we commonly call theology*."

CALOV: "If you consider the first imposition of the word (theologiae), it seems to be attributed to *the Gentiles*, from whom it subsequently passed into the use of the Church." (Isagog. ad ss. th. Ed. 2. L. I. p. 8.) *Pherecydes* the Syrian (6th century B.C.) is said to have been the first to bear the name *theologian*, who composed a book entitled "theologia" *("to philosophize about heavenly and divine things,"* as attested by Josephus, *Against Apion*, Book I, Chapter 2). And thus were called *Homer* and *Hesiod,* both authors *of a theogony* (Herodotus, Histories, Book II, Chapter 53), *Epimenides* the Cretan (Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians*, IX, 29), and *Sanchuniatón,* the author *of the "theology of the Phoenicians"* (Euseb. Praeparat. Ev. I. p. 31.). The Greeks and Romans

understood theology as *the philosophy concerning the divine*, i.e., *concerning the origin, nature, and worship of the gods*. Aristotle: "*Thales (he says) held water to be the principle of nature for the moist elements. But there are some, who, the most ancient and first to philosophize long before the present generation, are thought to have conceived of nature in this way: For they made Oceanus and Tethys the fathers of the generation, etc.*" (Metaphys. I, 3.) CICERO: "In the beginning they number three Joves, those who are called *theologians*." (*De N. D*. III, 21.) EUSEBIUS: "*All theology that is called outside the Church of God ... is improper.*" (*On the Psalms*, in the new collection of Montfaucon, Vol. I, p. 313.)

b) *Θεολογία* (*theologia*) is an abstract noun, and, if you look at its grammatical derivation, it descends from *the* concrete *θεολόγος* (*theologus*); although, when considering its logical derivation, it has the concrete or denominative from the abstract, as if from the form that denominates. See Jacob Martini, *Theological Disputations*, I, thesis 9, p. 3. However, *a theologian* is one to whom discourse about God either belongs or inheres.. Thus the title *theologian* is applied in the *inscription* of the Apocalypse. Thus in *Lactantius, On the Anger of God*, ch. XI, p. 638. and *Augustine,* Book XVIII, *On the City of God*, ch. XIV, Vol. VI of Works, p. 620. Cf. *Musaeus*, *Introduction to Theology*, p. 2

N. Hunnius: "Form is the internal cause, by which a thing is what it is, or, which gives a thing its being." (*Canones logici. Wittenberg*, 1621. p. 176.)

Calov: "As for the sacred use of the church (theology), that name is found in the designation of the author of the Apocalypse, who is inscribed as *θεολόγος* in the title of the book, whether it was from the author himself or not is ambiguous; which name they wish to assign to John in particular, because he asserts and confirms the divinity of the Son of God more than the others." (*Isag. adss. th*. Ed. 2. 1665. I. 8. sq.) Athanasius: "Thus *says the theologian also: 'In the beginning was the Word*.'" (*C. Gentes or. Opp.* ed. Bonutius, *Works* ed. Bonutius, I, f. 35.)

Lactantius: "All those who are worshiped as gods were men and the same were the first and greatest kings, but they, because of their virtue and because they had benefited the human race, were honored with divine honors after death. ..., who does not know? . . . Which the most ancient writers of Greece, whom they call *θεολόγους* (theologians), and also the Romans, who followed and imitated the Greeks, teach." (*On the Anger of God*, ch. 11)

Augustine: "During the same period there were poets, who were also called *theologians*, because they composed poems about the gods; but about such gods that, although they were great men, were nevertheless men. . . Nor could Orpheus, Musaeus, and Linus themselves keep away from the fabulous disgrace of their gods. But these *theologians* worshiped the gods; they were not worshiped as gods." (*City of God* XVIII.14)

c) Thus *Augustine*, Book VIII, *City of God*, ch. 1, p. 87: *We understand* that *the Greek word* (theology) *signifies a reason or discourse concerning divinity.* For although theology, as to its subject matter, is not only *λόγος περί τού θεού* (discourse about God), but also *ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ πρὸς τὸν θεόν,* (from God and toward God) yet the force of the word does not signify all these things equally with that one; but the name *Θεοῦ* (*theou*) in composition with the name *λόγος* (*logos*) denotes the object, just as *φυσις, αρετή, αστρα (psosis, aretē, and astro*) in the compounds (*physiologia, aretologia, and astrologia*). Cf. *Jacob Martini*, loc. cit., § 12, 13, 14, p. 3-4; *Gerhard* in the *Exegesis of Theological Loci*, p. 1; Mus*aeus* in *Introduction*, p. 11.

Calov: "The name of God in this word-composition properly does indeed denote God, but with some amplification, not only considered in respect to nature or essence, but also in respect to *works, or* as *divine things* are simultaneously connoted." (*Isagoge*. I, 6.)

d) For it is not because of any kind of thought or discourse about God or divine things that men are immediately called theologians in the usual sense (even if perhaps they may be said *to theologize),* but those who, by habit, can and do reason or discourse about God. When the doctrine about God, by which God and divine things are proposed and explained, is in the proper case called theology, the expression is *metonymical*, not proper. For the cause is put for the effect. See *Musaeus*, *Introduction*, p. 3; *König*, *Compendium of Positive Theology*, p. 4, § 27.

> N. HUNNIUS: "*Habitus* is a quality acquired by frequent exercises (and such a readiness, by which we easily and promptly perform those things which were previously accomplished with more difficulty and trouble), so confirmed that it cannot be removed without a great change." (*Logical Canons*, p. 426 ff.)

e) So that there is knowledge, or the habit of knowledge*, in an analogous sense.* However, when this knowledge of God falls to simpler people, unskilled in teaching, they are not in the custom of being called theologians. Thus the learned *theologians* of Lipsia in the Appendix to the Consilium. Dedek. fol. 137 A. warns that, *because of some knowledge of the word of God, no one is properly called a theologian,* namely because theology properly speaking, besides *apprehensive and judgmental knowledge, also includes the end, which is to instruct, or at least to make fit to instruct a man to attain eternal salvation.* Cf. *Meisner*, Part III, *Philosophical Synopsis*, p. 104.

f) For the disposition of the mind requires *τὸ ἀληθεύειν*, i.e., *to state the truth* about its object, *by affirming or denying.* Therefore, in this place we do not concern ourselves with the different kinds of pagan theology, full of lies and impious superstitions: *the mythic,* or *fabulous,* in which poets were engaged, and *the political*, or *civil,* in which priests were occupied. Indeed, there is also *the φυσικὸν* or *natural* theology, which the philosophers claimed for themselves. Although it agrees in name with the natural theology we praise in the following section, yet, as it is found among the pagan philosophers, it is tainted with many errors and is not entirely worthy of the name theology. Hence *Clement of Alexandria* calls it *θεολογίαν ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθῆ, "right and true theology*," that which absolutely deserves this name, in *Stromata* V, f. m. 569 A, 574 B. By this reasoning, the entire *ματαιολογία* (vain discourse) of the heretics is likewise removed. Cf. *Gerhard* in *Exegesis* § 13, 14, p. 6-7, and *Musaeus*, *Introduction*, p. 3-4.

> AUGUSTINE: "They call the first *'mythical'* (the kind most used by poets), the second *'physical'* (the kind used by philosophers), and the third *'civil'* (the kind used by peoples). In the *first* kind*,* in the one I mentioned, there are many things invented that are contrary to the dignity and immortal nature. For in it there is a god born from a head, another from a thigh, another from drops of blood; in it, that the gods have stolen, that they have committed adultery, that they have served a man; in short, in it everything is attributed to the gods that can fall not only upon a man, but even upon the most despicable man. . . The *second* kind is one about which philosophers have left many books; in which are questions such as: what the gods are, where, what kind, what nature, from what time, or whether they have existed from all eternity, whether they are made of fire, as Heraclitus believes, or of numbers, as Pythagoras, or of atoms, as Epicurus says, and so on; which can more easily be endured by the ears inside a school than outside in the marketplace. . . The *third* kind is that which citizens in cities, especially priests, ought to know and administer. In which is included what gods each should publicly worship, what sacred rites and sacrifices to perform. . . The first theology is most suited to the theater, the second to the world, the third to the city." (*City of God*. VI, 5.)

CALOV: "*The word theology* is used in various ways: 1. *ἀκύρως* and *καταχρηστικῶς,* improperly and abusively, of *false* theology, both that which deals with *falsely called gods*, such as was the theology *of the Gentiles*, and that which *indeed* presents *the true God*, but *not truly,* such as is the theology *of heretics*; 2. *κυρίως* and *γνησίως,* properly and truly, of *true* theology, which presents God *as He has revealed Himself*. . . For although the use of the Greek word seems older among the pagans, it is no more proper than the gods of the Gentiles are the proper gods." (*Isag*. I, 12.)

QUENSTEDT: "*The distinction* of theology into true and false is only *nominal* and purely *equivocal.* For false theology, which is also called opinionated, only shares the name of theology and is so called only *καταχρηστικῶς, so called,,* since it should rather be called *ματαιολογία* and *ψευδολογία* from 1 Tim. 4:2 and Titus 1:10, and is no more theology than a painted horse is a horse." (*Th. did.-pol*. P. I. c. 1. s. 1. th. 2. f. 3.)

g) They call the theology *of travelers* by another name, because they say this life is *the way* that leads to the goal or to the heavenly homeland. See below at § 5, note b.

h) For although the most exact knowledge of GOD has its place in *God* Himself, and no less in *Christ* the man through the communication of the divine attributes by virtue of the personal union, yet *the angels* also, being confirmed in good, and the *blessed* men, know God more perfectly than any of us; since, however, usage does not permit that on this account *God, or Christ*, or the blessed, or the angels be called *theologians*, it is clear that we must set aside here the meaning it otherwise has, when we speak of *the theology of the travelers*. Meanwhile, that knowledge which God has of Himself is called by the authors *archetypal theology* (not so much with regard to usage, as to the force of the term, considering its etymological meaning), since it does not depend on another knowledge of God in another subject, as if from an exemplary cause; rather, that knowledge of God and divine things which angels and men have by divine grace imitates it, as a form and exemplar, though in a lesser degree of perfection (which is not unusual in ectypa), and is therefore called *εχτυπος* (ectypal). Cf. *Martini*, loc. cit., disp. II, § 23 ff., p. 27; *Gerhard* in *Exegesis* § 15, p. 7, *Himmel*, *Syntagma*, p. 2, § 10–12. Which, in Christ according to His human nature, is the knowledge of God and divine things through the communication of attributes by virtue of the personal union; since it is the very infinite knowledge which Christ, according to His divine nature, has eternally, when considered in its order to God as a certain object, is of course the *very archetypal* theology, not another or *ἔκτυπος,* although it does not belong to the human nature *subjectively,* but *communicatively,* not in and of itself, but because of the personal union. But that habitual knowledge of God which is naturally in the man Christ is rightly called *ectypal*, and thus rightly distinguished from the theology of the union. See *J. F. König* in *Positive Theology*, p. 2, § 15, but especially *Musaeus*, *Introduction*, Ch. I, § 4 ff. to the end, p. 4 to 23.

QUENSTEDT: "*Archetypal* theology is substance and, as to the thing itself, the infinite essence of God; *ectypal* theology is a habitus and is contained in the genus of quality. *Archetypal* theology is the origin and principle of all wisdom; *ectypal* theology, however, is its *ἀπόρροια καὶ ἀπαύγασμα*, a certain emanation and reflection or image… Theology *archetype* is not only *in* God, but is also *God Himself,* who here is wonderfully *ἐπιστητὸν, ἐπιστήμων καὶ ἐπιστήμη,*

the known, the knower, and the knowledge; that is, the very subject which knows, the very object which is known, and the very act of knowing, or the theological thing, the theologian, and theology. For to be, to know, and to be wise are the same in God. Since *the archetype* theology is essential to the divine nature; therefore, just as the essence of God itself is common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, so this *θεοσοφία* (*theosophy*) is common to them. We prove this thesis from Matthew 11:27 and 1 Corinthians 2:10–11. (*Loc. cit*., thesis 3-4, f. 5.)

RUDELBACH: "I do not know whether anyone has pointed out the *scriptural basis* for this division (into *archetype* and *ectype*), this concept of theology. But where could it be sought, if not in the words of the Lord in Matthew 11:27: ‚No one knows the Son except the Father; nor the Father except the Son, and to whom the Son will reveal him', as also in the apostolic concept of the ongoing *metamorphosis* of all believers, and consequently of the New Testament teachers, into the image of the Lord, whose glory they behold as in a mirror-image (*κατοπτριζόμενοι*, 2 Cor. 3:18.) — by which word the Apostle has truly designated not merely a province of the Christian life, but the whole life in Christ, and thus also the condition of true theology as its summit?"(*Zeitschrift*. 1848, I, 7.)

i) A peculiar usage of the word *θεολογία* (*theologia*) is found among ecclesiastical writers, by which it denotes a part of sacred doctrine, distinct from the other, which they call *economy* (*oikonomia*). For by that name is denoted that which is about the essence, persons, and attributes of God; whereas *this one* deals with the incarnation and office of Christ the Son of God. See *Gregory Nazianzen*, Oration XXXVIII on the Nativity of Christ or Theophany, *Basil*, Epistle CXLI, *Cyril*, Book I on John.

CHRYSOSTOM: "*The others* (the three preceding evangelists) *have shone forth the economy, but he* (John) *thunders forth the theology."* (*Homily* 106.) ATHANASIUS*: "For his (Christ's) Father is God by nature, but ours by grace;" and God of him became by dispensation because he was man.*" (*De hum. nat. suscepta*, Opp. I, 468.) BASIL of Caesarea: "Everywhere the Holy Spirit confirms our minds, lest, while we attend to one, we neglect the other; that is, lest, while we attend to *theology*, we despise *the dispensation* (*oikonomia*) of Christ, and it come to pass that, while we cannot attain the sublimity of the divine nature, we fall into impiety." (*Epist*. 141. Opp. T. II, f, 107.) GREGORY OF NAZ.: *"'One is the account of theology or of nature, another of the dispensation*.'"

HOLLAZ: "In how many senses is the word, theology, taken? In a fourfold sense: a) *most generally*, for any doctrine about God, even if it is false or mixed with errors; b) *generally*, for true theology, whether it is original, or participated, or of wayfarers, or of the blessed, or natural, or revealed; c) *specifically*, for revealed theology, leading the pilgrim to eternal salvation; d) *most specifically*, for the doctrine of the one and triune God.[44] (*Examen th. Prolegom*. I. q. 6. p. 3.)

§ 2.

True theology of men in this life, for the twofold mode of knowing, is twofold [(a)]: *natural* and *revealed*. The former relies on the principles or light of nature; the latter on a supernatural [(b)] manifestation or revelation. Both revolve around God, not only as He is in Himself, but as the ultimate end and supreme good of man. [(c)]

HOLLAZ: "By *the light of nature* here are understood the principles of nature and reason, by which natural knowledge of God, as it were, rests as its mode of knowing; these have been called the *light* because, just as the light, when joined with colors, is the faculty of seeing and of knowing colors for the power of sight, so these principles are the faculty of knowing other things for the power of reason. Wisely says *Phil. Melanchthon* in *erot. dial*. p. 234: as light is contained in the eyes for seeing bodies, so in the mind are innate knowledge, by which we are advanced to some knowledge of God." (*Examen*, Part I, ch. 1, q. 5, p. 188.)

a) The same applies to the distinction of theology into *natural* and *supernatural.* The latter, this *supernatural* species*, we call from its origin,* and the revealed or *theology of revelation, the theology of gracious communication,* says the *J. Martini* (*loc. cit.,* Disp. IV, § 3, p. 80). However, there is also a distinction of this kind, so that among Christians, revealed theology or supernatural theology is said absolutely, while natural is scarcely said otherwise than with this its addition, natural theology. Cf. *Musaeus*, *Introduction*, Ch. III, § 1, p. 105.

b) For otherwise the word *"to reveal,"* in a more general sense, also pertains to natural knowledge, as the Greek word *φανερῶσαι* is taken in *Romans 1:19.* But here revelation is understood in the stricter sense, by which things hidden and latent, or not naturally knowable, are manifested and as it were *uncovered, or are presented for view with the veil removed,* to which the Greek word *ἀποκαλύπτειν* corresponds*, Luke 10:22,* or a special manifestation of any things, even those that can be known by the guidance of natural light, is denoted, supernaturally made by God. See *Musaeus's Introduction*, Ch. III, § 25, n. 5, p. 155, and *Tract on Conversion*, Disp. VI, Ch. II, § 29, p. 359.

c) Revelational theology will be treated more distinctly below. Concerning natural theology, it is certain that no other discipline can claim this distinguished work for itself, and that the perfections of God cannot be adequately explained and known if this consideration is absent. See *Mus., Introd*. Ch. II, § 1, p. 23. Similarly*,* B. *Jacob Martini*, in his *De Theologia Viatorum*, which embraces both the natural and the supernatural, says that its *internal* (or intermediate) *end* is *the contemplation of God and divine things and a pious life;* while its *external and ultimate end is the most blessed, eternal fellowship with God,* Disp. III. § 37. p. 57. Cf. Disp. I. § 80. and 89. pp. 18, 20.

§ 3.

Natural theology is a science,[(a)] and indeed a practical one, [(b)] in which are found [(c)] the end, the subject of operation and the causes and means, as well as the object, [(d)] material and formal. [(e)]

N. HUNNIUS: "The end of *science* is knowledge. For all science is *ἀπρακτος* (non-practical)... For the whole essence of science consists in this, that it *knows* only its subject*;* which done, it comes to a complete rest, and does not advance further (unless perhaps for the sake of an accidental and external end)." (*Can. log*. p. 5. sq.)

a) For it is an evident habit concerning a necessary object, deducing conclusions from necessary principles. Cf. *Musaeus*, Introduction, Ch. II, § 3, p. 28. Or, as *Jacob Martini* speaks, *loc. cit*., Disp. III, § 47, p. 58.: *It proceeds from natural principles in themselves known, by the natural light of the intellect: Hence,* as he adds 1. c. § 54. p. 59., *certain and true conclusions about God and divine things are drawn and established.*

b) That there are practical sciences, *Aristotle* acknowledged (*Nicomachean Ethics* I.1 and VI, *Metaphysics*) II, and all who follow him: *Ammonius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Francis Bonamy, Anthony of Montecatini, the Conimbricenses, Scherbio, Piccart,* and those whose works *Johann Conrad Duerr* cites in his *Institutiones Ethicae*. p. 2. 3. and *Notes on Piccart's Isagoge*. That theology, however, is a practical science is clear, because all of its conclusions are, if not *formally,* at least *virtually* practical. We call those which formally and directly prescribe some operation which pertains (as far as this is concerned) to the worship of God, and therefore must be practiced by man in this life, e.g., God is to be invoked, the neighbor is to be helped in their needs. We call these those which, although they do not formally prescribe any operation pertaining to the worship of God, nevertheless pertain to and fall within the scope of this very science for the purpose of drawing formally practical conclusions; as, for example, these: God is the cause of the good things we need, and these: The neighbor is loved by God just as we are; although they do not formally prescribe any action for man, they nevertheless lead to the former formally practical principles we mentioned; and therefore, since they too are and deal with the cause of practice, they are rightly considered practical. Cf. *Musaeus*, *Introduction*, Ch. II, § 4, p. 29, and Ch. III, § 4, p. 125.

> J. G. Walch: "In Scholastic metaphysics, the word *virtualiter* is opposed to *formaliter* and has the meaning that something is said of a thing with respect to existence and essence not actually, but only *according to its power*; e.g., the king is everywhere in his kingdom, not formally, as if he were really in all places, but virtually, because he has his servants everywhere who are there in his place. We were all previously in Adam, not formally or really and actually, but virtually, by virtue of his power. Theologians use these two words when they say that the whole of theology is practically not formal, as if it contained only propositions that in and of themselves prescribe action or inaction, but virtual, because even the theoretical propositions have the force of the practical with them." (*Philosophisches Lexicon*, under the heading "Virtualiter," p. 2737.)

c) Namely, insofar as it is a practical habit, where *the end,* which moves the agent's will to act, is first encountered; then *the subject,* which is the basis for the operation prescribed by the practical habit; furthermore, *the efficient cause* of the end (if not of the thing itself, as by the operation of making or obtaining it, then at least of the operation by which we attain that thing which contains the highest goodness in itself); also the *impulsive* cause, which moves the one who effects or contributes to the effecting or contributing of an end; finally, *the means*, which, if they themselves do not also have the reason of a cause for the attainment of an end—when that end is obtained by the undue or gratuitous benefit of another (as in the present case, as we shall soon indicate)—are nevertheless

conditions required on the part of the subject. Cf. *Musaeus, Introduction*, p. 29 ff. to 44. The distinction of means—*some of which precede the thing as causes upon which it depends, others of which merely denote a bare antecedence of order and are interposed only between the causes of the thing and the thing itself, with necessity not of efficiency but of presence*—is also taught by the H. Hoepfner (Disp. II *On Justification*, § 25, p. 113, and Disp. XI, § 5, p. 1021), where he distinguishes between an *organic* or *causal means* and a *means of the way*, which denotes the *order of antecedence and consequence*. The same distinction is also acknowledged by *Balthasar Meisner* (*Anthropologia Sacra*, De Deo, III, Disp. XXVIII, § 20), for example, that the mourning of a sinner has the character of a means, *not of merit.* Similarly, that there are conditions *which merely determine the subject to be saved, and do not contain or express the cause of salvation*, he teaches in *Theological Considerations against the Photinians*, ch. II, p. 177. That there are *conditions which contain the removal of obstacles, not the promotion or causation of the end itself* (justification or salvation), he writes in *Anthropologia*, loc. cit., § 21. Gerhard fully agrees and repeatedly emphasizes the distinction between a *condition of the subject and a cause of the effect* (*Confessio Catholica*, book II, part III, art. XXIII, ch. VI, pp. 777, 779). And *Hoepfner* (loc. cit., Disp. XI, Aph. I, § 6 and § 48 ff.; Aph. II, § 19, pp. 1021–1022, 1031–1032, 1047) orders that a distinction be made between a *causal* condition and one that is of *mere order* or *sign*. Both Gerhard and Hoepfner, in the same works, concede that non-causal conditions have some relation *to an end,* although they *do not* have *a relation* like *that of a cause* to its effect.

d) That is, insofar as it is a science; where they occur with *the thing to be known*, or from which conclusions are drawn; and that from which, being previously known, conclusions are deduced, or that which was first known as *the reason for knowing* the others. The former is called the *material* object, the latter the *formal* object. Compare the *Introduction* of *Musaeus*, ch. II, §§ 14–15, pp. 47–48.

e) However, it is clear from what has been said that natural theology is a wholly practical habit. For just as God can be considered in two ways—1) in Himself absolutely, and 2) in relation to man, as his ultimate end and supreme good—so natural theology, on account of this twofold consideration of God, is sometimes said to be twofold; nevertheless, this does not mean that there are *two* natural theologies. but there is *one* natural theology, under which both considerations fall as one science; so that it is for the one and the same science (natural theology) to explain the end (the essence and essential perfections of God) and the means of attaining the end (or that supreme good), it is for one and the same science (natural theology) to consider the objective end and the rule of operation concerning the same, and to derive and present from the knowledge of the one the knowledge of the other, which it radically and virtually contains. And it must be admitted that the essence of God and His essential perfections cannot be explained and known so absolutely without at the same time explaining and knowing in them the reason for the supreme good, and that natural theology does not satisfy man's appetite with a bare knowledge of God, but rather kindles in man a greater desire to enjoy Him; which blessed *Musaeus* shows at length in his *Introd*. Chap. II. p. 24. 25–26.

§ 4.

The end to which natural theology ultimately and in itself [(a)] tends, and to which it refers all that it teaches, is the ultimate blessedness of man, [(b)] by which name God, [(c)] as the *objective* end, and its attainment and fruition, consisting in the most perfect [(e)] operation [(d)] of the intellect and will as the *formal* end, we embrace. [(f)]

CALOV: *"The end* of natural theology is *not* indeed *the preparation* of man for receiving supernatural grace, as Alsted wishes in *Precognitions of Theology Book*, ch. 15; which end cannot be conceded, except for natural theology before the Fall; but *the guidance* of man to a further investigation of God, which in the state of integrity existed as a kind of preparation, in the post-lapsarian state is purely *pedagogical,* since there is in us no *ἱκανότης*, no preparation on our part for supernatural grace." (*Isag*. book I, p. 63 ff..)

THE SAME: "A distinction must be made between *grace that is* immediately *salutary* and a certain *pedagogical* grace. We call *the former* that which directly leads to the conversion of souls; *the latter,* that which *leads to the church,* through which, having been brought, one may enjoy salutary grace through the preaching of the Word. We deny *that* to the Gentiles, who lack the revelation of the Word of God; but we grant *this latter*, which is also sufficient for their *ἀναπολογία (inexcusability)*. Rom. 1:21." (L. c. p. 83.)

REUSCH: "The end of natural theology*, absolutely considered*, as intended by God in Himself, is blessedness; but the end of theology in the fallen and sinful man, as intended by God, is *a pedagogy leading toward revealed theology.* But if this is neglected through human fault, the end of natural theology, as it were, is *the inexcusability* of men in their own destruction, or their conviction that they perish by their own fault. Cf. Acts 17:26 ff.; Rom. 1:19–20." (*Annotation on Baier's Compendium*, p. 23.)

MARTIN CHEMNITZ shows that God has naturally manifested knowledge of Himself to the Gentiles: 1. for external *discipline,* 2. so that God *may be sought*, 3. to render men *inexcusable.* Cf. *Loci Theologici*, locus On God, ch. I, sect. 4, fol. 20 ff.

a) For it is not otherwise denied that the *end* of *natural theology* is rightly said to be *to render man inexcusable, and to lead him gradually to supernatural theology:* See *Himmelius*, *Syntagma*, Disp. I, § 20. Indeed, this end was added only after the Fall and the corruption of the human race, and the supernatural theology communicated for the restoration of mankind; and so it was *by accident,* since in the original state the author of the light of nature and of natural theology did not intend this end, but that one which we indicate in the thesis. See *Jacob Martini*, *Disp*. II, §§ 46, 52, 53, pp. 32–34.

b) For natural theology is 1) the noblest of the practical sciences, and therefore deals with the most perfect end; 2) it deals with God as the supreme good, and therefore as the one to be obtained; 3) it deals with man as being absolutely blessed. But man is not absolutely blessed except in God. See *Introd*., *Mus.* Cap. II. § 6. p. 30.

c) Who contains all goodness in Himself and alone can satisfy the appetite. Hence *Augustine: "You have made us for yourself,*" he says*, "O Lord, and*

our heart is restless until it rests in you." Book I, *Confessions*, Chapter I. Compare *Musaeus*, *loc. cit*., and *Jacob Martini*, loc. cit., *Disp*. II, § 55 ff., p. 34.

d) For it is man's proper good, and therefore to be placed in the operation of the rational soul. See *Introd*., *Musaeus.* ch. II. § 9. p. 35. By the act of the intellect we possess or are united to God, attaining the reason for the good that is in God; by the act of the will we enjoy or adhere to Him as our obtained good. *Musaeus*, loc. cit., p. 36-37.

e) Namely, so that it may satisfy the appetite. Therefore, there must be another operation than the one that takes place in this life, where the knowledge of God is imperfect; the will, however, has a desire for a more perfect union with God; although what kind of knowledge of God will exist after this life, namely intuitive and clear, cannot be distinctly known by man through the light of nature . *Mus.* 1. c. p. 37. 38. *Jac. Martini, Disp*. III. § 35. 36. 37. p. 56. 57.

f) Thus, the two ends, taken together, constitute one complete end. For otherwise, we are not blessed through God or in God, unless we attain and enjoy Him by a certain operation. The operation of our soul, whatever it may be, does not make us blessed unless it is directed toward God. *Musaeus*, loc. cit. § 9. p. 34.

§ 5.

The subject of the operation [(a)] is the pilgrim [(b)] man or one tending toward eternal blessedness.[(c)]

MUSAEUS: "In natural theology, the subject of the operation is rightly established to be the traveler, as is understood from the requisites of the subject of an operation. For this is required for it in every practical science: since it lacks the perfection that is its end, and so that it may become a participant in it through the principles and means prescribed in that science. This applies to the wayfarer in both his present state and in his original state. For by the very fact that he is a wayfarer, i.e., placed on the path to attaining blessedness, he lacks the perfection that is the end of natural theology, namely, blessedness. Yet he could have become a partaker of it in his original state through the principles and means prescribed by natural theology. In the state of sin, however, man the pilgrim cannot partake of blessedness through the principles and means prescribed by natural theology; but this is accidental. For it is accidental that man sinned and, through sin, fell from his end for which he was created. Nevertheless, by this he does not cease to be a subject of natural theology in the state of sin. For the practical acts which it prescribes bind him just as strictly now as they did in the state of integrity, even though he cannot attain the end for which they exist through them." (*Introduction to Theology*, Jena 1678, p. 41 ff.)

a) Or that which underlies the operation that natural theology, in respect to attaining blessedness, prescribes. It is otherwise called *the end FOR WHICH (finis CUI). Mus.* l. c. § 10. p. 41.

J. SCHARFFIUS: *"The 'end for which'* a thing is used in another, for whom the end is procured; as the end of medicine is the patient, for this person the medicinal good is procured. *The 'end* for *which'* is that for which the efficient cause is moved and acts in order to acquire it; as health is the 'end for which' in medicine." (*Metaphysica exemplaris*. 5th ed. Wittenberg, 1649, p. 127.)

b) Which is opposed *to the comprehensor;* just as the state *of the way* and the state *of the homeland* are distinguished elsewhere, from *1 Cor. 9:24 ff.,* where those who live on earth are likened to *runners striving for the goal*, and the blessed who depart this life are likened to *those who attain the goal,* and *2 Cor. 5:6 and 8*, where those who are in this life are said to be *absent from the Lord (εκδημήσαι)* and to desire to be present with the Lord, where they may *dwell* as *at home (ἐνδημῆσαι)*. Cf. *Philippians 8:12-13* and *Musaeus, Introd*., Chap. I. § 8. p. 13. However, we do not say here man as a sinner, but as a traveler: because thus far we are dealing with natural theology, precisely and in itself considered, by which it abstracts from the state of integrity and corruption. See *Mus., Introd*. Chap. II. § 10. p. 41.

c) And indeed, insofar as he is to be led to blessedness, and therefore principally by the reason of the intellect and the will. For judgment concerning the subject of operation in the practical sciences must be drawn from the end. *Musaeus*, loc. cit., § 30, p. 87.

§ 6.

The causes of happiness are referred to as 1. the efficient cause, which is God, [(a)] 2. the internal impulsive cause, which is goodness or the gratuitous favor of God. [(b)]

a) Not nature, nor doctrine, nor habit. For by these, nothing is ultimately acquired after this life; but then one receives what corresponds to the life previously lived, whether well or ill. And since blessedness consists in the most perfect knowledge of God, it is certain that no one can confer this on man, except God Himself. *Musaeus*, loc. cit., § 11, p. 42.

> Reusch:"All goods besides God are finite, and therefore mutable and inconstant; consequently, their possession and enjoyment cannot provide perpetual , and the highest pleasure, and therefore neither perpetual and supreme happiness nor blessedness. Therefore, if a rational creature wishes to aspire to blessedness, and likewise to perpetual and consummate happiness, it must *possess God*, i.e., must always have Him so present and united to itself through immediate operations that it experiences Him in itself, or has the intuition of God. But no one can grant the intuition of God, except God Himself; hence the causal medium of perfect blessedness and happiness is God." (*Annotations on Baier's Compendium*, Jena 1757, p. 15.)

b) Not justice, as contrasted with goodness. For a man who 1) depends on God for his being and acting, and 2) does whatever good he does out of duty, has no right to God, no merit in the proper and strict sense. *Musaeus*, loc. cit., § 12, p. 43. And this is the reason why we have mentioned only internal, and not equally external, impulsive causes.

> Gerhard: "To that which does not possess *the properties of merit,* nothing meritorious can be ascribed. But the properties of merit do not pertain to our good works. Therefore, they cannot be meritorious. The assumption is proven in this way. *The nature and reason of merit require these four things*: 1. *That the work by which we merit be our own.* For what we do not bring forth from the storehouse and grove of our own powers, but obtain from another's liberality, by that we cannot merit his gifts, but only render due obedience. 2. *That it be an indebted act.* For that which is already owed does not constrain the one to whom it is owed to new benefits.

These are contradictions: to perform a debt owed to someone, and to merit something by that very work which was already owed. It must be exceedingly impudent for one who, as if well-deserving, demands a reward for himself for having paid his debts. 3. *That it be useful and advantageous to the one to whom it is given.* For if no benefit accrues to another from our work, he will never acknowledge it as merit. 4. *That it be equal in both value and dignity to what is rendered for our work.* For if there is some inequality between labor and wages, between work and reward, then merit by right has no place. A minister, distributing alms in the king's name, does not merit anything thereby, because he does not give from his own; he who pays a laborer's wages does not merit anything from him, because he gives nothing but what is due; he who gives a cup of water to a thirsty king, if he were granted a city for it, could not be said to have merited the gift by his own liberality, since there is no proportion between the gift and the reward. *Indeed*, *good works are not our own, but God's,* through His Spirit working effectively in us. It is God who inclines our heart to His testimonies. Ps. 119:36–37. Phil. 2:13; 1:29; John 15:5; 2 Cor. 3:5. The saints acknowledge this (Isaiah 26:12): ‘Lord, you have worked all our works in us.’ Since God works in us by sheer grace, from good works, I say, is God bound *to us*, or *are we* not much more bound to God? Rather, let us say with the prophet Hosea 13:19: 'From us comes our ruin, but our salvation is only in God.' Surely no one in their right mind would call that a proper sale, when a house is purchased from a rich man by a poor man for a small price given by the rich man, but it is a gift of a house, not an immediate one, yet a mediated one; and even if a kind of so-called *καταχμηστικώς* purchase is granted, it has not yet been proven that this is the same as the reason for eternal life; for it cannot be demonstrated from the Scriptures that it is given to us on account of our works. . . . 2. *Our good works are already due to God in many respects by the rights of creation, preservation*, *dominion, redemption, sanctification, etc.* Indeed, whatever we do is not the whole of what we owe to God, but only a part of our duty to Him; therefore, even if we were to do everything that has been commanded us, we would still have to say that we are unprofitable servants.· Luke 17:10. Therefore, since our works are already due to God, a reward is not given to them as a debt. If the works are due, the reward is indebted; if the reward is due, the works are indebted. 3. *Our works bring no benefit to God*. Job 22:2-3: "Can a man benefit God? But he who is prudent will benefit himself." 'Is it to the Almighty's will (Schaddai, i.e., God, who is sufficient for all things), that you be justified, and what profit is it to Him that you make your ways?' Ps. 50:2.: ,'If I were hungry, I would not tell you, for the world is mine, and all that is in it' (God does not need the sacrifices of His people, therefore not our other works either). . . 4. *There is no equivalence between our works and eternal life, which is an infinite good.* ,The sufferings are not worthy *(τὰ παθήματα οὐκ εἰσι ἄξια*) of the future glory,' Rom. 8:18; therefore, neither are the works worthy. They will perhaps object: that good works are indeed a debt and bring no particular advantage to God, yet they are nevertheless meritorious, because God has promised to give eternal life on account of the works. But even if it were granted that eternal life is given for works (which *in itself is a very bold claim*), it still could not be said that good works are meritorious of eternal life , because of the lack of the properties required for what is properly called merit. To the first man, for holy obedience to God and for perseverance in good works, the possession of eternal life would have been handed over; However, if we wish to speak properly and accurately, that obedience of the first man would not have been meritorious of eternal life, since it was already due, since no advantage accrued to God from it, and since there is no proportion between temporal obedience and eternal beatitude. What presumptuous audacity it is, then, to attribute this to man after the fall, who, though renewed by the Spirit of God, is nevertheless still carnal in part and sold under sin—something that would not even have been fitting for him in the state of integrity!" (*Loc. de bonis operibus*, § 102.)

GERHARD.: "Whatever rewards God gives for good works, He gives out of free goodness; yet He gives them as a *just* judge (Heb. *6:*10), not because He owes us anything, but because *He has promised,* and out of truth, which is a part of justice, He fulfills what He has promised freely. There is here no debt on our part, by which we bind God to ourselves, but a certain debt of God, by which He has bound Himself to us through a free promise." (L. c. § 119.)

§ 7.

The means [(a)] to attain the blessedness in natural theology are the acts of the mind and will occupied with God, by which God is rightly acknowledged [(b)] and worshiped. They are called by one name: religion. [(c)] They are contained in the law of nature or moral law, [(d)] and partly directly and immediately,[(e)] they are occupied with God; partly directly with man himself, [(f)] or with one's neighbor, [(g)] yet consequently they order him to God [(h)].

a) We understand by "conditions" in a more general sense those things which are the same as the non-causal conditions required on the part of the subject to be blessed, about which we spoke in § 3, note c, above. This is evident here from what we said in § 6, that God is moved by His gratuitous favor to bless men, by which very thing a causal or meritorious means on our part is excluded. Nor does natural theology recognize the merit of another, which becomes ours by appropriation. Hence it is necessary that the means given here are only conditions, and thus means in a looser and less proper sense. Cf. *Musaeus*, loc. cit., § 13, p. 43-44.

b) For *religion cannot be separated from wisdom, nor wisdom from religion, because it is the same God who must be understood, which is wisdom, and honored, which is religion. But wisdom precedes, and religion follows, because it comes first to know God, and a consequence to worship Him*. See *Lactantius*, Book IV, On True Wisdom, chapter IV. p. 176. However, the very recognition of God is sometimes itself included under the name of divine *worship*: namely, because *the beginning* of divine worship is *to know whom you worship.*

BALDUIIN: *"Religion* is taken in two ways: 1. of the moral *virtue*, which gives due and just honor to God; 2. of a certain *state* and condition of life of many men, who by a special way and rule think they are worshipping God." (*Tract on Cases of Conscience*. p. 143.)

CALOV: "According to the name taken *homonymously (ὁμονύμως)*, religion is distinguished into true and false. . . *False* religion is said of any superstitious worship of God, as well as of the opinions of heretics concerning God and divine things; in this way we call pagan, Mohammedan, papist, Calvinist, etc. religion, which comes by this name only *equivocally.*" (*Isag*. I, 280. sqq.)

H. KROMAYER: "*Opposed to* religion *is* then *impiety*, i.e., contempt of God, when one lives even against the dictates of conscience, as if God did not exist; then *ἐθελοθρησκεία,* i.e., *a self-chosen worship* (as 'the worship of angels,' [*θρησκεία των αγγέλων*], Col. 2:18); then from the part *of hypocrisy,* when this worship is performed with bodily gestures, but with a foreign mind." (*Scrutinium relig*. p. 4.)

CALOV: "Among the papists, religion is *abusively* defined as the state of those who, by the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, tend toward Christian perfection (Bellarmine, book 2 *On Monks*, ch. 2.). But this papist religion is mere superstition." (*Isagoge*, pt. I, p. 278.)

c) *The name religion is derived from the bond of piety, because God has bound man to Himself and has bound him by piety: for it is necessary that we serve Him as a lord and obey Him as a father, . Lactantius*, loc. cit., ch. XXVII. pp. 349, 351. However, the word religion in its stricter sense denotes *either* the disposition of the will by which we are inclined to devotion and the honor and worship due to God on account of His excellence; *or* the very acts of honoring or worshipping God because of His excellence, and it connotes on the part of the intellect a correct knowledge of God, and on the part of the will other virtues (or acts of virtue), which are directed to the honor and worship of God; in a looser sense, however, it implies the complex of all virtues or acts pertaining to the worship of God.. See *Musaeus*, *Introduction*, Ch. II, § 2, p. 25, 27, and in *Refutation of the Theological-Political Tract on Philosophical Liberty*, § 37, p. 19, and § 47, p. 28.

CALOV: "Various reasons *for the name* (religion) are given, but especially four: 1. Masurius Sabinus in his Commentaries on the Indigeneae, as reported by A. Gellius, l. 4. Noct. Att. c. 9., thinks it is said *from relinquendo*. 'Religious,' he says, 'is that which, on account of some sanctity, is removed and set apart from us, a word derived from *relinquendo*, as if a ceremony from carendo.' Thus also Macrobius, lib. 1, hints that "religiosum" is so called. 3. Saturnal. ch. 3. and in the same sense he quotes Servius Sulpicius. In this way, temples and shrines are considered to have been called *'religious'* because, on account of their sanctity, they are to be revered and rather feared than made common; religious days, however, are so called for the opposite reason, because of the dreadfulness of the omen of relinquishing them. — 2. Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods*, bk. 2., and Zwingli, 1. *True and False Religion* [*de vera et falsa rei*], and others derive it *from 'relegendo' (to relegate)*; who 'prayed and sacrificed all day long,' says Cicero, 'were called superstitious, a name which later became more widespread; but those who diligently reviewed and as it *were re-read* everything pertaining to the worship of the gods were called religious from relegendo [*to* re-read], just as eligentes [choosing] is derived from eligendo [to choose], and intelligentes [intelligent] from intelligendo [to understand].' — 3. Augustine, Book 10 of *City of God*, Chapter 4, suggests that the word is derived from *eligendo* (choosing), because we choose God again through religion. 'He himself,' he says, 'is the fountain of our blessedness; he himself is the end of all our desire. *Choosing* him, or rather *religating* [*binding*] him (for we had lost him through negligence), binding [*religentes*] him, therefore, from which 'religion' is said to be named, we tend toward him with love, so that by arriving we may rest.' — 4. The same Augustine (*On True Religion*, ch. 53), Jerome *On Amos 9*, Ambrose (*On Virgins*, bk. 1), and Lactantius (*Divine Institutes*, bk. 4, ch. 18), said that it is derived *from religare*, 'because God has bound man to Himself and, as it were, bound him with a bond of piety,' as Lactantius says; that 'by religion we are bound and *tied* as it were into the Lord's bundle,' as Jerome says. loc. cit. This etymology, as accepted by the principal Latin Fathers, as well as by Gellius loc. cit., seems equally appropriate to the nature of the thing as to the word itself, since it aptly suggests both the form and the end of religion." (*Isagoge*, pt. I, p. 275 ff..) Livy: "No crime dissolves religion," i.e., no crime removes any obligation. (*Hist*. l. 2, c. 32.)

d) By which, those things that are proper to the rational creature, insofar as it is rational, and therefore pertain to morals or the way of life, are defined and prescribed; while the opposite, or those things that are inconsistent with them, are prohibited. And this law is that of God, as the author of nature, implanted by the finger or

influx in the very creation of the human soul: of which we shall see more below in its proper place.

DANNHAUER: *"The moral law I. natural and eternal, is the law of nature,* not of the universe, by which every creature is constituted and maintains its order; not common to man and beast, which Ulpian improperly calls the law of nature; but specifically 1. *the law of human nature* considered in itself, which would oblige man even when solitary, if not to action, then at least to disposition, such as: that God is to be worshipped, parents honored, no one harmed, promises kept; what you do not wish to happen to you, do not do to another; what you wish to be done for you, you should also wish for another; *that αὐτοφονίαν* (suicide) is unlawful. (Otherwise, it is called the law of nations, which obligates a man as a member of a state to maintain public peace through special contracts; such rights include: not to violate ambassadors, not to use poisoned weapons in war, etc.) 2. *Good in itself* and consistent with the idea of divine holiness, so that even if it had never been given, it would still be seen to be binding by true judgment. Hence, it is not because God willed, for example, to prohibit idolatry, but because it is in itself worthy of hatred, that it is a sin; thus we worship God not only because He willed it, but also because God is ours. Thus we owe obedience to God, not only because God has commanded it (otherwise we would also owe equal obedience to a commanding angel), but because we are God's, and consequently obligated by natural right. The precept or primary and general work of this law is: to do good and to avoid evil (a principle as common as the theoretical one: that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time), to live honorably, to harm no one, and to give to each his due. 3. *Immutable and eternal;* for just as it is impossible for th , the norm of this law, which is the eternal law in the divine mind, to change, so it is impossible for its ray to change; just as the sun is incorruptible, so too is its ray. *A thing,* which constitutes natural law, is sometimes changed, not *the law.* For example, if a creditor accepts what is owed to him, the debtor is no longer obligated to pay, not because natural law has ceased to command that I pay what I owe, but because what I owed has ceased to be owed. Thus, when God commanded Isaac to be slain (Gen. 22:2), it is not on that account that parricide becomes lawful, but because it is done at the Lord's command, it ceases to be parricide. 4. *Σύμφυτος (innate) and connatural* through promulgation inscribed in the hearts of men by the finger of God. . . II. The *positive* moral law is that which depends solely on the will of God, and which, unless God had so ordained it, would not be considered a sin." (*Hodosoph. phaenom*. VI. p. 240. 242.)

M. CHEMNITZ: "These discussions are assailed by many as if they were philosophical, concerning which Paul said, Col. 2:8: 'Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit.' But fairness must be used in judging, lest things rightly and usefully handed down be wantonly disturbed and torn down in the name of philosophy. *Rather, let us consider the reasons why it is useful to observe the agreement of the law of nature with the Decalogue,* and let us show the boundaries within which that discussion ought to be contained. For if anyone were to refer that discussion so as to bend the interpretation of the Decalogue and restrict it only to the natural knowledge of the law, so that he would contend that one is accused by the law of God only of those sins that are known by nature, and that the decalogue is satisfied by whatever obedience reason, guided by the natural law, dictates and can perform—such a person, because he would go beyond the true boundaries, would rightly be said to be despoiling, Col. 2:8. And there is no doubt that the Pharisaic corruptions drew their origin from this. For it is a plausible opinion to take the interpretation of the Decalogue from the law of nature. And this notion has also fascinated many in the church, who have imagined that the fathers were saved before Moses by the law of nature, etc. Therefore, judgment must be applied in the use of the discussion on the law of nature. In these places, however, the true reason is shown *for how the agreement of the natural laws with the Decalogue can be rightly and usefully sought and considered.* And *these reasons* are given*: Because Paul explicitly treats that argument in Romans 1 and 2 and*

attributes the most honorable appellations to the law of nature. For he calls it in Rom. 1:18, the truth of God; in v. 19, the revelation of God; in v. 32, the righteousness of God; in Rom. 2:15, the work of the law, written in the hearts in the very creation. And indeed the appellation 'law of nature' is taken from this; for he says in Rom. 2:14: ,'The Gentiles by nature, who are lawless, do what the law commands.' And let us gratefully acknowledge that benefit, that He did not will the light of the law to be entirely extinguished by the Fall; but willed certain remnants to remain, so that there might be a political association among men, in which God, through the voice of the Gospel, might gather the Church. And Paul's words admonish us that these remnants are to be magnified.— 2. *This is a useful exercise, so that we may learn to love, honor, and magnify moral principles that are in accordance with the law of nature, wherever they are found and read among poets, historians, philosophers, legislators*, etc. For they are divine law and the truth of God divinely revealed. Thus Paul did not hesitate to quote a sentiment from Menander in a most serious matter (1 Cor. 15:33): "Bad company corrupts good morals." — 3. *It also helps for this purpose, that we may magnify the testimony of conscience even in those who are not born again;* lest the accusing thoughts (which Paul so calls, Rom. 2:15), when they are felt, be repelled by the notion that they are some vain fancy, which it is womanish to care about; but let us establish that it is truly the judgment *of God,* accusing sins. — 4. *So that by a brief comparison, it may be observed in which parts the natural knowledge of the law has been obscured,* where the judgment is depraved, and what those things are, whether sins or good works, which are shown in the Decalogue unknown to reason. In this way, the comparison of the law of nature with the decalogue can be rightly and usefully applied, and indeed the true meaning will be illustrated in some way. . . The second table of the law of nature is stated negatively by the philosophers: 'What you do *not* want done to you, do not do to another.' Christ, however, recites it affirmatively in Matthew 7:12: ,Whatever you want men to do to you, do you also to them'; and he clearly shows the agreement of this sentence with the Decalogue. For he says: ,This is the law and the prophets,' that is, in the second table." (*Loci Theologici*, Part II, fol. 96 ff..)

Apology of the Augsburg Confession.: "Human reason naturally understands the law in some way. For it has the same judgment divinely written in the mind. Because the *natural law,* which corresponds with the Law of Moses or the Ten Commandments, is innate and written in the hearts of all men, and thus reason can in some measure grasp and understand the Ten Commandments, it fancies that it has enough in the law and that through the law one can obtain forgiveness of sins." (Art. 4. p. 87. sq.) *"Natural law* is truly *divine* law, because it is a divine ordinance impressed on nature. If it is now *natural* law, then it is *God's* ordinance, thus planted in *nature* and is therefore also *divine* law." (Art. 23, p. 238.)

Luther: "If the *natural law* were not written and given by God in the heart, one would have to preach for a long time before consciences were touched; one would have to preach to a donkey, a horse, an ox, a mule—hundreds of thousands of years—before they would accept the law, although they have ears, eyes, and hearts like a human; they can hear it, but it does not enter the heart. Why? What is the fault? The soul is not formed or created so that such a thing would enter it. But a person to whom the law is presented soon says, "Yes, it is so; I cannot deny it." You could not so quickly persuade him otherwise, unless it had first been written in his heart. Since it is already in the heart, though dark and completely faded, it is awakened again by the Word, so that the heart must confess that it is so, as the commandments state: that one should honor, love, and serve God, because He alone is good and does good, and not only to the righteous, but also to the wicked." (*Exposition on Certain Chapters of the Second Book of Moses*, 1525. III, 1575)

The same: "Why then does one teach and keep the Ten Commandments? Answer: Because the *natural laws* are nowhere so finely and orderly composed as in Moses. Therefore, one rightly takes the example from Moses." (*Against the Heavenly Prophets*. 1525. Vol. 20, p. 211 [See also **here**])

e) E.g., on the part of the intellect, the acts of meditating and knowing the divine essence, attributes, providence, works, and benefits; on the part of the will, the acts of fear, love, trust, hope, patience, etc., to which correspond external acts, through which those internal acts are declared; e.g. prayers, the invocation of God and thanksgiving, made with sensible signs, whether in public assembly or privately, hymns and various celebrations of God, of His perfections and benefits, etc.

f) E.g. internal acts, concerned with moderating the affections; acts of cultivating the mind with honorable arts and sciences; acts of rightly preserving life, body, reputation, wealth, etc., which are partly internal, partly external.

g) E.g., acts of justice, by which one gives to each his due; acts of liberality; acts of fortitude in defending one's country, relatives, etc., which are likewise either elicited in the mind or commanded and external.

h) They also have reference to the worship of God, insofar as they are ultimately referred to God as an end and are performed in His obedience, praise, and glory. See on all these, *Musaeus*, loc. cit., § 33 ff., p. 88-89.

§ 8.

As for the sufficiency of the divine worship prescribed by natural theology for attaining blessedness after this life, a great diversity arises, and it must be observed most diligently with respect to the different states [(a)] of man: the primordial or state of integrity, and the state of corruption or sin. In that former state, man could, under the guidance of natural theology and by the powers granted to him, attain to a sufficient knowledge of God and the worship due to God, to be rendered without defect or sin, and thus [(b)] in this way obtain eternal blessedness from God. In this latter state, however, by the condition of his own corrupt nature, he is turned away from God and inclined toward things that displease Him; and since he regards God as hostile to him because of his sins [(c)] , he nevertheless does not find in natural theology a means by which to satisfy [(d)] God, who has been offended and with Him be restored [(e)] to grace; indeed, he can neither perfectly [(f)] know and prescribe to himself those things which otherwise pertain to the worship of God, nor render the worship which he understands by the light of nature to be due to God.[(g)] Hence, for the present state, natural theology is not sufficient for the salvation of any man.[(h)]

a) These different states are assumed for now, but will be more clearly set forth in their proper place in revealed theology below.

M. Chemnitz: "What, how, and how far does that *natural knowledge* extend? — To speak truly: it is either nonexistent, imperfect, or feeble. *Nonexistent*, because all of philosophy knows nothing of the free promise of the forgiveness of sins; for the Son of God revealed that to the church, having proceeded from the bosom of the eternal Father. John 1:18. Matt. 11:27; 1 Cor. 1:21; 2:7. — *Imperfect,* because the Gentiles know only a portion of the law. As for the inner rites of the first table, reason knows or establishes nothing certain; only certain Gentile philosophers teach about some external and civil matters. Meanwhile they mix many *absurd and paradoxical things,* about which they themselves do not agree sufficiently. — *Weak,* because, even if it has been impressed on human minds that God exists and commands obedience according to the distinction between good and evil, yet assent is not only weak, but is often shaken by horrendous doubts. As there is a most beautiful description in the Tusculan Disputations, where Cicero, while disputing about the immortality of the soul, says to Antony: "Read carefully the book of Plato which is about the soul; you will then have nothing more to desire." "I have done it, by Hercules," says Antony, "and that more than once; but I do not know how, for as long as I am reading, I assent, but as soon as I put the book down and begin to think to myself about the immortality of souls, that whole assent slips away." (*Loci Theologici*, P. I. f. 20.)

b) For he had a propitious God, who was inclined, without difficulty, to grant him blessedness at some time. Cf. B. *Jac. Martini*, loc. cit., Disp. III. § 84. sqq., p. 66. sqq.; *Musaeus*, *Introduction*, Ch. II, § 13, no. 4, p. 45.

c) For although God is supremely good, He is also supremely just and a most severe avenger of sinners, who oppose His most holy law, and this by virtue of the immutability of His justice: For this reason, unless satisfaction is made to the divine justice that has been offended, the goodness of God, which does not take away God's justice, cannot be known in such a way that forgiveness of sins and salvation, to be conferred on the sinner, can be expected from it. Cf. *Musaeus*'s special *Disputation on the Insufficiency of Natural Theology for Salvation*, against Edward Herbert of Cherbury (appended to the treatise on the *Eternal Decree of Election*), § 64, pp. 36–37.

d) This, however, is the chief thing; without it, no pleasing worship can be offered to God. *For it is* necessary *that the person first be pleasing to God (and this for Christ's sake alone*), *if the works of that person are to be pleasing and acceptable to God.* These are the words *of the Solid Decl.: Form. Conc.* Art. IV. p. 700. 701. But *how can the human heart love God, while it feels that He is terribly angry and oppresses us with temporal and eternal calamities? The Law, however, always accuses us, always shows that God is angry. Therefore, God is not loved unless, after we have grasped mercy by faith, He then becomes an object of love,* words from *Apology of the Augsburg Confession*, p. 83–84. conf. p. 66. And so it is clear that natural theology, which cannot supply what is primary in the post-lapsarian state, from which a pleasing worship of God begins, is not sufficient for salvation.

e) For although natural theology prescribes repentance to the sinful man, by which he is to grieve for his sins, this repentance nevertheless does not extend to all sins, since many are committed by the ignorant or the negligent, and original sin is not rightly recognized by a man left to himself and deprived of supernatural help. But neither can that sorrow for sins wash away the sins themselves, insofar as they involve an offense against God and subject man to the wrath of God and the guilt of eternal punishment, although it does involve a certain retractation of them. See *Musaeus*'s cited *Disputation*, § 37 ff., p. 22 ff.

f) Because of the innate obscurity of the intellect, even in natural things, about which see below in the Locus on Original Sin (*De Peccato Originali*). Meanwhile, it is worthy of note the words by which *G. Mylius* shows that *natural knowledge* (theology) *is lame and mutilated, because,* he says, it embraces *only one part, and the smallest part, of heavenly doctrine, namely, the law, and not even this one in its entirety, but only in part, it inculcates the knowledge of divine worship, partly ignorant of the true worship, and partly of the knowledge of evangelical salvation, in which the very nucleus of divine knowledge is itself included. Positions on God*, th. 13.

> CALOV: "What pertains in particular to *the more important heads of this natural theology* are the following: 1. *Concerning God,* in which the nature and attributes, as well as the legal will of God, are treated in part and the works of ; but by no means concerning the distinct persons of the Godhead, or the evangelical will of God and the works of grace, or other divine mysteries, which are entirely unknown to reason. 2. *Concerning the Law of God,* by which the same is held to be the law of nature according to the precepts of both tables. To this belong the laws of Zaleucus, the golden words of Pythagoras, the moral precepts of Socrates and Plato, the rules of Epictetus, Jamblichus, Simplicius, and other Platonists, as well as the excellent admonitions of Aristotle and the Peripatetics, the laws of the Twelve Tables, etc. 3. Of sin and transgression of the law. 4. On the punishment of sin, which the law of nature and the conscience of each person also dictate. 5. On the immortality of the soul and life after this life, which we demonstrate from Zoroaster, Hermes Trismegistus, Phocylides, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Xenocrates, Epaminondas, Cicero, Plotinus, Jamblichus, etc. (*Decad. dissertat., de Pseudo-Theol. Soc*. p. 80.)." (*Isag*. Book I. p. 68. ff.)

g) Because the entire human nature has been corrupted, deprived of the good powers it ought to have, and made prone to evil. Again beautifully *Mylius*, loc. cit., th. 12: "It *colors and sprinkles the mind with knowledge, but subdues the disordered motions of the heart far too feebly."* Compare with these and the preceding: *Jacob Martini*, loc. cit., § 112-113, p. 73; *J. Musaeus*, loc. cit., p. 45-46, and cited *Disputation*, § 32-33, p. 18, 19, 20.

h) Whether he has heard anything about supernatural revelation and about Christ the mediator, or not. For by the grace of God and the merit of Christ, no one is saved except the one who apprehends by faith and appropriates to himself the satisfaction provided by Christ for sins, so that this may be presented to an angry God as if it were his own merit. See also the aforementioned Disp. *Mus.* § 101 ff., p. 6 ff., and the Dissertation by the same author against *Stephen Curcellaeus* on the question: *"Whether Gentiles, without faith in Christ, can attain eternal salvation through the extraordinary grace of God,"* etc.

> CALOV: "Not everything *that is found in the writings of the Gentiles* concerning theology is to be referred to natural theology: for some things arose *from the abuse of reason and natural principles*, such as the various errors and false opinions of the Gentiles (about which I have written more fully in the theology of the Gentiles); some proceeded *from divine revelation,* not indeed made so directly to the Gentiles, but rather proceeding from the people of God, through fame or tradition, on account of the contact and certain dealings of the Gentiles with those who were of the people of God. Thus, since the patriarchs lived among the Gentiles, certain traces of the religion revealed by God were left among them, e.g., among the Egyptians and the Chaldeans (who were considered the foremost theologians among the Gentiles), certain remnants remained from Abraham's institution, from which the writings of Trismegistus and others of great authority among the Gentiles arose, in which not a few analogies of Christian theology concerning God, the Word, the generation of the Son of God, the Holy Spirit, etc., are found. Trinity, etc., are found; which gave the Socinians occasion to cavil at the mysteries of the faith, because they were drawn from and proceeded from the writings of the Gentiles, when rather the Gentiles had received them from the church." (*Isagoge*, Book I, p. 67.)

CHEMNITZ: "Does God approve of that knowledge? — That is what you ask: whether God wants us to seek and consider these traces of His divinity in our minds and in all of nature? I answer: Yes; because Paul adorns this consideration with an illustrious title, when he calls it 'the truth of God' (Rom. 1:18), and Christ commands us to consider the birds of the air, and likewise the lilies, how they grow (Matt. 6:26, 28), and Solomon in Prov. 6:6 refers the sluggard to the ant. And to this end, the entire Psalm 104 and all of chapter 45 of Ecclesiasticus are pertinent. If only we would diligently unfold the vast book of nature, then we would truly experience that it is true, as the prophet of our age has sung: "Every herb declares God's presence." If only man, *a microcosm*, would consider himself, then he would without a doubt perceive the illustrious traces of divinity. But, alas, it happens as it is said in Isa. 5:12, "They do not consider the work of the Lord." What, then, is the true and pious *use* of this natural knowledge in the church? Heb. 11:3 says that creation is an image of the invisible God; but it adds, "*by faith."* This statement shows the true use of the traces of divinity in nature. For it affirms that reason cannot truly and usefully know the Creator from the effects unless faith is added. *Therefore, one must not begin with natural knowledge;* but 1. the mind must be confirmed by the Word of God and by illustrious testimonies, in which God has revealed Himself peculiarly to the human race. Afterwards, the consideration of philosophical demonstrations can be usefully added. 2. Natural knowledge must be subordinated to divine revelation in the Word; so that, wherever it disagrees or conflicts, the natural must yield to the divine, which also adds strength and certainty to the natural in those things where they agree. 3. It is a delightful consideration to compare how much the knowledge of God shone in an unfallen nature with how little spark of knowledge remains in our fallen state, and how firm an assent and how obedient a conformity to that knowledge once existed; and insofar as all these things have been shaken, nay, almost extinguished, in this depravity of nature, they cannot be better considered than in these vestiges, which for this very reason God willed to be left." (*Loci Theologici*, locus *De Deo*, ch. I, §§ 5–6, fol. 21.)

§ 9.

In the meantime, natural theology [(a)] both in its principles and in the conclusions that depend on them, is entirely true [(b)] and certain, and does not conflict with true revealed theology, [(c)] although, since it is perceived to be actually present in humans after the Fall, it must be admitted that it is contaminated by various prejudices and errors. [(d)]

a) Which in itself is one, and is not to be considered different in its very nature on account of the different states of men; although a diversity must be admitted with regard to the degrees of perfection and imperfection. Cf. *Musaeus*, *Introduction*, Ch. II, § 6, p. 32.

b) For they depend, as though constituting a negative theology, on the author God, to whom falsehood is repugnant. And just as the first principles are about those things which cannot be otherwise and are therefore necessarily true, so it is clear that the conclusions, which have a necessary connection with these principles, are likewise true and certain. To this the Leipzig theologians refer in the *Appendix Consilii Dedicatorii*. fol. 143., that Paul, speaking of the Gentiles in *Romans 1:18*, that they *hold the truth*, etc., refers to the natural knowledge as it is in itself, since it is true science or cognition.

MELANCHTHON: "Just as light has been divinely implanted in the eyes, so certain notions have been implanted in human minds, by which they recognize and judge most things. Philosophers call this light *the knowledge of principles*, they call it *κοινας ἐννοιας* and *προλήψεις*. And the common division is known. *There are speculative principles,* such as the knowledge of numbers, of order, of syllogism, and of geometry and physics. All of these are acknowledged to be the most certain and the sources of the greatest benefits in life. For what kind of life would it be without numbers, without order? There are other *principles that are practical,* such as the entire natural distinction between what is honorable and what is shameful; likewise, that God must be obeyed. And indeed, these practical principles ought to be as clear to us and as firm as the knowledge of numbers; yet because of the stain of original sin, a certain darkness has come upon us, and the heart has conflicting impulses concerning the distinction between good and evil, for this reason people do not assent to these truths as consistently: God is to be obeyed, adultery is to be avoided, honest agreements are to be kept; just as with this knowledge: Two times four is eight. The knowledge of the laws remains, but the assent is weak because of the stubbornness of the heart. Knowledge is a testimony that we are descended from God and owe obedience to God, and it accuses disobedience. Doubt, however, and stubbornness are a clear sign that human nature is not intact; as the same are signified by the death and infinite calamities of the human race and many prodigious vices. Paul explained this in Romans, chapter 1, with these words: "They suppress the truth in unrighteousness," that is, even though true knowledge has been impressed upon men: that God is a certain eternal mind, the creator and preserver of things, wise, good, just, etc., and that this God must be obeyed according to the distinction between what is honorable and what is shameful; nevertheless, these true notions are detained in injustice, that is, they are held captive, they do not reign, but injustice reigns, fighting against these notions, namely, the turning away of the will from God, contempt for God, confidence in one's own strength, and finally, various impulses fighting against the light divinely implanted in the minds. Therefore, the assent is also weaker, and

> ‘The charioteer is carried by the horses, and the chariot does not heed the reins.’'

Therefore the philosophers, seeing that people's assent was weak and that they were carried away by a great impulse to various pleasures, investigated whether just and unjust are distinguished by nature or by opinion. To doubt this matter is shameful and disgraceful, just as if someone were to ask whether by nature, or by chance, four times four is eight. The divine light in the minds must not be extinguished, but rather be kindled, and the mind must be strengthened to recognize the practical principles, embrace them, and establish that they are truly as certain and firm as speculative truths, and indeed are equally the immutable decrees of God. As Paul also preaches in Romans 1, saying, "God shows it to them"; likewise in Romans 2: "The work of the law is written in their hearts." He also calls these notions "divine law" in Romans 1: "Who knowing the judgment of God." Therefore, the true definition of the law of nature is that the law of nature is the knowledge of the divine law, innate in human nature." (*Chief Theological Loci*. Leipzig 1552. pp. 199–202.)

c) For it is in agreement with truth. And there is only one truth. Although natural theology does not pursue the objects that are proper to revealed theology, it does not for that reason deny or attack any of them, or establish the opposite, but suspends its judgment, as if concerning matters placed outside its sphere. Indeed, if revelation is added, it is certain that the defect of our natural knowledge is supplied by the added, more sublime knowledge. Cf. *Musaeus*'s *Introduction*, Part II, Ch. V, § 7, p. 324 ff., and § 15, p. 337-338, and *Grauer's* treatise on the unique truth. A fuller comparison of true natural theology with the revealed was presented in 1676 under our auspices in the inaugural dissertation of the most beloved relative*, Heinrich von Lith*.

GERHARD: "In itself and per se there is no contrariety, no contradiction between philosophy and theology, because what theology proposes concerning the highest mysteries of the faith from revelation, that saner and more sincere philosophy knows must not be discussed and judged from the principles of reason, lest *a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος* (transition to another kind) occur, nor the distinct principles of the distinct disciplines be confused. Thus, when theology teaches that Mary gave birth and remained a virgin, sounder philosophy does not say that this assertion contradicts its own conclusion, namely, that it is *impossible* for a virgin to give birth; for it knows that that conclusion must necessarily be accepted with the limitation that a virgin gives birth *naturally*; and that such a state is *impossible,* whose contrary theology does not assert; for it says that by a *supernatural* and divine power, the virgin gave birth. But when some pseudo-philosopher wants his axioms and pronouncements to be so general that even the highest mysteries of the faith are to be judged by them, and thus invades another's territory, then it happens *by accident* that what is theologically true is called philosophically false, with respect, that is, not to the sounder use of philosophy, but to its most shameful abuse. Thus, justice and the rule of law are everywhere one and the same in the general concept; nevertheless, the law of this province is not the same as the law of another, but each province lives by its own special laws. Thus, truth is one in the general concept; meanwhile, each discipline has its own axioms, which are not to be carried over into another forum, but are to be left in their own sphere, lest *a transition to another kind* occur, which even sound philosophy itself repudiates." (*Exeges. locc*. book *De Sacra Scriptura*, § 474.)

LUTHER: "Sixth, let us compare this institution (the monastic) also with *natural reason,* i.e., with that crude light of nature, which, although it does not in itself touch the light and works of God, so that its judgment is fallacious in affirmatives (as they say), is nevertheless certain in negatives. For reason does not grasp most certainly *what God is,* yet it most certainly grasps *what God is not.* Thus, although it may not see what is right and good before God (namely, faith), it nevertheless knows clearly that infidelity, homicides, and disobedience are evil. Which Christ also uses when he teaches in Luke 11[:17] that every kingdom divided against itself will be desolate, and Paul when he says in 1 Corinthians 11 that not even *nature* teaches a woman to prophesy with her head uncovered. *Therefore, whatever is clearly contrary to this reason is certain and much more contrary to God.* For how can that which wars against earthly truth not also war against heavenly truth? In the same way that Christ, in John 3, distinguishes the truth and argues from both: "If I have told you earthly things and you do not believe, how will you believe if I tell you heavenly things?" (*Opp. lat. varii argumenti*; edited by D. H. Schmidt. Frankfurt 1872. Vol. VI. p. 318. sq. Opp. Hal. Tom. XIX, 1940. Cf. *Luther's* Theological Treatise on the Question: "Whether the *theological* proposition: 'The Word became flesh,' is true in *philosophy*"; which Luther denies, when *a μεταβασις εις αλλο γένοςi* (transition to another kind) is committed. See Opp. Hal. vol. X, 1396–1402.)

CALOV: "Junius is mistaken, 1) in that he assigns to *false theology* common principles and notions; which, although they impart only an imperfect knowledge and are joined with falsity by reason of the subject, namely the corrupt state of man, are nevertheless not false in themselves, but, truly deriving their origin from God and being inscribed on nature, are indeed detained in unrighteousness, yet contain the truth, Rom. 1:18. He is mistaken, 2) in asserting that the root of all false theology is those common principles, commonly called *κοινάϊ 'έννοιαι* (*common principles*), since what is true follows only from the true, and false theology has flowed not from the common principles as such, but from their corruption. He is mistaken, 3) when he points to the philosophical knowledge of God as false, and asserts that it arose from the cultivation of the natural notion; for some philosophical knowledge of God is true, indeed all of it that is properly philosophical (for the error of the philosophers is not to be attributed to philosophy itself), and whatever arises from the legitimate use and genuine cultivation of natural knowledge is true, not false, since it is its abuse, at least, that generates false opinions, not its use." (*Isag*. I, 21.)

THE SAME: *"The material from which* the principles known by the light of nature arise, from which conclusions are deduced according to the measure of human reason. . . *The principles* indeed have remained in a way from the former state (of integrity), but they are common and imperfect; which, however, must be distinguished from adventitious corruption, even though they are not found in the subject after the fall, except with that corruption." (Loc. cit. p. 64, 66.)

d) Thus we have above removed the *φυσική* or natural theology of the Gentile philosophers, along with the other kinds of pagan theology, as erroneous, note *f.* to § 1. And that men, deprived of true divine revelation, having also abused their reason and been carried away into various errors concerning the knowledge and worship of God, we are taught from the revelation itself *in Romans 1:22* ff. And hence it is that, since they did not find true revelation, they embraced false ones in place of true, rather than none at all. Compare, *Himmel, Syntagma*, *Disputation*. I, § 23 ff. to § 28.

§ 10.

The formal object [(a)] of natural theology, as a practical science, is its end [(b)], and this objective [(c)] or God, insofar as He is known by the light of nature [(d)] before demonstration, through a knowledge *innate* [(e)] or a certain light [(f)] inborn to the intellect and instinct [(g)] of nature, and then *acquired* through the inspection of creatures, is known as the vulgar or [(h)] common knowledge. [(i)]

a) For that which is first known in natural theology is also the reason for knowing the rest, according to what we have said in § 3, note *d.*

b) For in any science the end must be, to some extent, previously known, from which man is led to the practice or operation for which it is undertaken. See *Musaeus*, *Introduction*, Ch. II, § 5, p. 29; § 15, p. 48.

c) For the formal end of knowledge, if not distinct, is at least confused, and depends on the objective end; nor is that end known first, but this one. *Musaeus*, loc. cit., § 15. p. 48.

d) For as far as it is known from divine revelation, its knowledge pertains not to natural, but to revealed theology. *Mus.* 1. c. p. 49. By the appellation of *the light of nature*, however, we understand propositions which declare the existence, essence, and essential perfections of God, insofar as they are known either by discourse from the principles of nature and reason, or by the power of the agent intellect and phantasms, from terms apprehended immediately and without discourse. *Mus.* 1. c. pp. 50–52. And it should be noted that the formal object of natural theology is not precisely the light of nature, but God known through the light of nature. For that is not the proper and proximate reason for assent in natural theology, but is too general and remote. *Musaeus*, loc. cit., and § 28. p. 85. 86.

J. GERHARD: "Since in Ps. 96:5 it is said that the gods of the Gentiles are demons, and since Christ explicitly testifies in John 5:23 that whoever does not honor the Son does not honor the Father: it is rightly asked, in what sense the apostle says

that the Gentiles have known the eternal power and divinity of God from the creation of the world? Rom. 1:20. *Answer:* A distinction must be made between *the concept* of God, drawn from creatures by the pagan mind, and *the application* of that concept*;* the former was legitimate, the latter was not. For although the eternal power and divinity, and, as Plato speaks, the "eternal mind, the cause of all good in nature," or, as Aristotle says, ‚a supreme being and the first principle of all motion, the very *ακίνητον'* or, as Cicero says, 'a preeminent, eternal, and admirable nature' from the book of nature: nevertheless, they did not rightly apply it to that one Jehovah, who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; not to God the Father, from whom the Son was eternally begotten and sent in time to be the mediator and redeemer of the human race; but they attributed it to irrational animals, serpents, reptiles, etc., Rom. 1:28, or even to the devil himself, Ps. 96:5, and since they devised a form and standard of worshipping God from their own ingenuity, they worshiped the idol of their own heart, not the true God, which the apostle expresses thus: "Though they knew God, they did not glorify him as God," Romans 1:21, ‘they exchanged the truth of God for a lie’, v. 25." (*Locus on the Nature of God*, § 14.)

e) Which is called such, not because actual knowledge of God, or an expressed species, is naturally inherent in man before the use of reason; but because, given the apprehended terms, it is immediately present to the intellect without discursive reasoning, just as if it had been actually implanted in it by nature itself. *Mus.* l. c. § 19. p. 52.

f) Which is by no means an impressed species, naturally inherent in the intellect before the use of reason; nor yet a habit properly so called, nor even the bare *δύναμις* or power of knowing: but something else superadded to, or innate in, the power of knowing. A certain perfection, by which the intellect is constituted as a power or in a potential state near to the immediate elicitation of acts of cognition; which, although it is not a habit in the proper sense, is nevertheless *analogous to* a habit; as *Musaeus* has taught at length, both in several collections of manuscripts and again in his *Introduction,* Ch. II, § 19. p. 52 ff. up to 80, taught at length, and again asserts in der *Detailed Explanation* p. 150 ff. And also *Huelsemann* in *Prelections on the Breviary*. Ch. I, p. 1134, expressly confesses that *he assents to that opinion which* holds that *this natural knowledge is innate in man not as a habit, but as a bare power of knowing* (understanding, without a doubt, the proximate power), and having adduced *Rom. 1:19–20; 2:14*, he. proves that opinion, and concludes that *this natural knowledge is in man by virtue of a power, not by an infused habit.*

HOLLAZ: "It is agreed *το εἴ εστι*, or true existence, of innate knowledge of God *is* innate; but *το τί εστι*, or its definitive reason, is not so clear. Hence it is defined in different ways even by orthodox theologians. . . . Whatever it is that, according to them, can be said to be naturally in the intellect or *innate to* it, it must be reduced to a certain innate perfection or light of the intellect, by which, aided, it immediately perceives the truth of the common notions about God in the terms apprehended, without any discursive reasoning. And on this point they are almost unanimous. . . We do not, however, deny that the knowledge of God is an innate perfection, congenitally present in man as a traveler and *analogous to a habit.* This analogy consists in the following: 1. just as *the image of God* in the protoplasmic humans was a habit, so its remnants, to which the law of nature pertains, which dictates that God is to be worshipped, in a manner approach his very nature; since the parts are of the same nature as the whole. 2. Just as an habit is *a* certain *perfection, superadded to nature,* facilitating it for operation, so also

the natural knowledge of God is superadded to the cognitive faculty, inclining it to apprehend God in whatever way. 3. Since a habit is *difficult to remove,* so deeply does this natural knowledge adhere to the soul, and it cannot be completely eradicated." (*Examination*, Part I, ch. 1, q. 6, p. 189 ff.)

THE SAME: "The idea, representing the essence of God, congenitally present in the human intellect, is a pleasant dream of the Cartesians." (L. c. p. 195.)

CICERO: "Nor is there any nation so savage, nor any man so utterly monstrous, whose mind has not been imbued with the belief in the gods. Many hold false opinions about the gods, for that is a result of a vicious custom; yet all believe that *there is* a divine power and nature. Nor is this belief brought about by human conversation or consensus; it is not confirmed by institutions or by laws. However, in all matters, the consensus of *all* peoples is to be considered the law of nature." (*Tusculan Questions*, book 1)

THE SAME: "It is innate in all, and as if engraved on the mind, that there are gods." (*On the Nature of the Gods*, book 2)

HOLLAZ: "There can be *atheists* in a speculative sense, not by nature, but by just desertion from God and diabolical blinding; not through the total eradication of the light of nature as to habit, but through suffocation as to act and exercise; not for the whole course of life and permanently, but only through a certain passing paroxysm for a time. For the law of nature does not permit a firm and settled conviction to adhere to anyone that there is *no* God. For although the mind of the wicked man may be as it were lulled to sleep by a lethargy, so that he does not think about God, yet no one can exist in whom conscience does not at last vindicate itself and, even in death, accuse him of having neglected God." (Exam. P. I. c. 1. q. 5. p. 194.)

g) Which is nothing other than an inclination of nature toward God, as its end, that determines the intellect, endowed with that innate light, as with an added weight toward assent, together with other common notions about God, and especially that one which is about the existence of God, to be offered immediately and without discourse. See *Mus.* in *Introd*. p. 78–80. *Detailed Explanation* p. 161–163.

h) Such as is commonly held to be present in all, even the simplest, who are not capable of demonstrations, and is acquired either from the testimony of others, e.g., parents, preceptors, magistrates, and the people, or from the inspection of creatures; by a consequence, indeed, but an easy one, and one that meets the eye of even the most unlettered. *Mus., Introd*. 1. c. § 23. 24. p. 81.

i) It therefore presupposes both of these kinds of knowledge; from this, however, like a principle of cognition, it derives a rule for right action and draws its conclusions, natural theology being itself a demonstrative habit. *Mus.* 1. c. § 28. p. 86. And so B. *Himmelius* writes in Syntagm. Disp. I. § 19. p. 3: *The natural theology has two principles: the internal, namely the κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, the rudiments or remnants of the divine image, and the external, namely the inspection of creatures.*

§ 11.

To the material object [(a)] pertain the subject of the operation [(b)] and the means of the consequent cause and [(c)] the means, indeed in its own way even the end itself, both formal, [(d)] and objective, insofar as it is indeed known here exactly by demonstration [(e)].

a) By which name are understood the things to be known in natural theology, as a science, which it considers and from which it infers its conclusions to explain their nature and to prove their truth from some prior knowledge or from certain more familiar and prior principles. *Musaeus*, loc. cit., § 14, p. 47.

b) For this, insofar as it is subordinated to the end of a certain operation, falls under the consideration of natural theology, as a practical science; although it must be admitted that, in the state of corruption, its full reason and the wickedness of corruption itself are not sufficiently known by the light of nature, as far as it remains. *Mus.* l. c. § 31. p. 87.

c) For their relation to the end is most manifest, and see what we said in § 6 et seq.

d) For its knowledge, if not distinct (which we said in § 4, note *e,* cannot be investigated by the guidance of natural light with respect to its specific reason), at least confused, depends on the objective end and can be sought from it.

e) Namely both the existence of God, as well as His attributes and essential perfections, can certainly be demonstrated *a posteriori* from created things, as divine effects, through a more careful consideration of them, which are discussed at length by the schools of philosophers and can be consulted. In the meantime, see *Mus.* l. c. § 26. ff. p. 82. to 86.

GERHARD: *"The book of nature* can be established for the purpose of teaching in a twofold way, internal and external, from which natural knowledge is divided into *έμφυτον,* innate or inbred, and *'επίκτητου,* acquired. *Implanted* knowledge has its origin in *the κοιναϊς 'εννοίαις* (common notions), which are obscure remnants of the lost divine image and traces of that lost light which shone in the human mind before the Fall, certain sparks through which a common and anticipatory notion of what God is is naturally imprinted on the minds of all men. We therefore refer them to the internal book of nature, to which also pertains the book *of consciences,* the testimony of the inner conscience, which the scholastics call *συντήρησιν*; for from the principles born with us arises that practical syllogism in the heart of every human being: he who lives an impious life will feel the wrath of the avenging God. The reason depends on the fact that it is naturally engraved in everyone that God exists, that God is to be worshipped, and that God is the avenger of sins. The impious man's conscience concludes: "I have led a wicked life." *Acquired* knowledge from the external book of nature, namely from the contemplation of divine works and effects, is gathered by the power of natural reasoning from the human mind. For just as a book is composed of many letters, so a kind of book is composed of many creatures, since each creature is nothing but a certain letter written by the finger of God, in which we can read and through reading know God." (Exeges. 1. 2. § 60.)

THE SAME: "It is useful to have certain demonstrations in view, so that a comparison with the knowledge revealed in the can be made: 1. *From the order of movers.* We perceive by the senses that some things in this world move; but everything that is moved must be moved by another, since nothing can be at the same time in act and in potentiality with respect to the same thing; but in movers and moved there is no infinite regress, because there would be no first mover and consequently no others either, since secondary movers do not move except by virtue of being moved by the first. It is therefore necessary to come to a single first mover, whom we call God. The Philosopher uses this demonstration in Book 7 and 8 *of the Physics.* — 2. *From the series of efficient causes.* We find that in these sensible things there is an order of efficient causes, and yet among them is found, nor is it possible, for anything to be an

efficient cause of itself, because it would then be prior to itself, which is impossible. Therefore, since in such causes there is no regress to infinity, because secondary causes do not act except in virtue of the first, it is necessary to postulate some first efficient cause, whom all call God. Aristotle, 2nd *Metaphysics*, text 6. — 3. *From the gradation and connection of beings.* In created things, something more good and less good is found, something more being and less being. But this cannot hold in the different genera of good and being, unless as each of them more or less approaches some supreme good and supreme being; therefore, there must be something most excellent and noblest being, which by common consent we call God. Anselm, *Monologion*, ch. 1. This also pertains to that demonstration: Whatever exists, is either all possible, or not. If all things are possible, it follows that at some point there was *simply* nothing; for that which can exist, and at some point did not exist, is possible; for if it had always existed, it would not have been possible, but necessary. But it is absurd in many ways that there was simply nothing at some point. Therefore, it follows that not everything is possible, but that at the very least, something that was necessary has always existed. This, however, either has a cause of its necessity or it does not. If it does, we will eventually arrive at something that is necessary in itself, since proceeding to infinity is impossible. If it is necessary in itself, it has no cause for its necessity, but rather is the cause of the necessity in others; this very thing, however, is the supreme being, which we call God. Richard of St. Victor, *De Trinitate.* — 4. *From a certain operation for an end.* We see not only rational beings, but also those that lack knowledge, act for a certain end, because they always or more often operate in the same way and achieve their ends through proper means; from which it is clear that they do not act by chance or accident, but are directed by the intention of an intellect which we call God. Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.52, and from him Thomas, Part I, Question 2, Article 3—5. *From a natural inclination.* No natural inclination can be in vain. Yet all men are naturally inclined to believe that there is a governor of this universe, whom they call God; and since this is true for all men at all times, it seems to be natural. Furthermore, in sudden situations, a person's natural disposition and inclination are most clearly revealed; yet in sudden dangers, all men, when they find themselves without human help, by a certain natural instinct turn to a higher power; therefore, it is naturally ingrained in them that there is some supreme principle of things and governor of the universe. *On the Truth of Faith*, book 1, ch. 6. The Apostle in Acts 14:15–17 shows these to be the sources of natural demonstrations, from which the existence of God can be demonstrated: 1. from the production of things, 2. from preservation, 3. from governance, 4. from the bestowal of benefits on the human race, 5. from the condition of the human mind, 6. from political association. Lactantius, Book 1, Chapter 2 *Of the Divine Institutes*: ‚There is no one so rude, so savage in character, who, raising his eyes to heaven, even though he does not know by whose providence all that is seen is governed, does not nevertheless understand that there is *some one*, 1. from the very magnitude of things, 2. motion, 3. arrangement, 4. constancy, 5. utility, 6. plenitude, 7. temperance.'" (*Exegesis*, locus 2, on the Nature of God, § 61) *Defense of the Christian Religion*, Königsberg 1768, Part I, p. 136 ff.

LUTHARDT: "1. The proofs that result from *reflection* <u>*on the world*</u> are a. from reflection on the *being* of the world: the *cosmological* proof, which concludes from the world to the Creator of the world, according to Romans 1:19. f. . . b. the reflection on the *nature* of the world yields the *physico-theological* or *teleological* proof, which from the *purposiveness* of the world concludes to a supreme intelligence (Ps. 104:24). . . This is followed by the *historico-theological* proof, which from the teleology of *history* concludes to a supreme mind and a will governing according to moral laws in it. 2. The proofs that result from *man's reflection* <u>*on himself*</u> are a. the proof *from*

theoretical reason. Its first form is to infer the necessity and thus the truth of the idea of God from the *universality of the concept*. This *argumentum e consensu gentium* (argument from consensus of nations) was already used by Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 1:17, Tusculan *Disputations* I:13. and then also Christian scholarship in Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* V:14, Lactantius, *Divine Institutes* I:2. The second form is to conclude from the *idea* in us to its cause outside of us, which produced it. Descartes, *Meditationes* III: This idea which is in us requires God as cause, and therefore God exists. The third form is Anselm's *ontological* proof, *Proslogion* 2, which infers the existence of God from *the content of the idea of God*: "Even the fool is convinced that there is in the intellect something which cannot be conceived as greater." And certainly that which cannot be conceived as greater cannot exist in the intellect alone. For if it exists only in *the intellect*, it can be conceived to exist also in *reality,* which is greater. — Therefore, without a doubt, something exists which cannot be conceived as greater, both in the intellect and in reality. . . b. The proof *from practical reason* concludes in its first form from the *fact of the moral law within us* to its author outside of us: so already Melanchthon and Calvin; in its second form, from the *collision of the moral law* with the drive for happiness, a future reconciliation of both, and thus an absolute being, which reconciles them both." (*Compendium of Dogmatics*, Third Edition, Leipzig 1868, p. 64 ff.; cf. Philippi, *Ecclesiastical Doctrine of Faith*, II, p. 1 ff.)

C. Hase: *"Theism* is that persuasion by which a certain religious relation of man to God is established, as person to person, and never intervenes in another. Arbitrary distinction of the Kantian school: *Theism is* the recognition of God as a free, moral intelligence; *Deism* only as the prime cause of the universe. — *Atheism* is the persuasion by which the existence of a deity is denied. — The ordinary definition (of Pantheism) according to Klein and Ammon: *Pantheism* is the opinion that the world is not different from the deity, but pertains to the very nature of God *(ἓν καὶ πᾶν),* that is, God is confused with the world. a. *Material* or *Ionian* Pantheism*,* which holds that the essence of God is infinite (*Hylozoism, Materialism, Naturalism)*; b. *Stoic* Pantheism*,* which teaches that the world is an animal of which God is a plastic part; c. *Realistic* Pantheism*,* i.e.*, Spinozistic,* which contends that the unique essence of God manifests itself through two infinite attributes, extension and infinite thinking power; d. *Idealistic* or *Fichtean* Pantheism*,* in which it is held that all things that exist proceed from the absolute idea; e. *Identitalistic* or *Schellingian* Pantheism*,* in which God is said to discern nature and spirit by evolving himself from his absolute principle; f. *Panlogistic* or *Hegelian* Pantheism*,* in which the highest concept and existence are asserted to be the same. His (pantheistic) God is not personal, but the power that forms persons, through whom he attains self-awareness. A certain freedom and immortality are compatible with him, but not moral freedom or individual immortality. He destroys in his consistent application both religiosity in general, which to him is only a titanic relationship, in the deepest sense only a self-love of God, not human love and worship of the Supreme, and also the need for reconciliation, which to him is only a natural event or dialectical appearance." (*Hutterus redivivus*, 11th ed., 1868, p. 107 ff.) *Ammonius*: "It is clear that any *pantheism* fosters intolerable arrogance, advocates materialism, abolishes moral freedom, defiles the sanctity of the Deity with the infamy of all crimes, extinguishes every spark of the love of God in the human mind, and dissolves the very foundations of duty and virtue." (*Summa Religionis Christianae*, Leipzig 1830, p. 111.)

§ 12.

The parts of natural theology [(a)] are three: the first is about the end, the second about the subject of the operation, and the third about the principles and means.

a) Which should be arranged according to the analytical method, just as in other practical sciences.

FLACIUS: "Sciences are most commonly taught in *a threefold order*: by *synthesis* or composition, as they are made; by *analysis* or resolution, as they are applied to use; and finally by *definition* and division, how they can be understood most briefly and most quickly. . . Theology is most conveniently taught by *synthesis*, as are Grammar, Dialectic, Geometry. . . Synthesis is that method or order which begins *with the first and simplest elements*, *principles*, *or causes*, and by composing them progresses until it has constructed the entire body and has reached the desired end and goal. Just as grammar, beginning with the elements of letters, first forms syllables by combining them, then words from those, then thirdly sentences, from which it fourthly builds entire treatises, and finally produces complete volumes... It is no wonder that the sacred Scriptures are presented historically, for the method of both is synthetic and most of their content is historical or consists of deeds. . . Which are most conveniently and in their natural order set forth by synthesis. . . The synthetic method of theology (which is most proper to it) begins with God, as the simplest element, the first cause or mover, and progresses by variously combining Him with man, until it reaches the final end, i.e., the same God, according to Romans 11:36: 'From whom, through whom, and in whom are all things'; which is the briefest and most synthetic summary of theology. . . According to this method, the Catechisms, the Institutes, the Loci, and indeed most of the compendia of this discipline proceed (as far as the entire body is concerned). For it is, as has been said, the most convenient for it, for later things always arise *by nature* and *in sequence* from prior ones, depend on them, and are understood. . . *The analysis* of theology proceeds from its ultimate *end* or purpose, i.e., eternal life, through the proximate causes and the causes of those causes to the more remote ones, and finally to the very first sources and even to God Himself, who is the first and supreme source and author of truth, *resolving* and investigating everything. It is by this order that commentaries and expositions of the sacred Scriptures (which are indeed true and mere expositions of the text and do not degenerate into Institutes) are for the most part treated. For entire disputations or writings are resolved. . . Although, however, by this method the body of theology *cannot* be conveniently comprehended and delivered, because in its exposition the *later* in nature precede the earlier; since, however, knowledge of those depends on the exposition of these, it will have been useful to contemplate this outline as well, for, since it begins with those things which are prior *to us*, or more necessary and more familiar, we see here what the proximate causes or means are by which we can arrive at that of which we are most anxious and which we are accustomed to inquire, etc. . . A *definitive* method, furthermore, is accustomed to first propose a definition. . . This order is more artificial than natural." (*Clavis Sacrae Scripturae*, Part II, fols. 54–59; cf. J. G. Walch, *Philosophical Lexicon*, Leipzig 1733. See under "Analytic Method," "Synthetic Method.": "The *analytical* method has its name from the Greek word *ἀναλύειν,* to resolve, hence it is also called *methodus resolvens*, *resolutiva* in Latin. . . By this is generally understood that order in the knowledge and conception of the truth, by which one proceeds *from the particular to the universal,* from the conclusions to the principles, or, as the Peripatetics say, from

the *ends to the means*. . . The *synthetic* method has its name from the Greek word *συντίθημι*, i.e., to compose, hence it is also called *methodus compositiva* in Latin. . . By this is generally understood that order in the cognition and conception of truth, by which one proceeds *from the general to the particular, or from the principles to the conclusions* and particular truths (*from the causes to the effects*). . . Since the mathematicians have used it almost exclusively, it has become almost proprietary to mathematics, and has also acquired the name of the *mathematical* method." (L. c.)

§ 13.

Natural theology can be described as a practical science, based on the principles of nature concerning God, prescribing to the pilgrim a worship fitting to God, and explaining, confirming, and defending it, as the means to attain eternal blessedness in and from God.

Cf. *Introd*., *Mus.* loc. cit. § 41. p. 103. And thus far concerning natural theology.

§ 14. ^

In order to be properly informed about revealed theology, it must first be certain that there is a certain supernatural divine revelation [(a)]. This, however, is evident not only to us, who were born in the Church, [(b)] but also to the Gentiles [(c)].

a) For once this is shown, it is then not difficult to conclude that there exists a habit of revealed theology, by which certain men are made apt to know those things which are divinely revealed in such a way that they can teach and explain, confirm, and defend them. For not only is it known that the divine revelation, made immediately to a few, was given to them so that through these, divinely instructed, others might be instructed; but the revelation itself expressly teaches that God *has given teachers for the equipping of the saints,* Eph. 4:12, and in other places.

CALOV: "If anyone denies that *divine revelation* exists, that principle is proven from other sources, not only by the reasons by which the truth of principles is otherwise established, but by far more eminent ones, which are greater than any exception. For if it is denied that God exists, and that there must be some reason for men to worship God, it must be taught that it is impossible but that God has revealed the very reason, so that He might be worshipped in the proper manner; then, that God willed men to be brought to the fruition of Himself, and therefore the way by which they could be brought there had to be revealed to men; finally, that He has entirely revealed Himself, as is to be shown from history, a revelation which God willed to be supported by those miracles and documents, by which we are rendered infallibly certain that it is truly divine." (*Systema Theologiae*, vol. I, Prolegomena, ch. 3, § 1, p. 268.)

b) For partly in the first age, revelation, contained in the scriptures, became known to us through the guidance of parents or preceptors; partly that very revelation bore witness to its divine origin and inspired divine faith. Cf. *Mus.* c. III. § 2. p. 106.

c) This is what we noted in § 4 from B. *Himmel:* that natural theology itself *gradually leads men to the supernatural*, to which he refers the passages *Rom. 1:19, 20. Ad. 17, 27.* Therefore the Gentiles, since by the light of nature they knew that there is a God, and that the human soul survives the death of the body, and that there are also different states of the good and the wicked after death, and that men are exceedingly prone to sin and offend God daily, and have no means from natural theology by which they can propitiate God; they easily came to the idea of believing that God, out of His special goodness, had somewhere shown the way and the means of salvation by a special revelation. It is also established by experience that no nation has ever subsisted by natural theology alone. See *Mus.* l. c. and P. II. Cap. V. Sect. I. § 15. p. 387.

PLATO: "*Believing the soul to be immortal and able to endure all evils, but all good things, that we may always follow the higher path and practice justice with wisdom in every way, so that we may be friends to them and to the gods, remaining in him here and when we receive his rewards, ὥσπερ οἱ νικε φόροι καὲνθα καὲν παντὶ τῷ αἰῶνι εὐ πράττωμεν.* " (L. 10. de Republ. Gf. Gerhard, loc. de vita aet. § 21.: "Considering the soul to be immortal, and such that it can endure all evil and all good, let us follow the path that always leads to higher things, and cultivate justice with prudence in every way, so that we may be both true to ourselves and friends of God, while we live this life, and after we have brought back the rewards of virtue as victors and triumphant, let us enjoy them happily, both here and for all eternity."

SALLUST: "It is certain to me as truth that the lives of all mortals are overseen by a divine power, and that no good or evil deed of anyone is held in vain, but that from a different nature, rewards follow the good and punishments the wicked." (To Caesar.)

CICERO: "I have persuaded myself, and I feel, that with such great speed of mind, such memory of the past, such foresight of the future, so many arts, such great knowledge, so many inventions, the nature that contains these things cannot be mortal; and since the nature of the soul is simple, and contains nothing within itself that is unlike itself or foreign to it, it cannot be divided; and if it cannot be divided, it cannot perish." (*On Old Age*)

OVID: "We strive for the forbidden and always desire what is denied."

(*Amores* III, 4, 17)

"What is permitted is unwelcome; what is forbidden burns more acutely."

(*Amores* II, 19, 3)

_ _"I see better things and approve them,
I follow worse things."

(*Metamorphoses* 7, 21)

HORACE: "You may drive nature out with a fork, yet she will always return."

(*Epistles* I, 20, 24)

LYCOPHRON: "Good heavens, how depraved is human nature." (In Stobaeus, *Sententiae* Serm. II, p. 31)

PLATO: "*The ancients, being superior to us and dwelling closer to the gods, handed down this tradition*." (*Philebus* p. 16.)

CICERO: "Antiquity comes closest to the gods." (*De Legibus* II, 11)

THE SAME: "If nature had so produced us that we could behold and clearly perceive her, and complete the course of life with her as the best guide, there would indeed be no need for anyone to seek reason and instruction. Now, however, she has given us small sparks, which we quickly extinguish with bad morals and corrupt opinions, so that nowhere does the light of nature appear. For there are in our minds seeds of virtues innate, which, if they were allowed to grow up, would of themselves by nature lead us to a blessed life; but now, as soon as we are born and taken up, we are plunged into constant wickedness and the utmost perversity of opinions, so that we seem to have sucked in error almost with the nurse's milk." (*Tusculan Disputations* III, 1.)

THE SAME: "Which of these opinions is true, God will see; which is likely, is a great question." (*L. c*. I, 11.)

THE SAME: "Socrates thought that nothing could be known. He excepted only one thing: that he knew he knew nothing, and nothing more." (*Academica Priora* II, 23, 74.)

OVID: "Ah! How very easy it is for those who think that the grievous crimes of murder can be washed away by the waters of the river."
(Fast. l. 2. v. 45.)

CICERO**:** "We have not yet seen anyone who is him (i.e., in whom perfect wisdom will be), but from the philosophers' opinions, it is set forth what kind of person he will be, if he is ever to exist." (*Tusculan Disputations*. II, 22.)

§ 15.

It is, however, a habit [(a)] of the science of revealed theology, [(b)] if not *πρώτως* or in the strictest sense so called, at least in a looser sense, [(c)] and indeed a practical science. [(d)]

a) That revealed theology is*, strictly speaking, a habit,* was openly declared by the *Wittenberg* theologians in 1623*,* on the occasion of the Magdeburg controversy between M. Andreas Cramer and his colleagues, as they said *they were surprised* that *this was called into question by anyone.* The theologians of *Leipzig* made the same determination in 1624, as is found in the *Appendix Consilii Dedeburgensis*, fol. 136, and said that*,* if the name theology is taken for *doctrine,* this is done by *metalepsis*. But most others have also warned that theology, when considered *οὐσιωδῶς* or *essentially*, denotes *a disposition* of the mind, *συμβεβηκότως, accidentally and in relation, that is, the doctrine*; namely, that *it pertains to theology, that it be taught and learned.* Cf. *Musaeus*, *Introduction*, Part I, Chapter I, § 2, p. 3.

J. FECHT**:** "That theology is *a habit,* and indeed a practical one, is clearly evident from Heb. 5:14. For although there it is dealt with the more perfect knowledge to be attained by all *Christians ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς δικαιοσύνης* (that is, the Christian doctrine of righteousness in Christ Jesus); if, however, that is *the state* or habit *of those who have their senses exercised* (trained through frequent reading of the word and meditation, with the help of the Holy Spirit, of those who have a sense of mind), *theology* itself will rejoice all the more by that title, since it intends not only to obtain justice and salvation for itself, but *also to implant them in others*. Who, however, discerns between good and evil, with an accurate knowledge of things (for this alone is not understood through *το καλόν τε και κακόν,* good and evil, unless the very nature of the words is taken into account), no one can doubt that he is *practical*." (*Philocalia Sacra*, p. 1.)

CALOV**:** "The first *genus* **is** *a more remote habit,* namely an intellectual one, and a principal one; by which *we remove* as incompatible genera 1. *doctrine, 2. discipline,* which two are *related*, since theology is an absolute thing

and it happens to it to be taught or learned; 3. *revelation*, and 4. *the knowledge of truth*, which are reduced to the predicate of action, whereas theology pertains to the predicate of quality; *the former* is moreover the principle of theology, not a genus, while *the latter*, if understood as habitual, supplies nothing but a remote genus. II. A *proximate* genus is *practical habit,* because theology by its nature tends toward praxis, and indeed, as it is considered here, to bring a man to eternal salvation (John 20:31; Romans 15:4), nor is anything in it known so that one may stop at that knowledge, but for the sake of praxis. . . Hence *we exclude* 1. a *mixed* or composite habit: partly *theoretical,* partly practical, which is *a contradiction in terms*, since the same habit cannot ultimately subsist in mere knowledge and at the same time by its nature tend toward practice; 2. a habit *intermediate* between the purely speculative and the practical, which, as they are contradictory to each other, admit of no middle; 3. Ravensperger's *intellect* and *prudent use*; because theology is a single discipline, to be taught by a single method, namely the analytical, not the synthetic or both; 4. *the knowledge, wisdom, and prudence* of certain individuals; 5. *the knowledge* and *wisdom* of Antonius Walaeus, who combines both types, because a single habit admits only one type; 6. *knowledge* and 7. *the wisdom* of others; for these habits are theoretical, and are conceived only in contradiction as practical wisdom and knowledge. Theology, however, does not rest content with bare knowledge, but tends toward practice, and that in itself. Although in the Scriptures it is indeed called wisdom (1 Cor. 2:7). James 3:15, in the mode of wisdom (1 Cor. 2:7), in the mode of intelligence (1 Cor. 9), or under the name of knowledge (John 17:3), yet they ought not to be assigned to the same *genus* by virtue of this, since *not all predicates are immediately generic* or common, but are to be understood according to their eminent reason. III. *The next genus is the practical habit drawn from divine revelation,* because it arises from divine revelation, whether immediate or mediated. Others call it *θεόσδοτον* or divinely given, because it is among the gifts of God, not precisely sanctifying ones, but ministering ones (1 Cor. 12:8; Jas. 3:15). Some, acknowledging the practical, prefer to define either *prudence* with *Keckermann* or *art* with Ramus. But prudence deals with *human affairs* (6. Eth. c. 5.); whereas art is an effective habit occupied with external work and leaving some *ποίημα* (product) behind it. Neither expresses the nature of theology. However, if the name *of prudence* is to be extended, we do not deny that this genus is more suitable for others, since theology is a practical habit, as prudence is also indicated in Prov. 1:2; Ps. 119:104, 130; and the prudence of the children of light, in order to be distinguished from human prudence, Luke 16:8." (*System of Theological Loci*, Prolegomena, ch. 1, s. 1, Vol. I, p. 4 ff.)

b) For since it is established that theology is a habit of the mind, it is not without reason that one investigates to which species it is most properly referred, so that we may arrive at the concept of its nearest genus. And yet, among the habits that have been recognized thus far, there is no species to which it is more properly referred than to science. For it tends by its very nature to teach, explain, and confirm the things subject to it, as a certain and determinate object; and therefore it infers certain conclusions from certain principles, or constructs demonstrations, which is proper to science and does not equally suit any other habit. See *Musaeus*, *Introduction*, Ch. III, § 4, p. 112-113. To the same point tend the words which our *G. Mylius* wrote as early as 1598 in his *Positions on the Word of God and Sacred Scripture, thesis 1.*: *Just as any science emerges from its own principles through conclusions drawn from proofs and demonstrations, so too theology* (as a science) *has its own principle in the Christian religion, etc.* He also expressly presented *the method* τῆς θεολογικῆς ἀποδείξεως (of theological demonstration) in a special dissertation delivered in 1602: and he showed that *ἀπόδειξιν* (demonstration)*, although it permeates all branches of science, is nevertheless nowhere held to be more perfect than in theology, in which, because of divine revelation, there is such*

certainty that a greater cannot be given. See thesis 45 and following. Therefore, those who acknowledge revealed theology to be a habit of the intellect, and to be a habit of teaching and deducing certain conclusions about a particular and determinate object, so that the connection of the extremes is necessary because the conclusions depend on necessary and certain premises, not without cause constitute the genus of theology ["*theologiae*"; Mayes translates erroneously "reality"] as a science, because the formal reason for science consists in this: that it is a demonstrative habitus.

CALOV: "It is inquired whether the kind of theology ought to be assigned as *science properly so called*; which we deny: 1. *From the definition of science*, which is *'a demonstrative habit from necessary premises*' (*6th Ethic*, ch. 3). For theology is by no means such a demonstrative habitus from necessary premises. It does indeed have its own proofs, *ἀποδείξεις,* but *spiritual,* not *scientific,* as the Apostle teaches in 1 Cor. 2:4; for these require that the affections be proven by their own reasons concerning a necessary subject, and indeed primarily a priori. Theology, however, has not a subject of demonstration, but rather of operation; it does not consist in demonstrating affections, but in handing down the means of salvation; it does not prove a priori, but a posteriori; indeed, it does not use reason, but divine authority, which is indeed the most effective proof, but not properly speaking a demonstration, nor does it generate knowledge, but requires faith. 2. *From the requirements of science,* which are gathered from its definition and the nature of demonstration: 1) With respect to the subject, which must be necessary and universal. 2) With respect to the propositions, which must properly inhere in the subject and be demonstrated about it. 3) With respect to the principles, by which the propositions must be demonstrated a priori from immediate causes or reasons. For these conditions are not given in theology, whose a. object is the contingent man to be saved; indeed, theology deals more with particulars than with universals. b. The affections in theology are not properly transmitted for this object, but rather its state is foreseen, and the means by which the end must be brought about are treated explicitly. c. Hence, the principles of the affections are not applied; rather, everything is proven from divine revelation, by the sole authority of God speaking, which is either *αὐτολεξεί* (in the very words) asserted in the Scriptures, or *διανοητικῶς* (intellectually) and by consequence collected from the Scriptures by *reasoning* and by consequence. 3. *From the nature and condition of science,* because science is cognition that is evident and perfect; which likewise does not entirely apply to theology, whose knowledge is rather non-evident, since it deals not with *ἐπιστητά* or knowable things, but with *τὰ πιστά* or believable things, and thus its mysteries are to be believed, not known; it commands reason in its cognitions to be taken captive, not to be master. Furthermore, the knowledge of theology in this life is imperfect, as the apostle teaches in 1 Cor. 13:12. 4. The *end* of science is theory; but the end of theology is praxis." (*Isagoge* I, 239–241.) N. Hunnius: "The end of science is knowledge. For all science is *ἄπρακτος* (non-practical). Science, indeed, is converted with its end and, as something acquired, does not differ from its end; and the entire essence of science consists in this, that it knows only its subject, by which act it rests entirely and does not proceed further (unless perhaps by reason *of an accidental and external end)*." (*Canones logici*. Wittenberg 1621. p. 5 ff.)

CALOV: "It must be observed, however, that it is not to be inquired whether theology can be called *a science in a looser sense of the word*, nor even whether theology should rather be called a science on account of its perfection than an opinion or an imperfect habit; which Thomas asserts, Part I, Question I, Article 2. We readily admit both of these, since it is also called science in a lax sense by the Holy Spirit, 1 Cor. 12:8. etc. and is rightly taught by Thomas as well as Augustine, everywhere, that it is not only an opinion but also a science; but in that sense, science cannot be assigned to it as *its genus*, since this signification is less proper, and not only theology but also other disciplines, even practical ones, can be called sciences by reason of their perfection, although they are not under the genus of sciences properly so called." (*Systema* Proleg. I, 42.)

RUDELBACH: "It (Theology) is a science mediated by the Spirit of God. This was it and nothing else that the theologians of that school held fast to, when they further described Theology as a "habitus practicus"; they mean to say that this science, like no other, is conditioned by immediate life-streams. . . With the "habitus practicus" (by which, regarding the point of departure, they place themselves on the side of the Scotists against the Thomists, the latter of whom conceived theology as a science partly speculative, partly practical) they wish to indicate that hidden efficacy of the Spirit, which is the *primus et perpetuus motor* (first and perpetual mover) of true theology. . . *We cannot abandon this determination;* it is the living center of our consideration. Theology is practical through and through, practical through its roots, means, and connections. . . In a narrower sense, the practical theological disciplines are: Catechetics, Homiletics, and Liturgics; not as if they were the only ones to be put into practice, but because they principally represent the Word in immediate motion." (*On the Concept of Theology and that of New Testament Isagogy*. cf. *Zeitschrift* 1848. Vol. I. p. 8. sq. 27. sq.)

ANTITHESIS:

LUTHARDT: "Theology is the ecclesiastical science of Christianity. . . In that definition (of the older Lutheran dogmatists), however, both the immediate relation of theology to *salvation*, and its conception as a *personal property* are, though meant in the best sense of religious earnestness, not scientifically correct. . . As jurisprudence is the science of law, in the sense of the state as the seat of law, so theology is the science of Christianity, in the sense of the church as the seat of Christianity." (*Compend. der Dogm*. 3rd ed. 1868. pp. 1-3.)

HARLESS: "Christian theology is the scientific knowledge of faith according to its foundation and essence." (*Theological Encyclopedia and Methodology*. Nuremberg, 1837. Section I. § 4. p. 25)

KAHNIS: "Theology is the scientific self-awareness of the Church. It was undoubtedly one-sided when the old dogmatists considered theology merely (!) as the personal habitus of a theologian: an abstraction borrowed from the concrete reality of a theologian. The dogmatists of the Enlightenment rightly insisted on the objective significance of theology as a churchly, Christian, or religious *science*, just as they also did for jurisprudence, medicine, Philosophy, Philology, etc., is not regarded merely as the specific property of a jurist, a physician, etc., but as a body of knowledge that transcends the individual persons who possess and cultivate it." (*Die Luth. Dogm*. Second Edition, Leipzig 1874, Vol. I, p. 8 ff.)

c) For indeed, if for science in the proper and simple sense it is required (as is commonly done according to Aristotle), that demonstrations be constructed from principles that are evident and self-known. For it must be admitted that revealed theology, in the principal articles of Christian doctrine which are called mysteries, draws its conclusions from divine revelation alone, which is naturally not self-evident. See *Musaeus*, *Introd*. 1. c. p. 116. 117. Meanwhile, it is better, while retaining the name of science, to express in the generic concept of theology those things which are common to it, as a habit, not only of the mind, and that a practical one, but also of conclusions, or the demonstrative, with other habits of the mind, but which are adapted to designate a concept of a genus not more remote, but more proximate; than

to omit those and simply command students or teachers to be content with the name of habit, or habit of the mind, or habit of the practical intellect, or the habit of *θεόσδοτον* (divinely given) (none of which expresses the nature of the demonstrative habit).

d) For all conclusions, if not *formally,* are at least *virtually* practical. Those formally prescribe something to be done or omitted: e.g. The Triune God is to be adored. These, by virtue of their conjunction with other formally practical ones, entail a formally practical conclusion: e.g. that Christ is true God, from which it is concluded: Therefore, one must believe in him. Compare *John Olearius, Univ. theol*., prooem., pp. 8–9. The same is true of what *Gerhard* writes in his *Exeg. LL*., prooem., § 12, p. 5: *"All that is taught in theology pertains to praxis, if not immediately and directly, then at least mediately and indirectly.*" That it does not contradict science to be practical is shown by Blessed. *J. Martini* in loc. cit., Disp. II, § 13 ff., p. 52 ff., and Disp. IV, § 22 ff., p. 86. Cf. above § 3, note *b.*

§ 16.

The end of revealed theology [(a)] is twofold: *internal*, which consists in the acts of knowing the objects of theology, not in any way, but insofar as [(b)] they are to be accurately explained, confirmed, and defended for the sake of men's faith and salvation; and *external*, [(c)] which is the very faith and salvation of men, and all things that are joined with faith.

CALOV: "The ultimate end, in a sense, namely on our part, is eternal salvation, or rather, being led to eternal salvation... *That end* which is of the Holy Scripture is the same end of theology, since both deal with the same object, Scripture proposes the articles of faith *sporadically* or scattered, theology explains the same ones *systematically* and in order. . . Its end is the same: the attainment of the enjoyment of God or eternal salvation. And everything that is taught in theology is directed toward this end; *although some* of its subjects *may seem theoretical, they are not proposed in theology for the sake of theory and mere contemplation,* but for the sake of practice; for when the nature of God, an angel, or man is known, it is not so that we may rest in the knowledge, but rather that knowledge is directed to practice, that we may enjoy God, become *equal to the angels*, and aspire to blessedness." (*Isagoge*. I, 183. sq.)

QUENSTEDT: *"Absolutely* and simply*,* theology *is not necessary,* not even for the whole church: for God can inform and convert men *immediately*, i.e., without the ministry of theologians; but *under the hypothesis,* given, of course, God's will. For it pleased God to deal with us through His Word and its preaching, Romans 10:14, and through the study of the Scriptures, John 5:39, and to lead men to salvation by the way of doctrine and instruction. (I note: without the ministry of *human* theologians; for *"το"* immediately can be understood either of the ministry *of men, or* of the announcement *of the word; in this* sense God never converts anyone immediately, but in *that* sense more often.") (Th. did.-pol. P. I. c. 1. s. 2. q. 2. f. 20. sq.)

CALOV: "This *πρᾶξις* (praxis) of leading men to salvation constitutes the theologian, or it is his proper function and the office of the theologian himself. Although, however, the theologian is not always occupied with

leading men to eternal salvation, he must nevertheless be instructed in that habit of leading men to salvation, which by its nature tends toward that end. And it is the proper task of the theologian to act in this way, even though that external end which he intends, eternal salvation, often does not follow on the part of the subject of that most holy administration." (*Isag*. I, 190. sq.)

GERHARD**:** "The intermediate and proximate end is either internal, *the instruction* of men for eternal salvation, or external, *the* actual *attainment* of blessedness or eternal life (Luke 1:77). John 5:39, 20:31, Romans 15:4, 2 Timothy 3:16. *Whatever, therefore, does not lead to this end, neither directly nor indirectly, nor immediately nor mediately, pertains not to theological γνῶσιν* (knowledge). From this it is easily concluded what is to be stated about certain futile, rather than useful, scholastic questions and idle speculations, which the apostle calls "foolish and unlearned questions" (2 Tim. 2:23), namely: that they pertain rather to *ματαιολογία* (vain talk) rather than to *θεολογία* (theology). 1 Tim. 1:6." (*Exegesis of Theological Loci,* Prolegomena, § 26.)

MEISNER**:** "The theologian knows God as an end, for our beatitude is situated in the fruition of God; and he knows him not so that he may rest in that knowledge, nor desire anything else; but rather, so that through that knowledge ... both he himself and others who hear him may become partakers of eternal salvation. *He who does not always aim at this end, nor has it in view in all his theory* (***γνώσει***)*, does not deserve the name of a true theologian.*[11] (*Sober Philosophy*, Part III, s. 5, ch. 2, p. 163)

ANTITHESIS:

LUTHARDT**:** "Therefore she (theology) is designated (by the older dogmatists) as an eminently *practical* wisdom, and compared to medicine; cf. the dedication of Gerhard's *Sacred Meditations*. This is based on a confusion of theological *science* with the church's proclamation of salvation. The *necessity* of theology, as is already evident from its actual existence, is conditioned by the *intellectual need* of the Christian, as well as by the practical need of the Church; its *possibility* is grounded in the relationship of knowing to faith." (*Kompendium* etc. p. 3.)

HARLESS: "Just as every scientific discipline is a product of the historical development of human knowledge, so the need for theological knowledge is not to be derived *from the essence of religion* itself, but only from the historical development of the Church, from which scientific theology itself has arisen. *The necessity of theological knowledge lies, in its potential, in the very nature of the rational spirit, which is compelled not only to have what it possesses as a given possession, but also to set it forth again as its own proper movement and as absolute truth at the same time."* (*Theological Encyclopaedia*. Nuremberg, 1837. p. 26. sq.)

a) As of a practical science.

b) For theology in itself pertains to these acts, and the theologian has them in his power by virtue of the science he possesses. Cf. *Musaeus*, *Introduction*, Ch. III, § 6, p. 127, and *Meisner*, Part III, *Philosophical Synopsis*, p. 112., where, after comparing the theologian with the physician, he says that the *internal end* of theology is the *theological healing, or working for the salvation of man;* so that a theologian is said to have *rightly performed his duty if he has omitted nothing in his power for the healing and restoration of men, even though he does not lead all to salvation.*

c) Which is beyond the power of the theologian, nor is it always reached by the power of the knowledge which is within him, as is clear from experience.. Cf. *Meisner,* loc. cit.

§ 17.

The external end is usually distinguished into *the ultimate* and *the intermediate.* Each of these, in turn, is distinguished into *the objective* and *the formal.* The objective is God, infinitely perfect and supremely good. The formal is a certain operation concerning God, by which we possess and enjoy Him as the supreme good. Therefore, the objective end is one in both cases. The formal, however, is different: one if you consider the ultimate end, another if you consider the intermediate.

§ 18.

Namely, the ultimate formal end consists in an intuitive and clear knowledge of God [(a)] , and likewise in the most intense love [(b)] of God intuitively known.

a) Thus Christ*, in Matthew 5:8,* about to declare *the blessedness* of those *who are pure in heart*, says that *they will see God*. And *John*, in 1 John 3:2, places the future blessedness*, which has not yet appeared*, in the fact that *we shall see God* (whose *children* we are) *as He is.* We are said, however, to attain God in this way as the supreme good, because God is apprehended by that act of the intellect and is made intimately present to us and united with us. See *Musaeus*, *Introduction*, ch. III, § 11, p. 130. We will say more on this below in its proper place.

b) By clearly knowing or apprehending this God, as our good, we adhere to Him for His own sake. For it cannot be otherwise, but that the will is drawn to the highest love of God, when the intellect perfectly knows Him as our supreme good. *Musaeus.* l. c. p. 131.

§ 19.

The intermediate formal end is faith [(a)] in Christ, as the cause of obtaining grace from God. To the same end, however, pertains the love of God, [(b)] as He is reconciled to us; indeed also other acts [(c)] by which we are made partakers of divine goodness; and in its own way, the entire sanctity of life. [(d)]

Calov: "The *intermediate* end can likewise be distinguished into *internal* and *external. The latter* is the *faith* of men to be led to salvation. . . *The internal,* however, is any *function* of theologians that pertains to the faith and salvation of men; above all, prayer, the preaching of the divine word, the administration of the sacraments, and the administration of ecclesiastical discipline." (*Isag*. I, 192. ff.)

The Same: "For the theologian should *not* direct his knowledge solely *for his own sake,* but so that the truth, once known, may be apprehended by a trusting heart; and the true and living practice of faith is that from which *the πραξις ενσεβειας*—the *fruit* of true faith—further emanates and is brought about." (Loc. cit. p. 216. sq.)

HOLLAZ: "By the *intermediate* end of theology is understood that means of salvation by which we attain the *ultimate* end, or eternal blessedness. But we attain it through faith. Therefore... *love* for God and neighbor, *holiness* of life, and the restoration of the divine image follow faith in Christ by an individual bond, and thus pertain to *the consequences of the intermediate end* of theology, *but are not the causes* for attaining eternal blessedness. There are some authors who, with Musaeus in Introd. theol. p. 135.), or a *secondary* end with Hildebrand in th. dogm. p. 21., or a *non-causal intermediate* end with Baier. With whom we will not quarrel, since they admit that they are taking the end of theology *in a broader sense*." (*Exam. theologic. acroamat. Prolegom*. c. 1. q. 18. p. 13.)

QUENSTEDT: "Distinguish between the *πρᾶξις τῆς πίστεως* (praxis of faith) and *πρᾶξις τῆς εὐσεβείας* (praxis of piety). . . Both practices are found in theology, but *the former*, not *the latter,* is on our part *the only means* either of attaining or of being brought to salvation; and therefore *theology is called practical not because of the latter, but because of the former*." (*Didactic–Polemical Theology*, Part I, ch. 1, sect. 2, q. 3, fol. 25)

a) For through this we are united to God, as our good, already in this life; insofar as Christ, whose merit we apprehend by faith, becomes our *propitiation, Rom. 3:25,* so that we may have *peace with God, Rom. 5:1,* and the right or inheritance *of eternal life, John 3:16.*

b) Thus, *John* (1 John 4:7-8) connects the love of God with *a* true and saving *knowledge of God*. And it is certain that by the act of love, even in this life, we adhere to God and enjoy Him as our good.

c) For example, filial trust, or the acquiescence of the will in the reconciled God, as the cause of obtaining the other goods; so that, as *children*, *we may cry out* to God: *Abba, Father! Rom. 8:15.* Hence, there is also immediately a place for the hope of those goods, both spiritual and temporal; as in the same chapter. verse 24, we are said to *be saved by hope*, i.e., to await salvation with a firm act of hope; and verse 28, *being certain,* and therefore also securely hoping or expecting, that *all things will work together for our good.*

d) Indeed, theology is wholly directed toward the holiness of the entire life and, in order to attain it, is occupied with teaching and confirming conclusions that lead to it and are directed as if toward a goal; although it is certain that it does not have the same status as faith as a cause in relation to the ultimate end, nevertheless, just as the term *'means'* is used, so here the term *'end'* must be taken in a broader sense; for this reason, some even use the term *'secondary end'* or *'concomitant end'* here. Meanwhile, *J. Foerster* writes in *Theological Problems*, disputation I: *The architectural end* of theology consists *in πρᾶξις* (praxis)*, which πρᾶξις is exercised in faith or in life.* Th. 19. and ff.. to 23. And *Jac. Martini* loc. cit., § 34, p. 38. calls *the external end* of theology to be *piety,* whose true *description* is found in *1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, from a good conscience, and from sincere faith";* and he adds another passage*, Heb. 12:14*: *Without holiness no one will see God. Gerhard* also, in his *Exegesis*, Prolegomena, § 12, p. 5, says that the *πρᾶξις* (praxis) *to which* theology, *as to an end*, tends consists *in doing the will of God,* according *to Matthew 7:21; Luke 6:46; John 13:17.* Therefore, if the end of theology is the holiness of life, in which, however, one does not ultimately rest, but a further end is given, namely, eternal salvation; Indeed, so that, although holiness of life is not prescribed as the means by which we obtain

eternal life, it is nevertheless prescribed as pertaining to the way of eternal life, by which we must pass, lest we fall from it: why should holiness of life not rightly be called the intermediate end of theology? which, if anyone were to call, in addition, *an intermediate non-causal end* (with respect to the ultimate end), we would not object.

§ 20.

The subject of the operation [(a)] is sinful man, [(b)] insofar as he is to be led to eternal salvation. [(c)]

> GERHARD: "Just as in medicine *physiology* and *pathology* are first treated, which consider the affections of the subject (the human body), around which, insofar as it is to be healed, it is concerned; so in theology, which is a spiritual medicine, the nature of man, both constituted and fallen, is first treated, then the means to the end of theology (i.e., the restoration and salvation of man) are proposed as leading to the end of theology." (*Exegesis*, Prolegomena, § 28)

a) Our theologians acknowledge that the subject of the operation of revealed theology is given, namely, those theologians of our own school who hold revealed theology to be a practical habit. And although philosophers otherwise teach that the subject of practical habits and sciences must bring *a* certain natural *capacity* or aptitude for performing the prescribed operation, and although they also restrict *πραξιν* (praxis) itself to those things that are *ἐφ' ἡμῖν,* or within our power, here, however, the practice of faith depends on the supernatural grace and influx of God, and man is by nature inept for it, like a dead man: our theologians, *however*, think it sufficient here to say that the end must nevertheless be introduced into man, as the subject, through certain prescribed means, by the power of divine grace, or that he himself must be led to the end through those means. See *Gerhard* in *Exegesis*, loc. cit., § 28, p. 17; *Meisner*, *Philosophical Synopsis*, Part III, p. 114, 121. The subject of the operation, however, coincides with *the end for which it is performed*. See *Musaeus, Introduction*. 1. c. § 15. p. 136.

b) Whether corrupted by sin or subject to it, such as every man born carnally is throughout his entire life after the fall. For we do not take the state of sin so strictly, as it is opposed to the state of regeneration; rather, we confess that even a regenerated man continues to need theological practice as long as he is on the way or in this life.

c) For the sinful man is the *material* subject of the operation; but insofar as he is to be formed and brought to salvation, he constitutes the *formal* subject of the operation. Cf. *Gerhard*, loc. cit.; *Meisner*, *Philosophical Sacra*, Part III, p. 115.

§ 21.

The efficient cause of the formal ultimate end [(a)] is God, [(b)] the Trinity. [(c)]

a) Or of that operation, by which we perfectly possess and enjoy God Himself, as our supreme good.

b) For only God can bestow upon the human intellect the light of glory, and thus elevate it to elicit that operation which entirely surpasses the natural power of the finite intellect. Likewise, only He can perfect the will in such a way that an act of the most intense love for this good may arise in it.

c) For the bestowal of blessedness is an outward work, common to the three Persons.

§ 22.

The internal impulsive cause is God's [(a)] goodness; the external and meritorious cause is the merit of Christ. [(b)]

a) Not only because, according to divine justice, blessedness is not owed to man; but above all, if you consider the blessedness to be given to a sinner.

b) For since the justice of God, offended by sin, demands satisfaction or punishment from man, the grace or goodness of God does not become the complete principle of our salvation unless it intervenes through the merit by which divine justice is satisfied. And so Paul, in *Romans 3:24*, connects, in the order of the justification of the sinner, *the grace of God and the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; and 1 Tim. 2:4–6,* after saying that *God desires all people to be saved,* he immediately adds *the mediator of God and of men, who gave Himself as a ransom for all,* so that we might be saved.

§ 23.

But faith in Christ [(a)] is also rightly counted among the causes of salvation. [(b)]

a) For thus, to the other causes—the grace or love of God, by which He loved *the world*, and to His *only-begotten Son,* inasmuch as He was *given* to the world as a mediator, atoning for the sins of the world by His merit—faith, or *believing in Him,* is joined, *John 3:16.* And elsewhere we are said *to be saved διά της πίστεως, through faith, Eph. 2:8; to live ix πίστεως, by faith, Rom. 1:17; Gal. 3:11; Heb. 10:38.* The particles *ἐκ* and *διά* have the force of a cause there.

b) Not, however, in itself and absolutely considered, as if it were an act or a quality; nor insofar as it is efficacious through charity, but in relation to the object, which is Christ the mediator. And if one must come to a specific kind of causality; as must be admitted, faith does not have to do with salvation and blessed vision in the manner of an efficient, material, formal, or final cause, but its causality consists in this, that while it presents to God the merit of Christ, as apprehended by man, it thereby moves God to confer salvation on that man by grace; thus faith is rightly referred to the genus of an impulsive cause; and because it moves God by the dignity, not of itself, but of the merit of Christ, *the impulsive cause* of that very merit of Christ can be said to be *less principal*. See *Musaeus*, *Introduction*, loc. cit., § 18, p. 138-139.

GERHARD: "We also say that faith is the cause of justification, namely *an instrumental one.* It is one thing to be justified *διὰ τὴν πίστιν* (on account of faith), another *διὰ τῆς πίστεως* (through faith); *the former* denotes the *meritorious* cause, the latter *the instrumental one. We* are not justified *on account* of faith as if it were some kind of merit, but *through* faith, which apprehends the merit." (*Locus on Justification*,. § I79.)

QUENSTEDT: "*The moving cause* (of predestination) is one internal, another external. *The internal* is *the* purely gratuitous *grace of God*, excluding altogether any merit of human works, or anything that comes under the name of work or action, whether done by the grace of God or by the powers of nature. For God has chosen us not according to works, but according to His mere grace. *Even faith itself does not pertain here*, if it is viewed as *a condition*, more or less worthy, whether per se or from estimation, by the will of God superadded to faith; that none of these enters into the decree of election as *a moving or impelling cause* for God to make such a decree, but that it is to be ascribed to the pure, mere grace of God, as Huelsemann teaches in *Breviarium* c. 15, th. 6." (*Theologia didactico-polemica*, P. III, c. 2, s. 1, th. 10, f. 25.)

REUSCH: "The *principal impulsive cause* is that which moves the efficient cause to act by its own goodness and its own value; *the less principal*, instrumental or organic cause is that which does so by the goodness and value of another." (*Annotations on Baier's Compendium*, p. 771.)

§ 24.

And because faith is conferred on men only by God [(a)], who produces and confirms it through the Word and the Sacraments as through instruments [(b)]: therefore these also are rightly numbered among the causes of salvation. [(c)]

a) For there is no need for human strength, but it is supernaturally conferred on man, who is by nature incapable of believing, as we will see below.

b) Thus in *James 1:21* the *Word* of God is called the *seed,* from which the faithful are born; and thus active power and true causality are attributed to it in order to produce faith in men. And Baptism in *Titus 3:5* is called the *washing of regeneration;* namely, that regeneration depends on it, as on a cause.

c) For because they are causes of faith, which is the cause of salvation, they are rightly considered causes of salvation itself, as of those things which are caused.

CARPZOV: „It should be added that the Augsburg Confession deals with the word and sacraments here (article 5), as they are *operative* means and act by way of *physical operation*, since the question is in this place: Where does faith come from? and do the word and sacraments operate the same? For besides this mode of operation, another also belongs to the word and sacraments, which is *moral*, and consists in *the giving, extending* or *offering, collation* and *sealing of the good of justification. For the action of the word and sacraments, insofar as they generate,* nourish and excite *faith ,* should not be confused with the action of the word and sacraments, *insofar as they concur closely with justification.* For since in *the former* action the word and sacraments act as *instruments* both *effective* of spiritual powers for believing, and *excitatory of* spiritual movements of faith; in *the latter,* especially in justification, they are at least organs *giving* , *collating* and *obsignating of* the good of justification, which is the obedience of Christ." (*Isag. in libros symb*. Ed. 2. Lips. 1675. p. 251.)

§ 25.

The object of revealed theology is twofold: *material* and *formal*. The material is revealed things [(a)] which are known in revealed theology. And to this pertain not only the subject of operation and the causes and means of attaining the end, but also the end itself [(b)], insofar as it is known by the habit of theology. The formal, or the principle and reason of knowing from which depends the cognition of things that are proposed in revealed theology, is divine revelation. [(c)]

BROCHMAND: „One thing is adequate, another is proximate, another is the principal *object* of theology. The *adequate* object of theology is *whatever God has taken care to write down in His Word.* For since the principle of theology is the written Word of God, it is impossible not to acknowledge as the object of theology everything that is found handed down and written down in the Holy Scriptures. Therefore, since in the Holy Scriptures not only is God, creation, the original integrity of angels and men, the fall of angels and men, the restoration of men through Christ, but also the natural knowledge of God, the love owed to God and neighbor, the deeds of many men, pious and impious: all these cannot but be the subject of theology according to Romans 15:4 and 2 Timothy 3:16. *The proximate* object of theology is what eye has not seen, ear has not heard, it has not entered into the heart of man, prepared by God for men and *revealed by the Holy Spirit* , Isaiah 64:4; 1 Corinthians 2:9–10. Which assertion is confirmed by these testimonies of Holy Scripture: John 1:18; Matthew 11:27; 16:17; 1 Corinthians 2:7–8. *The chief* object of theology is *God, inasmuch as He manifested Himself in Christ to sinners for salvation.* To this pertain 1 Corinthians 2:2; John 5:46; Acts 4:11–12.“ (*Universal System of Theology*, Ulm 1664, Article I, ch. 1, § 4, fol. 2 ff.)

PFEIFFER: „Positive theology is nothing else than the coordination of conclusions about faith deduced from the Holy Scriptures correctly understood or articles of faith solidly proven from the oracles of Holy Scripture, indeed nothing else than *Holy Scripture itself*, reduced to certain places in a coherent order and with a clear method; hence *not even a single member, not even a small one, should be in that body of doctrine, which is not established from the Holy Scriptures correctly understood.* “ (*Thesaur. hermeneut*. p. 5.)

GERHARD: "The only principle of theology is the word of God; *therefore, what is not revealed in the Word of God is not theological."* (*Loc. de creatione*, § 3.)

CALOV: *„The general object* or *consideration* . . . are called *divinely revealed things,* insofar as they are to be perceived by us *for salvation;* in which sense blessed Meisner Part III, Ethics, § 1, p. 174. the object says, ‘every divine thing, by which man can be led to eternal salvation.’ Nor is it inconvenient for our same Meisner to think that all that can be called *religion by one word,* since it encompasses everything necessary for salvation, to be believed and done, and to which all things that are usually proposed in the system of theology are referred or have a certain respect; so that *religion* itself constitutes *the material* of this object, but *the formal*, *insofar as we are promoted to salvation through it.* We also acquiesce in this opinion, until something is shown more conveniently, by which the general object can be explained.“ (*Isagoge* I, 273. ff.)

THE SAME: "The object of theology must be assigned in such a way that it concerns true blessedness, and it is necessary that those things *which do not contribute to this end be removed from theological treatment* ." (*Ibid.*, p. 264)

THE SAME : *"The formal reason for the object of theology is not revelation,* but rather the revealed things constitute the *material* of the object*, which* are viewed in theology under this *formal* reason, *in which they regard the ultimate end,* eternal salvation." (L. c.)

a) But in this place things are said to be revealed which are supernaturally manifested by God, whether they could also be known through the light of nature or not: as will be clear from what follows.

b) Sometimes indeed the end is the principle of knowledge in practical sciences; but the objective and formal end of revealed theology is not so well known that it should not be handed down and taught by another previously known method of knowledge, namely divine revelation. See *Musaeus*, *Introduction*, loc. cit., § 24, pp. 151–152.

c) It is otherwise called *the first revealing truth;* and by one name, if we speak of theology as it is today, is understood the Scripture *θεόπνευστος,* which testifies of itself through the confluence of God in the mind of man, and from which all theological conclusions are deduced; which will be taught in the following chapter.

§ 26.

The material object is distinguished [(a)] into *things to be believed* and *things to be done*. Things to be believed are called those which so underlie faith that they are not formally [(b)] operations directed by previous practical acts; but they are to be believed by those who are to attain salvation; for example, that God loves the human race, that Christ is the Son of God and the Son of man, etc. By the name of things to be done are understood the very operations of theology prescribed by practical acts, perhaps also habits of transferring to operation, or of acquiring through operation, if not for the sake of obtaining salvation, yet so that we do not fall short of salvation; e.g. the actual or habitual apprehension of the merits of Christ, which we call faith, the actual or habitual love by which we love God, Christ and our neighbor, the hope of eternal life, etc.

MUSAEUS: "We say here that things to be believed are not all that deserve faith, but those that are necessary *for the attainment of salvation by faith; nor do we say things to be done*, which are incumbent on man to do for any reason, but which, if not for the sake of attaining salvation, yet *lest we fall short of salvation*, are instituted and commanded by God to be done. For in the divinely inspired Scripture, histories and various things are found scattered about, which are to *be believed by the very fact that they are contained in it,* but which have no bearing on our salvation. Many *things to be done also* occur in the Scriptures, which likewise are not ordered to the eternal salvation of man and therefore do not come within the *material object* of theology,

unless perhaps *indirectly and accidentally,* insofar as they can be referred to human health in some indirect and accidental way. For in practical sciences the breadth of the object must be estimated from the end.“ (*Introduction to Theology*, Jena 1678. p. 156. ff.)

RUDELBACHIUS : “The main thing is that they (the old dogmatists) uphold the fundamental concept of *revelation*, which, in our conviction, alone can measure the entire field and assign each doctrine its place. Christology, the doctrine of Christ’s person and work, nevertheless always remains the decisive center point toward which everything is prepared, through which everything reaches its goal.” (*Zeitschrift*, 1857, p. 382.)

a) If you consider the force of the words, they can agree, and sometimes really are the same thing, to be believed and to do. For to do, by the very fact that they are supernaturally revealed, could also rightly be called to be believed; and on the contrary, if something is to be believed in such a way that it is to be deduced to an operation, or as an operation that should be done by us, it really belongs to doing. Vid. *Mus.* lc § 26. p. 156. But how they are distinguished here from the use of speech, is clear from the following in the thesis.

b) And by this reason it is clear that the foundation of that distinction is not the hypothesis that theology is a habit partly theoretical, partly practical; for we said above that things to be believed also, although formally they are not *πράξεις* (practices), are nevertheless treated for the sake of *πρᾶξις* (praxis).

§ 27.

The articles of faith are called*,* in another sense*, articles of faith,* [(a)] which in a *broader* [(b)] sense are divided 1. into *pure* and *mixed* articles of faith*,* and 2. into *fundamental* and *non-fundamental.*

a) They are called articles of faith because from them, like parts closely bound together, faith or the doctrine of faith, which is to be believed, is constituted; just as the joints of the fingers, fitted together and closely connected, are called articulations. See *Mus., Introd*. Cap. III. § 30. p. 163. Others call the articles not so much of faith, as *of the doctrine of faith*. But it has long been the case that faith is said to be not only that *by which* one believes, but also *that which* is believed, that is, the doctrine of faith.

REUSCH: "An article properly denotes a part *of* either *a chain* or the human body, insofar as it is connected with other parts." (*Annotation on Baier's Compendium*, p. 39.)

b) It is certain that the term "article of faith" was once accustomed to be taken in a *stricter* sense; precisely denoting the mysteries of the faith necessary for salvation, and thus only the pure and fundamental articles. Thus *Luther*, in *his* Exposition on Psalm 45 (*Works*, vol. III, Jena Latin edition, fol. 490), says*: "Know this first*," he says*, "that the articles of faith are truly statements about such things as the eye has not seen, the ear has not heard, nor have they entered into the heart of man, and are taught and understood by the Word and the Holy Spirit alone." And it is the nature of all articles of faith that the entire reason abhors them.* Likewise*, Conrad Schlüsselburg* in *Theology of Calvin*, Book II, p. 13, states *the customary definition of the articles of faith, as handed down by our theologians, to be as follows:*

An article of faith is a proposition or doctrine, *not known by nature*, *but divinely revealed and delivered by the express Word of God, or an indubitable consequence built upon it, concerning God, His essence, will, word, and the sacraments and benefits of God, pertaining to the true worship of God and the salvation of men, to be apprehended by faith.* It is also *well* known how *Hunnius* in the *Colloquy of Regensburg*, session XI, p. 351 ff., argued at length *that all articles of faith must necessarily be known and believed by all and every Christian*. To which respond the things that *Musaeus* taught concerning the requisites of an article of faith, strictly so called, in his *Questions on Syncretism*, Question IV, § 13, pp. 28–29. However, the term article of faith is otherwise frequently taken in a *broader* sense, especially today, and admits the division indicated in the thesis, which *Musaeus* has discussed at length in *Introduction*, ch. III, § 30, pp. 162 ff.; cf. *Detailed Explanation*, p. 111 ff., and *Questions on Syncretism*, Question IV, annotations p. 38.

N. Hunnius: "*Dogma* in this thesis is taken only concerning the doctrine of Christian faith and religion, and that in the broadest sense, insofar as every doctrine, whether true and divine, or false and heretical, is comprehended under the name of dogma." (*Theological Discourse on the Fundamental Disagreement*, etc. Wittenberg 1626. § 179.)

Ibid.: "*An article* signifies nothing other than a part of the heavenly doctrine revealed in the prophetic and apostolic word. However, to somewhat restrict the excessive breadth of this declaration, *I distinguish the historical word* from *the* dogmatic and *moral doctrines*, or those that prescribe what is to be done and what is to be omitted, from the dogmas of faith, or those that teach what is to be believed and what is not to be believed (which are properly and first called dogmas). And because I am now not concerned with the foundation *of piety,* but *of faith,* not of things to be done, but of things to be believed, *the historical* and *moral* are to be entirely removed, which never deserve to be called articles of faith." (L. c. § 53. 54.)

Quenstedt: *"The object about which* the articles of faith are concerned are *τὰ πιστά* (things to be believed) as such. . . For although faith, considered in general, is concerned with all things contained in the word of God, whether they be historical, moral, or dogmatic; yet it is concerned in a special way with the dogmas of the faith or things to be believed as such. This is to be observed, lest anyone fall into the absurdity of the Jesuit Adam Tanner, who asserted in the Colloquy of Regensburg, session 11, that everything which is believed, or which occurs in the Holy Scriptures, has the force of a dogma and is an article of faith, so that he even ridiculously concocted new articles of faith from the incest of Judah and the dog that moved the tail of Tobit. Thus also the history of the foxes' tails of Samson, of Balaam's ass, of Methuselah's years, of the building of the Tower of Babel, etc., would have to be numbered among the articles of faith." (*Didactic-Polemical Theology*, Part I, ch. 5, s. 1, note 6, fol. 349.)

The Smalcald Articles: "The Papists cite Augustine and certain Fathers who have written about *purgatory*. . . But this in general was nothing but the devotion of men, and indeed of one or another, *not constituting an article of faith, which belongs to God alone*. . . We have another rule, namely, that *the Word of God establishes the articles of faith and that no one else, not even an angel, does* so." (Part II. art. 2. p. 303.)

Hollaz: "An article of faith is a part of the doctrine revealed by the written Word of God concerning God and divine things, proposed to the sinner for *salvation* through faith." (*Examination*, Prolegomena, ch. 2, q. 12, p. 43)

Quenstedt: *"The* generic *form* of the articles of faith does not consist in conformity with the written revelation of God, but in *the relation* of the distinct articles of faith *to one another,* and then, and especially, *to the whole,* i.e., to the whole body of heavenly doctrine, of which they are the parts or

particular members. And although they are closely interlinked, like the joints in a finger, *one* is *nevertheless* placed *outside of the other*." (Loc. cit., note 7, fol. 349)

HOLLAZ: "For a true article of faith*, it is required*: that it be revealed in *the written Word of God*, that it relate to man's *salvation*, that it be closely *connected* with the other dogmas of the faith*,* that it be *non-evident. . .* (It must be established that some articles of faith are not evident by reason of the material and formal object, while others are evident only by reason of the *formal* object.*')"* (Examen etc. Proleg. c. 2. q. 14. p. 44.)

THE SAME: "An article of faith is taken either collectively or distributively. *Collectively,* it denotes an entire head of Christian doctrine; *distributively*, it designates any assertion or statement that constitutes a part of the doctrine. — Proof: Christian doctrine is divided into *chapters* or *theological loci, and* the chapters are divided into specific *theses*. Both *the chapters* of the doctrine of faith and the *theses* of the *chapters* are called *articles of faith;* e.g., the theological locus *on Christ* is called an article of faith, and this proposition: *'Christ, as man, sits at the right hand of God,*' is likewise called an article of faith." (L. c. q. 13.)

N. HUNNIUS: "Those things that come together to form *a building* are threefold: 1. some *support and are not supported,* 2. some *support and are supported;* 3. some are *supported and do not support.* Of the *first* kind is *the foundation* and those things that essentially enter into it. *Of the second* are *the* intermediate *walls*, which rest on the lower parts and bear the upper ones. *Of the third are the apex,* the roof, and things pertaining to it. For indeed the third order *does* not *found* at all, the second only in part and in a certain respect, the first absolutely; therefore neither the last nor the middle, but the first alone holds the name *of foundation*, to which the others are ordered, whether this is done immediately or through another." *(Διάσκεψις* etc. § 13.)

KROMAYER: "Others divide the articles of faith into fundamentals, circum-fundamentals, and praeter-fundamentals. By *fundamentals*, those which enter into the definition of saving faith and more closely touch upon it; by *circum-fundamentals,* those which are more remote or are elicited by consequences; by *praeter-fundamentals*, they understand indifferent matters or *matters of question*." (*Scrutinium religionum*, p. 447.)

QUENSTEDT: "They distinguish the doctrines necessary for salvation into those that precede, constitute, and follow the foundation of faith, namely *the antecedent* (or *presupposed), constitutive, and consequent of faith.* This distinction is approved by Dr. Calov in *System of Theology*, Part I, General ch. 5, § 1, p. 776., but so that the antecedents and consequents of faith are not denied to be necessary to know, much less are such things established that could be plainly denied or rejected while preserving faith, at least because they do not enter into the constitution of faith, but precede or follow faith. The *antecedents*, or *presuppositions*, are those things which do not in fact produce justifying and saving faith, nor are they required for it with absolute necessity and immediacy; nevertheless, they are necessary for the doctrines that generate and constitute faith to be rightly believed and to remain intact, which could not happen if they were not posited, or were unknown, or denied. They therefore establish, help, and preserve the foundation of faith, yet they do not primarily generate faith itself. . . The proximate and immediate *constitutors* of faith*,* or fundamental articles, which . . . intrinsically constitute and cause faith, are the chapters of Christian doctrine concerning God's *φιλανθρωπία* (love for mankind)*,* the universal merit and satisfaction of Christ, and its appropriation in the individual. . . They are the *consequences* of faith, which, that is, follow the established trust in such a way that, unless they are posited, the trust itself again vanishes, namely: the eternal duration of God, the executive justice of God, the effective sanctification by God, the communication of the idioms (characteristics) and operations in the person of Christ, the kingly office of Christ, the existence of the church, the conversion of man through repentance and the justification of the converted (according to some), peace and tranquility of conscience, the practice of piety toward God and charity toward one's neighbor, the efficacy of the word and sacraments, etc." (*Theological Didactic-Polity*, Part I, ch. 5, § 1, theses 5–8, fol. 352 ff.)

LARGER CATECHISM: "In the beginning, our theologians divided the faith into *twelve articles*, although, if all the particulars which Scripture delivers and which are to be referred to the faith were to be taken up separately, there are many more articles, but neither can they be adequately expressed in so few words." (*Book of Concord,* p. 449.)

SCHERZER: "The Scholastics say that the *articles of faith have grown* with respect to explicit knowledge; which is the mystery and secret of advancing Scholastic theology." (*System of Theology,* p. 8.)

KROMAYER: "We premise, 1. that the articles necessary for salvation are to be known *at all times*, i.e., that they find a place in the Old and New Testament, as the apostle says to the Ephesians 4:5.: ‚One Lord, *one faith'* (i.e., *which* is believed, not *by whom* it is believed, the objective or doctrine to be believed, not the subjective, which apprehends the merit of Christ and is distinguished from its subjects), ‚one baptism, one God and Father of all.' And in Acts 13:32: *ἡμεῖς ὑμᾶς εὐαγγελιζόμεθα τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πατέρας ἐπαγγελιαν γενομένην,* i.e., we proclaim to you the fulfillment of the promise made to the fathers. The *ἐπαγγελία* (promise) and *εὐαγγέλιον* (gospel) differ, in that the former is taken in its strictest sense as the preaching of Christ to be exhibited, while the latter is the preaching of Christ already exhibited. Therefore, the object of both is Christ; *the most definite end* of the Scriptures, that is, the goal and center toward which all things in the sacred texts converge, and indeed to be apprehended through faith. Thus the apostolic synod decreed in Acts 15:11, "We believe *it* is through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ *that* we are saved, *just as they* are," the fathers of the Old Testament being unable to bear the yoke of the law, which was *unbearable*, i.e., impossible to carry. Therefore, when the faith is said to be *one* and the articles of faith necessary for salvation are *for all time*, this is to be understood: that they obtained it before and after Christ was revealed, though without the state of integrity in which, had man persevered, he would have been justified and saved not by faith in Christ's merit, but by obedience to divine commandments. Given these premises: *whatever doctrine was unknown at any time was not strictly necessary for salvation*." (*Theologia didactico-polemica*, P. I, Prooemium, p. 1 ff..)

§ 28.

Articles of pure faith are called those which are known only from divine revelation: such as the article on the Holy Trinity, the article on the incarnation of the Son of God, and others. Mixed are called those which are known not only from revelation, but also from the light of nature [(a)]: e.g., the article on the existence of God, and on the divine attributes.

QUENSTEDT: "There are certain dogmas in the Scriptures which are simply *πιστά* (believed) and can in no way be known by reason, but far surpass it; there are also certain *πιστά κατά τι* or believable in a certain respect, which, although revealed in the Scriptures and necessary to know, are nevertheless such that *reason*, *by its own principles*, *can in some way arrive at their knowledge.* From this arise pure and mixed articles: The *former* are drawn from the Word of God alone and are only believed, such as the article concerning the Trinity, incarnation, etc. The *latter*, although they become known in some way from the light of nature, are nevertheless believed only insofar as they are established by divine revelation; thus, for example, that God exists, that God has care for all things, that He is powerful, wise, one, good, etc., which are both known by evident demonstration and believed on account of divine revelation. Yet all these things which are in some way known by the light of nature are not believed insofar as they derive from natural light, but insofar as they are held on the basis of divine revelation. (*Theologia didactico-polemica*. Part I, ch. 5, sect. 1, thesis 1, fol. 350)

HOLLAZ: "The distinction of articles of faith into pure and mixed must be rightly understood. For no article of faith, *formally* considered, insofar as it is an article of faith, is *mixed*; for all articles of faith that depend on divine revelation and are therefore not evident by the formal object's reason are pure. *They are distinguished into pure and mixed by the reason of the material object.* Indeed, those divine things which are set forth in the articles of faith, which they call mixed, consist partly of reason and partly of supernatural revelation. They consist, I say, of principles of reason, which are known *less well, less securely, and less fully,* whereas from the revealed word they are known far better, more certainly, and more fully for the salvation of man. Add to this that *certain circumstances* concerning things knowable by both reason *and revelation* are matters of *mere faith*. For example, take *the creation* of this universe, completed within the six days. Not without reason the apostle says: *πίστει νοούμεν, κατηρτίσθαι τοὺς αἰῶνας ῥήματι θεοῦ.*(by faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God) Heb. 11:3." (*Examination*, Prolegomena. c. 2. q. 17. p. 45.)

QUENSTEDT: "The principle of being of articles of faith is God alone; *the principle of their being known is not the authority of the church*, *not human reason*, but divine revelation in the Word. Where it is to be observed that each article of faith has its own proper and native *seat* in Holy Scripture, from which it must also be judged, e.g., the article on creation has its seat in Gen. 1, the article on the divinity of the Son of God in the N.T. John 1, on original sin in Rom. 5, on the Lord's Supper in the words of institution in Matt. 26., Mark 14, Luke 22, 1 Cor. 10 and 11, of justification Rom. 3, 4, and 5, of election Eph. 1, etc. From these seats, therefore, the articles of faith are rightly judged and explained, since they are treated in them *expressly*. Which, when the Papists and Calvinists neglect, they fall into the greatest difficulties and gravest errors, e.g., the former (Papists), while they wish to explain the article of justification from the 2nd chapter of James; the latter (Calvinists), while they draw their judgment about the Lord's Supper from the 6th chapter of John." (*Theologia didactico-polemica,* Part I. ch. 5. s. 1. thesis 1, fol. 349)

BROCHMAND: "It is not disputed whether it is in the hand and power *of the church* to establish new articles of faith. For this was *not* granted *even* to *the apostles themselves*, as Christ testifies, who commanded the disciples to teach only those things which they had received from him, Matt. 28:19-20. To which admonition we also read that the apostles obeyed, Acts 26:22; 1 Cor. 11:23; 2 Cor. 13:3; 2 Pet. 1:6." (*Systema*, Artic. 25. q. 5. Tom. II. f. 236)

a) And of these it is rightly said that not only *they are to be believed,* but also *to be known.* They are called articles of faith, not insofar as they are known with evident clarity from the principles of natural light, but insofar as they are believed, or insofar as they are received by the assent of faith on account of divine revelation.

§ 29.

Fundamental articles of faith are those which have such a relation to the foundation of faith and salvation that, with it preserved, they cannot be ignored or at least denied. The *foundation* of faith [(a)] is said to be, however, the *thing* on which the faith and salvation of men is founded, and this is Christ [(b)] insofar as He is the cause of our salvation; [(c)] then the *doctrine* by which that thing, on which faith is founded, is contained; [(d)] and is a complex of several propositions [(e)] divinely revealed, which import a certain relation to salvation. [(f)] The former foundation is called *the real* or *substantial*, the latter the *dogmatic* foundation, by authors.

QUENSTEDT: "*The form* is the very close and necessary *cohesion* of these articles both among themselves and with the foundation of faith. . . Hence the well-known axiom: *'Faith is a single, connected thing*,' by which it is meant that all the fundamental articles of faith are so closely linked together that whoever denies one also denies the others." (*Theologia didactico-polemica*, Part I, ch. 5, s. 1, thesis 2, fol. 351)

HOLLAZ: "Some fundamental articles of faith are read ῥητως or in explicit words in the sacred writings; some are contained in the sacred Scripture only διανοητικώς (intellectually) and according to the matter, which are perceived from it by a manifest and immovable consequence. We read *expressly* written that there are three who testify in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and that these three are one (1 John 5:7); that Christ is a true man 1 Tim. 2:5, that He is also truly God 1 John 5:21 [*sic*: 1 John 5:20], that He is the one mediator between God and men 1 Tim. 2:5, the only-begotten Son of God John 1:14; that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father John 15:26; that all nations are to be baptized Matt. 28:19. *By a valid consequence* we infer that God, one in essence, is *three* in persons; that God eternally begot the Son δμοονσιον (consubstantial); that Christ is *one person* composed of two natures; that the Holy Spirit also *proceeds from the Son of God*; that *infants* are to be baptized, etc." (*Examination*, Prolegomena, ch. 2, q. 22, p. 52 ff.)

LUTHER: "For where he (the devil) brings it to the point that one concedes to him in one article, he has won, and it is just as if he had already lost them all and Christ; he can then also well ruin and take others; for they are all intertwined and linked together, like a golden chain, so that if you dissolve one link, the entire chain is dissolved and everything falls apart. And there is no article that he cannot overthrow, if he can get reason to fall into it and try to be clever, and then knows how to twist and stretch the Scripture so that it fits his purpose; this then goes in like a sweet poison. Therefore we see even now, because the devil has once gained a foothold, that he always introduces one heresy and rottenness after another, attacking this article today, tomorrow another, as he is already on his way through his forerunners, by which he wants to challenge again the divinity of Christ, as well as the resurrection of the dead." (*Sermon on the Christian Armor*. 1532. IX, 450 ff.)

THE SAME: "It is certain, whoever does not rightly believe one article or will not (after he has been admonished and instructed), certainly does not believe any with earnestness and true faith. And whoever is so bold as to dare to deny God or accuse Him of falsehood in a single word, and does so willfully against and beyond what he has been once or twice admonished or instructed, he also dares (and indeed does) deny God and accuse Him of falsehood in all His words. Therefore it is said, plainly and simply: believe everything, or believe nothing at all. The Holy Spirit does not allow Himself to be separated or divided, so that He should teach one part truly and the other falsely, except where there are weak persons who are ready to be instructed and do not stubbornly resist. Otherwise, if it were to be allowed that a person could deny one article without harm, because they held all the others to be true (although in reality this is impossible), then no heretic would ever be condemned, nor could there be any heretics on earth. For all heretics are of this sort: first they begin by denying just one article, and then they must deny all the others afterward, and all of them must be denied: just like a ring, if it gets a crack or a scratch, it is no longer any good at all, and if a bell cracks in one place, it no longer sounds at all and is completely useless." (*Brief Confession Concerning the Holy Sacrament Against the Fanatics*, 1544. XX, 2216 ff. [StL 20, 1781 f.])

THE SAME: "In philosophy, a small error in the beginning is in the end a great one. Thus in theology, a small error overturns the entire doctrine. Therefore, doctrine and life must be kept as far apart as possible. . . For doctrine is like a mathematical point; it cannot therefore be divided, that is, it can bear neither subtraction nor addition. . . Doctrine must therefore be a certain single, perpetual, and round golden circle, in which there is no fissure. When even the smallest defect is added, the circle is no longer whole, etc. . . For if they believed it to be the Word of God, they would not play with it so, but would honor it with the highest honor, and would have faith in it without any dispute or doubt, knowing that one word of God is all, and all is one; likewise, they would know that one article is all, and all is one, and that if one is lost, all are gradually lost. For they are coherent and held together by a certain common bond. . . Therefore, if you deny God in one article, you have denied Him in all, because God is not divided into many articles, but is all in each, and one in all the articles." (*Commentary on the Epistle of St. Paul to the Galatians*, ed. Dr. J. C. Irmischer, vol. II, p. 334 ff.; cf. Halle, vol. VIII, 2653–62)

a) The foundation is otherwise chiefly regarded in architecture and denotes that which is first among those things that enter into the constitution of a building, as its parts, and is the reason and cause why that which it founds, namely the building, is or can be. Hence, here *by analogy*, the foundation of faith and salvation is called that which is first in saving faith and the salvation of men, and is the reason and cause why saving faith and salvation itself is or can be for men. See *Musaeus*, *Introduction*, ch. III, § 34, p. 166-167.

QUENSTEDT**:** *"The foundation of faith* is constituted *in three parts* by the same Dr. Hunnius and others: substantial, organic, dogmatic..." *The organic* is the Word of God, which, like a seed from which Christians are regenerated (1 Pet. 1:23), is also called a foundation insofar as it is the medium for generating faith and the principle of doctrine, which underlies and is laid as a foundation for faith, and is therefore the foundation of faith (cf. Eph. 2:20-21)... Hence, a *heresy* is not just any error contrary to the Word of God, but one that undermines and overturns the very foundation of faith—whether *substantial*, the proper object of faith; *organic*, the word of God, the principle and medium of faith; or *dogmatic*, that very doctrine from which faith is conceived and sustained." (*Theologia didactico-polemica*. Part I, ch. 5, s. 1, thesis 2, fol. 350 ff.)

b) Thus Paul says that the *foundation,* on which the church, or the assembly of the faithful and the saved, as such, and therefore the saving faith of men, rests*,* is *Jesus Christ, and that no other foundation can be laid besides this,* 1 Cor. 3:11.

c) For just as Christ is the cause of our salvation by this, that by satisfying divine justice with His merit He moves the benevolent will of God to forgive us our sins and to grant eternal salvation; so God Himself is not excluded, but included in the foundation of faith and salvation as the efficient cause, and his grace or *φιλανθρωπία* (love for mankind)**,** as the internal, impulsive cause of conferring salvation upon us. See *Musaeus*, loc. cit., p. 169.

d) Thus in *Eph. 2:20.* Paul says that the faithful are *built upon the foundation of the prophets and apostles,* that is, the doctrine preached by them; *indeed, with Jesus Christ himself as the cornerstone,* to whom the reason of the foundation ultimately returns. *Musaeus* loc. cit., pp. 171–172.

e) For the individual articles, which are called fundamental, do not, when considered separately, constitute the dogmatic foundation of faith; but all of them, taken together, form that foundation. Yet if one or another fundamental article is removed, faith itself and salvation collapse. *Musaeus,* p. 172.

N. HUNNIUS: "A dogma in theology is a doctrine concerning Christian faith and religion. Among these dogmas there is an *order,* so that faith exists without some, but not without others; therefore I understand by the *dogmatic foundation* that part of heavenly doctrine which, *when proposed alone to man*, generates in him justifying and saving faith, and *without which* saving faith cannot be generated." (*Διάσκεψις,* Examination. § 95.)

HOLLAZ: "You say: 'One thing has only one foundation. Therefore, a twofold foundation, namely a real and a doctrinal one, is not given.' I answer: The substantive and the dogmatic foundation of faith and salvation are not two foundations adequately distinguished, nor do they differ in reality, but *according to our mode of conceiving them* on account of different connotations. For *Christ* is the foundation on the part *of the thing; the doctrine* about Christ is the foundation on the part of our *knowledge.* But the *doctrine* about Christ is nothing other than *Christ known by the intellect* and proposed to others for knowledge through the written or preached Word. Therefore, the dogmatic and the substantial foundation do not differ, except as doctrine and the object of doctrine, which, when finally taken together, constitute one and the same foundation in reality, although our mind conceives it as twofold." (*Exam.* Proleg., ch. 2, q. 19, p. 47 ff.)

f) They all certainly imply some relation to salvation, though not an entirely equal one, as will become clear from what follows. Meanwhile, it is not necessary for a fundamental article that its relation to salvation be taught in the Scriptures under the express necessity of believing for salvation. For although this sometimes happens, e.g., with regard to the article about the one true God and the Son of God sent in the flesh, *John 17:3*: it is nevertheless sufficient, if in the Scriptures their relation to salvation is delivered implicitly and by consequence, when they are nevertheless proposed, although not under an express necessity of believing, in such a way that their necessary connection with the foundation of salvation, Jesus Christ, can be understood from a more profound consideration of them and concluded by a straightforward and manifest consequence. *Musaeus, On Syncretism*, Question IV, § 15, p. 30.

§ 30.

Fundamental articles of faith are distinguished into *primary* and *secondary.*

The reason for the distinction is based on the unequal degree of necessity and the need for an explicit knowledge of them in generating and sustaining faith.

§ 31.

Those are commonly called primary articles which [(a)], if saving faith and salvation are to be preserved, can not only not be denied, but also cannot be ignored [(b)].

QUENSTEDT: "Nor is the opinion of those to be disapproved . . . who state that the articles of faith are *simply fundamental*, the ignorance of which also damns, those which constitute and explain some *cause* of our salvation, such as: by reason of the principal efficient cause, *the article concerning God, One and Triune;* by reason of the internal impulsive cause, the article *concerning God's love for the entire human race* fallen into sin; by reason of the meritorious cause, *concerning the person*, *merit, and satisfaction of Christ;* by reason of the material cause, the doctrine *of sinful man* (the knowledge of sin is necessary not as a cause of faith or a means by which trust in God can be aroused or eternal salvation procured—for the recognition of a disease is not the cause of health—but as a certain condition or requirement necessary in the subject for being led to salvation); by reason of the instrumental cause on God's part*, concerning the Word of God;* on man's part*, concerning faith* or the apprehension of the meritorious worth of Christ; by reason of the formal cause, *concerning the remission of sins and the imputation of Christ's righteousness;* and finally, by reason of the end, the article *of eternal life.* So that this may be a dogma of faith necessary for all to believe: God, One in essence and Three in persons *(the efficient cause*), out of immense love for the fallen human race *(the internal impulsive cause),* to every sinful man who acknowledges his sins *(the material cause*), through and for Christ the mediator and by his merit *(the meritorious cause)* in the word announced (*the Instrumental cause on God's part*) and apprehended by faith *(the Instrumental cause on man's part)*, it forgives sins and applies the righteousness of Christ *(the Formal cause)* and grants eternal life *(the Final cause)*." (*Theol. did.-pol.*, Part I, ch. 5, sect. 1, thesis 10, fol. 354)

KROMAYER**:** "Those dogmas intrinsically constitute faith which enter into its *definition*. The definition of saving faith, however, is this: that it is the trust by which one believes that God, on account of the merit of His Son, will be willing to have mercy on him as a sinner, so that he will not be condemned but will attain eternal salvation. It is clear that those things which do not enter into this definition are either presupposed or consequent. However, there are very few things which enter into the definition, idea, and concept of faith, and in these the core and marrow of what is to be believed for salvation is contained. The first element is that there must be trust; the second, that God wills to have mercy on the sinner; the third, on account of Christ; the fourth, on the individual sinner; the fifth, that such a person will be eternally saved." (*Theol. posit.-pol*. Part I. Prooem. p. 4)

a) Or, whose explicit knowledge is necessary for saving faith to be generated and to exist. *Hunnius, De dissensu fundamentali*, § 63, pp. 41–42; *Musaeus*, *Introd*. pp. 176–177.

b) The reason is a priori, that for the real foundation of salvation to be apprehended or retained, the knowledge of these is necessary. For the foundation does not generate faith, or cause salvation, unless it is known. *Mus.* l. c. p. 177.

§ 32.

The primary articles, again, can be distinguished [(a)] into *others,* whose subject matter is of the intrinsic reason of the real foundation: e.g. [(b)] the article concerning Christ as *θεάνθρωπος* (God-man), [(c)] likewise the article concerning the merit and satisfaction of Christ for our sins; and *others*, whose matter, although not of the intrinsic reason of the real foundation, is nevertheless so closely connected with it that, unless it itself is explicitly

known, the other elements entering into the constitution of that foundation will not be sufficient to generate and sustain saving faith: e.g., the article concerning God [(d)] and of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, [(e)] an article on the gracious will of God, by which He wills [(f)] all men to be saved, an article on [(g)] the sin by which we are defiled, made odious to God, and worthy of punishment, an article on justification or the remission of sins to be obtained through Christ, [(h)] and on the faith by which the remission of sins is obtained, [(i)] of the blessed life, [(k)] which those will attain who have departed from this life propitiously to God.

a) See *Musaeus* loc. cit. p. 173.

b) For just as the real or substantial foundation of salvation is Christ, insofar as he is the meritorious cause of obtaining from God the remission of sins and eternal salvation, according to note. *b.* to § 29: so the article on Christ the *God-man* presents Him as the meritorious cause; and the article on Christ's satisfaction for sins presents that by which he merits the remission of sins. Both, therefore, pertain to the nature of the real foundation.

> N. Hunnius: "Whoever professes and teaches that Christ is the foundation of faith does not thereby *actually* place or establish him; nor does whoever is ignorant of or denies him thereby *actually* destroy or overturn him. He constitutes the foundation *notionally* who believes and professes that it is truly and really laid." (*Διάσκεψις*, Examination, § 66. sq.)

c) For this reason, in order to know that *Christ has satisfied for us,* it is necessary to know that he has borne and offered something that men ought to have borne and offered, and therefore that He is *a man;* it is also necessary to know that what He rendered or bore was sufficient, or had a sufficient value and price, and therefore that Christ Himself is *God.* Whether this, *that Christ is θεάνθρωπος (God-man), is known directly through preaching, or indirectly, as when one judges the effect from the cause,* it is the same; it must certainly be known. See *Hunnius*, loc. cit., p. 183, § 294.

> Dannhauer: "*In the πιστοῖς θεοπνεύστοις (faithful God-breathed writings)* (let the apocryphal dog of Tobit depart) the fundamental, *eminently principal,* root and as it were the balm of spiritual life is *the Christosophic word,* radical and final, the cause and source of life simply, absolutely necessary for the being of spiritual life, without which spiritual life cannot be had, nor eternal life obtained (for the fundamental laws of any state stand or fall with its sovereign), the ignorance of which, not only that which is called *κατὰν διάθεσιν* (dispositional), but also *κατ' ἀάπόφασιν* (by negation), condemns, 2 Thess. 1; and therefore this kind of *faith* is neither ignorable nor deniable, while salvation is preserved." (*Hodos. Phaen*. II. p. 667.)

d) For just as there is a most intimate connection between the meritorious cause and the efficient cause, which, moved by that merit, grants the effect, so if anyone is ignorant of the God who grants the remission of sins and salvation, he cannot acknowledge Christ as the meritorious cause of salvation. *Musaeus,* l. c. p. 173. 174.

e) For *one must know the Father, so that He may not be unknown, who offers such abundant grace to the human race. If the Father, then also the Son; for he who does not know the Father, does not know the Son either (and he who does not have the Son, does not have the Father either). Furthermore, just as the knowledge of the Father requires the knowledge of the Son, so the knowledge of the Father and the Son as the Giver of the Spirit requires the knowledge of the Holy Spirit. Hunnius, loc*. cit., §§ 272–273. p. 172–173. and § 427. p. 270. Cf. *Mus.* Q. IV. *de syncret*. § 9. p. 26. *It should be noted*, however*, that it is one thing for the mystery of the Trinity to be considered formally and distinctly with its personal characteristics, or when the simple triadic number is attended to and precisely three persons, neither more nor fewer, are established in the Trinity; and it is another thing, materially or according to the number counted, when the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are believed in*. See *Johann Meisnerus, Iren. dur*. sect. II. § 211. ff. p. 191. Conf. *Huelsem. Dial. apol*. p. 56.

Apology A. C.: "Our adversaries approve of the first article of our confession, in which we set forth that we believe and teach that there is one divine essence, individual, etc., and yet *that there are three distinct persons of that same divine essence and coeternal:* the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. . . And we constantly affirm *that those who think otherwise are outside the Church of Christ, are idolaters*, and offend God." (Book of Concord, Art. I. p. 77.)

Gerhard: "The mystery of the Trinity is necessary for all who are to be saved to know and believe. *Exposition:* a) We exclude from those to be saved not only the denial of the Trinity, but also ignorance of it. Some things revealed in the Word are so arranged that they can be ignored without jeopardizing salvation, although they cannot be denied without the same danger; but ignorance of the Trinity is as damning as its denial, b) We do not require an equal degree of knowledge from all members of the church, since the light of spiritual knowledge and faith is more illustrious in some and more obscure in others, c) Nor do we require a perfect and full *grasp* and intuitive knowledge of this mystery from those who are to be saved, since we cannot be advanced to it in this life Exod. 33:20; 1 Cor. 13:9, in which sense Cyprian, in Sermon I on the Baptism of Christ, rightly declares that the Trinity is known to itself alone. But this we assert: that for the Catholic faith, necessary for all who are to be saved, a distinct and explicit knowledge and confession of the three persons of the Godhead is required, not a confused and implicit one. We demonstrate this 1) *from the definition of God handed down in the Scriptures.* Whoever does not acknowledge God as He has revealed Himself in His word strays from the true God; whoever is ignorant of or denies the definition of God handed down in the Scriptures is ignorant of or denies God Himself… 2) *From the most intimate and indissoluble union of the persons of the Trinity.* Whose one person is not outside another, one of them cannot be known, worshiped, or invoked, unless the other is also known, worshiped, and invoked at the same time. . . . 3) *From the Savior's explicit assertion in Matthew* 11:27: No one knows the Son except the Father, nor does anyone know the Father except the Son and to whom the Son wills to reveal him. . . . 4) *From the description of the Gentiles outside the Church.* The Gentiles were able to know by the light of nature that there is a God, and that he is one, good, just, and a punisher of sin. But because they could not know by the light of nature the mystery of the Trinity, which was revealed in the Word and by the light of grace alone, Scripture denies them the saving knowledge of God and attributes to them mere mere *ἀγνωσία* (ignorance) with respect to the knowledge that brings salvation. . . 5) *From the nature of this mystery.* The mystery of the Trinity being ignored or denied, *the* entire *economy* of salvation is ignored or denied. . . 6) *From the testimony of the pious ancients.* Athanasius in the symbol: 'This is the catholic faith, that we worship one God in Trinity and the Trinity in unity. Unless one has kept this faith entire and inviolate, he cannot be saved.' Gregory Nazianzen, at the end of Oration II. on Peace: *τριὰς πᾶσί ποτε γνωθησομένη, τοῖς μὲν τῷ ἐλλάμψει, τοῖς δὲ κολάσει* (the Trinity will someday be known by all, by some through illumination, by others through punishment)." (Exeges. loc. III. §§2—8.)

MEISNER: "*A number* is either *the numbering* or *the numbered.* When the number of the elect is in question, this can be understood either of the number itself, which they call *the numbering*, namely how great it is or *how many* thousands of people are chosen; or of the *numbered* number or the numbered people, *namely who in particular* are the elect or which persons. The Scholastics call that one the formal number, this the material number. The former asks: *how many* are chosen; the latter: *who* are chosen. This distinction can be illustrated by an example. For if someone knows that a certain prince maintains *two hundred* court ministers but does not know *who* those ministers are, the number of courtiers is both certain and uncertain. Certain formally, because he knows *how many* there are; uncertain materially, because he does not know *who they* are. Hence it is clear that the distinction between the formal and material number is by no means to be rejected." (*Anthropol*. d. 18. q. l. n. 1.)

f) For that benevolent and gratuitous will of God is *the προηγουμένη (antecedent) or internal impulsive cause for the obtaining of the remission of our sins,* with which the merit of Christ is therefore most closely connected, as an external impulsive cause, which would not even have place without it. For if *God did not love mankind so as to give His only-begotten Son for them, there would be no reason why God should accept the merit of Christ, as if it were a foreign thing, from us as if it were our own. For this entire matter depends on the benevolent will of God toward us miserable men,*" writes *Musaeus, Tract on Syncretism*, Question IV, § 9, p. 26. However, this dogma *concerning the universality of divine grace* (as well as the other *concerning the universality of Christ's death) is to be taken literally in a universal sense, just as it ought to be received in its entirety, and is simply necessary for all to believe, so that no one, through the ordinary and customary word of God* (whatever may be said of *the simpler believers, and of the special mode of the gracious operation, by which the Holy Spirit works faith in them) can be certain of himself in particular that God wills him to be saved (that Christ died for him), unless through those parts* of doctrine *which are actually known and believed,* the aforesaid *Musaeus* has expressly taught, loc. cit., p. 66. § 7. With whom *J. Meisner*, *Irenicum Durans*. S. II. § 228. p. 200-201., is in full agreement, who, when discussing those *universal propositions*, says that *without them, if one has them not, no one can certainly know and determine that the benefits of Christ's death pertain to him.* He also adds these words: "*If, however, I were to concede altogether, some man, e.g. Adam and Eve, to have conceived faith, or still to be able to conceive it, who perhaps have never heard anything about the universal benevolence of God, the universal merit of Christ, or who, on account of the weakness of their intellect, a lack of judgment, or some other cause, could not have penetrated to that point; I nevertheless deny that this can be done if the intellect is imbued with the contrary error of particularity.*

g) For Christ's satisfaction for sins certainly implies a certain relation to sins. See *Mus.* 1. c. p. 27. And *unless one knows that men sin, and each one understands individually that he has sinned, no faith is to be expected;* these are the words *of Hunnius,* l. c. § 340. p. 206. cf. § 454. p. 291. For no one will think he needs the satisfaction of the mediator with God, who does not think he has offended God.

h) For *if justification were nonexistent, the merit of Christ would be of no benefit to us* (*sinners*). *Mus.* 1. c. And Christ, the mediator, relates to *the remission of our sins as a meritorious cause to its effect, by meriting it and acquiring it.* However, *there is a perpetual connection* between *the meritorious cause* and *the effect, so that if the effect, for which merit is the cause, is not*

given, the meritorious cause will be of no avail, or certainly its attempt, labor, action, or passion to merit the effect will be vain and ineffectual. Mus., Introd. p. 173.

LUTHER: "For in this (article on justification) everything hangs and stands, and it draws all the others along with it, and everything is for the sake of this one; that whoever errs in the others certainly does not have this one correctly, and even if he holds the others but does not have this one, it is all in vain. Again, this article also has the grace, if one diligently and earnestly holds to it, that it does not allow one to fall into heresy or to run counter to Christ or His Christianity. For he certainly brings with him the Holy Spirit, who thereby enlightens the heart and keeps it in a right, certain understanding, so that it can make a pure and clear distinction and judgment of all other articles of the faith and mightily preserve and defend them. As can also be seen in the ancient Fathers: where they remained with such articles and founded their teaching on them or derived it from them, they remained pure in all things; but where they departed *from* this and disputed *outside* of it, they also went astray and stumbled grievously; as also happened from time to time to the very oldest, Tertullian, and Cyprian. And what is lacking, not only the Papists, but all our heretical spirits, who rave against Baptism and other articles, except that they have already fallen from this, do not care about it, and have raised up other things in its place and thereby lost their minds, so that they can teach nothing correctly about this and cannot maintain any article for certain? as can be well seen in their books; and then fall from one error into others, until at last they lead themselves and other people to destruction. For where this knowledge of Christ is gone, the sun has lost its light and it is utter darkness, so that one no longer understands anything correctly and cannot defend oneself against any error or the devil's false teaching. And even if one retains the words of faith and of Christ (as they have remained in the papacy), there is still no foundation for any article in the heart, and what remains is nothing but foam and uncertain persuasions or conceit, or a painted, colored faith. As they themselves call their faith "*fidem acquisitam et informem*", that is, a loose, lazy, idle thought that does nothing and is good for nothing, neither holds nor fights when it comes to the fray, where it ought to hold its ground and *prove* itself. And indeed, they prove with their deeds that their boasting about faith and Christ is completely false and a lie, for they will not tolerate this article of the knowledge of Christ and true faith, but rage against it with excommunications and murder. Again, where this sun shines and illuminates the heart, there is a true, certain understanding of all things, so that one can stand firm and hold to all articles: for example, that Christ is a true man, born of the Virgin Mary, and also a true, almighty God, begotten of the Father in eternity, Lord over angels and all creatures. Likewise, he believes and teaches correctly about the Holy Spirit, about baptism, the Sacrament, good works, the resurrection of the dead; he walks simply in faith, does not dispute or wrangle over God's Word, and does not cause quarrels or doubts. And if someone comes who *challenges* one or more of these articles, a Christian can defend himself and refute them; for he has the right Master (the Holy Spirit), who alone reveals these articles from heaven, and they are given to all who hear and accept this word or preaching of Christ. Therefore, such a one will not be led astray into heresy and error; and even if he should happen to err and stumble, yet (so long as he does not fall from this) he soon gets back on the right path. For this light consumes and drives away the

clouds and darkness and guides and raises him up again. But if he loses this light, he cannot be helped. For where this knowledge is gone, it takes everything with it, and you may thereafter profess and confess all the articles (as the Papists *do*), but there is neither sincerity nor true understanding; but rather, it is like groping in the dark and a blind man hearing talk of a color he has never seen." (Exposition of the 14th, 15th, and 16th Chapters of St. John 1538. VIII, 504—506 [*StL* 8, 628–630; AE 24, 320–322])

THE SAME: "For if the article of justification is lost, the whole Christian doctrine is at the same time lost. And all who are in the world and do not hold it are either Jews, Turks, Papists, or heretics. . . For out of that doctrine, and in that doctrine alone, the church is made and consists." (*Commentary on the Epistle of St. Paul to the Galatians*, by Dr. J. C. Irmischer, Vol. I, p. 20 ff. Cf. *Hal*., VIII, 1552 ff.)

THE SAME**:** "This locus is the cornerstone, which alone begets, nourishes, builds, preserves, and defends the Church of God; *and without it the Church of God cannot subsist for one hour.*" (Pref. of Dr. M. Luther to J. Brenz's exposition on the Prophet Amos. See J. Brenz, *Works*, Vol. IV, p. 1087. Cf. *Luther, Works*, Halle, Vol. XIV, p. 191.)

i) For if *there were no faith, the merit of Christ would be of no benefit to us. Mus. Tract. de syncret*. l. c. p. 27. And just as it is necessary to know that Christ, by His merit, has acquired for all the grace of the remission of sins, so it is necessary to know that the merit of Christ actually benefits believers in obtaining the remission of sins.

k) What we said in note *h.* about the article of justification pertains here in its own way. For eternal life also relates to Christ and His merit as an effect to its cause, just as justification confers the right to eternal life or its inheritance upon men. And, *if anyone is ignorant that a blessed life is given to those who depart from this life with the favor of God, whom they will ultimately attain, he can neither acknowledge Christ as the meritorious cause of our salvation, nor can he have a steadfast confidence in him for obtaining eternal life from God. Mus.* in *Introd*. p. 173–174.

N. HUNNIUS: "He overturns the foundation who holds the fundamental doctrines, yet denies that any doctrine *is* necessarily *presupposed* to them. Examples are Hymenæus, Alexander, and Philetus, who were shipwrecked concerning the faith and subverted the faith of some, 1 Tim. 1:19–20. 2 Tim. 2:17, 18; however much they acknowledged the saving grace of God and the merit of Christ, and professed that men are saved by faith, they nevertheless shipwrecked the faith by denying *the resurrection of the dead*." *(Διάσκεψις,* § 356.)

§ 33.

Secondary fundamental articles are customarily described as parts [(a)] of Christian doctrine which, although they can be ignored [(b)] while the foundation of salvation remains safe, nevertheless cannot be denied [(c)] while it remains safe. [(d)] Such are the articles concerning the characteristic properties [(e)] of the divine persons, the personal union considered in itself, and the communication of attributes [(f)] in Christ, of original sin [(g)] , of the decree

of election with regard to final faith, [h] of justification by faith alone, excluding the merit of works, [i] etc., of which, although explicit knowledge is not possessed by all simple believers, yet the denial on the part of the denier cannot stand [k] with faith and salvation, unless great simplicity and ignorance of the consequence, by which that negation, by consequence, opposes the very foundation of faith, and a mind abhorring the error which directly opposes the foundation of faith and prepared to accept a better interpretation, intervenes. [l]

Book of Concord: "As for the condemnations, expositions, and rejections of false and impure doctrine, especially concerning the article of the Lord's Supper, which in this explanation and thorough treatment of the disputed articles must be expressly and distinctly set forth, so that everyone may know how to guard against them, and for many other reasons cannot in any way be omitted: it is likewise our will and opinion that this is not meant to apply to those persons who err out of *simplicity* and do not blaspheme the truth of the divine Word, much less to entire churches, whether within or without the Holy Roman Empire, but only to the false and deceitful *doctrines* and their *obstinate teachers and blasphemers*, whom we have in our lands, churches and schools which we do not at all intend to tolerate, are to be actually rejected, since they are contrary to the express Word of God and cannot stand apart from it, so that the devout may be warned against them, for we have no doubt at all that many devout, innocent people, even in the churches which have not hitherto fully agreed with us, to be found, who walk in the simplicity of their hearts, do not rightly understand the matter and are offended by the blasphemies against the Holy Supper, as it is observed in our churches according to the institution of Christ and unanimously taught therefrom in accordance with the word of His testament, take no pleasure at all, and who will, it is hoped, if they are properly instructed in doctrine, through the guidance of the Holy Spirit, turn to the infallible truth of the divine Word, joining themselves to us and our churches and schools." (Preface of the Electors, etc. p. 16. sq.)

Apology of the Augsburg Confession: "Although there are many *weak ones* among them who build *stubble* upon the foundation that will perish, that is, certain useless opinions, which, however, because they do not overturn the foundation, are sometimes condoned for them, and sometimes even corrected. And the writings of the holy *fathers* testify that at times they too built stubble upon the foundation, but which did not overthrow their faith." (*Concordia,* p. 155. ff.)

Luther: "There are two reasons why sins do not harm the saints, yet they strangle the wicked. The first is that the saints have faith in Christ. . . The other reason is that the saints, through faith, are so discerning that they rely solely on the mercy of God, regard their own works as nothing, and indeed confess from the bottom of their hearts that they are mere useless works and sins. . . Do we not see in Augustine many errors, which he recanted? These would have all been damning to him, if he had not been preserved by faith; for the greater part of them are against the faith; but confession and the fear of God made them harmless to him. Whoever now follows them, follows to his own destruction." . . It "still undoubtedly happens to many devout Christians that they celebrate Mass in

a simple faith of their heart, and consider it a sacrifice. But since they do not rely on the sacrifice, indeed, they hold that everything they do is sin, and cling alone to the pure mercy of God, they are preserved from perishing in this error. . . Now that we have recognized the error, it is not fitting that we continue to err and hold the Mass to be a sacrifice. For it would be to sin against the entire faith and our own conscience. Here, no faith, no confession, could excuse. *You cannot say: "I will err in a Christian way."* A Christian error happens out of ignorance. . . Those who now know and recognize the error and yet cling to it as if it were no error, follow the Fathers, but they will not come to them." (*On the Abuse of the Mass*. 1522. XIX, 1380—1385.)

a) For they are rather *parts* and declarations of the primary articles of faith themselves, than that they constitute peculiar, entire, complete, and from the others distinct articles of faith; although in a more general sense they are rightly called articles of faith, insofar as they pertain to faith and are consistent with the foundation of faith: e.g., in the article on the person of Christ, three parts are contained, corresponding to as many kinds of communication of the attributes . See also *Musaeus*, *Tract. de syncret*. p. 53-54. Conf. *Ausführl. Erklärung*, p. 126 ff.

BALDUIN: "Since not everyone has the same capacity for understanding or the opportunity to learn, a distinction must be made here between *the substance* of the articles of faith and the discussions that have arisen from them, which were added for the sake of *explanation*. The substance of the articles of faith must and can be held by any simple person; but the disputes and explanations are not required of everyone. The substance of the articles of faith is that which is simply, though generally and confusingly, signified by the words of the article; that God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three gods, but one God in three persons; if one believes this in general, it is sufficient, even if one cannot say in particular what a person is, what personal properties are, and how they differ from one another; for these matters pertain to the schools of the learned and to a clearer explanation of this article. Thus, it is sufficient for the simple and unlearned person to know that there are two natures in Christ, human and divine, and that the Son of the Most High is called the son of Mary, that the Lord of glory was crucified, etc., all of which the Scriptures say of Christ in their very words; though he does not exactly understand the mystery of the personal union and the communication of the attributes, nor does he perceive what is disputed about them; for these also belong to the schools of the learned; and so on with the others." (*Tract on Cases of Conscience*, Book II, ch. 1, case 7, p. 62 ff.)

b) In this respect they are called *secondary,* and are distinguished from the primary. According to others, they are called necessary for belief, *not in themselves, positively and directly* (which is proper to the primary fundamental articles), but *on account of another, negatively, indirectly.* See *Hunnius*, *On Fundamental Dissent*, § 63, p. 42, and § 284, p. 178; *Meisner*, *Irenicum Durans*, S. II, § 227, p. 199.

c) By which reason they merit and retain the name of *fundamental* articles.

QUENSTEDT: "Certain articles (fundamental articles), although they can *be ignored* without loss of faith *and* detriment to salvation, nevertheless, *cannot be denied* while retaining that faith, e.g., that God is infinite, immense, immutable; that the name of God, Jehovah, is incommunicable; that the divine persons are distinguished from one another by certain characteristic properties;

etc., can plainly *be ignored* without detriment to faith or loss of salvation, because with these unknown, confidence in the God who promises and the Christ who merits is inviolate, and many simple Christians never consider these and similar things, nor are they thereby in danger concerning faith and salvation; but if anyone ***denies*** that God is infinite, immense, and immutable, he, by accusing the Spirit of truth of lying and transforming God into an idol, robbing him of the honor due to him, and thus sinning most grievously against God, would completely shipwreck the faith; as Dr. Nicholas Hunnius rightly teaches in the place cited several times, § 58 ff. (Theol. did.- pol. P. I. c. 5. s. 1. th. 3. fol. 351. sq.)

THE SAME: "There are other articles of faith, which are *not simply fundamental* or the cause of salvation, yet pertain to the foundation, *the denial of which condemns and makes one a heretic,* such as the doctrines concerning creation, election, the church, the sacraments, etc. Furthermore, there are *less principal* articles of faith, which are indeed proposed in Scripture for belief, but not under the necessity of salvation; *the denial of these, not in itself, but by some not-so-evident consequence*, *strikes* against some fundamental article of faith and overthrows it; *and this denial makes one a schismatic,* e.g., that sin is not the substance of man, that election is not universal, etc.; and finally, there are *incidental questions,* which are debated among scholars concerning the more difficult places of Scripture." (*Theol. did.-pol.*, Part I, ch. 5, sect. 1, thesis 10, note 1, fol. 355)

d) For *the denial of such an article necessarily and always implies an error indirectly contrary to the foundation of faith and salvation, and by which, as a consequence, that foundation*, *or something without which it cannot be saved, is destroyed. Musaeus,* l. c. p. 177.

e) For just as the divine persons are constituted in their being as distinct persons by certain hypostatic properties or characteristics, and are distinguished from other persons: so, when these properties are denied, it is denied that they are divine persons. Meanwhile, they can believe and worship the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit as one true God, who *have never even thought, "What is the difference between person and essence?" "In what does the personality of the Holy Spirit differ from the personality of the Son or Messiah?" "Or who and what is the proper and distinctive character of each?" or about other such consequences. Hülsemann*, *Apologetic Dialogue*, p. 56, and J. *Meisner*, *Irenicum Durans*, p. 191-192.

f) For the personal union and the communication of the attributes are contained in the person of Christ, *the God-man,* and his merit necessarily presupposes both. Therefore, whoever acknowledges and believes in the person of Christ *as the God-man*, he by that very fact, if not explicitly, then at least implicitly, also believes in the personal union and the communication of the attributes. And on the contrary, he who denies the personal union or the communication of the idioms, or confounds the natures or the properties of the natures, by consequence denies Christ himself *as* the *θεάνθρωπος* (God-man), and fancies him to be either only God, or only man, or two Christs. See *Mus., Introd*. p. 175-176.

g) *Of course, to conceive a trust in Christ, a simple knowledge of it* (original sin) *in the intellect is not required;* however, it is required *to guard against the contrary opinion, which is the persuasion of innate holiness and the ability to keep divine commandments, by which,* if *one is deceived, one will never come to the knowledge of sin and salvation. Hülsemann*, *Calvinus Irreconciliabilis*, p. 475; *J. Meisner*, § 229, p. 201.

h) For just as the decree and its execution must accurately correspond to each other, so if the decree of election is denied, it will consequently also be denied that God saves men in time on account of faith in Christ: which is shown by *Mus. Tract. de aeterno el. decr*., especially Chap. V. § 119. ff. It is certain, however, that simple ignorance of that decree does not hinder the faith of the simple, who can nevertheless embrace the grace of God and the merit and satisfaction of Christ as the cause of salvation, even if they have not reflected on the decree of election.

i) Scripture itself indeed opposes faith and works in justification so that from the affirmation of one it argues to the destruction of the other, e.g., from justification by works to the denial of justification by faith*, Romans 3 and 4.* Meanwhile, one who has not considered justification by faith alone, and not by works, can believe in Christ and through this faith obtain the remission of sins. Hence, *J. Meisner* also classifies this doctrine among those things *that are established by accident and are therefore necessary only to prevent a contrary error or false opinion from entering the mind, which would undermine or destroy what has once been rightly established.* L. c. § 239, p. 205.

k) Indeed, one who denies a secondary fundamental article in such a way that he can and does see at the same time that, by that denial, a primary article of faith—and indeed the very foundation of the faith—is overturned; is not only indirectly, by the force of that negation, opposed to the foundation of the faith, but already, through an error deduced from that negation, directly destroys the very foundation of the faith, and makes it impossible for faith to be generated or to exist in it. See *Mus.* l. c. p. 177.

l) For the negation of a secondary article does not oppose the foundation of faith, except by consequence; but one who, out of simplicity, embraces that negation does not grasp the consequence. Therefore, in such a subject, this negation can stand with the foundation itself. And because the explicit knowledge of the article that is denied is not simply necessary for generating faith and causing salvation; Therefore, its negation, proceeding from mere ignorance and simplicity, can stand with the knowledge of the other things which pertain to the foundation itself, insofar as it is necessary to be known for the generation of faith and the causation of salvation; nor is faith itself and salvation thereby necessarily removed and impeded. *Mus.* loc. cit. pp. 177-178. *Huelsemann* agrees in *Calvin. Irreconc*. p. 432 ff., where he presents this *axiom*: *Not every doctrine which, by its very nature, asserts or destroys something necessarily presupposed to faith or consequent upon it, has the same effect in the mind of every individual;* and while he advises returning to the question *of understanding the consequences*, he thinks it necessary to distinguish between *the seduced and the docile,* and *the seducers and the obstinate,* and he illustrates this by the example of the article on the communication of attributes, etc. However, *Kromayer* follows Huelsemann, *Prooem. theol. pos.-pol*. p. 4.

> KROMAYER**:** "Concerning *the evidentiary force of consequences*, it must be recognized beforehand (e.g., if the other party denies that this or that follows from these or those premises), that *a distinction* must be made between *seducers and the seduced,* between *the obstinate* and *the docile,* between *heterodox teachers* and those merely *heterodox.* The seduced and the docile are to be tolerated and instructed; the obstinate and the calumniators of the truth are to be cut off from divine grace, there is no doubt. For a graver judgment is threatened by the Savior, Matthew 5:19, against the heterodox teachers

than against the heterodox alone, especially against the simple and the docile. . . Then *one must appeal to each person's conscience,* whether it is at peace with the denial of that consequence, or not. If it is not at peace, but wavers concerning that denial of the consequence, so that confidence in Christ therefore wavers, he, without a doubt, deprives himself of faith and consequently of salvation." (*Positive-Polemical Theology*, Part I, p. 4)

AEG. HUNNIUS: "There are *lesser errors* that impinge on less principal articles, which the apostle likens *to stubble,* burning in the fire of temptation, yet so that the one who errs is saved, retaining the foundation of salvation, having grasped the rock, namely Christ, and suffers the loss of his own work which he had built upon the foundation. (1 Cor. 3:11–15.) *It is another matter if someone*, *out of contempt, says: 'The foundation of salvation is sufficient for me*, and it is enough that I am right on this article,' and in the meantime refuses to accept better instruction on the rest. Such a one would err concerning indeed the lesser articles, but not with a simple error, but one joined with contempt of the divine word." (*Colloquy Held at Regensburg* in 1601, Lauingen, Session 14, p. 433 ff.)

GERHARD: "Before the Scriptures were published, it was not necessary for salvation to believe that there were any divine scriptures. But after they were published, a distinction must be made between simple ignorance and willful denial. *To believe that there are some divine Scriptures is not simply and absolutely necessary for salvation,* namely if this proceeds from simple *ignorance*, because many have been saved who embraced the substantial or fundamental elements of the Christian faith, even though they were ignorant that there were some divine scriptures; but whoever, after the scriptures have been published, would *pertinaciously deny* that there are any divine scriptures, he will be considered a heretic and excluded from the possession of salvation." (*Locus on the Church*, § 121)

HUELSEMANN: "It has long been proven by our theologians that the *Holy Spirit proceeds* both from the Son and from the Father. . . If, however, anyone, from weakness of intellect, does not perceive the force of these consequences and of the bare letter of John chapter 15 should hold to the Filioque, but be orthodox in all other respects; we do not deprive him of salvation either because of ignorance of the truth or *because of a denial arising from mere ignorance,* nor do we consider him to be counted among heretics, unlike Bellarmine . . . and others who, throughout their writings, defame the Greek Church by the name of heresy because of its denial of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son." (*Prelections on the Formula of Concord*, Art. 3, s. 1, ch. 5, § 10, p. 282)

CALOV: "When a head of the faith, a fundamental dogma, an article of the system of beliefs is denied or overturned, it is *materially* a heresy*;* if pertinacity is added, it is *formal* heresy." (*Systema,* VIII. p. 226. ff.)

KROMAYER: "What? That *any adulterated doctrine*, outside of and apart from the θεόπνευστος (God-breathed) word, when *pertinaciously* defended, may be brought *under the name of heresy, generically understood*." (Scrutin. rel. p. 480.)

LUTHER: "I taught twenty years ago that faith alone without works justifies, as I still do. But if at that time someone had stood up and taught that monasticism and nunnery should be called idolatry and the Mass the very abomination, I would not have helped burn such a heretic, but I would have thought it right that it happened to him. And I*,* a thoughtless fool, *could not see the consequence* that I would have to admit that if faith alone were sufficient, then monasticism and the Mass could not be. . . . The apostles at Jerusalem (Acts 15:11), along with many thousands of Jews, were justified by faith alone, that is, by the grace of Christ; nor did they also have their Nestoriuses and Eutyches in their midst; they did not see this consequence, that the Law of Moses did nothing and could do nothing toward it, but wanted to give to it also the idiomata, which belong alone to the Lamb of God, and said (as

stated above): the Gentiles could not be saved unless they were circumcised and kept the Law of Moses. This was tantamount to denying Christ and His grace, as St. Paul says in Galatians 2:21: ‚If righteousness comes from the law, then Christ died in vain'; and Rom. 11:6.: ‚If by grace, it is not by works.' But those in Jerusalem say this: It is indeed by grace alone, but it must nevertheless also be by works; for since grace has not yet done this, then the law must do it, as follows. That is to say in German, to slap yourself in the face and not understand what you are saying. The schools call this (as has been said): to concede the antecedent and deny the consequent, or to destroy the consequent, to affirm the antecedent, to say both yes and no at the same time in the same matter." (*On Councils and Churches*. 1539. XVI, 2737, 2740 ff. [StL 16, 2238, 2240])

THE SAME**:** "They do not distinguish, they err and remain in error. To err does not harm the Church at all, but to remain in error—that is impossible; as Christ says in Matthew 24:23, that even the elect would be led astray, if it were possible. For the Church confesses in the Lord's Prayer that she is sinful and errant, but everything is forgiven her." (*On the Private Mass*. 1533. XIX, 1515.)

THE SAME**:** "As St. Augustine speaks of himself: *Errare potero, haereticus non ero*: I may err, but I will not become a heretic. The reason: Heretics do not merely err, but they refuse to be corrected, defend their error as right, and fight against acknowledged truth and against their own conscience. Of such, St. Paul says in Titus 3:10-11: 'A heretic you are to avoid after a first and second admonition, knowing that such a one is perverted and sins autocatacritos,' that is, one who willfully and knowingly wants to remain condemned in error. But St. Augustine is willing to gladly confess his error and have it corrected. Therefore, he cannot be a heretic, even if he is mistaken. Thus all the other saints also do, gladly casting their hay, straw, and wood into the fire, so that they may remain on the foundation of salvation. As we also have done and still do." (*On the Councils and the Church*. 1539. XVI, 2664 [StL 16, 2182])

THE SAME**:** "We must nevertheless confess that the fanatics have the Scripture and the Word of God in other articles, and whoever hears it from them and believes will be saved, although they are unholy heretics and blasphemers of Christ." (*Concerning Rebaptism*. 1528. XVII, 2675)

THE SAME**:** "By what other means could one tell the difference between the true Church of Christ and the church of the devil, if not by obedience and disobedience to Christ—especially when that disobedience is publicly acknowledged and understood, and brazenly and impudently excuses itself and insists it is in the right? For the holy Church sins and stumbles or even errs, as the Lord's Prayer teaches; but she neither defends nor excuses herself, but humbly asks for forgiveness and reforms herself as best she can; thus it is forgiven her, so that at that point her sin is no longer counted as sin. If then, in regard to obedience and obstinate disobedience, I am not to recognize or distinguish the true Church from the false, then I know of no Church to speak of." (*A Letter of Dr. Martin Luther Concerning His Book on the Private Mass*. XIX, 1579.)

§ 34.

Non-fundamental articles are those which, while preserving the foundation of the faith, can not only be ignored, but also denied or disputed [(a)] on either side. E.g., on sin

and the perpetual rejection of certain angels, on the immortality of the first man before the fall, on the Antichrist, [(b)] on the origin of the soul by creation or by transmission [(c),] etc.

FECHT: "Articles of faith are either fundamental or non-fundamental." Where, however, it should be noted that this distinction is not of articles properly so called, and thus taken univocally, but rather *an equivocal distinction,* since non-fundamental articles are improperly called articles of faith only and most remotely." (Compend., the whole comp. of th. Praecognita. C. 1. § 42. p. 29.)

[Casper] CALVOERS: "It must be carefully distinguished between those things which are *necessary for the faith of any believer* and for salvation, and those which are *necessary for the church for the purity, exposition, and defense of salutary doctrine;* and this pertains to the distinction between *Christian and catholic articles,* and *ecclesiastical and theological* articles." (*Fissures of Zion*. Leipzig 1710. p. 1172.)

QUENSTEDT: "To the non-fundamental articles, or those which, while the foundation of the faith is preserved, can be both ignored and denied, Dr. Hunnius (l. c. § 65) refers the dogma concerning the perpetual rejection of certain angels; concerning the immortality of man before the fall; concerning the Antichrist; concerning the unforgiveness of sin against the Holy Spirit; of Christian liberty in rites, etc. These, whether they are ignored or denied, *in themselves* bring no harm to the faith, since they do not remove any cause of faith or fundamental dogma through their own negation." (*Theol. didactico-polemica*, Part I, ch. 5, sect. 1, thesis 2, fol. 350)

a) In the meantime, even in these matters, care must be taken not to sin rashly against divine revelation and God Himself by embracing or professing an error; especially not to establish anything against one's conscience and with the seduction of others, by which the supports and truth of one or more fundamental articles of the faith are undermined. For thus, as if through a mortal sin, the Holy Spirit and faith can nevertheless be and are shaken. To this end are directed the words of *J. Meisner*, l. c. § 242, p. 207.

N. HUNNIUS: "When in the following the form of speech occurs: 'this or that dogma can be ignored or denied while the foundation of the faith remains intact,' one must by no means understand this to mean that such a denial or ignorance can take place while *the faith remains safe*; for such *a denial can be ruinous to the faith*, even if it does not overturn the foundation of the faith." *(Διάσκεψις* (Examination) § 353.)

THE SAME: "Faith is destroyed by a doctrine that has to do with *mortal sin.* There is a twofold doctrine that is salutary to man: *one,* which is the proximate cause of faith, or which makes a man trust in God and Christ, and hence he certainly expects the remission of sins and eternal salvation; *the other,* which indeed does not produce this confidence, is nevertheless proposed to man by God, either to demonstrate faith or to learn other things necessary for Christianity: he who fails in the former kind of doctrine not only errs dangerously, but also concerning faith; who in the latter, errs dangerously, not, however, concerning the doctrine of faith, but *morally,* so that nothing is taken away from the confidence (on account of the doctrine from which confidence is born) which a man has toward God, yet he provokes the wrath of the Lord. For this reason, denying the history of Samson, David, etc., denying that circumcision was a divine institution, etc., This in itself detracts nothing from the foundation of faith or its fundamental doctrine, yet it errs not without the peril of salvation, because by depriving God of truth of the praise due to Him, it offends Him with a mortal sin and thus provokes His wrath, which is connected with the loss of faith and salvation, unless repentance is performed. To this belong the virgin birth of Christ and several other dogmas, the denial of which does not overturn or even corrupt the fundamental doctrine of the faith, yet it provokes the wrath of God, whereby faith falls for lack of an efficient cause, even while its foundation remains." *(Διάσκεψις* (Examination) § 350.)

HUELSEMANN: "I deny that the approval of any non-true theological dogma is innocent of all guilt; for although not every guilt is deadly or inflicts condemnation in the second act, nevertheless it is condemnable in the first act, in the way that the apostle distinguishes *τὸ* 'condemnable' from that which inflicts damnation in the second act (Rom. 8:1). . . For we have an express precept concerning the quality of the dogma *in itself*, 1 Pet. 4:11, that whoever proposes anything to be believed to another is bound to propose *λόγια θεοῦ* (the oracles of God). . . Consequently, in relation to guilt before God, no proposition of any theological dogma, directly or indirectly pertaining to faith and not true in itself, is *an adiaphoron;* although in relation to the attainment of supreme glory it may be innocuous in the second act." (*Prelections on the Formula of Concord*. p. 950.)

CARPZOV: "The Augsburg Confession *does not hold* non-fundamental dogmas *in little regard,* but says that at least in *the weak* they are to be condoned." (Isag. etc. p. 310.)

DANNHAUER: "An article of faith is not . . . every gloss, assertion, or opinion that does not have a certain and clear definition in the Holy Scriptures, such as the questions about the time of the world's creation—whether in spring or in autumn?" of the year and day of Christ's birth; add *ἀειπαρθενότητα* (perpetual virginity) even after the childbirth of the blessed Virgin (which, following the pontifical doctors, Hornej. disp. 4. on the sufficiency of Scripture, p. 339, concedes that the article is of faith, and the contrary opinion of Helvidius and the Antidicomarianites is rightly and without doubt condemned as heresy; but Basil in Hom. on the Nativity. Christ expunged it from this series, precisely by asserting, through his contrary judgment, that the doctrine of piety is not violated nor does it pertain to the mystery of the Word); add the Psychopannychian *) and other such opinions, in which minds may be exercised, yet from which one ought not to have the sacraments of the church prescribed. You will find heaps of such swellings in scholastic theology, where one milks the goat and another holds the sieve." (*Hodos. Phaen*. 11. p. 667.)

BUDDEUS: "Many things are contained in the Holy Scripture which, because they have been divinely revealed to us, we are also bound to believe, yet are not necessary for attaining salvation. Moreover, many things are required and are so necessary that one may be a member of a particular church, and much more so, that one may serve as a pastor in it, which, however, are not equally necessary for salvation, and so we are not speaking of them." (*Institutions of Dogmatic Theology*. p. 41.)

b) See on these *Nic. Hunnius,* l. c. § 65, p. 43.

QUENSTEDT: "A distinction must be made between the fundamental articles of faith, which pertain to saving faith, and *the non-fundamental articles, the knowledge of which is also handed down in the Word of God, and which pertain to dogmatic or historical faith.* To this class we refer the doctrine about the *Antichrist* because of the prophecies of the Scriptures, which were revealed to us by the Holy Spirit in the prophet Daniel, in St. Paul, and in the Apocalypse of John. However, we do not say that this question about the Antichrist is such that its resolution is necessary for *all Christians* to know for salvation, or that ignorance of it is *per se* damning, since in past ages and today there have been and are many Christians, not at all given to papistic errors, who without the knowledge of this truth are undoubtedly saved. For many of the Fathers expressed differing opinions about the Antichrist, because being further removed from the fulfillment of these prophecies, they more freely indulged their own opinions or more carelessly seized upon and propagated the uncertain opinions of others." (*Theol. did.-pol*. Part IV, ch. 16, s. 2, fol. 1688)

HUELSEMANN: "Just as in the other articles of faith, those who seek to overturn the truth of the matter itself are accustomed to begin with the denial of the

*) The same Dannhauer: "*Ψυχοπαννυχία* (Psychopannychia) is a fable contrary to the sacred scriptures, in which martyrs cry out with a loud voice under the altar in Revelation 6:10-11." (p. 719)

necessary knowledge of this subject, so it is today with the doctrine of the *Antichrist.* For although we have already explained the nature of the *necessity* in the thesis, namely that it is *hypothetical and not absolute*; nevertheless, given the hypothesis, i.e., the presence of the Antichrist and the present danger of seduction, the doctrine of discerning the Antichrist from true teachers is no less necessary today than the doctrine on the malices and snares of the devils. Compare with this the serious warnings of Christ and the Apostles in Matthew 7:24; Luke 12:42 ff., 17:35 ff., 21:8; 2 Thessalonians 2; 2 Timothy 3:4; 2 Peter 2; 1 John 2:4. Revelation 11:12 ff. contain admonitions about avoiding the snares of the Antichrist, which cannot be heeded without a distinct knowledge of the Antichrist. Nevertheless, just as the threat and signs of the already imminent and actually descending flood were nevertheless mocked by Noah's kinsmen, Genesis 6:4, 13, and Luke 17:27, so also the mutual mockeries and cavils of the Papists and Calvinists, who object to each other the deceptions of the Antichrist in frivolous and false matters, are not without reason considered a derision of the thing itself, as if one were to call another Polyphemus, Medusa, Charon, or by some other such name, of which he does not believe the subject to exist in nature." (*Prelections on the Breviary*, ch. 22, p. 1229)

c) Thus indeed blessed Luther judged, when even at *the urgent and insistent request of Dr. Pomeranus (Bugenhagen) to determine for certain what was finally to be decided about the origin of the soul, he refused;* and although *inclined to the view of traducianism,* he nevertheless preferred *with Augustine to think and contend that it should not be held as an article of faith, against the bold dogmatists* who *are not careful enough in these matters*, etc., as related by *John Wigand,* who says *he remembered* his discourse, in the book *On Neutral and Indifferent Things*, pp. 38, 39, and *Andreas Musculus* in the *Common Loci Collected from the Fathers*, Book I, p. 89 ff., where he presents *excerpts from the mouth of Luther in a dissertation delivered this year, 1546, the year of his death.* Wigand himself, however, at the same place (p. 38), after presenting the arguments for both sides, concludes that *it is permissible to leave the whole matter in the middle, and that it is not to be considered heresy to lean toward either one opinion or the other.* And within these limits, besides the aforementioned *Musculus*, other authors of the Formula of Concord: *Martin Chemnitz*, *Loci Theologici*, Part I, Book on Original Sin, Question IV, pp. 234–256; and *David Chytraeus*, *Commentary on the Apocalypse*, ch. III, p. 91. Cf. *Balduin, Commentary on the Epistle to Titus*, ch. III, Question I, p. 1519.

Cf. LUTHER's *Disputation on the Distinction of the Persons in the Godhead*. Theses 30–34, 41–50. Opp. Hal., Vol. X, pp. 227 ff.

REUSCH: "It is also readily apparent that articles of faith which are not fundamental cannot have their basis in the clear testimony of Holy Scripture; for if, this being granted, they were to be denied, the divinity of Holy Scripture would thereby be denied, and the knowledge of the foundation of faith, which is known only from Holy Scripture, would be undermined. They are also called by some *theological problems,* of which the number is immense and may be increased daily; but their knowledge is useless and the discussions about them are vain." (Annotations, etc. p. 62.)

BALDUIN: *"The theological subjects* they dispute are not of one kind. *Some matters are not of faith but of question,* or do not directly concern an article of faith but only some *circumstance*; such as the dispute about the time of the world's creation; about the end of the world, whether it will occur by substance or by accident; about the stature of the resurrected on the last day; about the location of paradise, in which Enoch and Elijah already live, etc. On these and similar questions, since nothing certain has been decided in Scripture, a probable judgment of reason can be admitted without danger; indeed, in these many things can be unknown while Christian faith remains intact, and *one can err* somewhere without any charge of heretical doctrine," says Augustine in Book 2 of *On Original Sin against Pelagius and Celestius*, chapter 23. (Disputation on Colossians ch. 2, Book 1)

RECHENBERG: *"Theological problems* are questions which occur in almost all articles of theology, both positive, polemical, and also exegetical and moral; but since they do not pertain to the substance of the Christian faith and the economy of salvation as designated in the Holy Scriptures, they are customarily debated *for and against* in the schools. Because they have not yet been determined by the common consent of the orthodox church, and no one, whether he affirms or denies such questions, should be tainted with the stain of heresy. Many such questions arise in Roman scholastic theology among the Thomists and Scotists." (*Hierolexicon,* sub tit. *Problemata,* p. 1309.)

HUELSEMANN: "That *the proximate ministerial cause*, or the individual writing a certain *canonical* book, should be certainly recognized by name, and that no error should be committed in the name, we deny to be necessary for salvation. . . Whether Philip or Bartholomew wrote that gospel which is read under the name of Mark makes no difference to saving faith. ... From the internal nature *of things*, and not from the quality *of the speaker*, *the divinity* of the sacred Scripture is perceived*."* (*Anti-Bellarminus*. c. 9. § 10. p. 106. sq.)

THE SAME: "That this book *is from a prophet and not an apostle*, and vice versa, and that this or that was *the* author's *name*, e.g., the writer of the Acts of the Apostles, or to be ignorant of or to suppose it to be Barnabas, Josephus, or any other besides Luke (whose certainty of facts they require as necessary for knowledge and belief, and to be drawn from tradition alone), is not an article of Christian faith, and when it is known, *it is not believed by divine faith*, *but by human*. . . Some, such as Brochm. art. 2. ch 8. qu. 5., deny that *knowledge of the numerical quantity of the canonical books* is necessary for salvation." (Praelectt. in Form. Conc. Art. I. c. 3. § 12. p. 225.)

QUENSTEDT**:** "We deny that *the catalog of the canonical books* is an article of faith, added to the other contents of Scripture. Many have faith and can attain salvation who do not hold to the number of the canonical books." (*Theol. did.-pol*. Part I, ch. 4, sect. 2, question 8, fol. 135)

§ 35.

The formal object of theology, which is divine revelation [(a)], exercises its function through this, [(b)] that it affects, moves, and bends the human will [(c)], so that it may command the intellect to assent.

REUSCH**:** "The formal object of revealed theology is revelation, or Holy Scripture, insofar as by its means *a)* dogmas are determined, and *b)* the knowledge of these is elevated to that clarity in which it is alive and has an immovable assent. . . Therefore, he who, through the natural cognitive faculty, investigated the true sense of Holy Scripture, from this determined the dogmas which explain the kingdom of grace and that which is connected to it, and those, for a further declaration, he reduced them to a system, but did not attain a living knowledge of these dogmas through the supernatural efficacy of Holy Scripture because of malicious resistance; he obtained *the part of the formal reason* in that knowledge which he ought to have of the kingdom of grace and its connections through theology, i.e., that this knowledge of the kingdom of grace and its connected things is uniquely derived from revelation, or Holy Scripture; the other part of that formal reason in this knowledge, namely, that it be *living*, is lacking, and so *the formal object* of theology has only a partial place in that man." (Annott. in B. Comp. pp. 53, 55.)

a) See above § 25 and note *c*.

b) For divine revelation contains these two principles: First, *whatever God says, or reveals, is true;* second, *this*—or (when we speak of revealed theology and its formal object as it stands) *whatever is contained in the Holy Scriptures, God says*. The first principle is evident from the nature and attributes of God, known by the light of nature. The latter is not self-evident; and therefore, since the intellect cannot clearly perceive its truth, that is, the identity of the predicate with the subject, it is necessary for the will to command the intellect to assent and for the will, consequently, to be drawn or moved by the revelation itself, in order to determine the intellect to assent. Thus *in Acts 16:14* it is said *that the Lord opened the heart of Lydia,* that is, effectively moved the soul, which in the Scriptures is often called the *heart*, *to pay attention to the things that were spoken by Paul,* or so that the will itself would apply the intellect to paying attention and giving assent. Cf. *Musaeus, Introd*. ch. III. § 39. p. 184.

c) Meanwhile, theology, formally considered, remains a habit of the intellect. For it does not cease to be a habit of knowing and assenting; it connotes, however, or presupposes a certain habit of the will, which authors call *pious affection*. *Mus.* l. c. § 40. p. 185.

§ 36.

And hence it is clear that theology is a habit in its substance [(a)] supernatural, acquired indeed through our acts [(b)] but by the powers of grace and the operation of the Holy Spirit. [(c)] [(d)]

a) Or what it is and must be *in itself* and by the force of its true formal object; or, with respect to the true habit of assent. For if you look precisely at the habit of apprehending objects long since revealed and apprehended and of handing them down to others, in this sense, if the supernatural habit of assent is absent, then, as is the case with unregenerate and impious men, it is theology only in an equivocal sense. *Mus.* l. c. § 42. 43. p. 189 ff. Cf. Dr. D. *Ph. J. Spener*'s German Treatise: *Die allgemeine Gottes-Gelahrtheit etc*. Part I, Question V, pp. 185 ff., where many similar passages from our own theologians are cited.

> LUTHER**:** "One finds more heathen and human conceit than a certain holy doctrine of the Scripture among the theologians. How are we to deal with them now? I know of no other counsel here than a humble prayer to God that He Himself give us such Doctors of Theology; let the Pope, the Emperor, and the universities make doctors of art, of medicine, of law, and of sententiae; but be sure of this, no one will make a Doctor of the Holy Scriptures for you except the Holy Spirit from heaven alone, as Christ says in John 6:45: 'They must all have been taught by God himself.'" (*To the Christian Nobility*, etc. 1520. X, 383. ff.)
>
> THE SAME**:** "There is a twofold clarity of Scripture, just as there is a twofold obscurity, one external, which lies in the ministry of the Word, the other in the knowledge of the heart. If you speak of the internal clarity, *no man sees a single iota in the Scriptures unless he has the Spirit of God*; all have a blinded heart, so that, even if they speak and know how to expound all of Scripture, they nevertheless feel or truly know nothing

of these things, nor do they believe in God, nor that they themselves are God's creatures, nor anything else, according to that in Psalm 14: ‘The fool has said in his heart, There is no God. For the Spirit is required to understand the whole Scripture and any part of it. If you speak of the external, nothing at all is left obscure or ambiguous, but all things are brought to light by the Word in the most certain way, and declared to the whole world, whatever is in the Scriptures." (*On the Bondage of the Will*. 1525. Latin Works, pertaining to the history of the Reformation, edited by Dr. H. Schmidt. Vol. VII. p. 127. Cf. Halle Tom. XVIII, 2071. ff.)

THE SAME: "So you can now conclude for yourself that St. Matthew here (5:23) is not to be understood as speaking of the common works that each person should do for another out of love, of which he speaks in Matthew 25:35. ff. speaks, but rather above all of the true Christian work: such as teaching righteously, fostering the faith, and therein instructing, strengthening, and preserving it, so that we may testify that we are righteous Christians. For the others are not so certain, because even false Christians can adorn themselves and hide behind great, beautiful works of love. But to teach and confess Christ rightly is not possible without faith. As St. Paul says in 1 Cor. 12:3, "No one can call Jesus Lord except by the Holy Spirit." For no false Christian or heretical spirit can understand this teaching. How much less will he rightly preach and confess Him, even if he takes up the words and repeats them, but does not remain with them or keep them pure? He always preaches in such a way that one can see he is not in the right; yet he smears his own drivel on them, by which he takes away Christ's honor and appropriates it to himself. Therefore, this alone is the surest work of a true Christian, when he praises and preaches Christ in such a way that people learn that they are nothing and Christ is everything." (*Exposition of Matthew 5–7*, 1532, VII, 623)

MUSEUS: "Whoever is born and raised in the church and, from his parents, has imbibed with his mother's milk the opinion that the codex of the Scriptures contains the word divinely revealed and recorded in writing by divine inspiration, believes this, of course, on account of his parents' testimony and authority. In this faith he can be confirmed by the authority of the Church, spread far and wide throughout the world, and by other signs or motives of credibility, even though he is a hypocrite and, by his malice, places an obstacle to the grace that is to work the certainty and divinity of this faith through the word itself. Even if he gives his assent to the Scriptures, albeit only on the basis of human faith or opinion, he can then, through human study, acquire for himself the habit of interpreting the Scriptures, drawing conclusions from them, confirming and defending them, and doing so again with an assent supported by human authority. This is also attested by experience. For there are found impious men, and even heretics, who are often more expedient in explaining the Scriptures and in drawing, confirming, and defending conclusions from them than other orthodox and most pious theologians. This is perhaps the reason why they have attributed theology simply to *natural* habits, which even fall within the reach of unregenerate men. But *this, which we readily acknowledge to be a natural habit, is theology in an equivocal sense, and it is as far removed from theology properly so called as human faith, or an opinion conceived in the mind about the truth of divine revelation from external motives, is from divine faith.* For its ultimate reason for assent is plainly different from the ultimate reason for assent of theology properly so called. For its ultimate reason for assent, as has been said, is the first truth revealing as such, which, through the revelation recorded in the Scriptures, elevated by its own supernatural concurrence*, moves* the intellect and will *immediately in itself,* commanding this to assent to the intellect and eliciting that same assent in it, so that the assent ultimately rests in it. The ultimate reason for assent to the latter, as was just shown, is human authority, namely that of parents and the Church, which relies *on human faith,* or on miracles or other motives that generate *opinion*; for example, a hypocrite

or a secret heretic who deceives the theologian will indeed assent to this conclusion drawn by him from the Scriptures: Christ is *ὁμοούσιος* (one substance) with God the Father, for this reason: Christ is the only-begotten Son of God; but not believed in immediately for its own sake, so that assent would ultimately rest on the authority of the first revealing truth, but because he sees that it is contained in the Gospel of John. He believes those things contained in the Gospel of John to be true because he was taught them from a young age by his parents or preceptors, or received them from the Church, which holds that they are divinely revealed and infallibly true. And in this testimony of parents, preceptors, or the Church, as in the ultimate reason for assent, his own assent finally rests. Since, however, that testimony is human, it can generate only human faith or opinion; and just as the act of assent of theology, in this latter sense, ultimately resting on this testimony, is in its substance natural and merely opinative, so theology itself, thus accepted, *is a habit in its substance natural and merely opinative.* But theology properly so called, because it ultimately rests on the first revealed truth, *is a supernatural and simply certain habit.* For the first revealing truth, whenever it sustains the role of the ultimate reason for assent and immediately moves the intellect to its own assent, generates an assent in a supernatural substance, and this is not an opinionative one, but simply certain, to which it is utterly repugnant for a falsehood to be subservient. . . However, it cannot be acquired through any acts other than those to which the first revealing truth, as the ultimate reason for assent, moves by its very nature, namely, through supernatural acts in the substance, which, elicited by the First Truth illuminating the intellect through its revelation and drawing the will into assent, leave behind *a disposition* inclined toward other similar acts, from which, when repeated, the habit of the same nature, i.e., supernatural in substance, is finally generated. . . It must be repeated that theology can be taken in a twofold sense. One, for the habit of declaring, confirming, and defending those things which have been revealed for the sake of our salvation, precisely by the first truth revealing as the ultimate reason for assent. Second, for the habit of explaining, confirming, and defending the same things from the Scriptures, not, however, by the first truth revealed, but relying on human authority or other opinion-generating motives of credibility as the ultimate reason for assent. We grant that theology, taken in this latter sense, also applies to *unregenerate* men. But this, as we have shown above, is *theology spoken of equivocally*. However, we deny and utterly deny that theology, taken in the former sense, applies to unregenerate men. For there is, as we have taught elsewhere: *a habit in the supernatural substance*, *which for this reason finds a place only in the regenerate,* and cannot be obtained apart from the supernatural grace of God and concurrence with His Word, which elevates it to testify of itself. [i.e. *testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum*] . . Therefore, faith can be in a man without the habit of theology, yet it cannot be in anyone against the habit of theology properly so called, without the habit of faith." (*Introduction to Theology*, Part I, ch. 3, §§ 43-45, p. 190-192, 193, 195 ff., 199.)

b) Namely today, and according to the common law, or ordinarily. For otherwise we do not deny that the habit of theology can be obtained *in an extraordinary way through the immediate illumination and inspiration of God*, as happened to *the prophets and apostles*. *Musaeus,* l. c. § 43. p. 192. 193., *Gerhard*, *Exeg. prooem*. § 17. p. 9.

c) For this reason some call theology the *θεόσδοτον* (divinely given) habit: for it acknowledges that in this sense, or with regard to the gracious concurrence or illumination of God, it is rightly so called (*Mus.*, loc. cit., § 44). p. 169), although, having accepted the term in its *Aristotelian* sense (to which *ευδαιμονία θεόσδοτος* 'god-given happiness' is called in *I. Nicom. IX* in opposition to those things which are acquired by our own study and labor), he has not denied without cause that our theology is *θεόσδοτον* (divinely given). L. c. p. 194.

GERHARD**:** "We readily admit that, if a certain genus derived from the intellectual habits enumerated by Aristotle is to be attributed to theology, it most closely approaches the nature of *wisdom*; yet, if considered absolutely, *it is more correctly defined by the habit of θεόσδοτον* (divinely given) than by a genus drawn from Aristotelian intellectual habits; since, as Savonarola warns in book III *On the Division of the Sciences*, p. 800, 'is learned rather by purity of heart, good works, contemplation, and the illumination of the Holy Spirit, than by the force of intellect,' which he proves from John 6:45 in the same place." (*Exegesis loci*, prooem. § 10)

QUENSTEDT: "The question is not... about the *θεόσδοτον* (divinely given) habit by the immediate infusion of grace, but by the discovery, principle, and object. . . *We distinguish between the assisting and the indwelling grace of the Holy Spirit;* the habit of theology is conferred not so much through the former as through *the latter*. For this divine formation, by which they become theologians, is an operation of the grace of the Holy Spirit not precisely of the indwelling kind, but rather *of the assisting kind*, which the unregenerate and the impious also possess *in a certain way*. In those, however, who are *theologians in reality and by name*, i.e., who are not only instructed with the theological habit, so to speak, but are also simultaneously *regenerated*, that is, believers and pious, in them theology is *not only from the Holy Spirit, but also with the Holy Spirit* and is joined with His gracious indwelling." (*Theologia didactico-polemica*, Part I, ch. 1, s. 2, q. 3, fol. 22 ff.)

DEYLING: "The habit is called *θεόσδοτον* (divinely given) because it contains *the sanctifying and enabling gifts*, which *are not to be separated* from one another. Both are *χαρίσματα* (charisms) and gifts that *are supernatural,* whose bestowal and distribution are distinctly ascribed to God, from whom *every good gift* comes (James 1:17), or to the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. 12:4; 2 Cor. 3:5)." (*Institutiones prudentiae pastoralis*, prooem. p. 2)

d) Successively, indeed, and not without the labor and study of several years. also *Scherzer* says that theology is *an acquired habit, because it includes the meditation, Ps. 1:2*, *for which the apparatus of the arts and languages is prerequired, and the prayer of Ps. 119:18*. *System, theol*. proleg. § 8. p. 3.; cf. *Gerh.* in Exeg. l. c. § 17. p. 9.

LUTHER: "I will show you a true way to study theology, one in which I have exercised myself; if you follow it, you will be so instructed that you yourself could (if it were necessary) write books as good as those of the Fathers and the Councils. As for myself, I may (in God) presume, and boast without arrogance or lying, that I would not concede much to some of the Fathers if it came to making books; but I cannot boast of my life in the same way. And this is the method that the holy King David (without doubt also all the Patriarchs and Prophets) teaches in Psalm 119; there you will find three rules within, richly set forth throughout the entire psalm, and they are called: *oratio*, *meditatio*, *tentatio* (Prayer, Meditation, Temptation). First, you should know that the Holy Scripture is such a book that it makes the wisdom of all other books foolishness, because none teaches about eternal life except this one alone. Therefore, you should immediately despair of your own mind and understanding, for by that you will not attain it, but with such presumption you will cast yourself and others with you from heaven (as happened to Lucifer) into the abyss of hell. Rather, kneel down in your closet and pray with true humility and earnestness to God that He, through His beloved Son, will give you His Holy Spirit, who will enlighten you, guide you, and grant you understanding. As you see, David in the aforementioned psalm always prays: "Teach me, O Lord; instruct me; lead me; show me," and many more such words, even though he was well acquainted with the text of Moses and many other books, and heard and read them daily. Yet he still wants to have the true Master of the Scripture Himself, so that he might never fall into error with his own reason and become his own master. For this is how fanatic spirits are

eliminated, those who let themselves be deceived into thinking that Scripture is subject to them and can be easily grasped by their own reason, as if it were the Fables of Marcolphus or Aesop, when they have no part in the Holy Spirit or in prayer. To change this, you should meditate—that is, not only in your heart but also outwardly, constantly exercising and rubbing the spoken word and the literal words of the book, reading and rereading them with diligent attention and reflection on what the Holy Spirit means by them. And beware that you do not become weary or think that you have read, heard, or said it once or twice enough, and understand it all thoroughly; for no true theologian will ever come of it, and they are like untimely fruit that falls off before it is half ripe. Therefore, you see in that same Psalm how David continually praises that he will speak, compose, say, sing, hear, and read, day and night and always, yet nothing but God's Word and commandments alone. For God will not give you His Spirit without the outward word; therefore, conform to it, for He has not commanded it in vain: to write, preach, read, hear, sing, speak, etc., outwardly. Thirdly, there is *tentatio*, trial or temptation, which is the touchstone, which teaches you not only to know and understand, but also to experience how right, how true, how sweet, how lovely, how powerful, and how comforting God's Word is, wisdom above all wisdom. Therefore you see how David in the aforementioned Psalm so often complains about various enemies, wicked princes or tyrants, about false spirits and sects, which he must endure, because he meditates, that is, deals with God's Word in various ways (as has been said). For as soon as God's Word rises up through you, the devil will visit you, make you a true doctor, and through his temptations teach you to seek and love God's Word. For I myself (to mix a little mouse-dropping in with the pepper) have a great deal to thank my Papists for, that they have beaten me, pressed me, and tormented me so through the devil's raging, that is, they have made me a fairly good theologian, which I otherwise would not have become. And what they have gained from me in return, I gladly grant them the honor, victory, and triumph, for that is how they wanted it. Behold, there you have David's rule; if you now diligently follow this example, you will also sing and praise with him in the same Psalm, v. 72: "The law of your mouth is more precious to me than thousands of pieces of gold and silver." Likewise vv. 98, 99, 100: ‘You make me wiser than my enemies, for your law is my treasure forever. I am more learned than all my teachers, for your testimonies are my delight. I am wiser than the ancients, for I keep your commandments’ etc. And you will find how insipid and dull the books of the fathers will taste to you; you will also not only despise the books of your adversaries, but you will grow less and less fond of your own, both in writing and in teaching. When you come this far, then hope confidently that you have begun to become a true theologian, who may teach not only the young, imperfect Christians, but also the growing and perfect ones; for the Church of Christ has within it all kinds of Christians: young, old, weak, sick, healthy, strong, fresh, lazy, foolish, wise. But if you feel this way and let yourself be led to believe you are certain of it, and you dote on your own little book, teaching or writing, as if you had made it very splendid and preached it brilliantly, you also take great pleasure in being praised before others, and perhaps you even want to be praised; otherwise, you would grieve or give up. If you are that hair, my dear, then grab your own ears, and if you grab right, you will find a fine pair of bigger, longer, rougher donkey's ears: so go ahead and take the trouble to trim them and adorn them with golden bells, so that wherever you go, you might be heard, have people point at you with their fingers and say: Behold, behold, there goes the fine beast that can write such precious books and preach so excellently well. Then you will be blessed and most blessed in the kingdom of heaven, yes, where the devil and his angels have the

hellish fire prepared for them. In short: let us seek honor and be proud wherever we can. In this book, honor belongs to God alone, and it is called: *Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam.* To whom be glory forever and ever. Amen." (*Preface to the First Part of His German Books*. 1539. XIV, 423–427 [StL 14, 434 ff.])

THE SAME: "Therefore, Scripture is such a book that it requires not only reading and preaching, but also the right *interpreter*, namely the revelation of the *Holy Spirit;* as we also see in our own time, when one most clearly proves from Scripture the articles of pure doctrine and refutes the error of the adversary, yet nothing helps with them; and there has never been a doctrine of the faith preached that has not been challenged and opposed more than once by the heretics, who nevertheless have read the same Scripture that we have. [Biermann claims Jehovah's Witnesses got that from the Bible! He uses this to justify "Scripture AND Tradition".] But such a revelation also requires *true disciples,* who are willing to be taught and instructed, like these pious, simple disciples (from Emmaus), not clever-clogs and stubborn spirits, nor self-made spirits who with their cleverness reach far above the heavens. For it is also a teaching that seeks to make our wisdom foolish and put out the eyes of reason, where it is to be believed and understood otherwise; for it does not come from human wisdom, like other teachings and arts on earth, which flow from reason and can be grasped by it again. Therefore, it is also impossible to grasp with the reason; or, if you presume to measure and calculate it, to see how it fits together, you will be led completely astray; just as all heresies have arisen from this, and how Jews, pagans, and now the Turks become mad and foolish concerning our doctrine and faith, because it is not in accordance with reason and human wisdom; except for the pious, simple-minded little flock that remains on this path and says: "God has spoken it, therefore I will believe it." They can grasp and understand it; as Christ himself says in Matthew 11:25 and gives thanks to God with a joyful heart that He has hidden such things from the wise and prudent and revealed them to little children." (*Church Postil*, Gospel for Easter Monday. XI, 917.)

§ 37.

However, theology is distinguished from faith, like the container from that which is contained. For theology, in addition to faith, also involves the ability to explain and confirm those things which have been revealed.

Compare *Musaeus,* § 45. p. 199. ff., where he also teaches that theology is more perfect than faith, not *intensively,* but *extensively,* p. 206.

DANNHAUER: *Theological knowledge and faith agree*: 1. in their *author*. Both are *θεόσδοτον* (divinely given) light, but both also require the work of prayer, meditation, and temptation. An exception must be made for the case of extraordinary conversions, where in a single sermon the human mind was often enlightened, immediately yielded to the truth, and conceived faith. You may read examples in the Acts of the Apostles, where we know that τὸ to happen and to have happened, but we do not know the mode of happening; see Polemos, p. 30. In this very way we read of the conversion of that philosopher in the famous history of Rufinus, 1. 1. c. 3. add. Sozom. 1. l. c. 18. p. 431 ff. 2. In their *object, τῶν μὴ βλεπομένων* (of things not seen). . . *They differ* in the measure of 1. *extensiveness.* For faith, it is enough to know what is necessary for salvation. . . But theology extends more broadly to the entire biblical corpus, to be fully treated, to be expounded from the original languages with a comparison of versions, polished,

to be reconciled, where reconciling where enantiophaneiai (apparent contradictions) occur, to be illustrated from history, chronology, and topography, to be unfolded from mixtures of enigmas, extended by consequences, vindicated and polished by the wandering spirits. . . 2. *In degree of intensity.* Faith holds a degree of perfection in solidity, while theology strives for perfection of degree. 3. *Extension.* Indeed, the whole life must be devoted to nurturing confidence, but the light of faith ends with catechesis, leaving room for other secular studies as well; theology is always exclusively occupied day and night with the unique divine things." (*Hodosophia Defensionis,* p. 8. ff.)

THE SAME: "Like some very elegant image by Albrecht Dürer (e.g., the painting of the burning of Troy) that strikes the eye of either a common person or one imbued with the art of painting: the former notices the colors, figures, lights, shadows, the story itself; the latter, in addition, the affections, the manners, the genius of the art, the decorum, the symmetry; the latter sees more, more fully, more clearly. For what is the entire Holy Scripture, if not a painting of divine things? What is the sacred codex, if not a mirror in which the Divine Nature has painted itself? There is no Christian who cannot see here, as much as is sufficient for his salvation, nor is he without the common rule, which, when he follows it, he cannot go astray. But the theologian, instructed with more resources, polished by more practiced senses, must see more in proportion to the degree of his talent and calling, and not only see, but also vindicate from false hermeneutics." (*Hermeneutica sacra*, p. 2.)

LUTHER: "In other arts it is so that whoever hears and sees much becomes learned; but in theology and divine wisdom, neither hearing nor seeing counts, neither feeling nor groping; rather, the beginning is solely to hear and *believe* the Word of God. Whoever does not begin in this way will lack something, and he will accomplish nothing and will not preach correctly, even if he had the wisdom of the whole world. This is the beginning, if one wants to be taught in spiritual, divine matters. The beginning is called: believing the Word of God." (Exposition of John 6–8, 1530. VII, 2261. f.)

§ 38.

Theology can be defined as the practical science [(a)] which teaches, confirms, and defends from divine [(b)] revelation all those things [(c)] which are necessary for sinful man,[(d)] both for the knowledge of faith [(e)] in Christ and for the practice of holiness of life,[(f)] to be obtained from God [(g)] and for the cause [(i)] of eternal blessedness [(h)] in God.

GERHARD: "*Theology (considered systematically and abstractively)* is the doctrine extracted from the Word of God, by which people are instructed in true faith and a pious life for eternal life. *Theology* (*habitually and concretely considered*) is the *θεόσδοτον* (divinely given) habit, conferred on man by the word of the Holy Spirit, by which he is instructed not only in the knowledge of divine mysteries through the illumination of the mind, so that he may translate into the affections of the heart and the execution of works what he understands, but also is rendered apt and expedient for instructing others about those divine mysteries and the way of salvation, and for vindicating heavenly truth from the corruptions of its contradictors, so that men, shining with true faith and good works, may be brought to the kingdom of heaven." (*Exeges. locc*. Prooem. § 31.)

QUENSTEDT: "Theology, considered *systematically and abstractly*, is a doctrine built from the Word of God, by which men are instructed in true faith and a pious life for eternal life. Or: it is a doctrine drawn from divine revelation, showing how men are to be instructed about the worship of God through Christ to

eternal life. Theology, when considered *habitually and concretely*, is a practical habit of the θεόσδοτον (divinely given) understanding, conferred upon man by the Holy Spirit through the word concerning true religion, so that through its works the sinful man may be led by faith in Christ to God and eternal salvation." (L. c. I. fol. 16.)

DANNHAUER: "Sacred hodosophia, or *our theology*, is a constant, heavenly, and efficacious light in the spiritual, pure, and illuminable eye, which leads the man exiled from Heaven back to the blessedness of the heavenly homeland with a sweet guidance. . . If anyone prefers a proper definition, let him hold to this: Theology is a divinely given disposition in a pure conscience and a devoted mind, which reduces a man, supremely miserable, by an effective doctrine to salvation and eternal life." (*Hodosophia*, p. 6.)

PFEIFFER: *"Positive theology,* if we rightly assess the matter, is nothing other than the coordination of conclusions about faith, drawn from Holy Scripture rightly understood, or of the articles of faith solidly proven from the oracles of Holy Scripture; indeed*, nothing other than Scripture itself arranged into certain loci in a coherent order and with a clear method*." (*Thesaurus hermeneuticus*. p. 5. ff.)

FOR THE PERVERTED DEFINITIONS OF RECENT THEOLOGIANS see *Lehre und Wehre*, Vol. XXI, pp. 162–164.

a) This is the kind of thing, concerning which see § 15.
b) Which is the formal object of theology. See § 25 and 35.
c) These and the following pertain to the material object.
d) Who is the subject of the operation. See § 20.
e) As a primary intermediate end. See § 19.
f) Which pertains to the secondary intermediate end. See § 19.
g) As the efficient cause of the final formal end; although also of the intermediate one. See § 21 and 24.
h) The ultimate end here is that which encompasses the objective and the formal. See §§ 17 and 18.
i) Compare, *Mus*. l. c. § 46. p. 206.

§ 39.

The parts of revealed theology are to be arranged according to the analytical order, so that first those pertaining to [(a)] the end, then those to the subject of the operation, and finally those to the causes and means are treated.

DANNHAUER: "Scripture itself does not observe a human method of *ἀκρίβειαν* (precision); the divine inspirations were given *in many ways and in many parts*. But just as God gave the book of nature to man, and in it various materials—forests, fields, mountains, plants—almost all mixed together, leaving to man the care, cultivation, and arrangement of their order, so that he might not be idle: so he has proposed the book of Scripture, full of various subjects, where (what someone said of the Aphorisms of Hippocrates) you will seek in vain to find order in the material; but for this reason Christ gave teachers and the gift of teaching, that they might reduce all things to order, cultivate, polish, vindicate, and dispense the salutary fruits." (*Hodosophia*. Praef. p. 5.)

TWESTEN: "One regards the *scientific arrangement* of a Dogmatics as something of little consequence for its Christian content and character, but often fails to consider that the arrangement cannot be without influence on the dogmas themselves, and that its

scientific principles cannot be separated from those by which the view and formation of the doctrines of faith are determined." (*Lectures on Dogmatics*, etc. Hamburg, 1888. I, 34)

RAMBACH: "The Aristotelian-Scholastic method is the most common, to which Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas laid the foundation. The most important thing in this is that, according to the prescription of Aristotle, theology is treated as a practical discipline in such a way that 1. it deals with the objective and formal end, namely God and the happiness of man, 2. with the subject, 3. with the means by which the end is obtained, and that all articles of faith are presented according to the genera of causes and expressed in metaphysical terms. Now, it is not improper to treat the practical disciplines, among which theology is counted, by the analytical method. But this approach is also fraught with many inconveniences, since, for example, those who scrupulously adhere to this method do not know where to place the article on predestination. Hence it is located and relocated by one here, by another there. The treatment according to the kinds of causes—that is, the practice of deriving for each doctrine an efficient, instrumental, and final cause—often provides an opportunity to complicate the clearest matters and to repeat the same things repeatedly to no purpose. Moreover, the many metaphysical terms give rise to numerous logomachies and word-quarrels and obscure the dignity of this divine science. However, for this reason, this method is not to be entirely rejected, if one only carefully avoids the inconveniences associated with it." (*Dogmatische Theologie* I, 144)

RUDELBACH: "The outline of the older dogmatists, which, according to the *theological loci*, was essentially *peripheral*, and it cannot be denied that many in this mode of treatment from the very beginning exhibit more the character of layered deposition than that of organic organization, indeed that entire loci (e.g., the one on political magistracy) were not worked into the system, but rather represent a subsidiary side work and confuse the boundaries of dogmatic science. However, after careful consideration, we must nevertheless, with regard to the architectural question in general, side with the older dogmatists. These loci not only arose historically (which can be easily demonstrated from the earliest time when dogmatics was conceived as a separate theological discipline), but they also constitute an essential and factual unfolding (from theology in the narrowest sense to anthropology, Christology, ecclesiology, Eschatology) and—what is of primary importance—they hold fast to the fundamental concept of *revelation*, which, in our conviction, alone can measure the entire field and assign its proper place to each doctrine of the faith." (*Zeitschrift* 1857, p. 382.)

BRETSCHNEIDER: "A *system* is opposed to an aggregate, a collection, where one thing stands beside another, and is, in *the strictest sense* of the word, a whole of propositions, all of which are subordinate to a single *principle* (i.e., a general proposition in which the other propositions are contained as consequences, and which is therefore called the fundamental proposition) and are derived from this in a coherent and clear order. In this sense, only purely philosophical sciences can be systems. In *a broader sense*, however, systems are called a body of knowledge that is ordered according to general, internally coherent ideas in such a way that they form a logically complete whole. In this sense, a posteriori sciences can be systems, e.g., Christian theology." (*Systematischer Entwurf aller in der Dogmatik vorkommenden Begriffe*, p. 39.)

KLIEFOTH: "There are two ways of systematic treatment. The first is concerned solely with arranging its material according to its nature. It is the one applicable to *empirical* subjects. Hence its characteristic lies in two things: First, it must always work vis-à-vis this empirical material of its own; it can only arrange this empirical material by simultaneously recognizing it empirically. Second, such an arrangement of empirical material can produce a self-contained whole, a *system*, only if the material itself is a whole in itself. For example, one who writes the *history of a people* will indeed arrange this empirical material, but it will not result in a system, because the history of a people is not in itself a harmonious whole; rather, it is only a part of world history and, moreover, is torn apart within itself by sin. In contrast*, natural history,* and even larger sections of natural history, e.g., Zoology, Botany, in these sciences, can be treated systematically, since the animal world and the plant world, as God's works, necessarily form a harmonious whole; from which we also see that such a system must, above all, seek its empirical sources and constantly adhere to them, and can only be built up hand in hand with empirical research, not being completed before that research is finished. This kind of systematic treatment, which we shall call the empirical, is therefore also applicable only to a *part* of empirical materials, and is modified in some way for each different material according to the nature of the empirical sources of knowledge inherent in that material. Fundamentally different from this, however, is the method of *system-building* that has occupied the *speculative* philosophers of all ages: they sought, *starting from some simplest principle*, to derive from that single principle, through its own *self-development* and by rejecting all empiricism, a system of knowledge, the hope that the absolute necessity of that developmental process would give such a system and its individual propositions such correctness and certainty that it would then not only correspond with everything that empiricism allows us to know, but would also provide the proper *key* for *empirical* cognition itself. . . It needs no proof that this fundamentally *speculative* method of system-building is something entirely different from that first kind, which proceeds solely from the arrangement of empirically gained insights in accordance with their subject-matter. Now, if we look at both of their *relationships to the doctrine of salvation*, it is beyond doubt to me that the *speculative method* is not applicable to it, either wholly or in part, since God has revealed His salvation *historically* in word and deed, and thus also wills it to be recognized by us in an *empirical* way. On the other hand, it is just as certain and self-evident that I consider the first *empirical* method of systematic treatment applicable to the doctrine of salvation, indeed, that it seems to me applicable to the doctrine of salvation more than to anything else in the world, because the words and works of God for salvation are certainly a harmonious whole in themselves. As indeed all Christian dogmatists of all time have made use of this method. I insist, however, for this very reason, along with all these dogmatists, that the laws of *this* method must also be observed, that the formation of Christian systematic theology must take place only in relation to its proper empiricism... Now, if I compare this with von Hofmann's demands for a system, it is undoubtedly clear from his own statements that he does not find the *empirical* method of systematic treatment scientific enough, but rather recommends the path of *speculative* system-building. For he seeks the *simplest thing as a starting point,* which is *to unfold itself*, from which everything is to be derived with unbreakable necessity,

while setting aside *Scripture and church doctrine*; but what results is to correspond with what is to be compared *afterward*. Of all this, of these categories of necessity, self-development, and derivation, the empirical method of systematic treatment knows nothing; but the speculative method not only knows of them, but its very essence lies in them." (*Kirchliche Zeitschrift*. Edited by Dr. Kliefoth and Dr. Mejer. Vol. VI, pp. 240 ff.)

a) For although the end is not derived from the census of natural things, as in other practical sciences, nevertheless its knowledge, drawn from divine revelation, is by nature prior to the knowledge of the means, likewise drawn from divine revelation. Cf. *Musaeus,* Introd. l. c. § 47. ff. p. 209. ff.

PROLEGOMENA ^

Chapter II.

ON THE BEGINNING OF REVEALED THEOLOGY, OR ON HOLY SCRIPTURE.

§ 1 .

The principle of knowledge, or the formal [(a)] object of revealed theology, is divine [(b)] revelation, and indeed, for the present state of the Church, mediated revelation, which is contained in the Holy Scriptures as signs available to the senses. [(c)]

a) As far as the matter is concerned, they coincide, though they differ in reason, insofar as the *principle of cognition* is said to be in relation to conclusions as to principles; the *formal object*, however, is insofar as it is presented to the intellect as a form or formal reason, directing cognition to other things. See *Mus., Introd*. Part II, ch. I, § 1, p. 221-222.

b) See above, Book I, Ch. I, § 2, p. 5-6, and § 25, p. 43-44. Others use the term *Word of God instead of the term divine revelation,* which means the same thing. For they understand the *word of divine revelation.* See *Gerhard, Exeg. prooem*. § 18. p. 9.

c) In the past, indeed, God used many and various ways to reveal things that pertain to the salvation of men, according to *Heb. 1:1.* Specifically 1) *by the speech* of an articulate voice, in the air, formed outside the order of nature; as happened to the Patriarchs *Gen. 18:2. 19:1 ff. 22:1 ff.,* to Moses *Exod. 3:2. Num. 12:6.,* to the people of Israel, *Exod. 19:10 ff.* 2) *by dreams* or visions, objects of the phantasy of sleepers. See *Gen. 28:12. Dan. 2:1.* 3) by ecstatic *visions of those awake, Ezek. 1:4. Dan. 10:15. Acts 10:10.,* finally 4) by immediate *illumination* of the intellect, outside sleep and vision, see 2 *Tim. 3:16,*

2 *Pet. 1:21.* But now, after God has willed that those things which are necessary for the knowledge of revealed things for salvation, should be included in certain books; and new revelations having ceased, the habit of theology ordinarily rests on those ancient revelations, which were made immediately to the prophets and apostles and thus were recorded in writing, as on the sole principle.

QUENSTEDT: „"The *μόνον καὶ οἰκεῖον* (sole and proper), adequate and ordinary principle of knowing of sacred theology and of the entire Christian religion is divine revelation contained in the sacred letters, or, what is the same, only canonical Scripture is the principle of theology *in its entirety,* since from it alone the dogmas of faith are to be proved and deduced; the *complex* principle is this *proposition:* 'Whatever Scripture says is infallibly true, to be reverently believed and embraced.'" (*Th. did.-pol*. Part I, ch. 3, sect. 2, fol. 48)

THE SAME : "The thesis is *proven* (I.) *from Scripture,* which refers us to no other principle than to the Holy Scripture itself as the only rule of faith, morals and divine worship, Deut. 4:2; Josh. 23:6; Isa. 8:20; Luke 16:29. (II.) *From reason,* whose The *first one* was taken from the *sufficiency of Scripture.* Holy Scripture is sufficient by itself to prove all the dogmas of faith, and there is no need to add to it either the Roman Pontiff or the consent and authority of the Church, or human reason, revelations and private visions. *The second is from the properties of the principle.* In any discipline the principles must be *πρῶτα καὶ ἄμεσα, ἀληθῆ, ἀνυπεύθυνα, αὐτόπιστα, ἀναντίρρητα καὶ ἀναπόδεικτα* (first and immediate, true, infallible, certain, indubitable, worthy of faith per se, foreknown, previously granted and placed beyond controversy, indemonstrable), etc. See Aristotle. *Posterior Analytics*, book 1, ch. 2, and Topics, book I, ch. 1, num. 6. So also the principles of this divine discipline and of the Christian faith must be first, true etc.; otherwise the Christian faith could not safely rely on them. But all these requisites and properties of principles belong to Holy Scripture alone. And the *first* characteristic, which demands that all theological conclusions be first proven from it, is appropriate to Holy Scripture, from which it is clear that nothing can be produced from which conclusions in theology can be properly and directly deduced as a *prior* principle. It is Scripture itself, into which all theological conclusions must ultimately be resolved. *Secondly*, it is certain and indubitable truth, indeed truth itself, John 17:17, the word of truth 2 Cor. 6:7. Eph. 1:13. James 1:18. Indeed, since God is infallible, how can His Word be doubtful or uncertain? And this truth and authority Scripture demonstrates *thirdly* through itself, and gives faith to itself. Hence Nemesius, in his book *On the Nature of Man*, ch. 2: 'The doctrine of the divine word gives faith from itself, because it is divinely inspired.' Clement of Alexandria, in his *Stromata*, bk. VII, calls *κυριακὴν γραφήν* (the Lord's writing) *ἀρχὴν ἀναπόδεικτον* (an indemonstrable principle). Here belongs that of Bellarmine, book I on *The Word of God*, ch. 2: 'Of the Scriptures, which are contained in the prophetic and apostolic letters, nothing is more well known, nothing more certain, so that it must be the greatest of fools who would deny that faith is to be had in them.' *The third is from the induction of disciplines,* of which there are two kinds in the universe, one natural, the other supernatural. The former is based on human reason, the latter on divine authority. *The fourth is from the authority of the doctors."* (Loc. cit., fol. 49)

THE SAME: *„A distinction must be made between the times before and after Moses,* or between the revelation which was made by God to the patriarchs and without the support of the scriptures for 2454 years, according to Calvisius's calculation, from the beginning of the world until Moses, *was propagated by word of mouth;* and the revelation which *was recorded by Moses and the prophets in writing. The former* was the principle of theology until Moses, *the latter* after Moses. *For immediately after the first canon was established, which consisted of the Pentateuch, the Book of Job and the Song of Moses, revelation no longer delivered by word of mouth, but only that which was recorded in writing, was the norm and principle of religion.* To the argument of the pontiffs: "Whatever was a sufficient principle of things to be believed

up to the times of Moses, that could also have been a sufficient principle after the times of Moses, we respond: We deny the consequence: It was sufficient for a time, we grant; in perpetuity, we deny.“ (Loc. cit., fol. 51)

THE SAME: „A *distinction* must be made between those things which are contained in the Scriptures*, according to the meaning,* in the syllables and words themselves, and those which are deduced from them by proximate, immediate and necessary *consequence*; not only the former, but also the latter are principles of theology and of things to be believed. 'For those things which are *gathered from the Scriptures* (legitimately and necessarily) *are the same* as those which *are written*,' says Nazianzen in Book 5 of Theology. 'But many things,' says Basil, 'are contained *ἐν γραφῇ* (in writing) which are not contained *ἐν γράμματι* (in letter) , that is, they are contained in the holy letters *in sense, not in letter.* The Savior Himself, in his dispute against the Sadducees concerning the resurrection of the dead, used the consequences of Matt. 22:31." (Loc. cit., fol. 52)

THE SAME: "We cannot acknowledge the feigned infallibility of the Roman Pontiff or his decrees and definitions as the principle of our religion or theological truths ." (L. c.)

THE SAME**:** *"The antithesis of the pontificals,* who make *four* principles in theology and principles of faith, as Bellarmine, Book II. on Councils, ch. 12. § 1.: 'The written Word of God, *ἄγραφοι* (unwritten) traditions, the authority of councils and the *Roman Pontiff.*' The rest, however, they subject to this one in such a way that they *really recognize the only* proper principle of theology, namely, the *Roman Pontiff.* Hence it is an axiom of pontifical theology, especially Jesuit theology: 'Whatever the Roman Pontiff teaches and defines, that is infallibly true.' Hence Casaubon in Exercitat, contra Baronium, Exercitat. XVI. n. 28. p. 360.: 'It was once established at Rome that the true and correct norm in the cause of religion is not the word of God, not the consensus of antiquity, but the church, and the infallibility of the one pope.' Cf. Bellarmine, book III on the Word of God, ch. 15, response to argument 15; Melchior Canus, book V, Theological Loci, ch. 5.. Alphonsus of Castro, Book I, Adv. Heir, Chapter 8, considers that only the Pope should be said to be 'infallible' for this reason, because 'the Pope is the principal part and head of the Apostolic See or of the whole of that aggregate, which taken together is infallibly said in the public definition of the faith.' But the Jesuits refute this opinion, asserting in various places: 'if indeed the Pope is the doctor of the universal Church for the councillors, infallibility nevertheless depends on this individual only, not on the plurality of councillors.' See Pighius on Hierarchy, Book IV, Chapter 8 , Bellarius, Book II , Chapter 11, Chapter 16, Chapter 17, Chapter 14, Chapter 2, Bannern in QQ, Chapter 1, Article 10, Dub. 2, Conclusion 3, and others. And so the only, or certainly the supreme principle of papist mateology (empty talk) is the feigned infallibility of the Roman Pontiff. Well, Dr. Huelsemann says in *Anti-Bellarmine* cap. I. th. 20: 'The principle', he says, 'into which the papistic faith is resolved, cannot be, in the judgment of all those who use reason, except futile and most uncertain. The reason is that, even if they pretend to resolve their faith into Holy Scripture and the first truth understood according to the sense of the universal church, they nevertheless resolve the interpretation of the universal church into the interpretation of one man, who is called by them the Roman Pontiff.'" (L. c. fol. 53.)

PIUS IX.: "We teach and define as a divinely revealed dogma: the Roman Pontiff, *when speaking ex cathedra*, that is, when he acts as pastor and teacher of all Christians, and by his supreme apostolic authority defines a doctrine *on faith or morals* to be held by the universal Church, through the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, is endowed with that *infallibility* with which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to be instructed in defining doctrine on faith or morals; therefore the definitions of such a Roman Pontiff are *irreformable by himself, not by the consent of the Church*." (*First Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ*, published in session 4 of the Vatican Council: "Eternal Pastor." A.D. 1870. July 18. See The Canons and Decrees of the

Vatican Council, German-Latin edition by G. Schneemann, Freiburg at Herder, 1871, p. 45 ff, 1871. p. 45. sq.) On the fallibility of the Roman pontiff, cf. *Gerhard*'s *Catholic Confession*, Book I, Part II, ch. 2, fol. 77-111,

QUENSTEDT: "This principle of the pontiffs: 'Whatever the Roman Pontiff determines is infallibly true', first of all cannot be, it is clear from this, because they try to prove it from another source, namely from the Scripture itself, St. Matthew 16:18, John 21:15-16-17. . . Those who 1. can err in the doctrine of faith and become heretics, 2. have sanctioned many erroneous dogmas from the chair, and 3. contradict themselves: they cannot be the principle of faith and theological conclusions." (Loc. cit., fol. 51)

THE SAME: "Nor is *human* or natural *reason* the principle of theology and supernatural things." (L. cf. 55.)

THE SAME: "The thesis *is proven* I. *from the nature of the mysteries of faith* . . II. *From the nature of reason*, which is completely blind in supernatural matters. . . III. *From the silence of Scripture.* Nowhere are Christ, the prophets, and the apostles read of using this principle, nor does Scripture ever refer us to the judgment of reason in defining matters of faith. For thus Calvinists have hitherto believed with us: 'What is not written is not to be understood.' IV. *From the examples of the pious*, who in matters of faith did not follow the judgment of reason, but, contradicting it in vain, believed, as Abraham, Rom. 4:18., who, against hope (dictating the orbit of reason) under hope (of God who promised), believed that he would be the father of many nations, according to the word (Gen. 15:5 [*sic*: not Gen. 16:5]): So shall your seed be. And not weak in faith, he did not consider *(ον κατενόησέ)* his own body now dead... Compare the example of Naaman 2 Kings 5:5:10–11, 13, of Paul Gal. 15:16. V. *From the examples of those who in matters of faith*, *who followed the judgment of reason* either erred most gravely or perished most miserably, as the unbelieving tribune 2 Kings 7:12, Nicodemus, John 3:4, 9, Thomas, John 20:25, the Sadducees, Matt. 22:23.“ (Loc. cit., fol. 59)

THE SAME: *„Antithesis* I. *Of the Scholastics* , whose whole theology is nothing else than a mixture of theology and philosophy, or, according to Erasmus in the Encomium of Moria, ‘a discipline fused together from divine oracles and philosophical reasonings, as from the race of Centaurs, by a certain twofold mixture.’ For in the highest mysteries of faith the Scholastics draw their conclusions from logical, physical and metaphysical principles, omitting or lightly touching upon the words of Scripture, as we have insinuated in c. 1. s. 1. th. 2. n. 8. p. 3. II. Of the *papists* and especially the *Jesuits,* who not infrequently prove the articles of faith from the principles of reason, see Bellarmine. Bellarmine, book IV on Penance, ch. 5, book III on the Eucharist, ch. 22, book II on the Mass, ch. 4, book IV on the Soul of Christ, ch. 10. Sometimes they attack the same from the principles of reason, see Bellarmine. book IV on Monks, ch. 6, book II on Justification, ch. 7 (where he denies the 'imputation of Christ's righteousness, since it contradicts reason'), book IV on the Church, ch. 11. Gregory of Valencia, book VIII on Analysis of Catholic Faith, ch. 6, p. 101, among documents 'for understanding Scripture and deciding matters of faith' he places this in the sixth and last place, 'so that natural reason may also be consulted'. III. *Of the Calvinists;* for they pre-emptively submit the mysteries of faith to the teaching of reason, or even challenge them from philosophical principles, and it can be clearly demonstrated from their practice and from their words. See Sturm in the Ambrosian Epistle to Pappus, p. 5; Nicholas Taurellus in the Dedicatory Epistle of the Triumph, where he calls philosophy 'the foundation of faith'; Ludwig Crocius in Assertion of the Augsburg Confession, disputation 1; Conrad Vorstius, disputation XV Anti-Pistorian, where he says, 'the principles of faith are twofold, partly natural, such as sense and reason, then all axioms known by the natural light of reason, partly supernatural' etc. Goclenius, Disput. XV. Metaphys. th. 1, writes; 'In the studies of human and heavenly wisdom, dialectic I acknowledge both ministry and magisterium, and some judgment and command, he, dialectic of teaching and understanding things both sacred and profane I establish as a minister and teacher, and a judge and a queen or a certain temperance.' Zwingli, in the Marburg Colloquy, made his own that dictum of Averroes and the Socinians, 'nothing

is to be believed that it cannot be comprehended by reason, because God does not propose incomprehensible things to us', as reported by Philipp in brief notes on the Colloquy of Marburg, see Historiam A. C. Chytraei p. 641. Vedelius says in Bation. theol. 1. III. c. 6 . p. 513. 531. etc., 'ration is a norm, not primary, but secondary, to which some perfection can be added.' But the principle of nature, which in theory Vedelius and with him Massonius make a secondary principle of faith, in practice and use they make a primary principle of faith, as Dr. Jacob Martini demonstrates in his tract. on the principle of faith, disput. VII. § 9. sq. Keckermann in book I. System. Theol. c. 4. writes thus: 'God, by those two clearly divine disciplines, metaphysics and logic, wishes to kindle in the minds of men, and therefore this is the use of the auxiliary'; He further says: 'This mystery (the Holy Trinity) will declare itself.' See Dr. Menzer in the responsa. ad defens. secun. Pruten. Convers. Crocii c. 2. tom. I. Opp. p. 858. ff. Peter Martyr preface. on the book. Begum says: 'Not so much the divine word, as the words of nature should be followed in theology.' IV. *Socinians*, who establish reason as another principle of theology besides the Word of God and consider the Christian religion to be an inflection for it, since this is their axiom: 'Nothing in theology is true that is not approved by reason.' Also: 'Nothing can be believed that cannot be grasped and understood by reason.' These are the words of Slichting's *Disput. de Trinit. contra Meisner*. p. 125. Compare Smalcius disp. 4. de justific. contra Franzius fol. 137. and disp. 8 . f. 421. ‘That which reason and common sense are opposed to cannot be true in any way,’ says Socinus of the author. Script, p. 54. Surely that blasphemous attack on the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation flowed from no other source than from the prevailing dictate of human reason, which these men, although they do not wish to appear to be, far prefer to the dictate of the Holy Spirit speaking in holy letters. For thus Osterode writes in his Instit. Germ. c. 4. p. 31: ‘If reason expressly demonstrates that the Trinity of Persons in God is false, who then could ever imagine that it is nevertheless true and could be proved from the Word of God.’ V. *Of the Arminians,* who concede nothing in religion except what is in accordance with reason, and think that judgment concerning the mysteries of faith must be entrusted and indeed entrust it to human reason, see their *Confession,* chap. I. §16.’ (L. cf. 57.)

THE SAME: “*A distinction must be made* between reason in man *before* and *after the fall. . . Distinction* between reason taken passively as *the subject of information*, and accepted normally as *the principle of proof. . .* The former is necessary in any knowledge of things, and thus also of divine things, as a *principle by which* (*quo*), for man understands only through the intellect or reason; but the latter is in the knowledge of divine things as a *principle which* (*quod*) is not admitted. . . Without the *use* of reason or intellect, no one can engage in theology; for theology is not to be proposed to brute or animal beings lacking reason. Just as man cannot see without eyes, cannot hear without ears, cannot taste without tongue, so without reason, without which he is not even a man, cannot perceive, which faith (which Augustine calls the "soul of the soul" in Sermon 250. on Time) encompasses in its *periferia . . . A distinction must be made* between *organic principles, such as grammar, logic, rhetoric, the study of languages, etc., and philosophical* principles strictly speaking. The latter are to be used in theology (as a support theology), since without them neither the sense or meaning of words can be extracted (which is grammatical), nor the figures and manner of speaking can be evaluated (which is rhetorical), nor connections and consequences can be perceived, nor discourses can be established (which is logical). Well does Dr. Balthasar Meisner say in, *Disputation on Avoiding Calvinism*, Th. 83: "Who among us has ever denied that reason should be used in its own way in theological matters? Do we not use it ourselves whenever we pay attention to the property of the language or the structure of the whole context? Faith comes from hearing, Rom. 10:18. But for hearing, the use of reason is required, so that word is distinguished from word and some sense is perceived. Thus in confirming, in destroying, in expounding

we do not deny that the use is necessary, because in all things the *τρόπος παιδείας* (mode of instruction) and mode prescribed in logic must be observed.' — A *distinction* must be made between *the general or transcendent principles of reason,* which are verified of every being, and *the special or particular ones,* which are valid only in certain matters, such as physics and mathematics. We admit the *latter* in theology; for they are not only finite in view, but also formed of an infinite nature, whence they are also called transcendental. But we deny that *these* can be used as principles of theological conclusions, that is, that their decision and judgment depend on them. — A *distinction* must be made between *theological questions of pure faith* and *mixed ones* (where one term is sought from philosophy, the other from theology). In *mixed ones we grant that* special philosophical principles can be used, not indeed for the purpose of decision and demonstration, but only *for the purpose of illustration and secondary proof,* where the thing is defined from Scripture. — A *distinction* must be made between *the ministry of reason,* when like a handmaid it yields to its mistress or lady (from the ancient comparison of Ambrose, 2. De Abrahamo ch. 10.), and *the magisterium of reason,* when it arrogates to itself judgment about things unknown and beyond comprehension. . . A *distinction* must be made between reason *left to itself* or judging according to its natural principles, and reason *enclosed and chastised within the world of the divine Word* or enlightened by Holy Scripture; we do not deny *that the latter* can judge about matters of faith; but we deny that judgment about matters of faith is appropriate to *the former*." (Loc. cit., fol. 55 ff.)

THE SAME: "It is one thing to promote reason or the principles of reason in theological matters *theoretically and in words* as a principle, and another thing to apply *it or the principle of proof practically and in fact*. *This cannot* indeed be said of many Scholastics, Jesuits, Calvinists and Socinians, but *this* is common to all the heterodoxes already mentioned." (Loc. cit., fol. 60)

THE SAME: *"A distinction must be made* between *explicit* and *implicit contradiction; the former* occurs between two propositions, one of which affirms a thing, the other denies it; *the latter* occurs when in one and the same proposition the predicate contradicts the subject. *The former* is called *contradictory opposition* or also explicit contradiction, *the latter contradiction in the adjectival* or implicit. The judgment of explicit contradiction must be sought entirely from the rules of logical connections or rather oppositions; but human reason cannot judge of implicit contradiction, since it does not perceive or understand the thing itself." (Loc. cit., fol. 60 ff.)

THE SAME: „Rom. 12:1. by *λογικὴ λατρεία* or *logical worship* or *rational worship* is not understood worship that is taken from the will of reason or is examined by the balance of reason, but this *logical worship is opposed to the irrational* worship of the Old Testament, where victims of brute animals were offered to God; but Christians in the New Testament present themselves to God as a living sacrifice and do not offer irrational *animals* , but their own bodies to God. (For the apostle here explains *λογικὴ λατρεία* by the offering of our bodies, and that offering is not fulfilled by the slaughter of a living animal, but by the mortification and renewal of the old man.)" (Loc. cit., fol. 62)

THE SAME: „The adversaries *object*: 'religion has many things *above,* but nothing *against* reason'. Answer. 1.: *The articles of faith are not in themselves against reason,* but only above reason; *but it happens accidentally* that they are also against reason, when reason takes judgment of them for itself from its own principles, and does not follow the light of the word, but denies and attacks them. 2. The articles of faith are not only above, but also *against corrupt* and depraved reason, which judges them to be foolishness. Smalcius insists *Disp. IV. against Franz*. p. 137.: ‚Let anyone teach that one sentence of the holy letters conflicts with reason, and then reason will be silent in the church.' Answer.: No holy sentence conflicts with reason that is contained within its own terms, but all the mysteries of faith conflict with reason that goes beyond its terms, such as the Trinity, the Incarnation, etc." (Loc. cit.)

THE SAME: "*They object:* As *a small light* is not contrary to a great light, so reason is not contrary to Scripture. Answer 1.: There is no contrariety here *per se*, but per accidens. Reason, containing itself within its own sphere, is not contrary to Scripture,

but when having gone beyond and transgressed its sphere and judges from its own principles about the highest mysteries of faith. 2. Reason is contrary to Scripture, not as light, but *insofar as it is blind* and dark. 3. In great light *more is seen* than in lesser light etc. 4. Corrupted reason or *its corrupt use* is repugnant to theology when it measures the infinite from finite things or sells them as universal axioms, which are not such, e.g. when it opposes to creation its own so-called primary axiom: 'From nothing, nothing comes'; the mystery of the Trinity: 'one cannot be three.' For these are not truly universal, since they cannot be verified in all particulars. Thus, 'the whole being greater than its part', naturally, remains true in philosophy; nevertheless, the parts of the whole blessed and miraculously increased can surpass the whole not yet increased, John 6:9, 13. Thus, 'the finite is not capable of the infinite, physically and mathematically.' (Loc. cit., fol. 62 ff.)

THE SAME: "*They object: What is true in theology is not false in philosophy,* because there is one truth. Answer: 1.: Truth is one in the general concept, meanwhile each discipline has its own axioms, which are not to be dragged into another forum, but to be left *in its own sphere*. 2. When theology says: A virgin gave birth, philosophy: It is *ἀδύνατον* (impossible) for a virgin to give birth and remain such, they are not contradicted; for theology does not assert that a virgin gave birth *naturally* and remained such, but says that this was done by supernatural and divine power. — *A distinction must be made* between *philosophy* considered abstractly and by reason of its essence, and philosophy considered *concretely* and by reason of existence in a subject corrupted by sin; *in the former* way it is by no means opposed to divine truth (for truth is given only by reason of objects subordinate to each other, harmonious); but *in the latter* way, due to ignorance of the intellect and perversion of the will, it is not infrequently used by the philosopher to depravity and empty deception, Col. 2:8." (Loc. cit., fol. 63)

THE SAME: „When Vedelius, book III. Ration. Theol. c. 6 , calls reason '*a secondary norm of faith,* to which some perfection may be added', Dr. Weller correctly responds in Anti-Massonio Part I, disput. 4, thesis 9, p. 107: 1. that it is a σιδηρόξυλον (iron-wood, impossibility) to be a secondary norm, since a norm or canon, as Varinus defines, is μέτρον ἀδιάψευστον, πᾶσαν πρόσθεσιν καὶ ἀναίρεσιν μηδαμῶς ἐπιδεχόμενον (an unerring measure, in no way admitting any addition or subtraction. And Basil the Great in book 1, ch. 2, Against Eunomius says: 'There is an addition to that which lacks something, but that' (gnomon and rule), 'if anything is lacking in themselves, they cannot be called even by these names in a fitting manner.' " (Loc. cit.)

THE SAME: "The *Calvinists* press that they mean *regenerated reason*, or human reason made spiritual after regeneration, as Calvin (*Institutes* bk. IV, ch. 17, no. 26), Bucanus (loc. 48, q. 68), Grynaeus (*Disputationes Theologicae on the Origin of Man*, p. 515), Massonius (Part I, p. 366). Dannhauer responds in the cited place, p. 58.: 'This reply would obtain something, if reason in man were found pure, without the influx of the still remaining sinful source; but the water is troubled, like sweet water, at least suspected of poison, since every imagination of the human heart is evil at all times. And was not Sarah regenerated? And yet she laughed at and mocked the promise of the Lord as a paradox."" (Loc. cit., fol. 63 ff.)

BALDUIN: "When even the *regenerate* want to argue about matters of faith *from the principles of reason,* then their reason is said to be *corrupted*." (*Disputation on the 2nd chapter of the Epistle to the Colossians*. Witteb. 1617. B. 2.)

QUENSTEDT: "Nor even *the consensus of the primitive church or of the fathers of the earlier centuries after Christ* is the principle of the Christian faith, whether primary or secondary; nor does it produce divine, but only human and probable faith. . . This is the true state of the controversy: Whether the consensus of the teachers of the church of the five centuries after Christ, insofar as it can be demonstrated from their surviving writings, is to be held as a secondary or subordinate principle of the dogmas of faith, not only with respect to man, but also with respect to the matter itself." (*Loc. cit. fol. 64*)

CHEMNITZ: „Andradius does us an injustice, because he claims that we are not dependent on the testimonies of antiquity in general, and that we undermine the approval of the Church, the faith and its majesty. . . We confess that we disagree with those who invent opinions that have no testimonies of any time in the Church, as Servetus, Campanus, the Anabaptists and others did in our time. We also feel that no dogma in the Church that is new and in conflict with all antiquity should be accepted.“ (*Examination of the Council of Trent, On Tradition*, gen. 6. f. 71.)·

QUENSTEDT: The conclusion (*πόρισμα*) is proved*: From the nullity* or non-existence of that consensus. Many writings of the ancient doctors of the Church are *anecdotes*; few of those that were published have come down to us; many have perished; many fathers, especially from the most ancient antiquity, wrote little or nothing, and those writings of the fathers that still survive, have been mutilated, interpolated and corrupted. But the consensus of a few fathers is not immediately the consensus of the whole Church. — The adversaries *object*: nevertheless the best writings of the fathers were preserved by the heavenly providence, but the inferior ones have perished. But who will give credence to this? who will prescribe laws of divine providence? Or who will persuade us that in the burning of the library — whether the Alexandrian, of which Gellius speaks in *Noct. Att.* Bk. VI, last ch., or the Diocletianic, of which Dr. Dannhauer writes in *Christeid.* p. 231, that only the inferior monuments have perished, while what was worthy of preservation (*cedro*) was snatched from the teeth of fate? Indeed, blessed Luther attributes it rather to divine providence, in the preface to the first Wittenberg volume, 'that no small part of ecclesiastical writers perished, lest men be compelled to spend the time on the perusal of the fathers and councils that ought to be devoted to reading and searching the Holy Scripture.' — They insist: from the extant writings (*ἐκδότοις*) it is sufficient to estimate the consensus of the ancient Church. Answer: I concede that it can be estimated partially and probably; I deny that it yields divine faith; it can be estimated in those matters in which agreement appears, but not in others, where the fathers themselves are divided (*συμψηφισμός*); it can be estimated if they openly, universally, and persistently concur by one and the same consensus in some tradition of faith. Thus, for example, about the canon of Scripture we have a most beautiful consensus of the ancient doctors, if you collect all the testimonies for five and more centuries; but that consensus does not appear in the same way in the dogmas. How often in the writings of the fathers also the discrepancy about the sense of Scripture? How often the gap of times? How much space of places, where nothing is revealed in writings? That five-century consensus would only concern contemporary controversies, not heresies that arose after five centuries. See Dr. Dannhauer. *Myster. Syncretismi* p. 45. sq. 2. *From the weakness of the error.* . . 3. *From the multitude of spurious writings.* There is hardly any one of the ancient fathers in whose nest alien offspring, even deformed ones, have not been placed. . . 4. *From the condition and quality of that consensus* . . . 5. *From the negation of the requisites of the principle* .” (Loc. cit. fol. 66 ff.)

SMALCALD ARTICLES: “The Papists quote here Augustine and some of the Fathers who are said to have written concerning purgatory, and they think that we do not understand for what purpose and to what end they spoke as they did. St. Augustine does not write that there is a purgatory, nor has he a testimony of Scripture to constrain him thereto, but he leaves it in doubt whether there is one, and says that his mother asked to be remembered at the altar or Sacrament. Now, all this is indeed nothing but the devotion of men, and that, too, of individuals, and does not establish an article of faith, which is the prerogative of God alone. Our Papists, however, cite such statements [opinions] of men in order that men should believe in their horrible, blasphemous, and cursed traffic in masses for souls in purgatory [or in sacrifices for the dead and oblations], etc. … *For it will not do to frame articles of faith from the works or words of the holy Fathers*; otherwise their kind of fare, of garments, of house, etc., would have to become an article of faith, as was done with relics. *We have, however, another rule, namely: The Word of God shall establish articles of faith, and no one else, not even an angel*.” (Part 2, Article 2, The Mass, §13-15, p. 303.)

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis*: 1. *The Papists*, as Bellarmine's book II. de Christo ch. 2. Gord. Huntlaei *Controv*. II. c. 28., asserting: the unanimous opinion of the fathers is to be held by all as the infallible norm of faith.' . . 2. *The Crypto-Papists* in England, as the Laudians descended from William Laud, bishop of Canterbury who was beheaded. 3. *The innovators,* who, following the lead of Vincent of Lérins, make two principles of theology and assertions to be believed: one primary, Holy Scripture, the other secondary and subordinate, namely the Catholic consensus of the primitive church, and indeed the five centuries before Christ. " (Loc. cit. fol. 65.)

COUNCIL OF TRENT: "The Synod of Trent . . . perceiving that this truth and discipline are contained *in written books and unwritten traditions*, which, having been received from the mouth of Christ himself by the apostles or by the apostles themselves, dictated by the Holy Spirit, as if handed down by hand, have come down to us, following the example of the orthodox fathers, *all the books* of both the Old and New Testaments, since God is the author of both, *as well as the traditions themselves,* both pertaining to faith and morals, as having been dictated orally by Christ or by the Holy Spirit and preserved in continuous succession in the Catholic Church, receives and venerates *with equal affection and reverence*." (Session 4. Decree on the Canon, Scriptures. Ed. Smets. p. 14.)

ROMAN CATECHISM: "The whole system of doctrine, which is to be handed down to the faithful, is contained *in the word of God*, which *has been distributed in Scripture and tradition."* (Prooem. q. 12.)

CALIXT: *"There are two principles*: the authority of the divine law, and the tradition of the Catholic Church." (*De arte nova*, p. 49.) To this Kahn says: "When Calixtus spoke of two principles in the Church, Scripture and Tradition, this was evidently at the expense of the Protestant principle of Scripture and was once again an approximation to the Roman Church." (*The Inner Course of German Protestantism*. 3rd ed. Leipzig 1874. I, 105) [Ben. T. G. Mayes argued otherwise! See here, p. 295 ff.]

THEOLOGIANS OF DORPAT: "Accordingly, our confession also contains, in addition to the symbolically developed and fixed articles and dogmas of faith, elements of the general Christian and ecclesiastical creed—we mean the apostolic creed—that are partly still *in the process of formation,* partly have not yet entered the *historical dogma-forming movement* at all or only in a rudimentary way, because the Church has so far only been prompted to address them from one perspective, or because they have not yet become the subject of its more precise explanation and definition." (*Gutachten*, 1866, p. 12)

AUGUSTINE: "I have learned to pay this honor and fear to those books of Scripture alone, which are now called *canonical*, that I most firmly believe that none of their authors made any mistake in writing; but I read others in such a way that, no matter how much they excel in holiness and doctrine, I do not consider them true because they themselves thought so, but because they were able to convince me, either through those canonical authors or by probable reason, that they do not depart from the truth." (Ep. 19. to Hieron.)

HUELSEMANN: "*Vincent of Lérins* has no authority here, and his rule is stupid: 1. because of *the later age in which he lived,* which fell in the middle of the fifth century A.D.; 2. *because of the lack of support* from other older fathers, who not *only never approved this rule: 'Whatever all writers everywhere have written together, openly, frequently, and constantly, must ultimately be considered an article of faith and truth'* etc., but also openly rejected it, challenging the open and literal consensus that exists between the prophets and apostles." (*Praelect. in Form. Conc*. art. 16. s. 6. § 5. p. 876.)

QUENSTEDT: "The adversaries urge the promise of Christ in Matt. 28:20: '*I am with you'* etc. But whence will they prove that from that gracious

divine presence with the Church, which the Savior promised there, it follows that the harmonious testimonies of the Church's teachers or fathers obtain the status of a secondary or subordinate principle? . . . It is one thing to be the norm and rule of what is to be believed absolutely, and another to be the norm and rule under a certain respect and with certain limits as it were. Confessions and bodies of doctrine, such as the Augsburg Confession, the *Corpus Julium*, the *Corpus Prutenicum*, the Formula of Concord, etc., are the norm and rule not simply, but under a certain respect, the tesseral, testimonial norm of the public doctrine of certain particular churches; the principle and norm of this is the Holy Scripture, from which the authors of these confessions deduced that which they themselves believed to be believed and which they wished to believe in their territories. . . That which is not self-evident (*αὐτόπιστον*), that which requires the passage of centuries, nor suffices of itself, that which is not simply necessary, that which can be denied to some, etc., cannot properly be called a principle; but all these belong to this lower principle, as they call it, or sub-principle. . . Cf. Huelsemann, who writes thus: 'It is a prejudice that the patristic consensus restricts antiquity and universality and continuity (which is everywhere, which is always, which is taught by all) as a criterion (*κριτήριον*) of infallibility to the *principal* chapters of faith, *not to minute* questions of the divine law, and yet it has not determined which and how many are those questions on which, as it says, the foundations of the whole Catholic dogma are based; which determination is everywhere necessary for the application of this rule.'" (*Loc. cit. fol. 67 ff.*)

THE SAME: "Nor, finally, should *visions, apparitions, private revelations and internal angelic discourses* be used in proving the dogmas of faith." (*Loc. cit. fol. 69*)

THE SAME: *„State of the controversy:* It is asked whether, besides or outside of Holy Scripture, a norm of what is to be believed or done is to be sought from particular enthusiasms and private revelations. — *Distinction* between visions and revelations made *before the departure of the apostles,* and *after their death* and revealing new dogmas of faith; we speak here not of the former, but of the latter. — *Distinction* between *the word ἄγραφου* or unwritten, external and *internal;* the former is extolled by the papists alone, the latter by the papists and the Enthusiasts as well as the Socinians and some Calvinists. . . . papists between *εὐτόςασμόν* or true divine inspiration, and apparent, which again is either feigned or presumed. We are dealing here with the latter kind of enthusiasms, which is usually so called, and by *enthusiasts* we understand fanatical men who either imagine or presume the inspiration, revelations and inspirations of God, and either diabolical or melancholic or voluntary illusions and imaginations, calling these divine revelations, they deceive themselves and others. — *Distinction* between God's *power* and his *will;* that God can give new revelations, no one denies, but whether He wills, is doubtful. — *Distinction* between the *hidden* and *revealed will of God;* this is to be estimated solely from the written Word of God; about it, because it is hidden, nothing certain can be pronounced.“ (*Loc. cit. fol. 70*)

THE SAME: *„Distinction* between revelations that concern or impugn articles of faith, and which concern the *state of the church or the state,* common life and future events; the *former* we repudiate, but regarding the *latter*, some hold that they are not indeed to be thrust upon anyone with the necessity of believing, yet are not to be rashly rejected. *Balduin* in Commentary on 1 Timothy 4, Part I, q. 1, says: 'We do not doubt that God still sometimes reveals to some people future things, which pertain to the state of the church and the state, to be announced for the use of men.' *Distinction* between *the true Samuel* and the *personified Samuel* or his spectre; not the former, but the latter appeared to Saul (1 Sam. 28). For the circumstances of the text show that they were tricks of Satan.“ (*Loc. cit. fol. 75*)

ART. SMALC .: “In a word, *enthusiasm* inheres in Adam and his children from the beginning [from the first fall] to the end of the world, [its poison] having been implanted and infused into them by the old dragon,

and is the origin, power [life], and strength of all heresy, especially of that of the Papacy and Mahomet. Therefore we ought and must constantly maintain this point, *that God does not wish to deal with us otherwise than through the spoken Word and the Sacraments. It is the devil himself whatsoever is extolled as Spirit without the Word and Sacraments*. For God wished to appear even to Moses through the burning bush and spoken Word; and no prophet neither Elijah nor Elisha, received the Spirit without the Ten Commandments [or spoken Word]. Neither was John the Baptist conceived without the preceding word of Gabriel, nor did he leap in his mother's womb without the voice of Mary. And Peter says, 2 Pet. 1:21: The prophecy came not by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. Without the outward Word, however, they were not holy, much less would the Holy Ghost have moved them to speak when they still were unholy [or profane]; for they were holy, says he, since the Holy Ghost spake through them. " (Part III, Article 8, §9-13)

On the spectro Endor (1 Sam. 28.) cf. *A. Pfeifferi, Dubia vexata S. S. V. T.* p. 377–379. — Concerning things *predicted* through the Holy Spirit, through the devil, and from the stars, cf. *Luther* Tom. XIV, 231. sqq. — On apparentibus mortuis, astrology, necromancy, cf. *idem* Tom. XIX, 1385—96. XI, 1632—35, 436—42. — On enthusiasts cf. *idem* T. I, 2287—92.

QUENSTEDT*: "*We draw the proofs of the orthodox position: 1. from the *authority of Scripture,* which calls us back from all other principles, from revelations and apparitions to the law and to the testimony, Isa. 8:19, to Moses and the prophets, Luke 16:29. Christ commands us to search the Scriptures of John 5:39. And Peter warns us that we should pay attention to the prophetic word in 2 Pet. 1:19: 'until the day dawns and the morning star rises in our hearts.' 2. From the *perfection of the sacred letters* ... 3. From the *certainty of faith*, which is to be sought from the holy letters alone John 20:15, 2 Tim. 3:15. . . 4. From the *absence of any promise.* Nowhere are immediate revelations or visions to be expected in our times as having been promised. Luke 16:29. The condemned rich man is rebuked at the feast for having asked for revelations from the dead for his brothers who are still alive. 5. From the *diabolical fraud and fallacy* in these revelations . . . 6 . A. the *condition of these revelations*; for they are obscure, doubtful, uncertain, suspect, often absurd, fallacious, dangerous, not useful, not necessary, contrary to the Word of God, subject to the tricks and deceptions of Satan, subject to the judgment of others, 1 Cor. 14:29, 32., and therefore cannot be considered as the principle of theology and faith. 7. The *new prophets* seek their prophecies not so much from a special revelation, as *through a certain plagiarism* from Ezekiel, Daniel and the Apocalypse (Revelation). 8. Those *angels*, whom the adversaries dream of, either announce the same in faith, which is contained in the Word, or something else and different; if the latter, they are not to be heard Gal. 1:8, if the former, there is no need for their revelation. 9. Through the revelations of enthusiasts the *order of ministry* or the order between teachers and learners divinely sanctioned in the church *is overturned*." (*Loc. cit.* fol. 71 ff.)

THE SAME**:** *"They object*: Many things were truly predicted by their own prophetic Spirit, which the history of our times will prove. Answer 1: It is asked for *in the beginning,* and revelations of future events and their predictions are boasted, not proven. 2. The false hypothesis is supposed that all predictions of the future are prophetic or *God-breathed.* But there are also many *demon-inspired*, many natural, many conjectural, many accidental, many ambiguous and mere hoaxes, such as many among the Gentiles emanated from various oracles and seers of the devil, who would also have to be counted among the number of true prophets, if an argument were to be drawn from the prediction of certain future events." (Loc. cit. 74. ff.)

THE SAME: *"They object:* The apostle Paul clearly says in 1 Thess. 5:19, 20, 'The Spirit is not to be quenched, nor prophecies to be regarded as nothing.' *Answer:* Here by the *Spirit* is not meant a fanatical spirit, but the movement of the Holy Spirit set ablaze in the hearts of the faithful, who (like the sacred fire of old) are to be always cherished, lest they be extinguished, and should always be rekindled, 2 Tim. 1:6. Thus by *prophecies* are not meant

enthusiasms, but either objectively the prophetic writings, or instrumentally their explanation and application, either from a singular gift, of which prophecy is spoken in 1 Cor. 12 and 14, or from a common and ordinary gift.“ (Loc. cit. f. 77)

THE SAME: *„Antithesis:* 1. Various *fanatics*, who state: 'The knowledge of God and all the dogmas to be believed is to be sought not from the written word of God, but from the *revelation and innate light peculiar to each one*, from raptures, dreams, conversations with angels, from the internal word, from the inspiration (*Einsprechen*) of the heavenly Father, the internal instruction of Christ, essentially united with them, from the teaching of the Holy Spirit speaking and teaching within, a wisdom higher than that contained in the sacred Scriptures.' It is clear that many fanatics, ancient and more recent, were seized with such enthusiasm; the *Montanists*, *Donatists, and Adelphius* can be counted among the ancients. . . . The words of the *Historia Tripartita* are as follows: 'In that storm of the Messalians, whom they call *ενχήτας,* "those who pray," a heresy arose. But they are also called by another name *ένθουσιασταί,* i.e. inspired and divine. For these expect the operation of a certain demon and consider this the presence of the Holy Spirit. Those who are fully possessed by this madness shun the work of their hands as evil, and give themselves over to sleep and call the phantasies of dreams prophecies. The leaders of this heresy were Dadoes and Sabbas and Adelphius, Hermas and Symeones and others.' More recent enthusiasts are those who... came out of hell... under the leadership and auspices of *Thomas Munzer*, the seditious leader of the Anabaptists in Thuringia, *Caspar of Schwenkfeld* in Silesia, *Theophrastus Paracelsus* in Switzerland, *Coppinus* and *Quintinus* in Picardy, *Valentinus Weigelius* in Misnia. All of these contended that not only the written word of God, but also revelations, enthusiasms, dreams and the immediate voice of God should be heard and that the government of the Church should be established according to them. . . Add to these the *Rosicrucians*, *the new prophets Johann Warner and Georg Richard; the Quakers or Tremulants* in England, who also dream of divine raptures and immediate revelations. So also *Jean de Labadie* publicly boasted of heavenly revelations, conversations with the blessed saints and apparitions of the blessed Virgin Mary made to him during prayer, and his followers; God often acts directly without words with the faithful, they assert, and therefore, to the internal revelations of the Spirit 'to flee, to pay careful attention', they warn. So also *Anna Maria van Schurman, εὐκληρ.* p. 80, tries to prove, 'besides Scripture there is also today dogmatic prophecy and internal revelations.' 2. *Papists*, who admit private revelations, such as those made to Bridget, Catherine of Siena,.. among the principles of faith, Dr. Dannhauer shows Hodom. Spiritus Pap. phantasm. I. p. 61 f. . . 3. *Socinians.* Thus Faustus Socinus against Erasmus Joh. p. 166. considers that Laelius Socinus . . . obtained an interpretation of their words of Christ Joh. 8:52.; 'Before Abraham was the father of many nations, I am the light of the world', by many prayers from Christ himself, and that it was revealed by God himself. Ostorodus Instit. Germ. c. 1. requires immediate revelations or special internal illumination to understand the prophetic Scriptures and the greatest part of the Apocalypse of John. See Dn. D. Calovius 11. cc. 4. *Some Calvinists.* Thus Andreas *Carolstadius* magnified private revelations and visions, whom in his book, ‘Against Heavenly Prophets' blessed Luther refuted Tom. III. Jenens. cf. Sleidanum 1. III. p. 61. and 1. V. p. 117., where he says: 'He, of whom it is said above, Karlstadt, dissenting from Luther, left Witteberg, was much familiar with those clandestine doctors who, as we have said before, simulated visions and conversations with God.' And Huldrych *Zwingli*, who wants to have become known to him through the Spirit from a special revelation, the word 'est' in the words of the supper is placed for 'significat'. Hence Dr. Dannhauer *Hodom. Spirit. Calv. Phantas*. I. § 9. p. 59.: 'If you look at the beginnings, Calvinism owes not a little to the fanatic enthusiasm of Karlstadt and Zwingli, although it may later seem to have declined.'" (*L. c.* f. 70 f.)

F. A. PHILIPPIUS: "The *source* from which Dogmatics must draw is, therefore, the *reason enlightened by revelation* of the dogmatizing subject. The Christian individual, however, knows that the divine revelation, in accordance with its content and purpose, was given not only to a single subject but is intended for all humanity, and that within humanity there exists a community of those in whom this divine purpose of the saving revelation in Christ has already been actually realized. Therefore, the dogmatizing subject will feel the need to connect the enlightenment of his reason with the enlightenment of the *community of Christ* as a whole, and the agreement of his individual consciousness with the Christian collective consciousness will offer him a confirmation of the truth of the former... However, in order to properly conduct the examination of the various ecclesiastical communities and then be able to decide freely, a sure and infallible *rule and guide* is required, by which the doctrines of these communities can be measured. . . This norm will then subject the doctrine of the particular church as well as that of the universal church, in order to impress upon the presupposition of their correctness the unbreakable seal of absolute certainty. . . We have now recognized as a *threefold source* from which Christian doctrine is to draw its material: namely, the *enlightened reason* of the dogmatizing subject, the *doctrine of the Church,* and the *canonical Scripture* of the Old and New Testaments. . . . From our entire previous development, it follows of its own accord that the *doctrine of Scripture*, for us, will not, as in older dogmatics, come at the *beginning* of each article of faith, but at its *conclusion*, because we regard *Scripture not as the first source,* but *as a final norm* of dogmatic knowledge." (*Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*. Stuttgart 1854. I, 86—92. 226.)

LUTHARDT: "Dogmatics is the science of the connection of dogmas, which it must *reproduce from the religious faith of the Christian himself*. . . The Scripture, as *a normative factor* of the dogmatic system, gives it its biblical character." (*Kompendium der Dogmatik*. Leipzig 1868. p. 5. 23.)

VON HOFMANN: "It is a common requirement that one test the church's prevailing doctrine against the Scripture, but interpret the Scripture according to faith. But where do I find the faith by which I interpret the Scripture, if not in myself? For outside of me it is the church's doctrine, which must be tested against the Scripture being interpreted. And even if it were the Apostles' Creed, from which a new rule for interpreting Scripture—one that is not even capable of being applied—has recently been made, this too, just like the old one, the product of ecclesiastical activity must first be tested again against the Scripture, not so much to see if it is correct in detail, but whether it is truly that main summary of Christianity which our fathers themselves also wished to have drawn from the Scripture. The chief summary of divine doctrine, compiled from the clearest passages of Scripture, was for them the faith by which the Scripture was to be interpreted. But they only proved thereby that to them the Scripture appeared to be a collection of articles of faith, which it is not. Experience also teaches that the clear Scripture speaks clearly only to those who are seeking salvation; and as for the scope of that main summary, there has been no certainty, but rather a fruitless dispute to this day over the distinction between what is fundamental and what is not. That demand, therefore, points to the necessity of becoming certain of *Christianity as we bear it within ourselves as a present reality*. . . That relationship with God, after I have become partaker of it, has begun

an independent existence within me, which does not depend on the Church, or on the Scripture, to which the Church appeals, nor does it have its true and immediate guarantee in this or that, but rests in itself and is *immediately certain* truth, sustained and guaranteed by the Spirit of God who dwells in it. Nevertheless, the same thing, when one is willing to have it brought to one's understanding and expression" (dogmatic presentation), "must remain purely itself, unmixed with, and undisturbed by, that which lies outside of it, and thus outside of us, wherever it may be. And even if that which lies outside of us stands in the closest, causal relationship to that which is within us, and even if it reveals itself as the same truth without a doubt: here it is necessary to carry out the one immediate task purely for its own sake, in closed self-sufficiency. Of course, *where it is properly understood*, Scripture and the Church will offer exactly the same thing that we raise up within ourselves. But to find it there is a second task after that one." (*Der Schriftbeweiss*. Nördlingen, 1852. First Half, pp. 9, 10, 11.)

§ 2.

By the name Holy Scripture, however, is understood that collection or volume [(a)] of books which not only treat of sacred matters [(b)] and tend to faith and holiness of life,[(c)] but are also sealed by a special operation of the Holy Spirit,[(d)] which we commonly call *the Bible* [(e)] .

a) It signifies, of course, the Holy Scripture, by the force of the word and the usage of speech, in the nominative case, the writing or rather the books, rather than the sense; even though it connotes the sense and the mind of God, as that which they exhibit and for the sake of exhibiting which the books were committed. See *Hutterus* in Comp. Q. I. from *Chemn. Exam. Conc. Trid*. and *Cundis*. in Not. § 3. p. 5. Similarly *Aegid. Hunnius* Disp. I. th. 50: *Sacred Scripture is a volume which consists of certain books of the prophets, apostles, and evangelists, which are called biblical and canonical.*

b) It is called sacred by reason of *its object;* which, however, it shares with other writings, catechetical, homiletic, etc.

c) Thus it is called sacred from *its end;* which likewise it shares with others.

d) This designation is taken from the *efficient* cause*,* and the most proper signification is that of the Holy Scripture, as will be evident from what follows.

e) Clearly *κατ ᾽ ἐξοχὴν* (*par excellence*); and in the plural name*, των βιβλίων* ('the Bible')*,* written in diverse places and times, appear in one codex; as elsewhere, not only *ἡ γραφή* (the writing) *John 2:22,* but also *αἱ γραφαί* (the writings). *Matt. 21:42, αἱ γραφαὶ ἅγιαι* (the holy writings) *Rom. 1:2,* and *ιερά γράμματα* (sacred writings) *2 Tim. 3:15* are cited. Although it must be admitted that in the biblical canon, besides the books proceeding from divine inspiration, other books [Apochrypha], sacred in part by their subject matter and purpose, but nevertheless committed to human study, are also contained together, and the name 'Sacred Scripture' is accustomed to be given to the entire codex *by synecdoche*; here, however, we retain the *special* and *proper* meaning.

Reusch: "The *singular form* of expression implies that all the particular books of the sacred Scriptures *constitute one whole* and have one primary author." (*Annotatt*. etc. p. 74.)

§ 3.

The principal efficient cause of the Holy Scripture is God [(a)] triune [(b)]; however by appropriation [(c)], the Holy Spirit.[(d)]

a) See *Rom. 3:2. Paul* calls Scripture *λόγια του θεού, the oracles of God,* or proceeding from God, and *2 Tim. 3:16,* where Scripture is called *θεόπνευστος* (God-breathed), and by this very fact it is indicated that it effectively depends on God.

GERHARD: "*There is no real distinction* between the *Word of God* and the *Holy Scripture* materially considered. This is proven 1. from the material of Scripture. . . 2. From the phrase *equivalence of power.* . . 3. From the logical rule: An accident does not change the essence of a thing... 4. From the *demonstrative* particle used by the apostles. Paul speaks *demonstratively* of Mosaic Scripture and the homogeneous books of the Old and New Testaments: 'This *is the word of faith*, which we preach,' Rom. 10:8. 1 Pet. 1:25." (*Exeges.* 1. 1. § 7.)

QUENSTEDT: "That these words *(πάσα γραφή θεόπνευστος)* are *elliptically* spoken, no one fails to see, for the link of the substantive verb *εστί, 'is,'* which *is present* elsewhere in St. Luke very often, is missing; which, if you insert, makes the statement complete: *'all Scripture is God-breathed.'* The subject is *γραφή*, Scripture, not just any, but specifically *the Holy (Ιερά),* v. 15." (*Theol. did.-pol*. P. I. c. 4. s. 2. q. 3. f. 100)

THE SAME: "Although St. Peter does not speak precisely of *writing,* but of *the speaking* by which, with a living voice, the holy men of God uttered the prophecies that had come to them divinely and communicated them to others, yet through *λαλιάν* (speaking) both speech and writing are signified here, and under that term they are both simultaneously comprehended, cf. Acts 2:31. 3:24; Rom. 3:19; Jas. 5:10. For just as the holy men of God spoke as they were moved and inspired by the Holy Spirit, so also *they wrote* as they were moved and inspired by the same Spirit. Indeed, *prophecy of Scripture*, i.e., the prophetic Scripture, as Erasmus translates it in verse 20, was formerly brought forth by writing. And so the holy writers, in writing, depended on the Holy Spirit no less than in speaking, and were merely instrumental causes." (L. c. fol. 101. ff.)

b) For Scripture is an *outward* work and the spoken Word (*λόγος προψοραός*) of God, according to the one essence, wisdom, and power.

c) Or, in the manner of speaking customary in Scripture, by which the Holy Spirit is ascribed as the proper author of what is in fact common to the whole Holy Trinity.

d) So *Peter, in 2 Peter 1:21*, says that *the prophets* spoke in their *writings*, according to verse 20, *as being moved by the Holy Spirit.* And Paul, writing to the *Corinthians in 1 Corinthians 2:13*, says that he *speaks with the words which the Holy Spirit teaches.* Compare *2 Samuel 23:2,* where David refers the origin of his *Psalms* to *the Spirit of the LORD,* who spoke in him.

§ 4.

The causality of the principal efficient cause [(a)] is *θεοπνευστία,* or *divine inspiration,* [(b)] that is, an action of such a kind by which God not only the conceptions [(c)] of all things to be written,[(d)] conformable to their objects, but also the conceptions of the very words and of all things, [(e)] which were to be expressed by them, supernaturally communicated to the intellect of the writers and excited their will to the act of writing.[(f)]

a) Or *the formal principle,* by which God was constituted in the *actual* being of its cause (the Scripture) and exerted His influence upon it.

b) For just as *in 2 Tim. 3:16,* where Scripture is called *θεόπνευστος* (God-breathed), its dependence on God as its cause is indicated, so it is likewise established that God, through the very *θεοπνευστία* from which Scripture is denominated *θεόπνευστος*, is constituted in the being of Scripture as its efficient cause. *Mus., Introd*. P. II. C. Π. § 3. p. 245.

QUENSTEDT: *"Distinguish* between divine *revelation* and *inspiration. Revelation* formally and by the force of the word is a manifestation of unknown and hidden things, and it can take place in many and various ways, i.e., either through external speech, or through dreams and visions (for 'to reveal,' in Greek *ἀποκαλύπτειν*, is to uncover what was hidden). *Inspiration* is the action of the Holy Spirit, by which the actual knowledge of things is supernaturally infused into the created intellect, or is an internal suggestion or infusion of concepts, whether the things conceived were already known to the writer or hidden. *The former* (revelation) could precede the writing in time; *the latter (inspiration)* was always connected with the writing and influenced it. Meanwhile, I do not deny that *θεοπνευστίαν* itself, or divine inspiration, can be called a revelation in part, insofar as it is, so to speak, a manifestation of certain circumstances, as well as the order and manner in which things were to be committed to writing and recorded. Sometimes also revelation concurs and coincides with divine inspiration itself, when, that is, divine mysteries are revealed by being inspired and are inspired by being revealed in the very act of writing." (*Theol. did.-pol*. P. I. c. 4. S. 2. q. 8. fol. 98.)

DANNHAUER**:** "The light of the heavenly way is the sacred Scripture, contained in the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments, *θεόπνευστος*, i.e., divinely inspired; *for all Scripture (of the holy writings*) *is (ἐστὶ*–this must absolutely be supplied, lest there be an *anacoluthon*, i.e. "lacking sequence") *God-breathed and useful*, etc. Indeed, the letter of David to Uriah was *a* deadly *writing,* yet it was not *a writing of the holy letters.* — Divinely inspired, I say, by the Father, as the source of wisdom, and by the Son, Christ, through the Spirit, the searcher of hearts, whose *φορά* — impulse — spoke the holy men of God. For since the end of sacred Scripture is divine and supernatural, the means also had to be supernatural, 'that our faith should not be in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God.' And therefore Scripture is divine, not because God immediately wrote it all with His own finger, just as the Law (which God is said to have written, not merely by dictating and authoritatively speaking, but by writing; 'wrote on the tablets the ten words of the covenant,' Exod. 34:28. Who wrote it? The Lord himself, with whom Moses was for forty days, etc.), but that he had dictated it through divine men and had appropriated the Scripture to himself as his own. However, the *θεόπνευσις* (God-breathed) of the sacred Scripture is from the Holy Spirit *not only* 1. *breathing upon,* with an external, open *command*; and by that *general* command, 'teach all nations'—therefore even the most remote, to which the foot of the apostles did not come; therefore even those in the last ages, to whom the apostolic address was prevented by the death of the apostles. Both had to be helped by the pen, and that necessarily by some person or persons. For although Scripture is an accident of the divine Word, it is nevertheless essential to that word, which must shine forth among all nations without fear of falsehood, just as whiteness is an accident of a wall, but of the essence of a white wall; — or *special,* made to Isaiah and to John twelve times in the Apocalypse (1:11, 19; 2:1, 8, 12, 18; 3:1, 7, 14; 14:13; 19:9; 21:5); where the reason Isaiah had to write, namely out of concern for perpetuity; and why St. John did so was that, exiled on Patmos, he could not teach by living voice: from the same cause the other writers also understood that they had been given the task of writing, who, if they undertook so great a matter without divine command, bound themselves to the same sin that a secretary commits when, without the prince's orders, he writes a document to the subjects; — or *by a most special one,* with an obligation, determination, and divine impulse joined, by which moved, Jude (*Judas*)

confessed the necessity imposed upon him; occasion also came as *it were by compulsion*; see Aeg. Hunnius *De ecclesia*. p. 201. f. — Then *antecedent pedagogy, directive and preventive of error,* which indeed would have made Scripture alone infallible, was not yet properly *God-breathed*; it would have been joined with the writer's labor and difficulty, of which the author of the Maccabees complains. (2 Macc. 2:27.) For even though *the 'God-breathed'* *) writers, in their scrutiny and zeal for the practice of teaching, applied themselves to the task, that very fact shows that the act of writing was not without its own labor, as demonstrated by that swift and ready recitation from memory of what had been written down (Jer. 36:2). *Not only* 2. *by sub- or post-breathing* through the consequent testimony, by which the pedagogue judges and approves what the disciple has produced on his own, for the same reasons we have just mentioned; *but* 3. *by inspiring* through the most immediate accompanying grace; caring that the writer not err even in a single point, revealing anew things superior to human reason, directing the consignments of those things which he had received either by sight or by hearing (for indeed, as Bellarmine says, 'a true letter of a prince is said to be one which is dictated by the prince, even if the one who wrote it already knew what he was to write; so it is called and is the immediate Word of God, which was written by the evangelists, God inspiring and directing them, although they wrote what they had seen and heard,') suggesting what was omitted, guarding against error, not even excluding the slightest ones, **) dictating the most apt words, sanctifying and appropriating it to himself. — ,'What was written by the hand of the apostles, was written by the hand of God Himself,' August. 1. I. de consens. evang. c. ult. —; and also 4. *breathing,* whenever the oracle of Holy Scripture is sought in the proper order. Just as a pneumatic musical instrument, when skillfully played, seems to come to life, to breathe, and to sound, so too, when the sacred Scripture is handled with pious reading, hearing, and meditation, the Holy Spirit, as it were, breathes through it, utters divine oracles, and reveals the counsels necessary for salvation from the inner chambers of the divine heart. And this *θεόπνευσις* is the soul of Holy Scripture, from which it has its divine and *αὐτοπιστία* — self-authenticating authority —, and from nowhere else." (*Hodos. phaen*. 1. E. p. 18—20.)

c) Indeed, it is not so much the things themselves, in their real being (by which they are outside the writer's intellect), as the *conceptions* of the things to be expressed in writing that are inspired into the writer's intellect.

d) We believe that not only the *sublime* things that surpass the grasp of human reason, but also *all* the other things contained in Scripture, were inspired by God to the sacred writers as they were being committed to writing; for it is said that *πάσα γραφή* (all scripture)**,** *every iota of Scripture,* is divinely inspired, not merely some part of it. Inspiration, moreover, does not mean mere *assistance* or *governance* for the prevention of errors, but *the* very *communication* or *suggestion of the concepts*; as if a scribe were dictated what he should write. See *Mus., Introduct*. P. II. Cap. Π. § 3. n. .4. 5. p. 246. ff.

QUENSTEDT: *"Distinction* between bare divine *assistance and direction*, by which only care is taken lest the sacred writers deviate from the truth in speaking and writing, and divine assistance and direction that includes the *inspiration and dictation* of the Holy Spirit; not the former, but the latter renders Scripture *θεόπνευστος* (God-breathed), and has its place here." (L. c. q. 3. f. 98. f.)

---

*) 1 Pet. 1:10–11; 2 Tim. 3:14; 1 Cor. 7:15, where the apostle, endowed with the Holy Spirit (v. 40), nevertheless denies that this precept of his was expressly delivered by the Lord, but says that it was finally inferred by himself with the singular assistance of the Holy Spirit, guarding against error.

**) 2 Tim. 4:13, where he shows care for the cloak and parchments, indicating that the form of clothing is an adiaphoron and that apostolic parchments are not to be held in low esteem.

THE SAME: "*Distinction* is made between the *infallibility* of Holy Scripture and *its divinity; the former* is from divine assistance, the *latter* from the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Nor does it follow that because something was written by the infallible assistance and direction of God, it can be called *θεόπνευστου*, or divinely inspired." (L. c. f. 99.)

AUGSBURG CONFESSION: "Why does *Scripture* so often forbid making and hearing traditions? Why does it call them doctrines of demons (1 Tim. 4:1)? Did the *Holy Spirit* warn of these things in vain*?"* (p. 66 [*AC* 28, 49; *Triglotta* p. 91, § 49])

APOLOGY OF THE AUGSBURG CONFESSION: "Do they think in vain that the same thing is repeated so often? Do they suppose that the *Holy Spirit*, not noticing, omitted these words?" (p. 107 [*A*P 4, 107; *Triglotta* p. 153, § 108]) "You have, therefore, reader, our Apology, from which you will understand both what our adversaries have judged (for we have reported it in good faith) and that they have condemned several articles contrary to the manifest *Scripture of the Holy Spirit*." (p. 74.)

LUTHER: "First, he (David, 2 Sam. 23:2) names the Holy Spirit, to whom he attributes everything that the prophets prophesy. And on this and similar passages, St. Peter looks in 2 Peter 1:21: 'No prophecy ever came from the human will, but the holy men of God spoke as they were moved by the Holy Spirit.' Therefore, in the article of the faith (in the Nicene Creed), we sing of the Holy Spirit thus: 'who spoke through the prophets.' Thus, the entire Holy Scripture is attributed to the Holy Spirit. . . Hear now, he who has ears to hear! My words are not my own, but, 'he who hears me, hears God; he who despises me, despises God,' Luke 10:16. For I see that many of my descendants will not hear my words, to their great harm. Such a title may not be given to anyone who is not a prophet. We may do this, provided we are also holy and have the Holy Spirit, so that we may boast of being catechumens and disciples of the prophets, as those who recount and preach what we have heard and learned from the prophets and apostles, and are also certain that the prophets taught it. These are what are called the children of the prophets in the Old Testament, who do not establish anything of their own or anything new, as the prophets do, but teach what they have received from the prophets. ... Thus, we now have here again two distinct persons, the Father and the Son; and the Holy Spirit is also present, who introduced, made, and spoke these psalms from the Father and the Son in their own words. Thus, the distinct Trinity of persons in an indivisible divine essence is confessed, and that the Son is Man and Messiah, just as is confessed in the last words of David. A carnal heart runs ahead or thinks that David made it of his own accord as a pious man, for himself or for others, as the blind Jews do; but David will not allow it to be attributed to *him*. They are pleasant, lovely Psalms of Israel (he says), but I did not make them, but the Spirit of the Lord spoke through me." (From the Last Words of David. 1543. III, 2797. f., 2802. f.)

QUENSTEDT: "The original canonical Holy Scripture is *infallible truth and free from all error*, or, which is the same thing, in the canonical Holy Scripture there is no lie, no falsity, no error, not even the smallest, either in matters or in words; but all and every one of the things which are in it, whether they are dogmatic, moral, historical, chronological, topographical, or onomastic, are most true; and no ignorance, inattention, or forgetfulness, no lapse of memory, can or ought to be ascribed to the Holy Spirit, the amanuenses in consigning the sacred letters." (L. c. q. 5. f. 112.)

FORMULA OF CONCORD.: "With our whole heart we receive and embrace the prophetic and apostolic writings of the Old and New Testaments as the *clearest and purest fountains of Israel*." (Declaration of the Compendious Form of Doctrine, p. 631 [FC SD Rule & Norm, 3; *Triglotta* p. 851, 3])

LUTHER: "I earnestly beseech and warn every devout Christian not to be offended by the simple speech and narrative that will often come his way; but rather to have no doubt that, however poor it may seem, it is *nothing but the pure words, deeds*, *judgments, and history of the high divine majesty and wisdom.* For this is the Scripture that makes all the wise and clever people fools and is open only to the little ones and the simple, as Christ says in Matthew 11:25. Therefore, cast aside your pride and self-importance and hold this Scripture as the highest, most noble sanctuary, as the richest mine that can never be fully exhausted, so that you may find the divine wisdom, which God here presents so foolishly and poorly, in order to humble all pride. Here you will find the swaddling clothes and the manger where Christ lies, to which the angel also directs the shepherds, Luke 2:11. They are poor and humble swaddling clothes, but precious is the treasure, Christ, who lies within them." (Preface to the Old Testament, 1523. XIV, 2 f.)

THE SAME: "Thus I also wish to have answered those who accuse me of rejecting all the holy doctors of the Church. I do not reject them, but since everyone knows that they have sometimes erred as men, I will not give them further credit, except insofar as they provide proof of their understanding from *Scripture*, *which has never erred.* And this is what St. Paul commands me to do in 1 Thess. 5:21, where he says: 'Test and prove all doctrine; hold fast to what is good.' Likewise, St. Augustine writes to St. Jerome: "I have learned to give honor only to those books which are called Holy Scripture, so that I firmly believe that none of their authors has ever erred." (*Ground and Reason of All the Articles Condemned by the Roman Bull*. 1520. XV, 1758.)

QUENSTEDT: *"Distinguish* between the apostles' state *before receiving the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost,* and their state *after* the gift of the Holy Spirit *was bestowed*; in the former, they were subject to errors and suffered from ignorance of certain doctrines and a false apprehension, see Acts 1:7; Luke 24:25; in this they were led by the Holy Spirit into all truth, John 16:13. — *Distinguish* between *the* apostles' *conduct* and their *preaching and writing*, or between the infirmities of *life* and errors of *doctrine.* In *doctrine*, the apostles could in no way err after receiving the gift of the Holy Spirit; their mind and tongue were like the plectrum or pen of the very Spirit giving them what to say, and speaking in them (Matthew 10:19), thus leading them into all truth (John 16:13). In *their life* and external conduct, however, they were not entirely *without sin*, but because of innate original corruption, they were still subject to infirmities and lapses, and at times they sometimes even suffered *human weakness*, as in the case of the two brothers in Matthew 20:20 affirms Theophylact, — *Distinguish* between an error in faith and *doctrine, and* an error in some particular *act*, such as was the sin of Peter, Gal. 2:11 ff., i.e., a fault not of preaching, but of conduct, as Tertullian says in *De praescriptione*. — *Distinguish* between an error in *the theory of faith,* in which none of the holy writers erred, and an error *in practice,* and thus Peter erred, because his practice and external conduct did not agree with the theory or doctrine and profession of faith." (L. c. q. 5. f. 116.)

THE SAME: *"Distinguish* between those who *are introduced* by the holy writers *as speaking of their own accord,* such as Eve in Genesis 4:1, Cain in the same chapter and verse 13, Job cursing the day of his birth in chapter 3:1, the Jews in John 8:48, affirming that Christ has a demon; and those who are *introduced as speaking from the instinct or inspiration of the Holy Spirit*, such as Stephen the protomartyr, John the Baptist and his father Zechariah, Simeon, and the Virgin Mary; not the former, but the latter are to be reckoned among the *θεόπνευστοι* (divinely inspired) writers." (L. c. q. 3. fol. 99.)

THE SAME: *"Distinguish* between *curses* and *blasphemies,* e.g., those of Job, the Jews, etc., and between the *historical narration* and recording of the same; God did not inspire the Jews themselves, proclaiming Christ to be a demon, with the blasphemies of John 8:48, nor Job with the curse of his day of birth, ch. 3:1; He did, however, inspire his holy scribes to write and record them, not for imitation, but for caution and avoidance." (L. c. q. 4. f. 104.)

THE SAME: *"Luke,* indeed, says that he has thoroughly *investigated* everything [Luke 1:1-4], and that he did so through the tradition of those who were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word, so that he might also secure for himself some degree of certainty; yet when he wrote what he had understood, he did not draw from the reports of others or from his own memory, but from the divine inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who directed his mind and pen and suggested to him both the things to be written and the very words with which they were to be written." (L. c. q. 4. f. 104.)

LUTHER: "Because here (1 Cor. 7:12-13) St. Paul testifies that this passage is not the Lord's word but his own, he makes it clear that it is not *commanded* by God but is *free* to be done one way or the other. For he distinguishes his words from the Lord's word, so that the Lord's word is to be *a commandment,* but his word is to be *advice.*" (Explanation of the 7th Chapter of the 1st Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians. 1523. VIII, 1109.)

QUENSTEDT: "All that was to be written was suggested by the Holy Spirit to the sacred writers in this act of writing, and as it were dictated to their understanding into the pen, so that under these and no other *circumstances,* this and not another *manner* or *order* would be written." (L. c. q. 3. f. 98.)

e) For just as the sacred Scripture consists of *written* characters of words and letters, which is *what* constitutes *writing:* so when Scripture is called *θεόπνευστος in its entirety, absolutely, simply*, and without any restriction (according to what is in *note. preced.* we have indicated), it must be admitted that even the concepts of the words which were to be expressed by letters were inspired in the sacred writers; which *Musaeus* proved more at length and answered the objections of dissenters in *loc. cit*. n. 7. ff. p. 250. ff. That he has always taught this, he most clearly shows in *Tractatus Quaestionum de Syncretismo et Scriptura Sacra,* Book I, Question III, p. 319 ff. Cf. *Ausführl. Erklärung*, Q. VI. p. 42. sqq.

QUENSTEDT: "Nor does the apostle say, *'all things in Scripture* are *God-breathed,'* but *'all Scripture is God-breathed,'* to show that not only *the things* written, but also *the* very *act of writing* is *God-breathed.* And whatever is said of the entire Scripture must necessarily be understood in the same way of the words, as a part of Scripture that is by no means the least important. For if even a single word in the Scriptures were not divinely suggested or inspired, *'all Scripture is God-breathed'* could not be said. If, I say, the words and vocables had not been suggested to the holy writers by *divine inspiration,* the Holy Scripture would not be properly, absolutely, and simply, but impropriety, in a qualified sense, and with respect to the concepts of the things signified, at least could be called *θεόπνευστος,* inspired by God; just as Scripture *translated* into another language by human study cannot properly, absolutely, and simply be called *divine*, because the very formal words of which it consists were not suggested by the Holy Spirit through inspiration, although it can be called *divine* in a qualified and appropriate sense, namely, with respect to the concepts of things once inspired to the holy writers, which are signified by the words of the translation." (L. c. q. 4. f. 107.)

THE SAME: "1 Cor. 2:12-13. In this passage 1. *words* are distinguished from *the things* communicated through words. . . 2. Opposed to them are *the λόγοι διδακτοί ανθρώπινης σοφίας,* and *λόγοι διδακτοί τοϋ θεού*, the words which human wisdom teaches, or human words, even the most wisely devised, and the words which the Holy Spirit teaches, suggests, and dictates. (For the genitive expresses the efficient cause, as in John 6:45: '"And all will be *taught of God*,'

from Isa. 54:13.) The *former* are excluded from apostolic speech, but the *latter* are indeed attributed to it. For the apostle wants to say: 'Just as we have received that wisdom or knowledge of divine mysteries from the Holy Spirit, so too have we been taught by Him the very words by which we speak of it.' (L. c.)

LUTHER: "*One point of doctrine is worth more than heaven and earth.* Therefore, in the smallest thing, we do not permit it to be harmed." (*Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians*. Tom. II. p. 341. Ed. Hal. VIII, 2661.)

THE SAME: "But if they were not such careless despisers of Scripture, *a single* clear passage from Scripture should move them as much as if the world were full of Scripture, as indeed it is. For it seems to me that *any single passage makes the world too narrow."* (That These Words, 'This is my body,' Still Stand Firm. 1527. XX, 982.)

THE SAME**:** "For if we grant that any one of Paul's epistles, or any single passage, does not pertain to the universal church, then the entire authority of Paul is already nullified. For the Corinthians will say that what he teaches about faith in Romans does not apply to them. What could be more blasphemous and insane than this madness? Far be it, far be it, that there should be *a single point* in all of Paul that the whole universal church should not imitate and preserve." (*On the Babylonian Captivity*, ed. J. C. Irmischer, Vol. V, p. 27; Ed. Halle XIX, pp. 21 ff..)

THE SAME**:** "All admit that Christ says in John 10, 'Scripture cannot be broken,' and that its authority must be held to be entirely inviolable, to which it is neither permitted to contradict nor to deny." (*Commentary on the Psalms*. Ed. by J. C. Irmischer. Vol. III. p. 318. Ed. Halle IV, 1763.)

THE SAME: "Therefore, when Moses writes that God created heaven and earth and everything in them in six days, let it be that it was six days, and you must not find any gloss to say that six days were one day. But if you cannot understand how it was six days, then give honor to the Holy Spirit, that He is wiser than you. For you should handle the Scripture in such a way that you think as God Himself speaks. But since it is God who speaks, it is not for you to pervert His word out of impiety to whatever you wish, unless necessity forces you to understand a passage differently than its words read; namely, when faith cannot tolerate the understanding that the words give." (*Sermons on the First Book of Moses*. 1527. III, 23.)

f) To this pertains what is said in *2 Pet. 1:20-21*, that *the prophetic scripture (προφητείαν γραφής) was not brought about at any time by human will* (that those men did not produce their prophecies by their own motion and judgment, *but that the acts (φερομένους)* of *the Holy Spirit were spoken* (and that they applied themselves to the exercise of the act, both of speaking and of writing). For on the one hand, divine inspiration itself, by which they are prompted as to what ought to be committed to writing, implies an influence for the exercise of the act of writing; on the other hand, it is also certain that the holy writers were expressly moved by God's command to write, e.g., *Moses*, Deut. 31:19, *Isaiah,* ch. 8:1; 30:8; *Jeremiah*, ch. 30:2; *John,* Rev. 1:11, 19; 2:1, 8, 12, 18. etc., or otherwise that *the occasion and incentives* to write were presented by a special providence of God, by which they were made certain of God's will. Cf. *Mus.* l. c. § 8. p. 257. ff.

QUENSTEDT: *"Distinction* is made between *a fortuitous* and accidental *occasion*, and an occasion *supplied by God;* the apostles sometimes wrote on an occasion, but not a fortuitous one, but one supplied by God. God has so directed all things that we might have a complete and perfect canon of faith and life, namely, the prophetic and apostolic Scriptures, so that they must be accepted as proceeding from the same direction, instinct, and impulse, and not from a fortuitous and accidental occasion." (L. c. q. 2. f. 62.)

ANTITHESIS:

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. *of the Papists, 2. of certain Calvinists,* 3. *of the Socinians,* 4. *of the Arminians,* and finally 5. *of the Innovators,* who all those things which could be known by *natural reason* and from other sources or through personal experience and the ministry of the senses (or whose writers themselves were *eyewitnesses and earwitnesses*), which *have no bearing on salvation* and pertain only to the *circumstances* of the event or the matter narrated, and which also seem *trivial*, did not reveal, inspire, and dictate the Holy Spirit, but *only* stirred up and simultaneously governed the writers to record these things through *a* singular *assistance and direction*, so that they would not admit anything false, indecent, or incongruous, or allow anything human in their writing. Thus *Bellarmine*, in his book *De Verbo Dei*, chapter 15, says: "God was present with the prophets in one way, with the historians in another." To the former He revealed future things and at the same time assisted them, so that they would not mix anything false in their writing; to the latter He did not always reveal what they were to write, but merely moved them to write what they had either seen or heard, and of which they had a memory, and at the same time assisted them, so that they would not write anything false.' . . . The words of *Dr. Georg Calixtus* in Part I of his *Resp. Moguntinis oppositi*, thesis 72, are these: 'Nor is Scripture called divine because every single thing contained in it must be attributed to a special divine revelation (e.g., concerning the two sons of Abraham, of the father of David, of the line and succession of kings of Jerusalem and Samaria, that Herod was king of Judea, Pilate the governor, or that St. Paul writes to Timothy, 2 Tim. 4:13: Bring the cloak that I left with Carpus when you come"), but that the *principal things*, or those which the Scripture primarily and in itself addresses and intends, namely those which concern the redemption and salvation of the human race, are owed only to that particular divine revelation; in the other matters, however, which are known from other sources, whether through experience or the light of nature, the writers were so governed by divine assistance and the Spirit in recording them, that they would write nothing that was not true, real, decent, and appropriate.'" (L. c. q. 3. fol. 99.)

THE SAME.: "Observe that *Suarez* admits *θεοπνευστίαν* (or divine inspiration) of the very words of Scripture in all things that concern the mysteries of the faith and exceed human understanding; but he admits a special assistance by preservation from all error and falsity only in those things which are in themselves human and subject to the senses. *Bellarmine*, Book II, *de Conc. Auctor.*, Chapter 15. col. 264, writes: 'The sacred writers were not supposed to have labored much on their books; for it would have been enough if they labored in writing or dictating, if they uttered prophecies, or at most by recalling to memory what they had seen or heard, and thought of the words with which to write them, if they were writing histories or letters or something similar.' . . To this also belong those who attribute the method or disposition, the embellishment, the interpretation (*ἑρμηνεία*), phraseology, and style of Scripture to human ingenuity and industry, and not to the immediate and infallible inspiration of the Holy Spirit, among whom *Sebastian Castellio* stands out in his *dialogo 2. de elect*." (L. c. q. 4. f. 106. sq.)

CALVIN [MAYES: CALOV]: "When David complains there (Ps. 22) that he was a prey to his enemies, he designates all his possessions metaphorically under the name of *garments*, as if he had said in one word that he was stripped and despoiled by the wicked. While the evangelists neglect this figure, they depart from the native sense." (*Commentary on John*, p. 190.)

THE SAME: "When the prophet speaks of the preeminence of men, the apostle in Hebrews 2 draws this to Christ's self-emptying. . . That the apostle then treats of a brief abjection is not exegetical, but he deflects it to his own purpose, which had been said by David in another sense. Thus Eph. 4:8 does not so much interpret the passage from Psalm 68:19 as it does adapt it by a pious deflection to the person of Christ." (*Opp*. Tom. III. p. 24. ad Ps. 8.)

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis: Of the Papists,* who trifle, that the evangelists and apostles did not approach writing with a divine command, but

incidentally, from some accidental opportunity offered elsewhere, or were forced by necessity. Likewise: That God neither expressly commanded them to write, nor not to write. The Apostles nowhere testify that they were writing by the Lord's command. Thus *Bellarmine*, Book IV. *de Verbo Dei*, chapter 3, column 169, where he says: 'It is false that God commanded the apostles to write; for we read in Matthew, chapter 28, a command to preach the gospel, but nowhere do we read a command to write. Therefore God neither expressly commanded them to write, nor not to write. Yet we do not deny that, with God willing and inspiring, the apostles wrote what they wrote, etc.', and in chapter 4. § 3, second proof, he says: 'If it had been the intention of Christ and the apostles to confine and restrict the Word of God to Scripture, above all things, Christ would have openly commanded it and the apostles would have testified somewhere that they were writing by the Lord's command, just as they taught throughout the whole world by the Lord's command; but we read this nowhere.'" (L. c. q. 2. f. 94.)

THE SAME**:** *"Antithesis:* 1. *Of the Papists,* as in Albert Pighius, Book 1, Chapter 1, *Hierarchia Ecclesiastica,* ch. 2. says: 'Matthew and John the evangelists could both have erred in memory and lied,' and also: 'Who will make us certain that what they write about Christ is true and certain, since they had never seen him, but believed those who told them, etc.'; *Erasmus*, in his notes on Matthew chapters 2 and 27, states, "that the evangelists did not take such testimonies from books, but, trusting their memory, slipped up as is often the case." ... 3. The *Socinians*, as Socinus in his treatise on the authority of Scripture, where in chapter 1. p. 15. writes: "Certain things in Scripture appear to be false in themselves, but which are of little importance';" on p. 71. he says: "it could have happened that the evangelists and apostles erred slightly in some things." ... 4. *Arminians,* in the preface to their Apology and in the third specimen of errors against the Leiden theologians; Episcopius, *Institutiones theologicae*, book IV, sect. 1, ch. 4, p. 232, where he asserts: 'The sacred writers could have slipped and in fact did slip in matters of little importance and not pertaining to salvation, etc.' . . 5. The *Weigelians,* who teach concerning the writers or scribes of God, namely the prophets and apostles: 'That they were not immune from all error in dogmatic matters.' See Weigel in *Güldengriff* p. 57." (L. c. q. 5 f. 114.)

R. F. GRAU: "The theologians of the 17th century taught a divine mode and nature of the Holy Scripture, which, just as it does not agree with its human and historical reality, so it by no means proves itself to be a truly divine mode. The Divine in Jesus Christ proves itself to be truly divine precisely by entering entirely into human reality—into birth, human growth and development, even suffering and death—although it had to divest itself of its divine appearance and glory. Thus, the Holy Scripture, in order to be an infallible and comprehensive source of truth for the Church and its entire development, did not originate in a purely divine manner, as if the Holy Spirit, as the sole author, had dictated to the human writers, as mere scribes or instruments, both the content and the very words. On this basis, the high and divine qualities of perfection and sufficiency, clarity, etc., were attributed to Holy Scripture. This is, in fact, the doctrine of inspiration of the 17th century. We can only say, with the greatest scholar of Scripture of our time: "Neither the questions arising from the nature of the text, nor those arising from the nature of the language, not the literary peculiarities of the authors, nor the immediate purposes and the resulting particularities of the individual writings, not the variety of teaching methods, nor the diversity of historical accounts could be adequately addressed, without coming into conflict with that dogmatic statement about what divine inspiration of the Holy Scripture is: it was compatible, as far as the New Testament Scripture is concerned, only with a harmony of the Gospels, not

with the Gospels themselves, and only with a collection of proof texts for teaching, not with the apostolic epistles. A conception of the Scripture formed on this basis would bear only a distant resemblance to its reality.' *) . . . Not in a human semblance, as the Docetics taught, did the Godhead reveal itself on earth. Thus, the human nature of the historical development of the Holy Scriptures is not mere appearance, brought about by an external accommodation of the Holy Spirit to the natural nature of the human authors. Here it is necessary to recognize: it is not despite the authorship of the Holy Spirit that Scripture has truly been humanly and historically formed, but through that very origin. The Spirit of God, as the one acting in the world, is a Spirit of history and development; and as the Spirit of Christ, He is a Spirit of self-emptying and humility. (!) ... There is now no retreat to Quenstedt and Calov possible. . . The Holy Scripture is no longer for us a great code of law sent down from heaven with its individual paragraphs, called proof-texts. Such a view we must reject as docetic for the sake of faith, and as anti-historical for the sake of scholarship. The Scripture is for us a collection of writings brought about by truly human and historical development, a kind that does not contradict the Holy Spirit ruling in this development, as the Spirit of Jesus Christ, the Son of Man and of God, but corresponds to it alone. The boundaries of the divine and the human in Scripture cannot at all be determined mechanically and quantitatively, just as they cannot in the person of Jesus." (*Entwickelungsgeschichte des Neutestamentlichen Schriftthums* Gütersloh 1871. I, 11. 12. 18. f.)

KAHNIS: "The old-dogmatic doctrine of inspiration rests on the fundamental idea that Scripture is the Word of God, because God the Holy Spirit is its actual author. This, however, is the case insofar as He first gave the holy writers the impulse to write, and then dictated to them both the content and the words. . . The untenability of the old-orthodox doctrine of inspiration will strike anyone who takes the trouble to form a clear picture of it in detail. Are we to imagine that the Apostle Paul, when he wrote that tender, urbane, and subtly humorous letter to Philemon, was merely recording what the Holy Spirit dictated to him? A theory of inspiration that attributes to the Holy Spirit borrowings from other writings, purely personal judgments and expressions, etc., is truly worthy of the Holy Spirit? Does a doctrine of inspiration that attributes to the Holy Spirit borrowings from other writings, purely personal judgments and expressions, etc., truly do the Holy Spirit justice? . . . If we were to assume a human element even in the prophets and apostles at the very reception of revelation, we could not possibly conceive of conceptual processing and presentation without the cooperation of human individuality, and we would simply have to point to the undeniable facts. This human aspect becomes even more pronounced in poets, lyric and didactic writers, and historians. Should one assume that what David felt in his heart was dictated by the Holy Spirit in the form of a psalm? If the Evangelist Luke only wrote down what the Spirit dictated to him, why does he appeal to tradition and research? If Solomon's Proverbs, as even the strictest authorities admit, do not rest on revelation

*) v. Hofmann, *Die heilige Schrift des Neuen Testaments zusammenhängend untersucht*, Nordlingen 1862. 1st Part, p. 9.

but on worldly wisdom: what a contradiction it is to suppose that the Holy Spirit dictated human worldly wisdom! Do these rules, then, which are to be taken with a great deal of salt, become laws of the Holy Spirit? And if this doctrine of inspiration is applied to a book like Ecclesiastes, what monstrosities arise! . . . Among these prophetic and apostolic writings, however, there are differences both in point of origin and in content. We cannot equate Deuteronomy with the first four books. Among the Prophets, Obadiah and Jonah stand below Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel. In the New Testament, the Pastoral Epistles (p. 531) and the Epistle to Philemon take a secondary position. The word of Revelation, which is issued within the kingdom of the old and new covenant, can only be understood in the context of its history. And so the *historical books* of the Old and New Testaments come into their canonical right, but a right of a *second* degree. Just as their content is the cooperation of the divine and the human in the kingdom of God, so the holy historians are not necessarily men of revelation, but men who stand in the spirit of the kingdom of God. In the Old Testament, this category includes the prophetic history books in the first place, the hagiographical books of Ruth, Ezra, and Nehemiah in the second, and the books of Esther and Chronicles in the third place (p. 285 ff.). In the New Testament, this second rank is occupied first of all by the first three Gospels (p. 406 ff.), and secondly by the Acts of the Apostles (p. 518). A *third* class is formed by the Old and New Testament hagiographers, whose content is neither revelation nor the history of the kingdom, but *the life in the fellowship of God as it is manifested in the individual.* To this class belong in the Old Testament, first and foremost, the Psalms (pp. 294 ff.), secondly the Proverbs of Solomon (p. 304), Job (p. 305) and the Lamentations of Jeremiah, in third place the Song of Songs (p. 303), Ecclesiastes (p. 309) and Daniel (p. 369 ff.), in the New Testament first and foremost the Epistle to the Hebrews and the 2nd and 3rd Epistle of John, which, despite all probability, is nevertheless not certainly Johannine in origin and is moreover of more personal content (p. 546), in second place the other catholic epistles and the Apocalypse (p. 537 ff.). If in the *first* class personality is of essential importance, it is, by contrast, secondary in the *second* class, since here everything depends on objective truth and the spirit of the presentation. But it is in the nature of the *third* class that the subject comes to the fore. It is not indifferent whether a psalm is by David or not, the Proverbs are by Solomon or by others, Daniel is genuine or spurious, etc. But with these writings of third rank, one must be careful not to place too much emphasis on authenticity. However flawed this attempt may be from the standpoint of inspiration to divide Scripture into three classes: a distinction of degrees of inspiration in the sense of Scripture is, in any case, necessary, and it has had significant authorities in its favor in both ancient and modern times." (*Die lutherische Dogmatik historisch-genetisch dargestellt,* vol. 1. Leipzig 1861. p. 666. sqq.)

THE SAME: "Protestantism stands or falls with the principle of the sole authority of Scripture. However, this principle is independent of the doctrine of inspiration of the old dogmatics. To take it up again, as it was, can only be done with a hardening against the truth (!)." (*Der innere Gang* etc. 2nd ed. p. 241.)

THOMASIUS: "They (the holy scriptures) bear unmistakably the stamp of the individuality and self-activity of their authors, both in the conception of the thoughts, as in the execution and presentation. One need only approach them without prejudice, and one will immediately convince oneself that these writings are not 'dictated by the Holy Spirit'." (Ch*risti Person und W*erk. Third Part. First Section. 2nd ed. p. 449 ff.)

HOFMANN: "Not how the former (the Old Testament Scripture) came into being, but what it is, the latter (the New Testament) testifies. For when we read in 2 Pet. 1:21 of the Old Testament prophets that it was a divine effect, an effect of the Holy Spirit, by which they spoke; then according to its immediate wording and context, this is not even said of all the individual parts of the Old Testament Scripture, much less of their consolidation into its unified whole. . . Jesus does not appeal to something that was spoken at some point, nor to something that is merely contained in Scripture, but to the *whole of Scripture*. . . Therefore, when he cites individual passages of Scripture, whether to show their fulfillment in his person and history or to clothe his instructions in them, he does not mean them in their individuality, but Scripture as a unified whole is what he lets testify to him or declare the will of God. Likewise, the New Testament writers do not appeal to this or that word of Moses, David, or Isaiah merely because these individuals spoke by the power of the Spirit of God, but they introduce the Scripture as speaking, whether or not they name the one who said this or that. . . That the Old Testament Scripture is a work of the Holy Spirit, that it is inspired, our doctrine does not mention; but only because it is settled for us once and for all that *everything* which serves to carry on the sacred history happens by virtue of an effect of the Holy Spirit, who for this purpose determines man with respect to his natural life in the manner required for the particular purpose of such an effect. . . Such an effect took place not only on the writers, but also on those who compiled the individual parts of Scripture, whether into books or into the whole. Accordingly, the manifold operation of the Spirit of God, which is comprehended under the one name of Inspiration, will be described; so that one always keeps in view how the individual parts were produced in their relation to the intended whole through the operation of the Holy Spirit." (*Der Schriftbeweis*. Nördlingen, 1852. I, 567–573.)

LUTHARDT: "On the whole, faithful theology is still seeking to find a formula in which it can express the 'god-human' character of Scripture. . . Tholuck and Rothe have demonstrated the untenability of the old doctrine. .. One must start from the necessity and significance of the *whole of Scripture* for the Church and from there derive both the certainty which the Church as a whole has, first of all, from the whole of Scripture and its individual parts, insofar as they are integral parts of this whole, and also conclude on the divine action of its origin, so that the individual is always understood in relation to the whole, but the psychological state is conceived as that of the unity of receptivity and spontaneity. The Scripture *is* the normative Word of God (for the Church) and *contains* the saving Word of God (for individuals). Cf. Hofmann, *Schriftbew*. II, 2, 98–109." (Compendium. Third ed. p. 255.)

DELITZSCH: "Theopneustia is also a generic term that encompasses many different degrees of the Spirit's workings, depending on whether the writer relates to the revelation and history of salvation productively and continuously, or reproductively and applicatively. But in both cases, the divine appears under the affections of the human. In the latter case, even errors are possible in the reproduction of the historical and the given—memory errors, errors of combination, in short, such errors that even the most spiritual human activity is not absolutely above them. Whoever denies this

knows the historical books of the Old and New Testaments only superficially, and whoever takes offense at it sins against the Holy Spirit, whose wholly non-docetic loving condescension (!) into humanity he should rather admire and praise." (*System der bibl. Psychol*. Leipzig, 1855. p. 319. f.)

Kurtz: "We boldly assert, and with the confident assurance that we do not in the least encroach upon the divine character of Holy Scripture and history, that the holy men of God in the Old and New Testaments, whom the Spirit of God moved to divine works or words, could very well, with regard to natural scientific knowledge, have been caught up in the errors that were generally prevalent in their time. ... Thus Moses could also have held many physically erroneous views about the nature of the starry heavens or the interior of the earth, when he conceived the history of the creation of the heavens and the earth in a prophetic spirit, without these errors having to be imputed to him; for the Mosaic account of creation has not the purpose of providing physical instruction at all, but only religious instruction." (*Bibel und Astronomie*. Berlin, 1858. p. 8. f.)

Dieckhoff: "It must be conceded that the way in which the inerrancy of the Word of Holy Scripture was conceived in the old orthodox dogmatics is untenable, and that one cannot overcome negative criticism if one is unwilling to make that concession." (*Kirchliche Zeitschrift von Kliefoth-Mejer*. 1858. p. 757.)

Philippi: "In this, one should not from the outset resist acknowledging the possibility that some subordinate differences may truly exist, and therefore remain unresolved. For there is indeed here a realm of insignificant accident, just as the resemblance of a portrait is not determined by the exact correspondence of the length of the nails and hair. How far inspiration has also here completely overcome human weakness seems to us to be determinable only by historical, not dogmatic, means. We would therefore at least not wish to say a priori with Calov: “Nullus error, vel in leviculis, nullus memoriae lapsus, — ullum locum habere *potest* in universa Scriptura sacra” (No error, not even in trivial matters, no lapse of memory, — *can* have a place in the entire Holy Scripture). Julius Africanus similarly expressed himself regarding historical-chronological difficulties in the New Testament: *τὸ μέντοι εὐαγγέλιον πάντως αληθεύει* (The Gospel, however, speaks the truth throughout)." (*Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*. Stuttgart 1854. I, 208. sq.)

Cf. Rudelbach: "The Doctrine of the Inspiration of Holy Scripture, with Consideration of the Latest Investigations Thereon by Schleiermacher, Twesten, and Steudel, Historically-Apologetically and Dogmatically Developed." (*Journal for the Entire Lutheran Theology and Church*. Edited by Dr. A. G. Rudelbach and Dr. H. E. F. Guericke. First Year, 1840. First Quarterly Issue, pp. 1–59. Second Quarterly Issue, pp. 1–66.)

§ 5.

The impulsive cause [(a)] of Holy Scripture, committed to writing by the divine will, is internally the goodness [(b)] of God, externally [(c)] the need of men to be saved. [(d)]

a) It is necessary to acknowledge those who investigate and transmit the *causes of* divine *counsel*, and why God *willed the heavenly doctrine*, *preserved for some time*

through the tradition of living voices without the aid of the Scriptures, to be committed to writing. See *Gerhard*, *Exeg*. Book I, § 19. p. 36.

> GERHARD: "Moses received the command to write only after God had written the tablets of the decalogue with His own finger. Exodus 34:27." (*Exeg*. 1. 1. § 16.)

b) For the communication of Scripture to men is indeed an undeserved benefit of God.

c) Which the Greeks commonly call "preliminary" *(προκαταρκτικὴν)*; by which principle, in another connection, our theologians call the misery of mankind the "preliminary" *(προκαταρκτικὴν)* cause of the divine will to send the Son, so that it differs greatly from a meritorious cause. For just as the need of a poor man moves a rich and generous man to give him alms, yet for that reason the poor man does not deserve the alms by his need.

d) Of course, 1) with the multiplication of the human race and 2) the shortening of the span of human life, not all men could be instructed as they once were by the patriarchs, who were taught by immediate revelation from God, face to face and in person. But also, 3) with various corruptions of doctrine having crept in, and 4) with the frailty of those to be instructed and the weakness of their memory, it was nevertheless deemed necessary that a *written revelation* be provided, to which in every case of need one could safely resort. And so it seemed most fitting to the divine providence that the chief points of the divine revelations be comprehended in writing. Cf. *Gerhard* l. c. p. 37.

> CHEMNITZ: "It is worthy of consideration that, since the purity of doctrine was not preserved through traditions, and God no longer willed to employ that means whereby, when corruptions arose, He would repeatedly restore and preserve the purity of His doctrine, which had been revealed and handed down to the patriarchs from the beginning of the world, by means of new and particular revelations—I say, it is worthy of observation, what other method He Himself established and demonstrated in the time of Moses, namely, that by writings, approved and confirmed by divine authority and testimony, the purity of the heavenly doctrine might be propagated and preserved, so that questions or controversies arising about the old, genuine, and pure doctrine of the patriarchs would not always require new and particular revelations to be sought and awaited. That history, however, is to be carefully considered. For it will usefully illustrate and explain the present controversy concerning sacred Scripture, by showing its first origin. History, however, shows—and this is especially *to be noted—that God not only instituted it, but by His own act and example, when He first wrote the words of the Decalogue, He dedicated and consecrated that way and method, that the purity of heavenly doctrine might be preserved and maintained through divinely inspired Scriptures. Thus, the very first origin of the sacred Scripture will have God himself as its author.* We are speaking, however, of the divinely inspired Scriptures. . . The Jews invent fables that the book of Genesis was written by Moses before God wrote the words of the decalogue, for the reason that in Exodus 24 there is a mention of the volume of the covenant before the tablets of the decalogue were brought. But they do not notice that many things are said in sacred history by anticipation or by *ὕστερον πρότερον*; for that scroll, which is mentioned in Exodus 24, was the book of the Old Testament, which God made on Mount Sinai with the children of Israel, as it is clearly written in Hebrews 9. But in Exodus 34, when God was writing the words of the decalogue on the tablets, Moses had not yet written the scroll of the covenant, but he first received the command to write then. Therefore, there is no doubt that the events recorded in Exodus 24 concerning the writing and dedication of the scroll of the covenant took place after those described in Exodus 34, so that God wrote the decalogue on the tablets before Moses wrote his own books. . ., and that these were to be read so that it might be observed from the divinely inspired Scriptures, which

God willed to be preserved and to exist for posterity, that nothing had been written before the tablets of the decalogue, inscribed by the fingers of God. *For it greatly contributes to the illustration of the dignity and authority of the sacred Scripture, that God Himself not only instituted and commanded the method of conveying heavenly doctrine by letters, but that He Himself first initiated*, *dedicated, and consecrated it by the written words of the decalogue with his own fingers. For if the writing of the sacred books had been first begun by men, a prescription of more than two thousand years could have been opposed, during which time the doctrine of the divine word was delivered by word of mouth, without writing, in the better times of the world and among the most eminent patriarchs*. Therefore God Himself began the writing with His own fingers, to show how much is to be attributed to this method of preserving the purity of doctrine in writing for posterity. That He took stone tablets on which to write the words of the Decalogue is another matter, which is explained in 1 Corinthians 3. *However, lest those things which were to be written down, or the writings confirmed, by the men of God—adorned for this purpose with miracles and divine testimonies—be held in lesser regard*, *or as of no account*, *for the confirmation of doctrines and the refutation of corrupt authorities, God himself did not write down the entire law; but, having written the words of the Decalogue, He commanded Moses to write the rest from His mouth.* And so that the people of God might be certain that this Scripture was not brought by Moses by human will, but was divinely inspired, God, by very many stupendous miracles, attested to Moses's authority both before, after, and during the very writing." (*Exam. conc. Trid. De S. S*. f. 8. sq.)

QUENSTEDT: "Question 1: Was Holy Scripture *necessary*? — State of the controversy: The question is 1. not of Holy Scripture formally considered, but materially regarded; 2. not of the necessity on the part of God, or of the amanuenses of the Holy Spirit, but of the necessity of the Church; 3. not of the necessity in any state of the Church, but of the present Church, extended throughout the whole world, to be preserved until the consummation of the age, deprived of immediate revelations and of divinely inspired (θεοπνευστοις) doctors after the limits of the Scriptures were closed; 4. not of an absolute, but of a hypothetical necessity; nor 5. is the question whether Scripture was not necessary for this or that individual, but whether for the entire Church." (L. c. q. 1. f. 89.)

THE SAME: "The apostles wrote not only to meet the needs of their own time, but to leave for the people of all ages a certain and exact norm and rule both for believing and for living, cf. Rom. 15:4. Hence Tertullian against Marcion. ch. 5 says: "The apostles wrote not only to meet the needs of their own time, but to leave for the people of all ages a certain and exact norm and rule both of believing and of living, cf. Rom. 15:4. Hence Tertullian, against Marcion.

ANTITHESIS:

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis:* 1. The *Scripture-hating Papists* assert that sacred Scripture is not necessary and that the Church can be without it; so *Gregory of Valencia* in *Anal. fid*. p. 388, where he says, 'heavenly doctrine can be more purely preserved by tradition than by Scripture.'" *Bellarmine*, Book IV, Chapter 4 of *De Verbo Dei*, argues, "the Church can exist without Scripture, but not without tradition." *Costerus* asserts, "Christ did not will either Himself or His Church to depend on written Scriptures, nor to commit His mysteries to parchment." *Peter de Soto:* 'Let it be established as most certain that this divine plan of writing down the words and revelations was devised by God because of human imperfection and weakness, and is more expedient for the weaker and more imperfect; but for the holier and purer, it is either less necessary or not necessary at all.' To this point pertains that impious saying of a certain cardinal, reported by Tilensis, part 1, disp. 2, th. 35: 'That it would have been better for the church if no Scripture had ever existed.'.. 2. Of the *fanatics,* such as *the Anabaptists, Schwenkfeldians, and Weigelites,* who through their hypotheses deny the necessity of Scripture. For they refer men to be instructed by the Scripture, as a dead and killing letter, to the internal, natural word, to divine revelations, conversations with angels, etc." (L. c. q. 1. f. 90.)

§ 6.

The less principal efficient cause of the Holy Scripture were [(a)] men,[(b)] holy,[(c)] prophets,[(d)] and apostles. [(e)]

a) For God did not, just as He once wrote the Decalogue, so also write the Holy Scripture that we have with His own finger, or by *immediate* operation, into letters; but rather he made use of the work of men, as scribes, who in respect to both the *manner* and the *practice* of the act of writing, and the *conception* of things and words to be expressed in writing, depended, as from a principal cause, on God inspiring or supplying them, although with regard to the *characters* of letters and syllables, to be traced with a pen on parchment or paper, the force of the art of writing, *whether* natural *or* once bestowed by a supernatural influence, itself acted as the principal cause. See *Mus., Introd*. 1. c. and § 9. p. 259., also *de Syncr. et Script. S.* p. 322. 325.

> QUENSTEDT: "Cyprian, in his sermon on almsgiving: 'The Holy Spirit was the scribe, the prophets were his pens, by which the Holy Spirit dictated what was to be written.' Augustine elegantly says in Book 1 of 'On the Agreement of the Gospels', chapter 10: 'Whatever the Savior willed us to read about His own deeds and words, He commanded it to be written by them (the evangelists and apostles) as if by His own hands.' Therefore, God alone, if we wish to speak accurately, must be called the *author* of the Holy Scripture; the prophets and apostles, however, cannot be called authors, except by a kind of catachresis; for they were rather the pens of the author God and the amanuenses of the Spirit of God, the word that dictates and inspires. (L. c. s. 1. f. 80. sq.)

b) They were, indeed, in other respects not entirely immune from sin, yet in the act of writing they were not exposed to the danger of erring, since they were then entirely subject to the Holy Spirit, so that they neither admitted lapses of memory nor any other error, nor could they have been willing to err.

c) Thus *in 2 Pet. 1:21,* they are called *men of God*, i.e., men *peculiarly and immediately called and chosen by God for that purpose*, *that they might consign the divine revelations to writing. Gerhard,* in *Exeg*. Book I. § 18. p. 35. For among the Hebrews too, איש אלהים is a man *governed by the Spirit of God;* although at other times the word is taken more broadly.

> QUENSTEDT: "*Men of God* were called such because of the divine office they performed; for the epithet of the name of God denotes excellence, as in Genesis 23:6 and elsewhere. The *saints*, however, are called such not so much on account of inherent or imputed holiness, as on account of a special separation and a peculiar calling to the prophetic or apostolic office; so that 'holy' here is the same as 'separated' and consecrated to divine use." (L. c. th. 7. f. 83.)

d) That is, the men who, before the Incarnation of Christ, committed the Scripture, whose nucleus was Christ to come. See *Heb. 1:1.* Cf. *Mus.* l. c. § 4, p. 252.

> LUTHER: "A prophet is called one who has his understanding from God without intermediaries, to whom the Holy Spirit puts the word into the mouth. For he is the source, and they have no other master than God, 1 Cor. 14:1–2." No one can make a prophet through human preaching and teaching, 2 Pet. 1:21, and even if it is the

Word of God, and I preach the Word in the purest way, I still do not make a prophet; I can make a wise and understanding man. As in Matthew 23, v. 34, 'wise men' are named who drew doctrine from the prophets, for God speaks through people and not without a medium. But prophets are those who have the doctrine from God without any intermediary." (*Exposition of some chapters of the 2nd Book of Moses*. 1525. III, 1172.)

e) By which name not only those are meant whom Christ had chosen in the days of His flesh to teach all nations, and who were added after His ascension: *Matthew* (whose writings, however, we do not have, although we know he is to be considered an apostle) and *Paul;* but also the apostolic men, next to the apostles in office and dignity, such as *Mark* and *Luke* the evangelists, who were to instruct the universal church not less by their written works than by the preaching of their voice, are designated. See *Mus.* 1. c.

§ 7.

The matter *from which* [(a)] the words of Scripture are drawn; phrases and sentences, [(b)] in the Old [(c)] Testament according to the Hebrew language, [(d)] in the New [(e)] Testament according to the Greek language, [(f)] delivered in the very style, or in the choice and structure of words, according to the natural abilities, characters, emotions, and customary manner of speech of the various writers. [(g)]

a) Whether it is that from which the Holy Scripture is composed, which may be common to the Holy Scriptures and to other writings, as signs of certain things. For otherwise, it must be admitted that Scripture is not so much a substance composed of matter and form, as a unity by aggregation of parts. *Gerhard, Exeg*. L. I. § 54. p. 73. Others prefer to call it *material*, rather than matter.

b) Words, indeed, when considered in themselves and apart from the Holy Scripture, may be called its *remote* matter; the same words, however, when placed or constructed in context, may be called its *proximate matter*. See *Mus.* 1. c. §§ 10–12, p. 259 ff. It seems to come to the same thing that *Gerhard* says in *Exeg*. l. c. Cap. IV. § 54. p. 73: *that the matter from which the Scriptures, formally considered, can not inappropriately be established is the very framework and sequence of the biblical books.* Cf. his *Isag. LL.* Disp. IV. § 2. p. 11.

c) That is, with respect to the books written before the birth of Christ, which are signified by the term "Old Testament," taken *systematically* or *dogmatically*.

d) Although certain Chaldean portions also occur, e.g. *Gen.* 31:47, *Jer. 10:11, Dan. 2:4* ff. up to chap. 8:2, and *Ezra 4:8 ff.* up to chap. 6:18. and from Chapter 7:11 ff. to 27. It is clear, however, that God, in using a certain language, adapted Himself to the state of the people whom He had hitherto, as His chosen peculiar people, wished to make especially partakers of gracious revelation; so that, while the Israelites were in a free state, God would speak to the people in the Hebrew language of the patriarchs, but when accustomed to the power and language of the Chaldeans, He would condescend to speak to them in that same manner.

LUTHER: "The text (Isa. 9:6) appears to have been corrupted by the punctuators, who wrote ויקרא for the passive ויקרא. For the letters, whether read with points or without, are the same, and the grammar is perfectly sound. But the Jews, most pestilential of men, frequently pervert the meaning of the prophets by their points and distinctions, and their *points*, *which are a recent invention*, they wish to have more weight than a simple, genuine, and grammatically correct meaning. Therefore I do not greatly concern myself with these grammatical superstitions, although grammar is on our side, if it is punctuated correctly." (*Fuller Exposition of Isaiah 9*,. Works on Exegesis, ed. Dr. H. Schmidt. Vol. XXIII. p. 410 ff. Cf. Hal. Vol. VI, p. 292.)

THE SAME: "I cannot deny the rationale for the punctation, but I am not pleased with it because of the ambiguity it creates, which makes the Scripture uncertain and tears and rends it. Münster somewhere quotes a rabbi who says, 'Without the above and below, the Holy Scripture cannot be understood,' that is, without the upper and lower points. And this is true among the Hebrews. But they do not show the author of this reading, nor do they bring any certain arguments as to why the points should be added in this way; indeed, they arbitrarily employ the points. I believe one word must be read and understood differently from another, as here in מִטֶּה and מַטֶּה, but who can inform me which reading is truer, even though they say it should be read according to the above and below. In Jerome's time, the use of points does not seem to have been in vogue, yet the entire Bible was read without them. As for the more *recent* Hebrews, who presume to judge the true meaning and understanding of the language—men who are enemies, not friends, of Scripture—I do not accept them. For this reason, I often speak against the points, unless the former reading agrees with the New Testament. For from the points nothing else remains but mere divinations: whether מטה or מטה should be read, and so in many others written with the same letters. Therefore, I do not pay much attention to the rabbinical superscriptions and footnotes; it would be better to read the Scripture according to its internal sense, not the superior or inferior one." (*Lectures on Genesis* [Gen. 47:31.]. Opp. exeg. XI, p. 85. Hal. II, 2703. f.)

GERHARD: The question is: "Whether the vowel points were contemporary with the letters in the edition of the Bible, or whether they were added in later times? The former is affirmed. . . 2. of our theologians, almost all. Chemnitz in *Harmon*. ch. 51. Flacius part. 2. *Clavis Scripturae*. Hafenreffer in *The Temple of Ezekiel*. etc." (*Exeges*. 1.1. § 333. sq.)

e) By which name, *systematically* adopted, books written after the birth of Christ are usually designated.

f) However, it pleased God to use Greek, a language which for several centuries had been in common use among both the Jews and almost all the Gentiles, among whom the church was to be planted by apostolic preaching and to whom the New Testament Scriptures were then being committed. And from this condescension (*συγκατάβασις*), it also happened that the Greek was Hellenistic (*ἑλληνιστική*), that is, mixed with Hebraisms. See *Mus.* loc. cit. § 11, p. 261. And cf. *Johann Adam Schertzer*. *System*. Book I, § 14, p. 14. Although we do not say that the *solecisms and barbarisms* of Holy Scripture are to be attributed to this alone: for neither did the learned *Musaeus* ever hold this, who, when once in a philological inquiry... on the style of the New Testament delivered in 1641, would defend certain learned and well-deserving men, who, wishing to show the difference between the style of Scripture and that of other writers famous in the Greek language, had used those terms, introduced by the ancient father *Jerome*, from the charge of *impiety* and *blasphemy against the Holy Spirit*, and therefore he would examine the arguments of a certain writer,

and note his *ἀσυλλογιστίαν* [illogic] (in the same manner that *Huelsemann* also believed the fathers and more recent authors who had spoken thus should be excused, and *Musaeus*, *Disquisitio*, cites that and the subsequent *Vindiciae, Praelections on the Formula of Concord*, Art. I, ch. III, § 5, p. 222.), not only never made his own judgment, that there are in fact barbarisms and solecisms in the Scriptures, but also, that he did not embrace it, testified several times in the same discussion and throughout entire vindications; Indeed, in this whole matter he gained the approval of *Johann Major*, then senior professor of theology, the first and foremost professor of theology, whose congratulatory poem, which is like *an ἐπιτομή* [epitome] and *ἀνακεφαλαίωσις* [recapitulation] of almost everything discussed in that *Disquisitio*, adorns the very discussion to this day. And the *appendix* by *Musaeus* to the vindications of the *Disquisitio*, pp. 457–458, is also worth reading, as is *On Syncretism and Holy Scripture*, Book I, pp. 319–320. For this reason, even *Scherzer* in *System*. 1. c. p. 14,, although he denies that the solecisms, *κακία* or *ugliness*, and the barbarisms opposed to *ἑλληνιστική* Greek should be attributed to Scripture, nevertheless commends *Musaeus's Disq. de stylo N. T.*. Furthermore, concerning the *Gospel of Matthew and the Epistle to the Hebrews*, it is disputed: were those books not first composed in the Hebrew language? which seemed to many of the Fathers: it suffices here to say that their Greek text, which survives today, whether original or translated from another language, is truly God-breathed (*θεόπνευστος*), and thus rightly falls under the *αυτοπίστου* [self-authenticating] part of the principle of things to be believed. Cf. *Mus., Introd*. l. c. p. 261.

g) For the matter itself speaks, that the style in the Scriptures is in some places *milder and more subdued,* elsewhere *more serious and vehement*, again in some places *humbler and less polished,* elsewhere *more grand and polished,* sometimes *purer* in its use of a single language, at other times *mixed* with the idioms of various languages; since the primary author of the Scripture is one, and the whole Scripture is God-breathed (*θεόπνευστος*)**,** it must be admitted that the Holy Spirit Himself, in suggesting the concepts of the words, accommodated Himself to the disposition and condition of the scribes. See *Mus.* l. c. § 13. pp. 262–263. From what has been said, it is concluded that this particularity of style, which some call *the external and occidental form* of Scripture, is rightly referred to the matter as a *material affection*. Cf. *Mus.* § 18, p. 272.

> DANNHAUER: "*The words θεόπνευσις* [divine inspiration]... confirm 1.: *Divine oracles* (Exod. 4:15; Num. 28:12; 2 Sam. 23:2; Isa. 51:16; Jer. 1:9; 30:1, 4; Mark 13:11; Luke 1:70; 21:15; Acts 2:4), which assert that God is the author not only of the senses, but also the prophetic and apostolic mouth, and consequently of the written letter as well; nor is there one source for the word spoken by the mouth and another for the written word, which is God's (Exodus 34:27. Jer. 30:2; 36:2; 2 Tim. 3:16) also clearly attribute Scripture to the Author who is God; those who deny this hold that Scripture is not of *'private interpretation'*. (2 Pet. 2.) All of this was inspired by the Holy Spirit, which is not of *private interpretation*; but the words also are not of *private interpretation.* Therefore 2. *the difference between the authentic language and a version,* which would be nonexistent. For the meaning is the same in both. Suppose the words in both were also by man, and there would be no difference any longer. 3. The *uniformity of style* as to substance in the body of both Testaments, so that one mouth of all the *θεόπνευστοι* [God-breathed ones] seems to appear; although with regard to the accidental shaping of style*, by a* singular *condescension of the Holy Spirit he accommodated himself* to the talents, pursuits, and nationalities of the *divinely inspired writers*; whereby it came about that Isaiah (of royal blood) is more elegantly, Amos more humbly, Luke, steeped in Greek letters, more elegantly wrote, just as in a musical organ the substance of the melody, harmony, and tone (Phrygian or Lydian) is one, but the breath that blows the pipes accommodates itself to some pipes that are sharper and others that are duller." (*Hodos. Phaen*. 1. G. p. 30. sq.)

QUENSTEDT: *"A distinction must be made* between the *style* of speech, and the very *phrases*, *words, and expressions;* the *style* of speech the holy writers owed to daily use and custom, or even to education, and hence also the diversity of style, especially the prophetic, arises. For just as the sacred writers were informed or accustomed to a more lofty or humble manner of speaking and writing, so the Holy Spirit, using the same style, willed to *adapt* Himself to the disposition of men *and to condescend*, and thus to express the same things more magnificently through some, more simply through others; that the sacred writers used these and not other, equivalent words, this is solely from divine instinct and inspiration. For the Holy Spirit adapted Himself to the capacity and character of the sacred writers, so that the mysteries would be conveyed according to the usual manner of speaking. Thus, the Holy Spirit inspired the very words that the amanuenses would otherwise have used, had they been left to themselves. . . In a musical instrument, the pipes sound unevenly, but are moved by one musician. However, this opinion, that is, that the Holy Spirit *accommodated* Himself to His instrument and its genius and customary style of speaking, does not please everyone, and they consider the cause of the different style to be that 'the Holy Spirit gives to each to speak, as He wills,' Acts. 2:4, and that He regarded not so much the faculty of speaking of the authors, as the nature of the materials which He willed to speak or write about. Thus Dr. Calov, *System. Theol*. Tom. I. c. 4. q. 5. p. 574." (L. c. s. 2. q. 4. f. 109. sq.)

ANTITHESIS:

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. *Erasmus*, in his annotations on Acts 10, states that the Apostles' speech was not only unpolished and disorderly, but also imperfect, confused, and at times downright solecistic. 2. *From the Calvinist Beza*, who, while writing an invective against Erasmus, in his annotation on Acts 10:46, imprudently admits solecisms, saying on p. 329 of the Cambridge edition: I acknowledge simplicity as the supreme quality in the apostolic writings; I do not deny hyperbata (transpositions), anantapodota (hypothetical propositions), or even some solecisms." And soon after: "The apostles had the gravest reasons for sometimes even stammering and, indeed, for using solecisms along with the common people." Hence, in Luke 22:20, he denies that the words of the institution, *τὸ ἐκχυνόμενον*, can be referred to *τῷ αἵματι* without a solecism." (L. c. q. 6. f. 120.)

§ 8.

The form, or formal principle, [(a)] of Holy Scripture is the very concept [(b)] of things and words (whose signs are written words), insofar as [(c)]the minds of the writers were divinely inspired.

a) That, I say, by which the Holy Scripture is constituted in its *specific* being, as by a *proper and a priori* reason, and is distinguished from any other writing. *Mus.* 1. c. § 15. p. 265.

b) For this reason some say that *the internal form*, or *the formal element* of Scripture, is its meaning. See *Cundisius* on Comp. Hutt. Q. I. p. 7. For the *sense* of the words of Scripture is nothing other than the concepts of the mind by which objects are represented to the intellect, and when things themselves are understood under the name of sense, it is certain that they are regarded not in themselves, but as they are signified by words and concepts. *Musaeus*, loc. cit., p. 269.

c) For just as the Holy Scripture is constituted by the sense signified by the words in the *generic* being of Scripture, so it is constituted by the sense, as it is *θεόπνευστος* (God-breathed), in the *specific* being, or in the being of Holy Scripture. And this amounts to the same thing, if

you say, the form of Scripture is *θεόπνευστος* (God-breathed)*;* provided this is *not* taken precisely for the *act* of inspiration (for it pertains to the *efficient* cause*,* as also observed by *Gerhard* in *Exeg*. L. I. § 305. p. 322.), but *terminatively,* or as it terminates to the very concepts of things and words in the intellect of the holy men, which were to be expressed in writing. Hence also *Himmelius* in *Syntagm*. Disp. II. § 17, writes that the *form of Scripture is internal divine inspiration* (*θεόπνοια*)**.** Cf. *Mus.* 1. c., who also shows on p. 266 how the form of the sacred Scripture remains one and the same, not only in the *autographs* of the sacred writers, but also in the *apographs* of the copyists, and thus even to this day; that is to say, because those *apograph* codices were compiled in imitation of the original Scripture, either immediately or mediately, and so, although the manuscripts of Scripture have multiplied with respect to their external forms, the *divine* inspiration of the things and words nevertheless remains the same.

> HUELSEMANN: "Concerning the distinction between what is called *the material and the formal of the divine word*, some raised the question 20 years ago even in the orthodox church from a misunderstanding of certain phrases of B. Luther, Brenzi, and others. However, that controversy was decided in 1624 by the electoral and ducal theologians and reduced to these terms: 1. *A distinction* must be made between the material and the formal *of the word* and *of the divine Word. The material of the word* is the *sound* uttered by a human mouth, articulated and intelligible in common usage, by which it is distinguished from the sound of a bell or any other sign introduced by human discretion, but which is not produced by articulate speech; this distinction is shown by the Apostle in 1 Cor. 14:7–9. The *formal element of the Word* in general is a certain determinate *sense*, indicating a singular thing or person, which is either complex or incomplex, and of which the logical theorems treat. However, the *material* of the *divine Word* is *an intelligible sound concerning divine things*, produced by God mediately or immediately, having divine authority to bind to faith and obedience, which is demonstrated from 1 Thess. 2:13. *And the formal object of the divine Word* is its very *divine meaning*, expressed by an audible sign, *a determination concerning a certain thing* or person; which is likewise evident from 1 Cor. 14:8-9 and following. . . When a term or word of *Holy Scripture* is taken in the concrete, as it is most often taken and ought to be taken for the written Word, then the formal element of the divine Word and the formal element of the divine Scripture do not differ from each other, because that accidental form is not considered by ecclesiastical writers when they treat of the formal substance or sense of the ectype, which God expressed in sound, whether audible or analogous and legible. The reason is that the reader of the Scriptures conceives the words of the writer under this imagination, as if he were hearing the writer's voice resounding, which he sees and reads to signify the same thing through the characters, and because of this analogy of human apprehension, which is made through the eyes or through reading with apprehension, which is made through the ears, then, because of the analogy of the mode of revelation, which is by characters, with the mode which is by words and sounds, the Holy Spirit, by metonymy of the accident for the subject, calls the characters themselves the Word of God, and by metonymy of the container for the contained, calls the subject of attachment, or the material on which the characters bearing the Word of God are painted, the Word of God, the covenant of God, etc... *The Papists, Calvinists, and other sectarians* have the true Word of God, and yet they do not have it. *They have it*, as to the truth and existence of the object, before their eyes and ears, just as the five brothers of the rich man are said to have Moses and the prophets, Luke 16:29. *They do not have it* with regard to the truth of knowing (cognition) or with regard to the conformity of their concepts with the mind of God who proposes it. In this sense Chrysostom, Augustine, Luther, Brenz, and others cited by Movius in response to *Response to the Triad of Disputations of Mislente*, p. 86. f. deny that the papists and other heretics have the true word of God, adding the reason that the truth of the divine word does not consist

in the signs of the words, but in their true understanding. Where it is clear that by the word 'truth' the truth of existing, but the relative truth of knowing, is not understood." (*Praelectt. Form. Concord*. p. 431. sq. 433. sq. 435.)

QUENSTEDT: "*He distinguishes* between the *grammatical and external* sense of the divine word, and the *spiritual, internal, and divine* sense of the divine word. *The former* is *the formal* sense of the Word of God, insofar as it is *a word*; *the latter,* insofar as it is a *divine* word; *the former* can be perceived by anyone, even *an unregenerate person*, but *the latter* is apprehended only by an *enlightened* intellect." (L. c. s. 1. th. 5. f. 81.)

9.

The object of Scripture [(a)] *generally* speaking is all sacred things, in whose commemoration [(b)] the Holy Scripture is occupied; *specifically*, however, and *primarily*, those things which are ordered for the salvation of men per se, and [(c)] *either* pertain to the doctrines necessary for faith, *or* to a life suitable for one being saved. [(d)]

a) It is also called *the matter about which.*

b) For it is certain that the Holy Scripture, being recorded in a historical style, contains various things which, although not all are equally necessary to know, nevertheless all contribute in their own way to edification and are therefore rightly called the object of Scripture. See *Musaeus, Introd*. § 14. p. 264.

c) Thus *Gerhard, Exeg*. L. I. § 52. p. 72 calls *the Law and the Gospel the primary heads of divine revelation, to which all that is handed down in the Scriptures can be referred.*

d) And for this reason the object of Scripture and the object of revealed theology coincide; although those things which are treated in sacred Scripture besides the primary object, in their own way pertain to revealed theology, *either* with respect to illustrating the doctrines of faith and morals, *or* with respect to the interpretation of Scripture itself. See *Mus.* loc. cit. p. 265.

§ 10.

The end *to which* [(a)] the Holy Scriptures are addressed *in general* is indeed all men, without distinction of ecclesiastical and secular status, [(b)] to be instructed from the Scriptures not only by others, but also by their own [(c)] efforts; and *in particular*, those who are or are to be teachers [(d)] of the Church.

a) Or the subject for whose benefit the Holy Scripture is intended. See *Mus.* § 23, pp. 277–278. Some, calling it by the name of *object*, but distinct from the *matter about which it is*, call it, with the addition, a *personal object*. See *Gerh.* 1. c. § 480, p. m. 525.

b) This will become clearer if one considers the *end for which it is intended* (of which we will speak immediately), which pertains to all men by the intention of God.

c) Certainly, in both the ancient Israelite and the early Christian church, not only was Scripture publicly read and the people informed from it, but the reading of Scripture was also granted and commended to all indiscriminately, and *this* by divine command *(Deut. 6:6–7): "These words which I command you shall you diligently teach to your children and speak of them."* Likewise chap. 31:11–12, where God commands *the assembled people—men, women, children*, *and strangers who* would be *in the gates* of the Israelites—*to read all* the Scripture that existed at that time. And in *Isaiah 34:16,* the prophet, speaking to the common people, says: "*Search,*" he says, "*in the book of the LORD and read; not one of these shall fail, etc."* Indeed, David *in Psalm 1:2* proclaims *blessed* the one who is occupied with *the meditation of the Law,* or the Holy Scripture, *day and night.* In the New Testament, however*,* Christ in *Luke 16:29 and 31* says—not incidentally in a parable, but by the very force of the parable's purpose—that the books of *Moses and the prophets* are to be fully unfolded, consulted, and embraced by every person. And in *John 5:39*, *he commends the study of the Scriptures*, by which the readers themselves strive to penetrate into the meaning of the Scripture and to recognize *by* its *testimony* the Messiah, for the sake of attaining eternal life (for this is "*to search the Scriptures*,"*,* like those who search for veins of metal, or the dens of wild beasts), commends to the people of the Jews, whether by a formal command or at least by his approval. Christians are also praised, who are more diligently engaged in the study of reading and searching the Scriptures: the *Bereans in Acts 17:11, and Timothy,* when he was still an adolescent, indeed a boy, 2 Tim. 3:15.

> QUENSTEDT: "We do not say that for *any* person the reading of the Scriptures is *simply, absolutely*, and in and of itself necessary, so that without it one cannot conceive faith and attain salvation. For at one time there were no Scriptures that could be read, from the beginning of the world until Moses, yet there were faithful who attained eternal salvation. . . But we say that the reading of the Bible is *permissible* and, *for a certain reason, commanded* or even *necessary*, *κατά τι*, by a hypothetical necessity, if the inability and *weakness* to read is not insurmountable. . . For one of the two is simply necessary to the being, so to speak, of a faithful man, that he either read the word of God himself, or hear it read. . . When we do not forbid, but faithfully commend, *private* study of the Holy Scriptures for the domestic exercise of piety to pious heads of families and their household who are able to read, we do not thereby permit everyone indiscriminately, both learned and unlearned, to make themselves judges of the sacred text. of the letters, i.e., that each person interpret the Holy Scriptures according to his own judgment and from those things which seem right to him, gather dogmas, as the Jesuit Costerus frames the state of the controversy, *Apolog. II. contra Gomarum*. For this very thing is in no way to be granted to anyone, whether learned or unlearned, whether cleric or layman." (L. c. s. 2. q. 21. f. 313. sq.)
>
> THE SAME: "As for the predicate 'search,' (*τὸ ἐρευνᾶτε*)*,* some render it as an imperative, others as an indicative. Cyrill. 1. III. in John ch. 4, and with him most of the Papists and some Calvinists, among whom are Beza, Piscator, Camerarius, Tossanus, and of our own, Brenz, Erasmus Schmidt and others hold that the *ερευνάτε* is said not in a commanding, but in an indicative manner, or that it is an indicative and designative of the practice of the Jews, not of an office; i.e., the Savior says: 'You search the Scriptures not impiously, indeed, but unskillfully, lazily, perfunctorily, without fruit; for since they testify about me, you do not want to come to me.' They take their argument from the preceding and following context. In those passages, the former remaining words 'you have' (*ἔχετε*), 'you believe' (*πιστεύετε*), in the latter 'you teach' (*δοκεῖτε*), 'you wish' (*θέλετε*), since they are in the indicative mood, they therefore conclude that this is also controversial. Athanasius, however, Augustine, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Luther, as well as the Genuenses in the last version,

and many others, hold that the word *ερευνάτε* is to be understood as an imperative, not an indicative; to which we also subscribe. 8. If anyone were to insist most rigorously on the indicative, they must nevertheless admit that the imperative is not to be entirely excluded. 9. Finally, whether it indicates what is customary for the Jews, or commands what they ought to do, our argument drawn from this passage against the papists nevertheless stands firm, namely: that it is not forbidden for the laity *to have diligence and accuracy* in investigating the Scriptures, but that all, of whatever order, condition, or age, are to be admitted to the study of Scripture, and even encouraged to do so." (L. c. f. 317.)

THE SAME.: "If laymen are to be kept from reading the Scriptures *for fear of heresy*, much more so the clergy, bishops, and presbyters, because experience has so far proven, and Bellarmine himself admits (Book I, *On the Roman Pontiff*, ch. 8). § 8.: 'There has scarcely been any heresiarch or one at all notable among heretics who did not come from the clergy.', (*Vix quemquam fuisse haeresiarcham et inter haereticos paulo celebriorem, qui ex clero non prodierit*)'" (L. c. q. 21. f. 325.)

ANTHITHESIS:

QUENSTEDT: *"The antithesis of the papists*, among whom the power of reading the sacred books in the vernacular is granted to clerics and to them alone (though not to all of them, nor at all times, as Meisner observes in *Anti-Lessio* p. 52.), while *laymen* are barred from the reading of the sacred Scriptures in the vernacular tongue, and it is permitted only to a very few, namely, *those who have obtained permission to read from the bishop or an inquisitor*, *with the advice of the parish priest or confessor*; who read in the papal sense, and whom they consider will sustain no harm from it; and whatever other precautionary conditions are attached. . . Note, however: 1. In the papacy, to grant a layman permission to read the Bible, *the privilege* of bishops and inquisitors is generally required, *granted* individually and specifically *in writing*; without which it is unlawful and a most grave sin for anyone to attempt to read the Bible to the common people. 2. In the so-called Inquisition, *nothing* is *more heretical and capital* than the reading of the Bible. And it is clear from history that some have been condemned to the stake and burned for reading the Scriptures in the vernacular. Hence Molina says: "A horrible thing, that in lands where the Inquisition has dominion, *to have the Bible in the vernacular* is a crime to be expiated by fire." And it is a fact, attested by history, that some have been condemned to the stake and burned for reading the Scriptures in the vernacular. Hence Molina says: "A horrible thing, that in lands where the Inquisition has dominion, to possess the Bible in the vernacular is a crime punishable by fire."And how many laymen, truly, burdened with so many difficulties, deterred by so many threats, dare to ask permission from those tyrants to read a book so terminally forbidden, so odious and condemned to the flames? 3. If there is a profound peace from heresies in the church, they can tolerate laypeople tasting the Scriptures, but not being satisfied with the whole, but only to sample a little of that part which informs morals and recounts histories. But the part that proposes and explains the mysteries of faith, they want this part to be set aside. Therefore, they permit only the reading of certain biblical books. 4. They decree that a layman is to be permitted only a copy of *a version by some Catholic author*, who, as is known, in his translation has expressed not so much the sources themselves as the sense of the Roman Catholic Church, according to Bonfrerio in his *Preface to the Holy Scriptures*, ch. 11, sec. 9. p. 37. 5. *In free kingdoms and provinces,* where the Inquisition has no place, e.g. in Germany, France, Poland, the Papists use this *privilege*, to specifically permit several, or generally all, 'by word or deed,' as Serarius puts it, the power is granted by the bishops to read vernacular Bibles from the Papists' versions, so that in Germany the versions of Eck and Dietenberg are read with impunity, in France the Louvain French version, etc., i.e., to keep those who eagerly thirst for sacred reading away from the versions of the so-called heretics, which they fear more than those which they themselves have produced from the Latin Vulgate. Where, however, the pope reigns absolutely, as in Italy, Spain, Sicily, etc., the vernacular Bible is nowhere to be found." (L. c. f. 314. sq.)

FOURTH RULE OF THE INDEX OF PIUS IV (1564): "Since experience has shown that if the Holy Bible is permitted in the vernacular language everywhere without distinction, more harm than good arises from it, on account of the rashness of men; in this matter the judgment of the bishop or inquisitor shall be followed: so that with the counsel of the parish priest or confessor they may grant to Catholics the reading of the books translated by Catholic authors in the vernacular, to those whom they have judged can receive from such reading not harm, but an increase of faith and piety; and that they have this faculty in writing. However, those who presume to read or possess them without such permission cannot receive absolution for their sins unless they first return the books to the ordinary. As for booksellers who sell or otherwise grant the aforementioned books written in the vernacular to anyone not possessing the required faculty, they shall forfeit the price of the books, to be applied by the bishop to pious uses, and shall be subject to other penalties at the discretion of the same bishop, according to the gravity of the offense. Regulars, however, may read or buy them only with permission from their superiors." (*The Canons and Decrees of the Holy Ecumenical Council of Trent*. Ed. by G. Smets. Bielefeld 1851, p. 224.)

CLEMENT VIII.: "It must be noted concerning the above-written fourth rule of the Index of the Most Holy and Reverend Pope Pius IV, that by this printing and edition, no new faculty is granted to bishops, or to inquisitors or superiors of regulars, to grant permission to buy, read, or keep Bibles printed in the vernacular; since by the mandate and practice of the holy Roman and universal Inquisition the faculty of granting such licenses to read or retain vernacular Bibles, or other parts of Holy Scripture of both the New and the Old Testament published in any vernacular language, and furthermore summaries and compendia, even historical, of the same bibles or books of the Holy Scripture, written in whatever vernacular idiom; which indeed must be inviolably observed." (*Note on the Fourth Rule*. Cf. *Index*, etc. Cologne, printed by B. Gualtheri, 1602.)

d) Indeed, they are to be instructed from the Scriptures not only for their own good but also for the good of those they serve. Cf. 2 *Tim. 3:16–17,* where Scripture is said to be *useful for the man of God*, *fully equipping him* for *every work* of his office.

§ . 11.

The end for which (*finis cujus*) of Scripture, and the ultimate one, [(a)] is eternal salvation. [(b)] The intermediate end, with respect to any people, is faith [(c)] in Christ. With respect to the ministers of the church, the particular end of Scripture is the ministerial operations themselves, which depend on divine revelation. [(d)]

a) Namely*, with respect to us.* For others, the *absolutely* ultimate end, which is also *common* to all things that are done or given by God, is the glory of God. Cf. *Gerh. Exeg*. § 361–362.

b) On this, see what we said above about the end of revealed theology, Chap. I, §§ 17 and 18, p. 38, namely, that the ultimate end of theology and the principle of theology are the same.

c) Thus *John*, in chapter 20 of his Gospel, verse 31, indicates the intermediate end of Scripture and connects it with the ultimate end, saying: *These things are written,* proximately indeed to this end, *that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and* that *by believing* you may obtain the ultimate end, or *may have life*

eternal *through His name.* However, other acts that are joined with faith are not excluded here, but are rather included in their own way, in accordance with what we have said about the intermediate end of revealed theology, Chapter I, § 19, pp. 38 ff.

d) Whether it is those "*all good works*" which Paul enumerates and to which he says Scripture is useful, namely, for *διδασκαλίαν,* or the *instruction of men* in those things necessary to know, concerning the articles of faith and the entire Christian doctrine; to *ελεγχον, the demonstration* or *refutation* of errors that conflict with heavenly truth; further, for *επανόρθωσιν*, or the correction of disordered morals through rebukes and admonitions, by which men are withdrawn from sins; and finally, for *παιδείαν τὴν ἐν δικαιοσύνη,* or *instruction* in *righteousness,* or exhortation to a just and holy way of life *(2 Tim. 3:16).* See *Gerh.* in his Commentary on this passage, where he also teaches how *παράκλησις* or *consolation,* which, as an end, is said to be the purpose for which Scripture was entrusted *(Rom. 15:4),* is comprehended either under *teaching (διδασκαλία)* or under *instruction (παιδεία)*. For it either sets forth the testimony of divine grace under the guise of divine revelation, *or* exhorts Christians to patience. And thus it is also clear that these ends, although they are not the ends of Scripture simply considered in itself, but rather when considered in relation to the particular ecclesiastical ministry, are nevertheless *consistently* directed to faith in Christ, since the ecclesiastical ministry, by teaching, reproving, correcting, and instructing others, do this so that people may come to faith in Christ, and which perpetually accompanies it, to holiness of life, and that those who are brought to it may be preserved in it. See *Mus., Introd*. l. c. § 22. p. 277.

§ 12.

Among the affections of the Holy Scripture, first [(a)] place is held by its authority [(b)] or dignity [(c)] manifest, [(d)] moving the human intellect to assent to its words and the will to obedience to its commandments.

a) For thus it appears how the Holy Scripture fulfills the office of the formal object of revealed theology.

b) Which in Greek you would call *authenteia (αὐθεντίαν*), as among jurists *authentic* instruments and writings are called those which have certain and just authority, so that they can oblige to assent or even to obedience.

c) Conf. b. *Cundis.* in not. ad Comp. Hutt. L. I. Q. 1. p. 20.

d) For, in the usage of speech, one is said to be in authority or to have authority only if his dignity, by which he merits assent or obedience, is so known that it attracts the minds of others to him.

e) For this reason, some call the authority of Scripture *ἀξιοπιστίαν* — credibility — others *αὐτοπιστίαν* — self-crediting authority — that is, authority in *speaking* or *testifying,* so that *it* may be *believed.*

f) To which corresponds the word *ἐξουσία,* or *power,* like that of one who commands, or authority in prescribing.

§ 13.

And this authority of Scripture, *in itself and absolutely*, or with respect to its subject-matter, [(a)] depends solely on the Author of Scripture, God, and results from His truthfulness [(b)] and His supreme and infinite power. [(c)]

a) For authority *first* and by itself belongs to the author of any utterance or writing, e.g., a law, a command, etc., and *the foundation* of authority is the author's perfection in itself, and *proximately*, his perfection as it is known. Hence, then, or because of the dependence of the saying or writing on him who has authority, authority also pertains to that very saying or writing itself; and thus the authority of the Holy Scriptures is founded in its very theopneustia, or dependence on God as its author, whose supreme perfection is known to all. See *Mus., Introd*. P. II. C. III. § 1. and 4. p. 282. and 288.

b) However, they do not derive their authority from a less principal cause, just as other writings do not from scribes, but from the one who composed them or dictated them to the pen. *Mus.* l. c. § 3. p. 289. And from this it is clear that Holy Scripture does not derive its authority from the Church, since the Church was not its author and efficient cause. *Mus.* l. c. p. 290.

c) For just as God, by reason of His infinite knowledge and goodness, is supremely truthful in what He says, so that He can neither be deceived nor deceive, and for this reason His Word is rightly to be assented to: so the Holy Scripture, by its dependence on the truthful God, is likewise worthy of the assent of all men.

d) For just as God, by right of creation, has supreme dominion over men as creatures, by whose power He can oblige men to render obedience to Himself, so the Scripture, by the fact that it is the Word of God, is also worthy that all men should render obedience to its precepts. Cf. *Mus*. l. c. § 6. p. 289.

§ 14.

As for us, however, or for us to be convinced, [(a)] the Holy Scripture is worthy of faith and obedience; the marks of this must be not only the perfections of God themselves, but also the Scripture's dependence on God, or divine inspiration (*theopneustia*). [(b)]

a) Conf. I. § 11. note c.

b) Therefore, this knowledge, although *it is not a constitutive part* of the authority of Scripture, nor *a cause* or *foundation* or *part of the foundation* of that authority in itself considered—that is, the dignity which the name of authority in the objective case implies—is nevertheless necessary as *a condition* on the part of men, whose minds ought to be moved by the *known* dignity of Scripture to faith and obedience. *Mus.* § 11. p. 292.

§ 15.

The authority of Scripture, insofar as it pertains to giving assent [a] to its words, can be considered in *two ways:* [b] *partly* precisely in relation *to causing the assent* of believers, by which Scripture has what is *the principle of knowing and the formal object* of faith and revealed theology; [c] *partly* in relation *to discerning* from the very Scripture itself—which *is inspired* and true—other *writings and doctrines* that deal with matters of faith and morals; by which means Scripture has what is called *canonical,* that is, what serves as the *norm* and rule for distinguishing true from false. [d]

a) And this is the one which theologians commonly understand by the name of the authority of Scripture *simply*, and in explaining it they are almost exclusively occupied. And it must also be admitted that it is *prior* in the order of doctrine to the other, which involves the power of obliging to obedience to its commands, since it has no difficulty where that has been shown. See *Mus.* l. c. § 14. p. 294.

b) For although the *authority* of Scripture is *one* and the same, founded in the truth of God and in Scripture's dependence on God, by which it is established *both* as a formal motive for causing assent to faith (a function which the doctrine of Scripture can perform in any language) *and* as a norm for examining and judging any other writings and doctrines, so too the Scripture must be applied in a somewhat *different* way as a formal motive for causing the assent of faith (a function which the doctrine of Scripture can perform in any language), *and differently* as a norm for distinguishing true from false (which the Scripture provides only in its original text): Thus, the authority of Scripture must rightly be treated distinctly with respect to both of these functions. See *Mus.* l. c. § 15. p. 295.

c) Which one might call the *motivational and faith-causing* authority.

d) It is otherwise called the *canonical* or *normative* authority of truth and falsehood. Cf. *Mus.* l. c.

§ 16.

The authority of Scripture, when considered in its relation to causing the assent of faith, requires knowledge of two complex principles. One is: *Whatever has been committed to Scripture by God's inspiration is certainly and infallibly true.* The other: *Sacred Scripture has been committed by God's inspiration*. [a] The truth of the former principle is almost beyond doubt. [b] As for the latter, however, it must be considered in somewhat greater detail: insofar as it is *either* a matter of the knowledge of *human* faith, [c] by which the divine origin of the Holy Scriptures is made known, *or* of the knowledge of *divine* faith. [d]

a) Compare what we said in § 13.

b) For it is naturally and evidently known from the very terms themselves as apprehended.

c) By which name is understood a kind of knowledge whose ultimate reason for assent is human testimony, or another probable reason, which generates *the opinion*, or leads one to judge, that it is *credible* that the Holy Scriptures are not the invention of human ingenuity, but proceeded from God Himself and are truly divine.

d) That is, of a knowledge that is *simply certain* and which excludes all fear of the contrary, on account of the absolutely infallible certainty of divine revelation or testimony, by which it is supported as its ultimate reason for assent.

§ 17.

Arguments which demonstrate the divine origin of Scripture to be credible to human faith are [(a)] *internal*, that is, drawn from the intrinsic nature and properties of Scripture itself; and (b) *external*, that is, drawn from sources outside Scripture.

QUENSTEDT: ″Those who are tempted are not to be reckoned in the same category as unbelievers, since they still retain a spark of faith like smoldering flax; yet because they often have no or only slight sense of their former knowledge concerning the authority of Scripture, one must deal with them on this head throughout, as we observed above from Hunnius. The *obdurate*, however, if they are correctable and curable, are to be bound by the same arguments as the unbelievers, since they walk hand in hand with those who never had faith and those who have lost it after once receiving it; if they are incorrigible and incurable, they are to be left to themselves and to divine judgment. . . *Objection:* If the divine word is properly and principally believed for its own sake, it is in vain that faith is secured for it by other arguments. *Answer:* We deny the consequent. For just as in former times, when *miracles* were still being performed, they were done so that unbelieving people might be brought to faith, even though it was possible to believe without them and it was not proper and principal to believe on account of those miracles: so also today, since miracles have ceased to be performed, unbelievers are rightly led to faith by those other arguments, even though it may also be believed and is often believed without them, by the naked word preached." (L. c. P. I. c. 4. s. 2. q. 9. f. 146. sq.)

DANNHAUER: "We here encounter the question: How do you know, for example, that the Gospel of Matthew is by Matthew? That the Epistle to the Romans is divinely inspired writing of the blessed Paul, written by divine inspiration — a question, namely, that among Christians ought properly not to be heard, in the gravest judgment of Augustine, being more worthy of a pagan than of a Christian, yet wrested from us by the *impudence of adversaries* who catch the unwary with this snare and attempt to shake off the blush of shame, since they themselves do not know how to blush; likewise by the *temptation* of conscience, by which it can happen that one is vexed by this scruple, and the possible necessity which *those outside* impose." (*Hodos. Phaen.* I. p. 20. sq.), Cf. Luther, *Works*, Vol. XIX, 1238; Vol. VI, 2,8. sq.

HUELSEMANN: "As the ancients, both Jews and Christians, demonstrated from these principles, that God alone is the true God, and that the gods of the Gentiles are not true, because they are subject either to composition or to fragility or to vices and abominations; for it is known that their very parents, birth, death, parricides, adulteries, etc., as can be seen from several places in Scripture, Deut. 32:17–18, 31–32; Isa. 40–47. Jer. 10L3–5. ff. 11–12. ff. . . .: — thus from the same principles it can and must be demonstrated which *word* is divine." (*Praelectt. Form. Conc*. p. 216.)

a) For although they do not themselves produce the divine faith which the Holy Scripture provides, they nevertheless offer not a null, but an excellent use, namely, that contempt and rash judgments about doctrine not sufficiently known may be restrained, and rather a certain opinionative implanted in the minds of men, or that the human faith be prepared and inclined by a knowledge of the divine origin of Scripture to read and meditate on the Holy Scriptures with study and desire to learn, so that, obstacles removed, the Scripture itself, with the concurrence of God, may produce the divine faith which it is to confer; as will appear from what follows.

§ 18.

Internal arguments are found, on the one hand, in the *material* or stylistic, and on the other, in *the formal*, or in the sense *of θεόπνευστου* (divinely inspired*)* and the things signified.

See *Mus., Introd*. P. II. Cap. V. S. I. sqq. p. 305.

§ 19.

To the first class belongs the simplicity of style, [(a)] combined with a gravity worthy of God alone; [(b)] that not infrequently the things to be believed and done are set forth expressly under the name of God Himself. [(c)]

a) *Not* that the diction were *confused and mixed*, without connection and order of words and things (which is altogether false), *but* because Scripture does *not* use the blandishments of words and the *coloring* of secular *eloquence*, adapted to captivate the minds.

b) For the things that are to be *believed*, however sublime and difficult they may be, are nevertheless proposed without demonstrations, by *bare assertions*; and the things that are *to be done* or *omitted*, though arduous and troublesome in themselves, are nevertheless presented as if *by authority,* and indeed *to all* men*,* even to those who have no superior on earth. *Mus.* l. c.

c) Or because such *formulae of words* occur*,* by which God is introduced as speaking or bearing witness that He Himself is the one who, through His ministers, e.g., the prophets, declares this or that. For although, insofar as God Himself, just as with other things, so also by uniting His power with this part or doctrine of the Holy Scriptures, works effectively in the human mind, it is not so much human faith as divine that is brought forth; which fact is also acknowledged by *Mus.* in *Quaest. de Syncr. et Scr*. L. I. Q. I. § 7. p. 84 and 195. Cf. *Ausführl. Erklärung* p. 40. However, when the argument is considered *precisely,* insofar as it pertains to *the style and formulas of speech*, it must be admitted that it can and does happen that even false prophets and seducers make such statements: hence also *Johann Schroeder* in *Opusc. de principio theol*. Sect. I. Q. VII. n. 1. warns that this argument is one of those

from *which*, *when taken individually, it is not easy to conclude, what is plain*. And Johann Müller in *Atheis. dev.* P. I. cap. III. num. 3. p. 110. 111. and likewise the Hülsemann in *Comm. ad Jerem.* cap. I. aphor. III. theor. p. 42. are in agreement. Meanwhile, it remains certain, and this does not a little to rendering the divine origin of the Scriptures credible, that, since it cannot be assumed from elsewhere concerning the founders of the Scripture (e.g., that they were infamous or suspect persons, or from the underlying material, or from the lack of fulfillment of predictions, etc.) that they spoke falsely or deceitfully; it is indeed entirely consistent that the Scripture, which with such great assertion reports God as its author, is not a human invention, but the true word of God Himself. Cf. *Mus., Introd*. l. c. p. 309.

§ 20.

To the latter class of internal arguments belong those which are drawn from the properties of some of Scripture, if it is to be considered, either by divine appointment or by natural reason, as having been destined for the instruction of men in salvation, such as [(a)] the *truth* of its assertions without admixture of error, [(b)] perfect *holiness,* [(c)] excluding all that is dishonest or indecorous, *sufficiency* [(d)] of those things which are set forth as to be believed or done by those who are striving for salvation.

a) See *Mus., Introd*. 1. c. § 6. 7. pp. 317. 318. And *Huelsem. Prael*. in F. C. A. I. c. II. § 4. p. 216–217. They amount to the same thing, so far as the matter is concerned, as those things which are proposed by others as referring to the truly divine *perfections* of the *author* of Scripture: e.g., to the perfect *truth, holiness, wisdom, and goodness* of the author of Scripture, insofar as these shine forth *from the Scripture itself*; which, upon careful collation, will not be difficult to demonstrate.

b) For just as true knowledge of God, and what pertains to His worship, is required of men who are to attain eternal salvation, so the Scripture, or the doctrine divinely given to instruct men salutarily, requires, by the very light of nature, the truth of its doctrines to be pure from all error.

c) For just as a holy life, conformed to divine laws, is required of those to be saved, so the Scripture, intended for true religion and the salvation of men, must be holy, so that it may teach what pertains to the holiness of life, and not itself present anything shameful or unseemly.

d) For otherwise, unless everything necessary for the salvation of men, both in faith and in deed, is delivered without defect in such a Scripture, the Scripture itself will be able to lead no one to salvation.

§ 21.

The truth of Scripture is proven [(a)] *partly* by the *induction* of all the doctrines which are delivered in it for the cause of salvation and which can be known *either* from the light of nature itself [(b)] *or* which exceed the light of nature, [(c)] of which none can be proven false; *partly* from the *agreement* [(d)] of the books of the Old and New Testaments and of all their parts with one another; *partly* by comparing the *prophecies* of contingent future events, especially those that depend precisely on the free will of God and of men, *with the event* [(e)] or fulfillment that corresponds accurately to them.

a) See *Mus.* l. c. § 8. p. 319.

b) For these things, for example, concerning God and His essence, attributes, providence, worship, and the life to be rightly ordered according to God's will, are handed down in the Scriptures not only in full conformity with right reason in every respect, but also more simply, more certainly, and at times more perfectly than could be known by reason left to itself in this corrupt state of nature. Hence, not only is the truth of Scripture evident *with regard to these very doctrines*, and indeed such a truth that it points to God, whose perfection infinitely surpasses the power of nature and human reason, as its author; but also an argument arises from which it is concluded that this Scripture is likewise true and from God, *also in other matters*, in which it transmits things that exceed the light of nature. *Musaeus* l. c. § 11. p. 321. 322. and § 14. p. 334.

J. G. Hamann: "Reason must be content with the judgment of that philosopher concerning the writings of Heraclitus: 'What I understand is excellent; I therefore conclude likewise about that which I do not understand.'" (*Works*, I, 63.)

c) And from these, other things fall *under the light of nature* according to a certain *generic reason,* but *they exceed* it according to their *specific* reason: e.g., concerning the *creation* of this universe and the first men, concerning the *state* of men with *integrity,* then of *corruption,* of the ultimate end or blessedness of man, which not only truly do not contradict the light of nature, but also, when known from revelation contained in the Scriptures, can be known by the guidance of the light of nature itself, perfecting our natural knowledge and supplying for its defect, as it were, by the addition of a more sublime knowledge. Hence, it may be gathered again that not only is Scripture true in such matters, but also entirely *worthy of God* as its author; indeed, *it is to be attributed* not to men, but to *God* as the revealer. See *Musaeus*, loc. cit. § 12, pp. 324 ff. and § 15, p. 336. ff. *Other things*, however, *simply exceed the light of nature*: e.g., concerning the *Trinity* of divine persons in one essence, the *Incarnation* and the two natures and unity of the person of Christ, the *redemption* of the human race through the *passion and death* of Christ, *justification* by faith in Christ, the *resurrection* of the dead, the intuitive *vision* of God and the

glorification of the bodies, in which our blessedness is constituted, etc., which, precisely because they are commended as mysteries revealed by God for our salvation, deserve to be regarded as true and certain, not devised by man, but first known by God's supernatural revelation and recorded in writing, and they argue that Scripture, even in its *other* parts, and indeed in its entirety, is true and perfect from God. *Musaeus* l. c. § 16. p. 338 ff. For although these *mysteries* may seem to involve a *contradiction* for a corrupted reason (that is, one that follows the dictates of its own principles so as to transfer by a transition to another genus to divine matters, which are not universally true except perhaps only in the sphere of *natural* things), it is nevertheless sufficient that a true contradiction in these mysteries (that is, that the same thing is affirmed and denied of the same thing at the same time) *cannot be demonstrated* most clearly. See *Mus.* l. c. p. 341 ff.

d) Indeed, the fact that so *many* writers*, so dissimilar* in talent, education, and morals— , some even *separated* by vast distances of place and time, and lacking the opportunity to communicate their innermost thoughts to one another in writing, nevertheless *on a subject* so *grave* and so sublime, concerning *religion* and *the salvation* of men, conspire so excellently and universally in *one sentiment*, that this demonstrates the truth of the Scripture in such a way that it commands one to look at the *one* and the same *author* of the whole Scripture *and the inspirer of the conceptions* to be expressed in writing *to each* and *all* of them, in a word, God. *Musaeus*, loc. cit. § 16, p. 345. For the *more obscure* or difficult passages that occur elsewhere and seem to conflict with others, *do not* truly *conflict* with them; rather, they were long ago *reconciled* through the work of learned interpreters. See *Musaeus,* loc. cit. p. 346 ff.

e) For *contingent future events* of this kind cannot be foreseen and predicted with certainty and infallibility except by God, whose knowledge is infinite (as we shall see below in the Law concerning God); and therefore the Holy Scripture, which is full of such prophecies confirmed by events, e.g., concerning the coming of the Messiah and his circumstances, as well as the fate of the Jewish people, etc., is known to be so *true* that it must be believed to have proceeded from an *omniscient and truthful* God. Cf. *Mus.* l. c. § 18. p. 364 ff.

§ 22.

The holiness of Scripture is established by the induction of all parts of true religion, [(a)] by which man is ordered, both directly to *God,* and to *himself*, and to *other* men, according to the will of God and His eternal law, which are more perfectly delivered [(b)] in the Holy Scripture than elsewhere. [(c)]

a) See *Mus.* loc. cit. § 19. p. 368 sqq.

b) See what we have just said at § 20, note c, and § 21, note *b.*

c) And thus it is simultaneously acknowledged that the most holy God is the author of that Scripture.

§ 23.

The sufficiency of Holy Scripture for salvation, with the preceding premises standing, must of course be admitted, unless it can be shown that something necessary for man's salvation in belief or practice is not contained in it. [(a)] For indeed, it can be known from this, that the Holy Scripture so clearly and distinctly shows the way *of reconciling a sinful man* to *God*, which no other religion or writing teaches. [(b)]

a) And since no one can know or teach all those things that are necessary for a man's salvation, unless God reveals them (for we have shown above in chapter I, section 8, that natural theology is insufficient. p. 17.): furthermore, it is clear that the author of this Scripture, which is sufficient for salvation, is God. Cf. *Mus.* l. c. § 20. p. 373. and 377.

b) For it presents the reason for the atonement of sins through the sacrifice of the mediator, plainly admirable, which the Gentiles, by ineptly imitating it in their perverse zeal (*κακοζηλία*), confirm its excellence, even unwittingly. Cf. *Mus*. 1. c. pp. 374–376.

§ 24.

Among the *external* arguments by which the divine origin of the Scriptures is proven, the *first* is antiquity, [(a)] or that Scripture, in terms of *the doctrine* of faith and morals *partly* began with the very origin [(b)] of the world and *partly*, shortly thereafter, became known to the first human beings, [(c)] and in terms of the age of *its* written *words*, it precedes all the books of the Gentiles. [(d)]

a) Which indeed could in its own way be referred to internal signs, insofar as the duration of a thing differs from the thing itself only by reason; here, however, it is considered with regard to the *time* by which the duration of a thing is measured, and which is external to the thing itself. See *Mus.* l. c. Sect. II. § 1. p. 378.

b) If we consider that part of the doctrine which, in the fallen state of man, was to be known concerning God and worship, and about living a just and holy life, which was subsequently recorded in the Holy Scriptures. *Mus.* l. c.

c) As for those things which were necessary for the sinful man to know in order to be reconciled with God, concerning which the *protevangelion* (*πρωτευαγγέλιον*) *(Gen. 3:15)* pertains.

d) See *Justin Martyr, Paraenesis ad Gentes,* p. 18 ff.; *Tertullian*, *Apolog*., ch. XIX. p. 711–712; *Eusebius* in the Prologue to his *Chronicon*; *Augustine*, *De Civitate Dei*, Book XVIII, Chapter XXXIV, Volume X, p. 233. Cf. *Philip Mornay*, *De Veritate Religionis Christianae*, Chapter XXIV. p. 405., *H. Grotius*, *De Veritate Religionis Christianae* L. I. § 15, 16, p. 26 ff., *J. H. Ursinus*, *Exerc. de Zoroastre* etc., where he also attempts to prove that the *author of the very first book was Moses*.

H. GROTIUS: "Add to this the indisputable antiquity of Moses' writings, which no other writing can rival; and an argument for this is that the Greeks, from whom all learning that spread to other peoples flowed, admit that they received their letters from elsewhere, which among them have neither a different order, nor a different name, nor even a different form from the Syriac or Hebrew letters; as also the most ancient Athenian laws, from which the Roman laws were later derived, trace their origin to the laws of Moses." (*De Veritate Religionis Christianae*, Ed. Koecheri, L. I, § 15, p. 26 ff.)

§ 25.

A *second* argument can be drawn from the very men who committed the Holy Scripture, with a *knowledge* of the things to be handed down, [(a)] and a sincere *pursuit of the truth*, without any partiality or passion [(b)] of the heart; from which it is not difficult to recognize that they are worthy of faith. [(c)]

a) For they *partly* relate *histories* of things that happened in their own time, and of which they themselves were eyewitnesses, *or* even of earlier times; and they show by the work itself that they were well-informed about all that they relate. *Partly*, they present doctrines knowable from the light of nature in such a way that you marvel at their knowledge, by which they surpass others; finally, they expound on matters that exceed the grasp of reason, and not by a little; indeed, if you consider that most of them were illiterate and unversed in the arts and sciences, you will all the more perceive and esteem this knowledge as a gift bestowed from on high. Cf. *Mus.* 1. c. § 12. p. 383 sqq., *H. Grotius de V. R. Chr.* L. XIII. § 5. p. m. 208.

b) Indeed, it is so far from the case that either *fear* of danger or the *hope* of gain or private advantage could be said to have moved them either to *write,* or to *conceal* certain things while writing, or to present them *differently* than the facts themselves required, that, on the contrary, the writings themselves testify that they *neither* flattered others nor sought to curry favor, *nor* to conceal their own faults, *nor* to shun hatreds, persecutions, and the gravest dangers to the detriment of the truth. See *Mus.* 1. c. p. 387. sqq. and what is brought from b. *Aeg. Hunnii, Tract. de majestate Scripturae* arg. 10. Add *H. Grot.* l. c. § 6. p. m. 210.

c) For just as all *falsehood* stems from either *ignorance* or bad *will*, so *knowledge and a love of truth* make a writer *worthy of credence* (*ἀξιόχιστον*).

§ 26.

A third argument is added, drawn from *miracles,* [(a)] by which the sacred writers of the Old Testament show both their *mission* [(b)] *and* the divine [(c)] origin of the *doctrines* they propose.

a) By this name are understood works or effects produced contrary to the order of all created nature, which can only be produced by divine power.

b) Concerning the miracles of *Moses,* which, having been performed before the people, were recorded in memory with many, remarkable, and most clear testimonies, and were truly divine and entirely free from Satan's deceptions, see *Aegidius Hunnius,* loc. cit., argument 13, T. I. Opp. fol. 21, 22, 23. A similar account is given of the miracles performed by the *prophets, Christ* himself, and the *apostles*, or those divinely wrought which demonstrate their mission and doctrine to have proceeded from God, of which the sacred text itself provides a great number. See the same author, argument 14, and compare *Mus.* l. c. § 13. p. 391 sqq. That, however, the miracles of *Peter* and the others at the beginning of the New Testament became known even to the Gentiles, is taught by *H. Grotius de V. R. Chr*. 1. c. § 7. p. 212. 213.

c) Namely, God by working miraculously *does not* assist *deceivers* in misleading the minds of men, i.e., in persuading them that these deceivers are divinely sent to teach and therefore to be heard, but rather assists *those* whom He Himself has truly sent as those who will set forth *true and salutary* things.

§ 27.

Fourthly, by the spread of the church diffused throughout the world [(a)] already from the time of the apostles, there has been a consistent and plainly unanimous testimony [(b)] to the divine origin of the Scriptures.

a) That assembly, I say, of that one which acknowledges the *divine inspiration* of Scripture, at the same time constitutes the flower of the human race and in which the liberal arts and sciences and honorable morals flourish more than anywhere else.

b) For it is not credible that so countless a multitude of men, dispersed throughout the whole world and preeminent above others, could have conspired or been able to conspire in such a lie, so that these books, however repugnant to the fleshly sense and human *self-love*, so highly they would have prized them and with one voice testified that they were written by divine inspiration, if, in fact, each of their respective authors had composed them by his own human study and judgment. Cf. *J. Schroeder*, *De Principio Theologiae*, Cap. I, n. 12 and 14; and *Mus.* 1. c. § 4, p. 423 ff.

§ 28.

Specifically, *fifth*, the countless *martyrs* [(a)] *of* both *sexes* and *of* various *ages* and *nations* are to be noted, distinguished by their *innocence* and *holiness*, who, by bearing witness to the truth of that doctrine and its divine origin—even amid the gravest *torments* and sealing it with their own blood and *death—demonstrated a steadfastness and strength* more than human. [(b)]

a) For these, though part of the Church, nevertheless bore a special testimony to the Christian doctrine, not only a *verbal one*, but above all a *real one,* provided by the *special* occasion of the persecutions. *Mus.* l. c. § 5. p. 444. 445.

b) For who would believe that these men, so numerous and so diverse, endowed with reason and devoted to virtue, having neglected and as it were trampled underfoot all earthly things, honor, wealth, family, life itself, not only singly, but in masses and through a voluntary endurance of the most bitter evils, from which they could easily have withdrawn, would have so fought for the divine origin of that doctrine, unless they had been inwardly convinced of its truth by the very power of God, and sustained and confirmed in those sufferings? *Mus.* 1. c. p. 445. sq. Conf. *Schroeder*l. c. n. 11., *Grotius* lib. II. *de V. R. Chr*. § 22. p. m. 196. sqq.

§ 29.

Add to this, *sixthly, the* very *happy and sudden propagation* of Christian doctrine throughout the whole world [(a)] and, *seventh, its* wonderful *preservation* [(b)] amid so many persecutions.

a) Especially if you consider those *obstacles*, *both* on the part of *those to be converted,* who were then already entangled by other sacred and secular affairs, *and* on the part of *the doctrine itself,* which surpasses the grasp of reason and demands or foretells such difficult things, *and* on the part of the men *who proposed* that doctrine, who excelled neither in eloquence nor in human wisdom, and rather in a world of despisers, and finally from *adversaries* more powerful and more cunning: all of which seemed to be hindering the propagation of that doctrine. Hence it is easy to recognize the divine power which, being superior to all those obstacles, has taken possession of the hearts of men and made them certain of the divine origin of that doctrine. Cf. *Mus.* 1. c. § 6. p. 448. 449., *Hunnius,* loc. cit., argument 15, p. 33 ff.

> AUGUSTINE: "Whoever still inquires for miracles in order to believe is himself a great miracle, since, with the whole world believing, he does not believe." (*De Civ. Dei* 1.22.8.)

b) The same reasoning applies to the doctrine of preservation as to that of propagation, and the divine power and efficacy must be acknowledged, *both* in producing and strengthening faith in the hearts of men, *and* also in restraining and repelling the insults of so many and such great enemies without human force. Cf. *Mus.* l. c. § 7. p. 449 sqq., and *Hunnius*, arg. 16.

§ 30.

Nor are to be neglected, *eighthly,* the *testimonies* of the remaining *peoples* of the earth who, although strangers to those sacred things, have nevertheless borne witness — even if unwittingly — both to the deeds of the people of God [(a)] and to the doctrine [(b)] itself.

a) See what *Hunmus*, loc. cit. argument 6, p. 39 ff., reviews at greater length concerning the *Gentiles*, and what *Schroeder*, loc. cit. no. 15, presents in summary. The same may be said of the *Jews*, who, acknowledging the deeds of Christ, which were truly miraculous,

(although they, in blasphemous daring, attribute them to magic), and of the *Mohammedans*, who celebrate Christ as a prophet sent by God and renowned for miracles.

b) For this pertains to the fact that *pagan* religion collapsed of its own accord as soon as human aid was lacking, and that certain doctrines of the Christian religion are read as having been proven to the very wise among the Gentiles; those things, however, which are found more difficult there, are nevertheless superior to the things which pagans have as their own, and which are no less difficult to believe, indeed, for the most part, absurd, and which they themselves imitate through a certain kind of misguided zeal the sacred rites of the more ancient and truer religion. See *Grotius*, Book IV, nos. 10 and 12. p. 282, 286, *Hoornbeek, De Conversione Indorum et Gentilium*. The *Jews*, however, can be convinced not only from the Old Testament Scriptures, which they retain, but also from their own traditions, that the Messiah has come and that he is Jesus of Nazareth, in whom therefore one must believe and that salvation is to be obtained by his merit alone. See *Grotius*, Book III *De Veritate Religionis Christianae*, intact; *Mornay*, *De V. R. Chr*, Chapters XXIX, XXX, and XXXI, *Hoornbeck, Lib. de convertendis Judaeis*. *As for the Muhammedan religion, it is a mixture of various religions, which is self-contradictory and, when compared with Christianity, is forced to submit*. See *Grotius*, Book VI, entire.

> KORAN: "Remember how you, when I was speaking with Moses for forty nights, worshiped the calf, which we later forgave you, so that you might be grateful. Also, we gave Moses the Scripture and the revelation as your guidance. ... The believers, whether Jews, Christians, or Sabians (John-Christians), if they believe in God, the Last Day, and do right, then a reward will one day be theirs from their Lord, and neither fear nor sorrow will come upon them. . . We revealed the Scripture to Moses, and other messengers followed him; We gave Jesus, the son of Mary, clear proofs and supported him with the Holy Spirit... They say, We will not believe until we see God with our own eyes.' Thus did others say before them; for those who wished to believe, we have already given sufficient proofs." (Sura 2: The Cow.) — "The Jews devised a plot, but God outwitted them. God said: I will cause you, Jesus, to die and raise you to Me and purify you from those who disbelieve. . . Jesus is to God like Adam, whom He created from dust and said, 'Be,' and he was. This truth comes from God; therefore, do not be a doubter. . . It is not for a man that God should give him Scripture, wisdom, and prophecy, and then tell people: 'Worship me and not God.' . . . Whoever takes a religion other than Islam, God will not accept it, and he will be among the lost in the Hereafter. . . O you who believe, do not be like the unbelievers, who say of their brothers, when they are traveling in the land or going to war: 'If they had stayed with us, they would not have died or been killed.' God ordained it so, to grieve their hearts.' (Sura 3, ch.: The Family of Imran.) — "Because they did not believe (in Jesus) and uttered great blasphemies against Mary, we cursed them. They also said: We have killed the Messiah, Jesus, the son of Mary, the messenger of God. But they did not kill him and did not crucify him, but another who was like him. . . God raised him up to Himself; for God is almighty and all-wise. But before their death all the People of the Book will believe in him, but on the Day of Resurrection he will be a witness against them. . . Truly, We

have revealed to you, as We revealed to Noah and the prophets after him, and as We revealed to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, and Jacob, and the Tribes, Jesus, Job, Jonah, Aaron, and Solomon. We also inspired David with the Psalms. . . Truly, the Messiah Jesus, the son of Mary, is a messenger of God, and his word which He conveyed to Mary, and His spirit. Therefore, believe in God and His messenger, but do not speak of a Trinity. Avoid that, and it will be better for you. There is only one God. Far is He from having a son. . . Christ is not proud to the point of not wanting to be a servant of God." (Sura 4: The Women.) — "Indeed, they are disbelievers who say: 'God is the Messiah, the son of Mary.' Say to them: 'Who could prevent God, if He were to destroy the Messiah, the son of Mary, along with his mother and all the inhabitants of the earth?'. . . We caused Jesus, the son of Mary, to follow in the footsteps of the prophets, confirming the Torah that was in their hands, and we gave him the Gospel, containing guidance and light, and a confirmation of the Torah that was already in their hands, as a guidance and a reminder for the God-fearing. Let the people of the Gospel judge by what God has revealed in it; but whoever does not judge by what God has revealed in it, such are the wrongdoers. We have now also revealed to you the Book (the Qur'an) in truth, confirming the earlier Scriptures which are in their hands, and as a guardian over them. Judge then by what God has revealed, and do not follow their desires, deviating from the truth that has come to you. To every people We gave a religion and an open way (religious practice). . . O Jesus, son of Mary, remember My favor to you and your mother, when I strengthened you with the Holy Spirit, so that you could speak to people in the cradle and also when you were grown. . . You formed the shape of a bird from clay by My permission; you breathed into it, and by My permission it became a real bird; by My permission you healed the blind and the leper, and by My permission you brought the dead out of their graves." (Sura 5.) — "They do not esteem God as they ought, because they say: God has never revealed anything to mankind. Say: Who then revealed the Book which Moses brought as a light and guidance to mankind, which you wrote on parchment, of which you acknowledge some publicly, but conceal the greater part, and by which you learned what you and your fathers did not know? . . . The Creator of the heavens and the earth, how could he have a son, when he has no wife? . . . Whomever God wills to guide, He opens his breast to Islam; but whomever He wills to lead astray, He will make his breast narrow, as if he were climbing up to the heavens." (Sura 6.) — (*The Koran. Literally translated from the Arabic, etc. by Dr. L. Ullmann*. Crefeld 1840.)

§ 31.

Finally, the manifest and admirable examples *of* divine *vengeance* [(a)] against the *persecutors and violators* of this doctrine *also* deserve to be cited. [(b)]

a) Concerning these, see *Hunnius*, argument 21; *Schroeder*, number 13.

b) For these things show that God wills Scripture itself to be acknowledged and honored as if it were proceeding from Himself, since He so severely deals with those who act otherwise.

§32.

The *divine* faith, by which the sacred Scriptures, in their *formal* part (that is, their meaning or doctrine), are recognized as having a divine origin, [(a)] is produced for all times [(b)] by the *doctrine* of Scripture *itself*, insofar as, when read with attention or set forth by the teacher's voice, explained and perceived by hearing, it is, *in itself*, *immediately,* [(c)] but *by the divine power* [(d)], which it always and inseparably has joined to itself, [(e)] and so, God concurring and exerting this power, it indeed illuminates the human *intellect*, or, by stirring holy and object-appropriate thought, inclines it to assent; [(f)] it allures and moves its *will*, [(g)] that it may command the intellect to give its assent to itself (to the doctrine contained in the Scriptures) as if proceeding from God; and thus determine the intellect itself to *assent* on the ground of divine revelation. [(h)]

a) For indeed, for the assent of divine faith to be given to revealed doctrines, it is required that the revelation of those doctrines itself be believed by divine faith. See *Mus., Introd*. P. II. cap. VI. § 2. p. 463. sqq.

b) Indeed, the concepts, once produced in the understanding of the sacred scriptures by the act of revelation, still exist today, contained in the words of Scripture, and through the words of Scripture, whether by the voice of teachers or by the reading of the Scriptures, transmitted to our understanding, they are similarly produced in us today, moving the intellect to a supernatural assent of its dependence on God. See *Mus.* l. c. § 12. p. 468. sqq.

c) Or so that the ultimate reason for assenting to divine faith is the divine revelation itself, comprehended in the Scriptures, in which the assent rests, and is not resolved into any other distinct revelation or any further reason for assent. *Mus.* l. c. § 2. p. 466.

d) For divine revelation, or sacred Scripture, by itself and *without supernatural divine concurrence*, is *not* a *complete* and sufficient reason for the intellect to assent to its own supernatural dependence on God. For *words*, as such, and without any supernatural concurrence of God, cannot move the intellect further than to a simple apprehension of the things they signify; and *things*, represented to the intellect by the words of revelation, are in themselves inconclusive, even when they are apprehended; and although they possess a remarkable goodness, by which they might seem to draw the will into assent and to move the intellect to command assent: because, however, the will, in its order to spiritual things, is by nature inept and as it were dead, therefore the will, in the absence of God's supernatural concurrence, is not moved to command the intellect to assent. *Mus.* l. c. § 5. p. 481. 482..

> REUSCH: "Fecht ... calls *the will's command over the intellect an 'ironwood' (σιδηρόξυλον)* invented by the Scholastics. In general, from these it is clear that other theologians hold that it is contrary to the nature of the soul for the will to command the

assent of the intellect, for they think that experience teaches that assent depends on the clarity of knowledge, which the soul obtains through its cognitive faculty, by the force of the characters in the objects perceived and the reasons deduced from them. But since the Musaeus was not so inexperienced in psychology as to have pronounced against its principles, when it can be reasoned from them, the meaning of Musaeus's words will undoubtedly be different from that which is ascribed to him by Fecht and others." (*Annotatt*. etc. p. 89.) Cf. *Apol. A. C.* art. 4. p. 139 [*Triglotta* p205, AP 3, 180].

MUSAEUS: "It is known that the logicians divide the operations of the mind, or the effects of the intellect, into the *apprehension of simple things*, into the composition and division of simple things, or *judgment*, and into *discourse.* They call the *apprehension of simple things* when the mind conceives a simple term, e.g., wood, stone, and affirms or denies nothing about it; to which is also added the case when the mind conceives and grasps an entire proposition, but without judgment, so that it neither affirms nor denies it, which act of knowing we call simple apprehension, also in opposition to judgment. They call the composition and division of simple terms, or *judgment*, when the intellect combines the apprehended simple terms through the copula 'is' and makes an affirmative or negative proposition from them, so that it holds the same to be true or false. They call *Discourse* when the intellect infers something different from the recognized and assumed principles. . . What we call with the scholastic term (also known to novices in logic), 'apprehension of simple matters of faith'—this is what theologians customarily call the knowledge of the literal sense of the doctrine of faith and life." (*Der Jenaischen Theologen ausführliche Erklärung*, pp. 344, 350.)

e) For although the *authority* of Scripture and its *efficacy* must not be confused, it is nevertheless certain that they are connected insofar as the concurrence of God, or His power, by which Scripture is efficacious, is required in the order of knowing Scripture's dependence on God through the assent of faith. *Mus.* l. c. p. 490. We will see more about this connection of divine power with the divine word below, where we will treat of the efficacy of Scripture.

f) For otherwise, the human intellect, left to itself, when it fixes its thoughts on sacred doctrine, presented to it in writing or by word of mouth and known by the simple apprehension of the force of the words, and, applying judgment, inquires into its truth or falsity (whether of human or divine origin); is rather inept, like a blind man, to judge rightly, indeed rather inclined to deny what is affirmed, and to affirm what is denied there: according to *1 Cor. 2:14.* Therefore, in order to be inclined to a more correct judgment and to give assent, he needs the concurrence of divine power. Cf. *Mus.* 1. c. § 8. p. 492. sqq. 509–510.

g) For, since spiritual objects are invisible to us, it is therefore necessary, in order to overcome the perverse judgments that usually arise on the part of the intellect, to provide an actual and supernatural assent to sacred doctrine, so that the will (which otherwise follows the condition of the intellect, being by nature corrupt and dead to spiritual things, or alienated from them, *Eph. 2:1. Col 2, 13.*), divinely excited, is drawn into assent and, by its command, the intellect (notwithstanding the various doubts that arise) is determined to assent. Conf. *Mus.* l. c. § 9. p. 516. sqq.

h) However, what we have said is proven, 1) from 1 *Thess. 2:13,* where Paul, joyful in spirit and *giving thanks to God*, mentions that his hearers *received the λόγον ἀκοῆς, the word,* which he had preached in person *and which they had heard, not as the word of men, but, as it truly is, as the Word of God*; and thus acknowledged that this teaching was from God. He adds, however, that this was because *God, working effectively in those who believe (ενεργουμενος),* or because, by supernaturally cooperating with the word, He testified that it was His Word, and moved their minds to believe it by divine faith, as if it were the word of God. 2) from *1 Cor. 2:4-5,* where Paul says: *For my message and my preaching were not with persuasive words of human wisdom, but in a demonstration of the Spirit and of power*, *so that your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God.* For this is nothing other than that the doctrine delivered by Paul, while it did not move to assent through arguments drawn from human wisdom, nevertheless moved through the power of God and the Holy Spirit united to it and had the force of the most solid demonstration, so that, although it was full of unseen mysteries, according to *verse 7,* yet made known its own dependence on the Holy Spirit, to be believed by divine faith, and effectively moved their minds to the assent of faith. Conf. *Mus.* l. c. § 4. p. 475–476. How, however, the Holy Spirit, through the word, which is understood in part, works a certain spiritual light, and at the same time, on the part of the will, provides some impulse and holy movements, is shown by the example of the converted: the *Eunuch, Acts 8:36-37, Lydia,* (Acts 16:14), and *the hearers of Peter,* (Acts 2:37), shows that *Musaeus*, loc. cit. § 9, pp. 522–523, demonstrates this. However, it should also be noted here that the *very arguments by which the hearers were once persuaded to believe* the *apostolic* preaching *are the same arguments by which we are persuaded today to believe their writings; for they wrote the very same things that they taught,* says *Gerh.* T. I. LL. *de Script. S.* § 31. For the *Word of God, preached by the apostles from divine inspiration, and the Scriptures, composed from divine inspiration, do not differ except accidentally, insofar as the former consists of words spoken aloud, while the latter consists of words committed to writing. In relation to the understanding of a believing person, however, the motivating force of both for assent is one and the same. Mus.* l. c. p. 476.

§ 33.

And this indeed is the *one* argument [(a)] by which divine faith concerning the divine origin of the doctrine contained in the Scriptures is implanted in individual men; although the use of arguments that generate human faith perhaps did not [(b)] intervene. But nevertheless, it must be admitted that, in order to convert others, these arguments must be presented first, [(c)] and indeed, in the case of temptation, they are not inaptly applied to the faithful themselves to remove certain difficulties, [(d)] indeed, according to the state of their condition, they are in a manner necessary.

a) *The rest of the arguments, indeed, serve to move and persuade, and to convince an adversary, but not to persuade in the full sense, so as to kindle, or foster, or sustain the assurance (plerophoria) of the flame of faith, by which, as by a heavenly ray, all the mists of the disputing mind are dissipated. This full assurance is the benefit of the Holy Spirit, who, as Augustine says, has a chair in heaven and teaches hearts from within*; the words are from Schroeder, loc. cit., no. 16, where he treats of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. Cf. Hülsemann, *Praef., in Form. Conc*. Art. I. C. II. § 6. p. 217. 218. and those he orders to be consulted besides Schroeder, Hunnius, *Comment. on 1 Cor. 2:1*, and Meisner in his writings on the papal bull for the crime of calumny, Th. 25–26. Hence it is also clear how the argument from the efficacy of Scripture, according to the different meaning of the word, is now to be referred to the class of those things which produce only human faith, and now returns to this one very argument which produces divine faith. Namely, insofar as we conclude from the external and sensible acts of other men, e.g., the confession of the doctrine of the faith, a holier life, and martyrdom itself, that they proceed from the very efficacy of Scripture, or that the doctrine which Scripture embraces has efficacy in stirring, moving, kindling, and soothing souls: so, according to Schroeder, l. c. and no. 9, this argument does not establish divine faith, namely, before the intrinsic testimony of the Holy Spirit comes, forming in the mind of each believer this minor premise and conclusion: This word contained in these books is such that it concludes: Therefore, it is divine; these are the words of Huelsemann, 1. c. Cf. Cundis., Note on Comp. Hutt. L. I. Q. IV. pp. 22-23. When, however, the efficacy of Scripture is considered insofar as it exerts itself inwardly in the hearts of individuals through the spiritual acts of illumination, conversion, etc., it is nothing other than that very testimony of the Holy Spirit, which He, through His concurrence with that doctrine, utters concerning the divine origin of this doctrine in the hearts of these men and works assent. And thus we have said that the efficacy of Scripture concurs in the knowledge of the Scripture's dependence on God, which is required for the authority of Scripture, to § 32, note d. Cf. *Mus*. *Tr. de Syncr. et Scr*. *S*. Q. I. L. *de Scr. S*. § 8. p. 185 and 196 ff. Likewise *Ausführl. Erklärung* L. I. Q. V. p. 41, 42.

QUENSTEDT: "1 John 5:6: 'It is the Spirit who testifies, because the Spirit is truth.' . . The word 'Spirit' placed in the subject is properly taken for the third person of the Trinity, is beyond doubt; for immediately in v. 7, with the same attribution of *testimony*, it is called the Holy Spirit (*τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα*). In the predicate, however, by 'through the Spirit' we understand metonymically the word of the Holy Spirit, the Gospel concerning Christ, which is the peculiar work (*ἔργον*) and instrument (*ὄργανον*) of the Holy Spirit, from which the ministry of the Spirit is also called (2 Cor. 3:6). This very gospel, therefore, receives its attestation of truth from the testimony of the Holy Spirit, which He bears within our hearts. This *testimony* is (in the words of Dr. Dorschei), ‘proceeding from the Holy Spirit through Scripture, from Scripture, and in Scripture, by impressing His divine senses and thus insinuating Himself to each individual and bearing witness to them of the majesty of the divine Scriptures, is *by no means* a *private*, but is the very public and solemn testimony of divinity, the ordinary principle of testimony, in the Church, one and the same Spirit.' The Spirit testifies, however, that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is truth, i.e., the very truest, when He works inwardly in the hearts of men through the doctrine revealed by Himself and contained in the Scriptures, striking, drawing, and moving them,

so that they believe it to be from God, or truly divine. Hence, in verse 10, John adds: 'He who believes in the Son of God has the testimony in himself.' Cf. 1 Cor. 2:11-12. John 7:16-17." (*Theol. did.-pol*. P. I. c. 4. s. 2. q. 9. f. 145.)

Andreas Knoes: "He experiences this *efficacy*, whoever reads or hears Scripture without stubborn opposition and with a mind eager for the truth, which 'condition of the legitimate subject' Christ describes in John 7:17, is to be noted properly. . . The most effective motions are stirred in the heart, and indeed with an awareness of their origin, so that a person is conscious that he is moved in this or that way because of this or that divine truth recognized in his conscience. These movements are diverse according to the diversity of subjects, affections, and other circumstances; sometimes they take their origin from pain, as the *corrections* of the Holy Scriptures demonstrate their power, sometimes from joy, admiration, etc. These movements have a character of divinity so evident that for a time objections are almost silenced, and nothing in the mind dares to make a noise, and a certain reverence for divine truth is produced in the mind. . . Just as God has impressed the traces of His attributes on His other works, from the sun to the most despised worm and blade of grass, by which they are recognized as divine and distinguished from human ones without learned demonstration, through the mere sense of the greater perfection they possess: so it cannot seem absurd to sound reason that we should establish that God willed it, that the book which contains His special revelation should be discerned from human writings in the same way. . . There is a very great difference between this testimony, which the regenerate experience in the state of grace, and that informative one of which we are here speaking, which also applies to the ungodly, insofar as, through prevenient grace, it from time to time manifests itself in them and convinces them of the truth of the word. . . Just as one who looks at the sun concludes from the very sensation of light falling on and affecting his eyes that it is luminous, so from the sensation of divinity latent in the Holy Scriptures, its divinity is undoubtedly known; and therefore he who proves the divinity of Scripture from its very divinity, i.e., from the sense of divinity*, is* equally *not begging the question*, as he is not who proves water to be moist from the very sense of moisture, as Fecht well teaches in his *Comp. theol*. p. 34. sq. . . That objection, which is urged not only by the very learned Michaelis but also by the unlearned multitude, is of no weight at all, namely: "I have often read the Bible, and I have not experienced this efficacy of Scripture; therefore, it has none." For since the efficacy of the Holy Scripture is ordered and resistible, as is evident from what has been said, one wrongly concludes from a lack of personal experience that this most noble power of the Holy Scripture is absent. This conclusion from a lack of experience is just as valid as if, in physics, the falsity of a proposition could be claimed to have been proven by an experiment that failed, before it has been shown that the experiment was conducted exactly according to the rules. For we have long since warned that the legitimate condition of the subject is described by Christ in John 7:17." (*Institutt. th. practicae*. Holmiae 1768. 4. p. 66—71.)

Quenstedt: *"Distinguish* between a *circle* and *an* apodictic or demonstrative *regress*. A *circle* properly is when the proof returns in a circle and we proceed from the unknown to the equally unknown, or when the resolution is not made to the more known and certain, but to the equally unknown. *A demonstrative regress is when we proceed from a confused cognition to a distinct one.* When we prove the authority and divinity of the Holy Scriptures from the intrinsic testimony of the Holy Spirit, and from the Holy Scriptures we prove the testimony of the Holy Spirit, we do not commit a circle, but it is a demonstrative regress. For they differ like cause and effect; for the Holy Spirit primarily works and effects such a proof and sealing through the Word of God, word by word, in the hearts of the faithful, and this sealing in turn testifies about the Holy Spirit, as an effect about its cause. Pesantius in Tom. II. fol. 467 writes: "a circle is committed only when the proof of the same thing by the same thing according to the same thing is made," which does not happen in our present proof. The papists therefore wrongly charge us,

. . as if we were committing a circle here, while we prove the Holy Scripture from the testimony of the Holy Spirit, and the testimony of the Holy Spirit from the Holy Scripture. For by this reasoning there would also be a circle when Moses and the prophets prove Christ, and Christ proves Moses and the prophets, or even when John the Baptist testifies that Christ is the Messiah, and again Christ testifies that John the Baptist is a prophet, John 1, Luke 7." (L. c. f. 146.)

b) See the example of *Christian Gerson,* a convert from Judaism, in *Musaeus, Tr. de Syncr. et Scr. S.* Q. II. L. de Scr. § 24. p. 244.

MUSAEUS: "Therefore, the testimony of the Church is not necessarily required for the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit concerning the divine truth of the Scriptures to be able to manifest itself in the hearts of men. The same is proven by the many examples of converts. Among other things, the illustrious example of Christian *Gerson*, a converted Jew, bears witness to this. In the history of his conversion, he relates that he often wondered what this error could be that was so effective as to hold so many myriads of people in the superstition of the Christians, and that it once happened that the books of the New Testament were given him in pledge by a woman in his native language, which he, taking the opportunity, read, not that he himself acknowledged any authority in the Christian church or thought there was anything true in them, but only so that he might learn what the errors of the Christians were. However, while reading, he says, his mind was struck, so that he began to recognize in some measure the divinity and majesty of the books, and, excited by a desire to learn, he read them again and compared them with the Scriptures of the Old Testament. Then a light so great was kindled in his mind that he acknowledged with full faith the authority and divinity of the books and professed the Christian faith. Here indeed he brought forth that internal testimony of the Holy Spirit in the reader's heart through the Scriptures read in the vernacular, without any preceding testimony of the church, which indeed would have been *recognized by him himself*." (*QQ. theolog. de Syncretismo et S. S.* 1679. p. 244.)

Melchior Adam: *"Francis Junius* († 1602), sent to Lyon as a youth, while reading the books of Cicero *On the Laws*, was approached by a certain man who confirmed with many arguments those words of Epicurus: 'That God cares for nothing, neither his own nor another's.' This poison was so confirmed in him by the authority of the man and the cleverness of his arguments that his mind, clinging to this evil, became hardened. But God wonderfully snatched him from that immense abyss of perdition, after he had lain more than a year in the most dissolute pleasures. From his father, who had learned that his son was imbued with such a poison of *atheism*, he was recalled home and invited to read the New Testament, and he cast off that most pestilent opinion. But it is best to hear him confessing about himself: ‚I open the divinely offered New Testament," he says, "and it presents to me, at the very first, that most august head of John the evangelist and apostle: *In the beginning was the Word.* I read a part of the chapter, and am so moved in reading it, that I suddenly perceived the divinity of the subject and the majesty and authority of the writing, far surpassing all the rivers of human eloquence. My body trembled, my mind was amazed, and it affected me all that day, so that I seemed uncertain to myself of who I was. You have remembered me, O Lord my God, for Your immense mercy, and have received a lost sheep into Your flock.' This is from Junius. From that time on, therefore, he began to treat all other things coldly, but with fervor those things which pertain to piety." (*Vitae Germanorum theologorum*. etc. Francof, 1653. II, 194. f.)

c) See what we have said in the note to § 17, and cf. *Gerh.* L. I. de Scr. S. § 22., where he advises that those who deny the authority of Scripture should not *be ordered* to *wait* until *the Holy Spirit testifies immediately in their own hearts concerning the authority of Scripture;* but that they should be led to

arguments, both external and internal. Add. *Hunnius,* Tr. de Maj. Scr. at the beginning. Compare this work, § 17, note.

d) For indeed, *if* the faithful *begin to doubt the authority of Scripture in temptations, they are to be treated in the same way as those who deny it. For doubt is close to denial,* the words of *Gerh.* l. c. § 20.

§ 34.

The *canonical* [(a)], or normative, authority of Holy Scripture — which it possesses, on the one hand, not only with respect to meaning but also with respect to the very *words* [(b)] of the divinely inspired text, or the original text, in relation to versions [(c)] likewise committed to writing by human effort, and to other writings and doctrines [(d)] to be judged — as it is regarded *in itself* and absolutely [(e)], is grounded in the truthfulness of God as inspirer, and in the dependence of Scripture, with respect to the words of the original text, upon God. So also in relation to us — that is, in order that by divine faith [(f)] we may believe that the books of Scripture, under the idiom in which they are presented to us (i.e., the choice, sequence, and context of words in a certain language) are divinely inspired, and thus possess that normative force, or canonical dignity — the *testimony of the Church alone* does *not* suffice [(g)]; rather, the *internal testimony of the Holy Spirit*, or His operation, efficacious through Scripture itself, must also here concur. [(h)]

a) See above on this, § 15. The word *χανόνος,* however*,* meaning *a norm* or *rule*—which is properly mathematical—is then transferred to *civil laws, military orders* and *ranks,* as well as to the *scales* used by merchants (see *Chemnitz, Exam. C. Tr*. P. I, S. de Libb. Can. p. m. 81–82., *Cundis., ad Compend. Hutt*. L. I. Q. III. p. 15. 16.), occurs, according to a similar analogy, in the Scriptures themselves to designate a certain rule of Christian faith and actions, so that those which agree with it are accepted, while those which disagree are rejected. For thus in *2 Cor. 10:13*, Paul says that he does not glory, except *κατὰ τὸ μέτρον τῆς ῥάβδος, according to the measure of the rule;* and *Gal. 6:16*, he prays for and promises *peace and mercy* to all *who will walk by this rule*, as if in military order. The same phrase also occurs in *Phil. 3:16.*

b) For indeed the doctrine of Scripture moves to assent to itself, as divine, by the concurrence of God, in whatever language it is proposed, and with whatever words, provided that the doctrine itself, as it has been revealed, is sincerely presented. However, that the doctrine of faith and morals, which is proposed here or there as divine, may be referred to the genuine norm, and that its either *orthodoxy* or truth, or *heterodoxy,* or falsity, may be accurately known, one must have recourse to the Scripture, which is infallible in its words, and therefore to the Scripture in that very idiom in which the words themselves were employed

by divine inspiration, without the interposition of human and fallible judgment. Conf. *Mus.* l. c. p. 540.

c) For some of those versions are indeed subject to errors; and, even if those that most closely agree with the authentic text are found, they nevertheless depend on the original text for their certainty and truth; and thus they have no authority until their agreement with the authentic text has been investigated and established. *Mus.* l. c.

d) Hence, when our *symbolic books* are sometimes called the name of a *norm* or of *normative books*, what is understood is nevertheless not a norm in the *absolute* sense, but in a *qualified* sense, or a *secondary*, *derived* norm, that is, less properly so called. See *Himmel,* in *F. C. diss.* 1., *Grauer,* in A. C. P. I. p. 3 and Supplem. C. IV. p. 149.

> CARPZOV: "The book of symbols was *not* written *by divine inspiration* impulse, just as the biblical writers composed their canonical writings, *nor was it absolute, but out of necessity* and because of the insufficiency of the biblical canon, as Bellarmine states in Book 4, Chapter 4 of *De Verbo Dei*, in *ll. biblicis*, he desires in the biblical books, namely that catechesis is not found in them; but they were written for another reason, out of necessity, i.e., what in schools is called the *necessity of expediency*, so that, for example, the contentions of certain minds might be restrained, scandals among the weak prevented, and the craftiness and malice of heretics recognized. . . That which is composed *from* Scripture and *according to* it is not a principle, but *something principled.* Indeed, we must confess that the symbolic books, even in the preface (p. 34), fall under the name of *norm*, and that this name is attributed to the books of the symbols of our church. But principle and norm are not simply and equally taken as synonyms by the authors of this preface. *For even that which is principled can, by convention, be directed and judged, and thus merit the name of norm.* And in this way the term *norm* is taken in this place (in the preface of the Book of Concord. p. 21) and among the writers of the primitive church, e.g. when the ecumenical symbols and especially the Apostles' Creed (called so because it is *ἐξοχικῶς* and *ἐξαιρέτως* [*distinctive* and *preeminent* sense]) are called by the fathers *κανών της αλήθειας άκλινης,* 'a canon of truth that never wavers' (Iren. 1. 1. c. 1. § 19.), "the immovable rule of faith" and "irreformable" (Tertull.), "the norm of preaching established in common among all peoples" (Rufinus and Vernaunt, Honoré), ‚a certain rule of faith, by which believers may hold to catholic unity and convict the perversity of heretics' (Aug. serm. de temp. hom. 181.). And so also the term 'norma' in b. 1. signifies nothing other than a principle of knowledge, by which we are led to the knowledge of some conclusion or question that is being disputed. Such a principle is also that which depends on another and has been proven from elsewhere, as Aristotle shows in *Prior Analytics*, chapters 2 and 8. Therefore, a symbol is not *a norm* in an absolute and simple sense, but *in relation to certain churches* which presuppose its truth and certainty as proven from Scripture. . . Although it cannot be denied that by this designation or encomium, a reason for *a norm that was not only discriminative but also definitive* was attributed to the books of symbols; nevertheless, they did so with the greatest distinction and... held the symbolic books only as *secondary norms*, after the manner of those postulates which, while needing no proof themselves, are nevertheless proven elsewhere and are also admitted in certain discipline as undoubted." (*Isagoge in libros eccles. lutheranarum symbolicos*. p. 5. 6. 27. 28.)
>
> THE SAME: "The authors of the Book of Concord do not deny that Scripture alone is the unique norm, by and according to which all dogmas are to be examined and judged, indeed they profess it in so many words ..., nor do they deny, in their own way and sense, that these writings are also a norm. . . *They attribute more to them than a mere function of testifying.* . . When, however, 2. the book of symbols is called *a norm* and a form of doctrine, to and according to which, etc., then

this is understood only in a qualified sense, *on account of* some *analogy*, i.e., an external one, in that according to it also something is judged and evaluated, although it is not the principle by which it is judged and evaluated. And indeed, 3. in the question at hand, it is not so much about the truth of the doctrine as about its reception, force, and approval in a certain church; whether this dogma, e.g., the Flacian one on original sin, has ever been received and approved in the Lutheran church? whether the doctrine of Flacius agrees with the doctrine handed down and approved in the Lutheran church from the beginning of the Reformation? So that 4. the symbolic book is to be called a norm not of the faith itself, but of the profession of faith, 5. not of the whole faith, but only with respect to certain disputed articles, and indeed as 6. these have been handed down in certain churches. ... And so our own theologians did not detract from our doctrine by absolutely calling anything a norm, nor have they equated the symbolic book with it, but they attributed to their own symbolic book what the nature and reason of the book of symbols demands, and did not lean to either extreme here. Indeed, they did not merely wish to testify to the apprehension of doctrine and faith, and *how they publicly taught it, drawn from the Word of God, but also to set terms and limits on the desire to speak and profess in our churches, within which teachers ought above all to restrain themselves*, and 3. also *to provide and establish a standard by which the writings of others could be judged, not whether they are true or false (for this is to be judged by Scripture alone), but whether they agree with the doctrine received and handed down from the beginning in the Lutheran church,* so that 4. the purity of the doctrine once received would be protected from being disturbed by the spurious writings of others, and 5. the holy deposit of Luther's pure doctrine would be transmitted to posterity in this way. Cf. p. 638." (L. c. p. 1143–45.)

G. Walch: "The *primary* norm is that which by itself, that is, by its own and proper power, has the force of a norm; the *secondary, however*, is that which is not by itself, but by the authority of the sacred Scriptures and agreement with that power of a norm, is endowed with it and therefore depends on the primary. . . Others, to whom these distinctions still explained by us are displeasing, distinguish between the norm *of decision* and the norm *of discretion. That* is the principle which is *self-attesting* and plainly infallible, to whose judgment both sides of those who disagree must submit; but *this one*, or the norm of discretion, does not in fact decide the controversial question, yet it does distinguish orthodox from heterodox and show which are committed to a purer doctrine. . . Wernsdorf thinks that symbols can be called a norm *of knowledge*, in such a way that they are a kind of principle by which we come to know certain truths; but this seems to refer uniquely to Scripture, as the norm. . . If one considers these things, one will easily understand that the symbols are to be called a norm of knowledge, where knowledge is referred not to the truth itself and its foundation, but to profession. The symbols are a rule of knowledge insofar as from them it is understood which dogmas are proper to a certain church. Therefore, when you ask whether this or that dogma is *Lutheran,* you must learn this from the symbols, and then they are the rule for this knowledge. But when you ask whether a certain doctrine is *true* or false, that is certainly to be known not from the symbols as a rule, but from the Holy Scripture." (*Introd. in libb. eccl. Luth. symb*. p. 934–36.)

Hollaz: *"G. Mylius* in his *Explanation of the A. C.*, p. 2, says: 'Because the Augsburg Confession rests on the most firm foundation of the Holy Scriptures, we can and must rightfully call it *inspired* (*εόπνευστον*).' *Dr. Hutter* in his *Explic. lib. conc* p. 1. writes, we have constituted the author of the Book of Concord as the primary and *chief cause*, not a man, whether a theologian or a statesman, but God the Holy Spirit Himself, the source and giver of all good; so much so, that we do not hesitate to call it *θεόπνευστον,* divinely inspired. Reply . . The aforementioned theologians call the books of the symbols, in a broader sense, mediate *θεοπνεύστους* ... 1. by reason of the object ... 2. by reason of the mediated illumination." (*Exam. Proleg*. II. q. 27. p. 58.) *Schelwig* and *J. G. Neumann* likewise contend that the books of the symbols can be called *θεοπνεύστους*, with *Loescher* justly

dissenting (see *Unschuld. Nachrr*. 1707, p. 117. 1710, p. 414. 735.), *Carpzovio* (*Isag*. p. 3.), aliis.

LUTHER: "The Christian Church has no power to confirm articles of faith or good works, or the Gospel and Holy Scripture as a judge or sovereign; it has never done so, nor will it ever do so. The Christian Church, however, is itself confirmed by the Gospel and the Holy Scripture as by its judge and sovereign. The Christian Church confirms the Gospel and the Holy Scripture as a subject, shows and confesses them just as a servant shows the colors and coat of arms of his master. For it is certain that whoever does not have the power to promise and give the future and temporal life, he also has no power to establish articles of faith." (*Article on the Power of the Christian Church*. 1530. XIX, 1191.)

e) For thus we said in § 15, note *b*., that the authority of Scripture is a part of the thing itself, which is both the cause of the assent of faith and the norm of doctrine.

f) However, we confess that this can and must be believed by divine faith. Cf. *Mus., Introd*. loc. cit. p. 552.

g) Thus *Musaeus* expressly teaches in his *Introd*., Part II, Chapter VII, § 3, p. 533.

QUENSTEDT: "The *authority* of Scripture depends, neither by its own right, that is, by its intrinsic constitution, nor by our right, that is, with respect to knowledge and manifestation, solely or necessarily *on the testimony of the Church*." (L. c. s. 2. q. 8. f. 129.)

THE SAME: "The thesis is *proven*: 1. *from the saying of Christ* John 5:34: 'I do not accept testimony from a man.' . . . 2. *From the testimony of the Samaritans* in John 4:42, who said to the woman, 'It is no longer because of your words that we believe; for we have heard for ourselves and know that this is truly the Savior of the world, Christ.' . . 3. From *the nature and condition of the Holy Scriptures. ...* 4. *From the nature and condition of the Church. . .* 5. Finally, *from the inconvenience.* If the authority of the Church were the principal motive and means by which the Holy Spirit would prove its *authenticity*, it would follow: 1. that our faith would be first founded on human testimony and ultimately resolved into it; 2. either the universal church is meant, and its testimony is not given; or a particular church, and such is insufficient and uncertain; 3. or the authority of the church is the principal motive with respect to the *believers*, but they have already received the Scriptures; or with respect to *the unbeliever*, but they will no more admit the authority of the church than that of the Scriptures." (L. c. f. 132. sqq.)

CHEMNITZ: "Those writings, being divinely inspired, were then, when they were written, publicly proposed, delivered, and commended to the Church, so that it, with the utmost care and providence, would preserve them uncorrupted and, as it were, hand them down and commend them to posterity. And just as the old church in the time of Moses, Joshua, and the prophets, so also the primitive church in the time of the apostles could certainly testify as to which writings were divinely inspired. For it knew the authors whom God had commended to the church by special testimonies; it also knew which writings had been composed by them, and from what it had received by the Apostles' living tradition, it could judge that those writings were the very same doctrine which the apostles taught by living voice. Thus in John 21, the testimony of the apostle and the testimony of the church are joined: 'This is the disciple who wrote these things, and we know that his testimony is true.' Thus Paul marked his genuine epistles with a certain sign, 2 Thess. 3:17-18. *Scripture, therefore, has canonical authority primarily from the Holy Spirit,* by whose impulse and inspiration it was produced; *then from the writers*, to whom God Himself gave certain and peculiar

testimonies of truth; *and afterward from the primitive church, as from the witness in whose time those writings were published and approved.* This testimony of the primitive church concerning the divinely inspired writings was later handed down to posterity through a perpetual succession by hand and was diligently preserved in certain histories of antiquity, so that *the succeeding church was the keeper of the testimony of the primitive church concerning Scripture.* Therefore, there is *a* great *difference:* 1. between the testimony *of the primitive church*, which was in the time of the apostles; 2. between the testimony of the church that *immediately* followed *the time of the apostles*, which had received the testimony of the first church; 3. and between the testimony of the *present* church concerning Scripture. For the church, which is both now and was in the past, if it can produce the testimonies of those who had received and knew the testimony of the first church concerning the genuine writings, we believe it as *a witness proving* its statements. However, it does not have the authority to establish or decree anything about the sacred books, for which it cannot produce certain documents from the testimony of the primitive church." (*Exam. Conc. Trid*. Sess. 4. decr. 1. fol. 47.)

QUENSTEDT: "If we wish to speak accurately, it is one thing *to depend on the church*, and another *to be known* by *the benefit of the church* or through the church. . . *Distinguish* between the *ancient church* ... and the church of *today.* . . If we were to concede, at the utmost, that the church is a necessary means of knowing the authority of Scripture, we would not, however, understand *this to be the present church,* but rather *that one*. . . It is one thing for divine Scripture to be known by the testimony of the church, and another for it to be known by the testimony of the church *alone*. For experience testifies that the greatest number have been converted by the reading of the Holy Scriptures alone, without the proposition and authority of the Church. . . Dr. Dorscheus recites examples in Theol. Zachar. P. II. l. l. q. l. p. 48." (L. c. f. 130.)

THE SAME: "Well Aeg. Hunnius in the Colloquy of Regensburg in 1601, session 11. p. 247, says: ‚That the Epistle to the Romans is *Paul's,* we have *from the testimony of the primitive church*; but that it is sacred, *canonical*, and a rule of faith, this we have not from the testimony of the church, but *from internal criteria* and derive it from them.'" (L. c. f. 135.)

KROMAYER: "A distinction must be made between the phrases: to believe by the testimony of the Church, and to believe *because of* the testimony of the Church (i.e., by divine faith). We believe that this writing is inspired not because of the testimony, but through the testimony of the Church." (*Scrutin. rel*. p. 14.)

QUENSTEDT: "Dreier *objects*: Nowhere does a written document exist declaring that this or that book is canonical, or that these writings are divine and others are not, that these writings are complete and others are mutilated: therefore, the testimony of the church is needed for this, because one cannot believe without the word. *Ans.* . . Although that is not expressly stated in the text, it is nevertheless abundantly contained in Scripture in point of *fact* and *meaning*. . . For the Holy Scripture is nothing other than those very divine books, arranged in their proper order. Who, then, will deny that it is contained in Scripture which divine books they are? ... That the Scripture, however, is not corrupted or mutilated, is established by divine providence and by the express assertion of Christ in Matthew 5, even if the testimony of the church were not added." (L. c. f. 138.)

THE SAME: "To that of *Augustine* in the book *Contra Epistulam Fundamenti*, ch. 5.: *'I would not believe the Gospel, unless the authority of the Church moved me*.' For there Augustine 1. explains *not the cause* of his faith, since he is already a Catholic, but the occasion by which he came from Manichaeism to the love of the divine Scriptures. 2. That which Augustine says of the Church applies especially to *the primitive Church*, because the papal Church has departed from the consensus of the primitive one. 3. The Bishop of Hippo speaks *only of his own person,* or of himself as an individual, and does not prescribe a rule for all. However, we do not deny that someone can be led by the authority of the Church to believe the Scriptures; but that all must be led in this way was a point that needed to be proven. 4. He speaks of himself not as he was then, a Christian and a bishop,

but as he had been *when he was being led from Manichaeism* to *the orthodox religion;* that is, he says he would not have believed (he says 'I would have believed,' using an African phrase familiar to him, for 'I had believed') unless he had first been moved by the authority of the Church. . . Furthermore, there are various occasions for believing, namely: 1. the reputation of the church and the true religion, 2. the association of unbelievers with believers, 3. the authority of parents or others, 4. miracles, 5. the constancy of martyrs, 6. the integrity of the lives of those who profess Christianity, etc." (L. c. f. 137. sq.) Cf. *Luther's Report to a Good Friend Concerning Both Kinds*, 1528. XIX, 1660—1665.)

ANTITHESIS:

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis*: 1. *Of the Papists*; where, however, *the older* from *the more recent* are to be distinguished. *The former* more crudely and coarsely suspend the authority of the canonical Scriptures from the authority and testimony of the Church, and indeed of their own Roman Church, even by reason of its own constitution or canonization; so that the Scripture in itself is not authentic without the authority of the Church. Hence that rash and impious saying of Andradæ, in his *Defensorium pro Concilio Tridentino*, fol. 150: 'There is nothing divine in Scripture, except in so far as it has received it from the Church.' . . *The latter*, more mildly and cautiously, hold that the Scripture is indeed divine *in itself* and that its authority, as to the matter and in itself, depends on God; *yet* they contend that the Scripture does not obtain divine authority *in relation to us*, unless on account of the authority of the Church. . . *2. Of the innovators,* such as Dr. *Horneji*, , who in Disp. Theol. P. I. disp. 2. p. 2. *de canon. Script*, th. 77. sq. p. 116. and 119. says: 'The Word of God cannot be known without the testimony of the Church, nor can its true books be distinguished from false and spurious ones.'" (L. c. fol. 131. sq.)

a) For divine faith does not arise from any other source, whatever the reasons may be, for which the divinity of the Scriptures is believed, not only as probably true, but also as humanly infallible. Cf. B. *Huelss.* Praelect. ad F. C. Art. I. C. II. p. 118.

§ 35.

The Holy Spirit testifies concerning a certain idiom [(a)] of the books of Scripture, which must be acknowledged as *θεόπνευστον* ("God-inspired"), not excluding, but by adding [(b)] the testimony of the Church—not just any church, but [(c)] the primitive—so that the discourse of faith almost comes back to this [(d)]: *In whatever idiom the Holy Scripture was originally committed, in that same idiom was inspired by God Himself for writing, and thus also delivered by divine inspiration.* And indeed *the Holy Scripture of the Old Testament in that Hebrew which has been in use until now*, *and the Holy Scripture of the New Testament in that Greek which serves our use*, *was first committed in that language.* Therefore *the sacred Scripture of the Old Testament in that Hebrew which has been in use until now, and the sacred Scripture of the New Testament in that Greek which serves our use*, *was inspired by God Himself for writing*, *and thus was also delivered by divine inspiration in that language.* The major proposition, which is a part of the doctrine itself contained in the Scriptures, [(e)]

is without a doubt of divine faith, and by the power of the Holy Spirit, intimately connected to the whole of sacred doctrine, moves to the assent of divine faith. The minor proposition, which refers to some singular, sensible fact, distinct from the doctrine of the sacred Scripture itself, depends on the testimony of eyewitnesses and earwitnesses [(f)], as is otherwise customary in proving matters of fact and sensible things. *The conclusion*, however, does not cease to be *a matter of faith*, since from two premises, one revealed and the other metaphysically or morally evident, a revealed conclusion follows which is to be believed by divine faith. [(g)]

BRENZ: "We are not now speaking of that tradition by which the Holy Scriptures, and what they contain, are handed down to us from our forefathers. For we affirm *this* tradition to be certain, firm, and indubitable." (*Prolegom. Apolog. Wirtemberg. Francof.* 1556. f. 141.)

CHEMNITZ: "The second kind of traditions is that the books of the Holy Scriptures have been preserved by the Church in an unbroken series of time (as Augustine speaks) and a certain succession of connection, and faithfully transmitted to posterity and handed down to us as it were by hand. Thus Origen says that he learned *from the paradosis* (*παραδώσει,* by tradition) that the four Gospels are undisputed in the universal Church. And Eusebius, when discussing the canonical books, several times uses the word 'tradition,' that is, the Church testifying about the genuine and canonical books of Scripture. And this tradition, by which the sacred *books of Scripture* are handed down to us, we receive reverently; but it does not support the Papists who fight for *dogmas* that cannot be proven by any testimony of Scripture. For the Church, *by that* tradition, confesses that it is bound to the voice of doctrine sounding in the Scriptures, and by the propagation of that tradition, has taught that posterity is also bound to the Scripture." (*Exam. Conc. Trident*, fol. 62.) **[Prof. Biermann on "tradition" or "paradosis"]**

GERHARD: "The question is not about the *historical* traditions by which the primitive church authenticated the books of these or those biblical authors from the autographs and other reasons drawn from their meaning, and continued this its own sensible knowledge to the succeeding churches. For we grant that these *historical* traditions, or the testimonies of the Church, are not universally contained in the sacred Scriptures; but we deny that they concern the very substance of the revealed word and are contained in the . Although it is an article of faith that *all Scripture* is divine and canonical, containing revelations immediately inspired by God, *it is not, however, an article of faith, but a historical assertion, when* the Church testifies in a particular case that this or that book is by this or that author; e.g. that the Gospel of Matthew is by Matthew, the Epistle to the Hebrews by Paul." (*Conf. cathol*, lib. 1. p. 2. c. 5. f. 126. b.)

a) However, by the name *'idiom'* here, not only is *the* actual *language* of a certain people meant, as distinguished from the languages of other peoples; but (as was already stated in the previous § 34) *the* very *selection of words* in a certain language, *their order, context*, etc., to which corresponds the name *'syngrammatis,'* which *G. Zeaemann* has used in this matter. *Zeaemann,* in *Tract. de Colloq. Ratisb*. Cap. IX. or *Exegesis of the Question on the Canonical Books*, pp. 91, 108, 112. Hence, it does not yet prove the original idiom of Scripture from Scripture itself,

which from certain assertions of Scripture prove that the Old Testament Scripture was first written in Hebrew, and the New Testament Scripture first in Greek; for a certain idiom or syngramma requires more.

b) For the internal illuminating power of Scripture is so joined to meaning in any language that it does not precisely distinguish the words of the original text from other equivalent words of the same or any other language, text, or version. The other things, however, which prove the *divine inspiration* of the doctrine contained in the Scriptures, the *criteria, either* plainly do not pertain to the material or the words of Scripture, but to the formal or the doctrine precisely; *or,* when they do in some way pertain to the material, that is, the words and their context, and vaguely assert God as the author of the material Scripture in some, whatever that may be, language; they nevertheless *do not* certainly show *the specific* and *determined language* or *syngramma* in which each book of Scripture was originally committed to writing. There remains, therefore*,* the *testimony of the Church,* which *does not* indeed *grant canonical* or normative *dignity* to the books of Scripture in any certain idiom, *nor by its own force move to the assent of divine faith*, by which *the divine inspiration* of such an idiom is believed: but nevertheless, insofar as it is historical, it shows a certain idiom or syngramma, as the original of the books of Scripture, under which it received them from the writers themselves, and which generates a moral certainty about them, so *united* with what *Scripture* itself teaches, and with which the *Holy Spirit* has intimately joined His power, it already has a place in the discourse of faith; as is evident from the following (in the thesis) argument. In the meantime, see *Mus.* l. c. § 6. pp. 542–544. Also *Tract. QQ. de Syncret. et Script. S.* Q. II. L. I. *de Script*. § 5–7. p. 227–228. and 273. *Ausführl. Erklärung* p. 9. sqq.

> HOLLAZ: "When it is asked: Was the Gospel of Matthew first written in Greek or in Hebrew? that question is not dogmatic, but historical. For it is a question of fact that is self-evident, about which the canonical writers themselves, by word of mouth, by the subscription of their hand, and by the tradition of the autographs and the autographs themselves, delivered to the church and preserved in it with the utmost care, testified. A witness to this sensible fact is the *primitive Church,* which, while the writers were still living in the flesh fought on earth under Christ's banner and received *their autographs* from their own hands, as well as the subsequent church, which *in the times immediately following,* when *the autographs* of the canonical books themselves still existed, being handled and read by the eyes of readers, so that they could be seen in *whatever language* they were written, flourished. However, the *more recent* Church cannot testify on its own to the canonical authority of Scripture; but if it wishes to testify, it must turn back to the primitive and subsequent Church and borrow from it the testimony of the authentic text. Thus, we seek testimony from the Hebrew-speaking Jewish Church of the Old Testament and from the primitive Christian Church of the original *Greek* text of the New Testament. We gladly accept *the testimony of the* primitive *church*, but *not* that *alone*. We add to it the testimony of Scripture, its long preservation for the salutary use of mankind, and the quality of its style. — That the Old Testament was committed to Hebrew style, we gather from Romans 3:2, where Paul expressly writes that the oracles of God were entrusted to the Jews. From this statement of Paul we argue: Whatever oracles were committed to the Jews, so that through them they might be made wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus, were committed to them in the Hebrew idiom. But the oracles of God are contained in the sacred code of the Old Testament, etc. Therefore, the major proposition is established, because no one and no nation can be made wise unto salvation by any oracles, unless the words or oracles are presented to the person or nation

in a familiar and native tongue, which that nation understands and can thus apply to itself for its own salvation. The minor is clear from the aforementioned passage of Paul in Romans 3:2, compare with the statement of the same apostle in 2 Timothy 3:15. — We apply Paul's testimony to the Greek language of the New Testament, and we probably conclude: Whatever oracles were entrusted to all nations, so that through them they might become wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus, were entrusted to them in the Greek language. But the oracles of Christ and the apostles are contained in the sacred code of the New Testament, etc. Therefore the minor is shown: Just as God and the prophets entrusted their oracles to the Jews in their own native language, which all Jews understood, namely Hebrew, so Christ and the apostles entrusted their oracles to all nations, widely spread throughout the whole world, in the most common and well-known language to all nations, namely Greek, so that through it all nations might be made wise unto salvation. Cicero gravely says in his speech *Pro Archia Poeta*: "Greek is read in almost all nations, while Latin is confined to its own borders, which are indeed narrow." (*Exam. theol. Proleg*. c. 3. p. 127. sq.)

c) By the appellation 'the church *of the primitive age*,' however, is understood that church which flourished in the times when the writers of the sacred books lived: namely, with respect to the books *of the Old Testament,* the *Jewish* church*,* from Moses to Malachi; and with respect to the books *of the New Testament,* the *Christian* church*, contemporaneous with the Apostles* and their co-workers*,* to which the *divinely inspired* books were delivered by their authors, and which, relying on the testimony of the senses, could both know and testify with certainty which books, in what language and dialect, and with what choice of words and sequence, it had received from the hands of those who had written them. See *Mus.* l. c. p. 545. The church of later times, however, can define nothing in this question of ancient fact, except by relying on the testimony of the primitive Church. Idem l. c. p. 551.

d) This argument is found in *Musaeus*, *Introd*. loc. cit. § 7. p. 554. Cf. *Ausführliche Erklärung* p. 20., *Tr. Quaest. de Syncr. et Scr. S*. L. I. Q. II. § 18. p. 237.

e) For this pertains to what we read in *2 Tim. 3:16*: *that all Scripture is divinely inspired,* which is the same as to say that, from the very moment it was written, even with regard to its very idiom, or the specific words of a particular language and their selection, sequence, and context, it proceeded from divine inspiration. See also § 10 above and note c.

f) Indeed, the testimony of the primitive church to the moral certainty that the original idiom of the books of Scripture was not only truly published in antiquity, but also has been preserved so that it suffices to this day, although in the modern church there is no one who has seen *the autographs*, is clearly shown by *Musaeus*, *Introd*. p. 545. sqq. and Tr. QQ. *de Syncr. et Scr. S.* l. c. p. 247. sqq., with the discourses of learned DD. *Martin Chemnitius* p. 259., *Jacob Andreae* p. 263., *Aeg. Hunnius* p. 266. and *G. Zeaemann p.* 296. also adduced in support of this opinion. To whom many others could be added, especially those who have disputed against the papists (whose noted fraud is to try to lead us astray from the testimony of the primitive church by scrutinizing and investigating it in these matters); e.g. *Alb. Grauerus Disp. Inaug. de Scr. S. contra Costerum*, pres. P. *Piscatore,* § 126., *J. Major Tr. contra Valerianum M. de Regula Cred. Resp. ad quartam Conseq*. Cap. 3. § 7. p. 367., *Gerhard* in Exeg. L. I. § 75. sqq., *Sal. Glassius* in *Glaubensgrund* Cap. II. p. 38 ff. and Cap. VII. p. 231,

P. Haberkornius against Val. M. Disp. II. Cap. IV. p. 71, 79, 102, 107. Add. *Georg. Mylius* Posit. de V. D. § 70. sqq., *Kromayerus* Theol. Prof. Pol. Art. I. p. 37. It must, however, be admitted that the aforementioned doctors are dealing *not only* with *the secondary authors* of the books of Scripture, but also with the *idiom,* and indeed, most especially with it, namely, that *with the ancient church the autographs of the sacred writings were preserved and that they were seen, read, and faithfully copied from them:* which are the words of *J. Major*, 1. c. B. *Gerhard*, however, as do *Glassius* and *Haberkorn*, urges that *of Tertullian concerning the authentic letters of the apostles, which* were *to be read in the apostolic churches, preserving the voice of the apostles,* etc. *Kromayer* also, among *the criteria of a canonical book* of the New Testament, in fourth place, mentions *that it must have the testimony of the primitive Christian Church, which had seen, read, and known the autograph.* Finally, *Dan. Oramerus* in his *Isagogue to the Books of the Prophets and Apostles* p. 15., where he discusses the distinction between apocryphal and canonical books: "The *entire* New Testament,″ he says, "*depends on the first inspection of their autograph, to whose hands it came."* Most manifestly, however, *Zeaemann* (in the place cited by *Musaeus* in *Tract. QQ. de Syncret. et Scr. S.* p. 226, namely in *Tr. Theol. et Scholast. de Colloq. Batisb*. Cap. IX. or *Exeg. Quaest. de Libb. Can*. p. 91 and 108.) refers *the historical tradition* of the ancient church not only to the question of the authors of the sacred books, but also to that which is about *the syngramma* (as he calls it, which is otherwise called *an idioma*), and affirms that the church testifies to it as a *tangible* object and that one must rely on this testimony.

> TERTULLIAN: "Come now, you who wish to better exercise your curiosity in the matter of your salvation, travel through the apostolic churches, where the very cathedras of the apostles still preside in their places, where their authentic letters are read, sounding their voice, representing their face. Is Achaia the nearest to you? You have Corinth. If you are not far from Macedonia, you have Philippi. If you can make your way to Asia, you have Ephesus. But if you go to Italy, you have Rome, from which we also have the established authority." (*De praescriptionibus adv. haeret*.)

g) Thus, for example, the conclusion about faith is that by which the reborn man infers of himself as an individual: "*I have become a son of God and an heir of eternal life through Baptism."* The premises on which that conclusion rests are these: *the major,* indeed, is revealed: *"Whoever has been baptized has by baptism become a son of God and an heir of eternal life,"* as is taught *in Galatians 3:27. The minor*, however, not revealed, but resting on either the assertion of other trustworthy people, if one was baptized in infancy, or on one's own testimony of the senses, if one was baptized as an adult, is this: *But I was baptized* (i.e., water was poured over me in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, which was perceived partly by sight, partly by hearing). Conf. *Mus., Introd*. l. c. pp. 554, 555, who has discussed this mode of reasoning at greater length in *Tract. de Usu princip. Kat. in Theol*. Lib. II. c. XIII. sqq. pp. 435 sqq. and Tr. de Convers. Disp. IX. pp. 569 sqq.

§ 36.

Therefore, the canonical books of the Old Testament, which the ancient Jewish church accepted and handed down to the Christian church, [(a)] are the following: [(b)]

The five books of Moses, the book *of Joshua, Judges, two of Samuel, two of Kings, two of Chronicles, one of Ezra, one of Nehemiah* (or the latter part of Ezra), the book of *Esther, Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, the Song of Songs, the books of the four greater prophets,* who are: *Isaiah, Jeremiah* (of whom also are *Lamentations), Ezekiel, Daniel,* the *twelve minor prophets,* who are: *Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi:* which all remain uncorrupted [(c)] in the church.

a) For they are mentioned by Christ as being undoubtedly to be found among the Jews, and are divided into *Moses and the Prophets (Luke 16:29, 31), and into Moses, the Prophets, and the Psalms (Luke 24:44).* With this division corresponds in a manner the Jewish division into Torah or *Law,* Nevi'im or *Prophets* (which they further divide into the *former* and *latter),* and Ketuvim *or writings,* which are otherwise called *hagiographa*; though we must be careful not to attribute an inequality of perfection and dignity, following the example of more recent Jews, to writings that are equally divinely inspired. See Dn. *Frischmuthi's* special dissertation on this division of Scripture.

b) For each of these, see *J. Gerh.* in Exeg. L. I. Cap. VII. p. 118. sqq., *Mich. Walther* in *Officina bibl*., *Dan. Cramerus* in *Isag. ad Libb. Proph. et Apost*. and *Laur. Fabricius* in *partitione codicis Ebraei*. For to review these at greater length is not consistent with the purpose of this work.

c) That those books were uncorrupted in Christ's time cannot be denied, for He surely would not have said so so absolutely otherwise: *'They have Moses and the Prophets,' Luke 16:29; 'Search the Scriptures,' and 'they are the ones which testify about me,' John 5:39–40.* He would rather have warned his own people of corruptions, if any had existed then. And although he reproves the blindness and unbelief of the Jews in defending the true doctrine and acknowledging the revealed Messiah, Paul nevertheless attributes to them a faithful keeping of the sacred code itself, deposited with them*, Romans 3:2, cf. 9:4.* After these times, however, with the multiplication of copies of the Scriptures among Christians, not even one place was left for a *universal* corruption that would extend to all the codices, especially if you consider that divine providence has watched over His word. However, the *particular* corruption of certain manuscripts does not destroy the certainty *of the divine inspiration of* Scripture. Cf. *Glassius, Philol. S.* Lib. I. Tract. I.

§ 37.

The books which sometimes appear in the biblical codex of the Old Testament [(a)] beyond those listed: *Judith, Wisdom, Tobit, Ecclesiasticus, Baruch, two* (or *three) books of Maccabees, (the third and fourth of Esdras), fragments of Esther, Daniel on Susanna, on Bel and the Babylonian Dragon, the prayers of Azariah,*

of the three youths, and *of Manasseh,* since neither by the ancient Israelite Church, [(b)] nor by Christ and the apostles, [(c)] nor by the Christian church [(d)] which followed them most closely were they regarded as *θεόπνευστοι* (*divinely inspired*), nor did they have canonical [(e)] authority among them; therefore, they ought not to have it today either [(f)]; but, in order to distinguish them from those canonical books, they are rightly called [(g)] apocrypha.

a) Indeed, they are not only found mixed in with the canonical books in the Vulgate, but are also read in various other versions in different languages, since they were not outright rejected, and are profitably read for edification.

b) For they did not regard as canonical any others than those which, being written in the language then in use among the people of God, were presented to the priests, and, being recognized as divinely inspired by divine calling and inspiration, and as having been written by those very men in this particular order of words and context, were commended to the Church. Compare *Gerh. Exeg*. L. I. § 73–74.

c) Certainly, nowhere in the New Testament is any of them cited to prove any article of the Christian doctrine. See note a. on § 36.

d) For it anxiously followed the canon of the Hebrews and did not dare to add any book to it. The witnesses are *Melito* of Sardis, in Eusebius, Book IV, *Church History*, chapter 26; *Origen*, in the same, Book VI, chapter 25, *Eusebius* himself, Book III, Chapter IX; especially *Jerome* in the Prologue to the Galatians; and many others, in *Gerh.* the *Confessio Catholica*, Book II, Article I, Chapter I, p. 19. Compare the same author's *Exegesis*, Book I, § 75 sqq.

e) For what is at times, and indeed by Augustine himself, called *canonical*, cannot be taken in its proper and principal sense: but was said only in that sense, *a more general and* certainly *less proper one*, in which it was pleasing to call any book usefully read in the church by that name. *Gerh., Exeg*. § 156.

f) For the church of later times can define nothing concerning a matter of ancient fact, unless it relies on the testimony of the primitive church; as we have said at § 35, note *c,* near the end.

g) That is*, hidden,* or because their origin from divine inspiration was not established to the church of the time in which they appeared, nor indeed is it established to the church of succeeding ages. Hence they are not to be brought forward when the canonical Scripture is required; although otherwise they are not to be completely hidden, but are to be read profitably. Cf. *Chemnitius*, P. I. *Exam. Conc., Tr*. Loc. I. Sect. VI. § 20.

§ 38.

The canonical books of the New Testament are all those which are contained in the biblical canon: namely not only those, whose *θεοπνευστία* (*divine inspiration*) has never been doubted, [(a)] which are: [(b)] *The Four Gospels, of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, the Acts of the Apostles, Paul's Epistles: one to the Romans,*

two to the Corinthians, one to the Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians and Colossians, two to the Thessalonians, two to Timothy, one to Titus, one to Philemon, the first of Peter and the first of John; but also the remaining writings, whose origin, as with the authors themselves, is [c] whose divinity was once doubted by some, [d] yet today no dispute remains: namely, *the Epistle to the Hebrews, the second of Peter, the second and third Epistles of John, the Epistle of James*, *the Epistle of Jude, and the Apocalypse of John:* all of which also remain uncorrupted. [e]

a) They are therefore called *πρωτοκανονικοί,* or *canonical books of the first order*.

b) See on these *Mart. Chemnitz,* P. I. *Exam*. sect. on the writings of the Gospels and on the writings and epistles of the apostles; *Gerh., Exeg*. § 243 ff.; *Walther* in *Offic. Bibl*.; *Cramer* in *Isagoge*, etc.

c) It cannot indeed be denied that the ancients doubted the authors so much that they at the same time also denied to these books the authority proper to the *θεοπνεύστοι*. For thus *Eusebius*, in Book II of his *Ecclesiastical History*, chapter 23, near the end, writes of the *Epistle of James: Ιστέον, ὡς νοθεύεται*; which *Grynaeus* translates: "*It must be known that it is spurious." Valesius,* however, writes: "*Which some consider to be spurious and forged."* And already long ago Ruffinus: "*It should be known that it is not received by some."* So that, for the epistle *to be adulterated,* in Eusebius's mind, it is not indeed that it is spurious, but that it is nevertheless held to be spurious, and therefore not considered *inspired.* For Christians have not said*, ὡς νοθεύεται (i.e., "that it is forged"),* concerning a writing *that is inspired*—when the writer, the amanuensis of God, is merely unknown, while it is certain that the writing itself is of divine origin. Likewise *Eusebius*, Book III. Chapter 25, makes mention of *the άντιλεγομένων (anti-legomena), the books that are contradicted* or *called into question*, and to this category he refers the Epistle *of James,* that *of Jude,* and the second *of Peter,* as well as the second and third *of John*. Indeed, he allows *the Apocalypse of John* to be counted among the spurious, which some reject, saying*, "there are some who do not accept it*." Cf. Bk. VI. ch. XXV. That this, however, is to be understood not of the entire Christian church, but of certain particular assemblies (who had not themselves inspected the autographs offered to them, nor had been sufficiently instructed concerning the origin of those books from other, more certain testimonies), is indicated in chs. 11. Rather explicitly*, in* L. II. c. XXIII.*,* Eusebius says of the epistles of James and Jude, *"We have also learned that these are publicly read in many churches along with the others."* Or, if we prefer to follow Rufinus: "*We know, however, that these also, along with the others, are received by almost all churches."* And in Book III, Chapter XXV, on the Apocalypse of John, after the words quoted: "*Others*," he says*, "number them among the books approved by the consensus of all."*

CHEMNITZ: "The third question, therefore, is whether the writings about which, *in the most ancient church*, *doubt* was raised because of the contradiction of certain individuals—since the testimonies of the primitive church did not agree concerning them—*whether, I say, the present church can make those writings canonical, catholic, and on a par with those of the first order.* The Papists not only dispute that they can do this, but in fact they usurp that authority, abolishing altogether the necessary distinction of the primitive *and* most ancient church

between canonical books and apocryphal or ecclesiastical ones. But it is manifestly clear from what we have said that the church in no way has that authority; for by the same reasoning it could also reject canonical books or canonize adulterine ones. *For this entire matter (as we have said) depends on the certain testimonies of that church which existed in the time of the apostles,* which the church that followed, having accepted them, preserved in certain and trustworthy histories. Therefore, where the most certain documents of the primitive and most ancient church cannot be produced from the testimonies of the ancients, who lived not long after the time of the apostles, that those books about which the controversy arises were accepted and commended to the church as legitimate and certain without contradiction and doubt, no human decrees are of any force. For how insolent is the audacity to decree: although the primitive and the following most ancient church doubted those books because of the contradiction of many ecclesiastics, since the testimonies of their own authority were not sufficiently certain and firm, nevertheless, we decree that they must be received as entirely certain with the same authority as those that have always been judged legitimate! But by what documents do you prove this decree of yours? Pighius replies: The Church has that power, that she can impart canonical authority to certain writings which have it neither from herself nor from their authors. Why then should that authority not be imparted to the fables of Aesop or the true narratives of Lucian? Not that I would wish to compare those books, about which there is controversy, to the fables of Aesop (for I grant them, along with Cyprian and Jerome, the honorable place they have always held in the ancient church), but *by a reductio ad absurdum (ἐπαγωγῇ εἰς ἀδύνατον),* as the dialecticians say, I wanted to show, *in the dispute about the books of Scripture, that the church does not have that power, that it can make false writings true, true writings false*, *and make certain, canonical, and legitimate those that are doubtful and uncertain, without any certain and firm documents* which, as we have said above, are required for this matter. . . In this testimony, there is also another reason for that church, which existed in the times when those books were first written, and for the church that followed afterward. For it only preserves and transmits to posterity the testimony of the first church, and neither must nor can it establish anything about those books for which it does not have certain documents from the testimony of the first church. . . The third question is: Which books are in the canon, and which are not in the canon? as Jerome speaks. For we are not now speaking of the spurious, adulterated, and false writings, of which a catalog exists with Eusebius and in Dist. 15, Can. 'Sancta Romana.' Rather, the question is about those books which are found together in the Vulgate edition of the Bible and which are read in the churches by the faithful. Concerning these, the question is asked for the testimony of the ancient church, whether they are all of the same certainty and equal authority. And it is most certain and manifest that the testimony of the ancient church is this: that some of these books are in the canon, while others are not in the canon, but are apocrypha. . . From the writings of the Old Testament, among the apocrypha which are not in the canon, are numbered the book of Wisdom, Sirach, etc. From the books of the New Testament, which in the first and ancient church did not have sufficiently certain, firm, and consistent testimonies of their own certainty and authority, the following are cited: Eusebius, Book 3, Chapter 25: ‚The writings which are not considered indubitable, but which are contradicted, though known to many, are these: The Epistles of James and Jude, the second of Peter, and the second and third of John; the Apocalypse of John is rejected by some, while others judge it to be authentic and indubitable.'.. ‘It should not be overlooked that some in the Roman church rejected the Epistle to the Hebrews, asserting that it is contradicted, as if it were not Paul's.'.. I have noted these testimonies of the ancients so that not only the catalog of the writings of the New Testament may be known, which do not have sufficiently certain, firm, and consistent testimonies of their authority, but so that *the reasons why they* were *doubted* can be especially noted: *1. Because among the ancients, sufficiently certain, firm, and consistent testimonies were not found concerning the testimony of the first apostolic church that those books were approved by the apostles and commended to the church. 2. Because*

it *was* not certain from the testimony of the first and ancient church *whether those books had been written by those under whose names they were published,* but were judged to have been published by others under the name of the apostles. 3. Since *some of the very earliest authorities* attributed some of those books to the apostles, while others *contradicted this,* the matter, as it was not indisputably certain, was left in doubt. For this entire dispute depends on certain, firm, and consistent testimonies of the first and ancient church, which, when they are lacking, the subsequent church, just as it cannot make falsehoods into truths, so it cannot make certainties out of doubts without manifest and firm documents. Against these so manifest testimonies of antiquity*, the Council of Trent, in* its fourth session*,* decrees *as follows: 'If anyone does not receive the entire books, with all their parts, as they are contained in the old Latin Vulgate edition, for sacred and canonical, let him be anathema.'* But by what do they prove and confirm this decree of theirs against the testimonies of antiquity? Do they produce any certain and manifest documents from the testimonies of the first apostolic and ancient church, that those controversial books have the same certainty and equal authority with the rest, about which there has never been any doubt? By no means; for they cannot do this. But they seize for themselves this power, that the pope with his prelates can bestow canonical authority on those and perhaps even on other books, which neither deserve it of themselves nor from their authors, and which did not have it in the time of the apostles and the primitive church, as Pighius contends. Why then do they not openly say what is true? Although it cannot be proven that those books were either written by the prophets or by the apostles, or approved by them, and were certainly and consistently received by the first and ancient church—nay, although the contrary is proven more clearly than midday light by the most manifest testimonies of antiquity: nevertheless, notwithstanding this, we establish and decree that this is to be believed with certainty, even though we can produce no suitable documents on this matter, because (if you please) the fullness of this sort of antichristian power is buried in the treasury of the pontifical breast. — They pronounce anathema on all who do not receive the apocryphal books with the same certainty and authority as the canonical ones. Anathema, therefore, be upon Eusebius, Jerome, Origen, Melito, and the entire first apostolic church, from whose testimony those things we have just recited about these books were accepted. . . The entire dispute, therefore, rests on this question: whether it is certain and indubitable that those books, which are the subject of this controversy, are divinely inspired Scripture by the prophets and apostles, who had divine authority to both publish and approve them. All antiquity answers that it is not certain, but that, because of the contradictions of many, it was doubted. The Council of Trent, however, arrogantly threatens anathema unless one receives them with the same, indeed identical, certainty and authority as the other books, about which there was never any doubt. What, then, is so surprising that certain pontifical parasites have argued that the pope can establish new articles of faith, when in this place he is not afraid to fabricate a new canonical Scripture? So that there may be no further doubt as to who is he who, sitting in the temple of God, exalts himself above everything that is called God, 2 Thess. 2. — Are those books, then, to be simply rejected and condemned? By no means do we seek this. *What use, then, is this discussion*? I answer: *so that the rule of faith, or of sound doctrine in the church, may be certain.* For the ancients judged that the authority of ecclesiastical dogmas should be confirmed by the canonical books alone, as the testimonies above have shown. The authority of the canonical Scriptures alone was judged sufficient to support those things that are in dispute; the other books, which Cyprian calls *ecclesiastical* and Jerome *apocryphal*, they did *indeed* want *to be read* in the church *for the edification* of the people, *not for confirming the authority of the church's dogmas.* For they did not want them to be brought forward to confirm the faith by their authority. And their authority was judged less suitable for reinforcing those things that are in dispute. Therefore, no doctrine should be built from these books that does not have certain and manifest foundations and testimonies in other

canonical books. Nothing that is controversial can be proven from these books if there are no other proofs and confirmations in the canonical books. But what is said in those books must be explained and understood according to the analogy of what is clearly handed down in the canonical books. There is no doubt that this is the ancient view. But the Council of Trent, for that very necessary and true reason, breaks, overturns, and removes this distinction of the ancient church, because (as my Andradius says) they do not want to subject themselves to the necessity of, deprived of all other aids, borrowing faith from the canonical Scripture alone. For the Council of Trent says that it makes the apocryphal books canonical for the very reason of showing by what principal testimonies and aids the Church is to be supported in confirming its dogmas and in restoring its morals." (*Exam. Conc. Trid*. Geneva ed. f. 48. sq. 50–51. sq.) The same is taught by Flacius, A. Osiander (d. 1617), Aeg. Hunnius, Hafenreffer, C. Dietrich, F. Balduin, Th. Thummius and others. Cf. "Is the one to be declared a heretic or dangerous teacher who does not hold all the books contained in the New Testament to be canonical and so declares?" See *Lehre und Wehre*, vol. II, 204–216.

d) Therefore, even today, some call them *apocrypha*, while others more appropriately call them *second-order canonical books*, or *δευτεροκανονικοί*, *deuterocanonical.* For they are not hidden when the standard of doctrine is required, but they are commonly held among Christians today, especially by our own, as authoritative. See *Gerh. Exeg*. § 242.

GERHARD: "We, for our part, cannot be moved by them to reject the authority of this book (the Apocalypse), or to attribute it to Cerinthus, but we establish John the apostle as its author. . . . In the meantime, however, since in the primitive church there was for a time some doubt among some concerning the author of this book, we therefore refer it to the second order of canonical books; not indeed taking away its canonical authority, *nor yet simply and in all things connecting it with the other canonical books*, *concerning which there was never any doubt;* and we demand, with the fullest right, that the interpretation of this book be such that it in no way conflicts with the care given to the *books of the first order of canonicals*." (*Disputatt. theologic*. Jenae, 1655. p. 1015. sq.)

e) See *Glassius*, Book I, Phil. 8, Treatise II. Compare *Buxtorf's Anticritica* and *Hottinger's Thes. Philol*., fol. 118 ff., where it is shown that the modern codices are not even by chance and through the corruption of time *universally* and *radically* corrupt.

§ 39.

It pertains to the affections of the Holy Scripture, *secondly*, its efficacy [(a)] , or that which it has by virtue of an active [(b)] supernatural [(c)] and truly divine power, [(d)] to produce supernatural effects, namely to convert, regenerate, and [(e)] renew the minds of men, by divine [(f)] ordination to itself, with regard to its meaning [(g)] intimately [(h)] and indissolubly [(i)] even united beyond the first use [(k)]; and which, when the use of reading, hearing, or meditation is added, exerts itself in the second act, [(l)] so that those supernatural effects of grace

are produced, as from God as the principal cause, so simultaneously and jointly from Scripture itself as an instrumental efficient cause, [m] in one undivided influx. [n]

QUENSTEDT: *"Theses;* The Word of God has, by the very ordinance and will of God, even before and outside of legitimate use, an intrinsic, divine, and sufficient, and indiscriminate power and efficacy toward all men for spiritual and divine effects (with gracious and salvific ones; such as regeneration, conversion, illumination, salvation; then punitive ones, such as those of conviction, mortification, damnation, etc., are to be produced immediately, truly, and properly." (*Th. did.-pol*. P. I. c. 4. s. 2. q. 16. f. 246.)

a) That this must be joined with the authority of Scripture, we have said in *note e.* to § 32. We understand, however, by the name efficacy (by which the second act, or actual operation, is otherwise designated, as with the Greeks by the name *ἐνεργείας*) in this place the very *δύναμιν ἐνεργητικὴν,* or the power that effects spiritual effects. *Mus., Introd*. P. II. c. VIII. § 2. p. 559.

b) Not a mere *objective* power, but *an effective,* or productive, power of supernatural forces and movements in the human intellect and will, whose nature is blind and dead to spiritual things. *Mus*. l. c. p. 560.

c) Indeed, it is not to be sought in the elegance *of expression*, nor in the gravity *of the sentences,* nor in the oratorical weight *of the arguments,* but *in* a power of action created and *perfected,* which *is* therefore *not* so much *natural to* the Scripture, either in its words or in the things signified, *but supernatural,* being intimately joined with the nature of the Scripture by divine ordinance; as is said in what follows. Cf. *Mus.* l. c. § 3. 4. p. 561–562. Likewise our predecessors, on the occasion of the Rathmannian controversy, in *App. Consil. Ded*. Q. VI. § 3. fol. 263b–264a, taught that the power to illuminate and convert belongs to Scripture *not by a physical or natural necessity, but in a supernatural way,* and that the theologians who might have said that the Word of God has that *natural power* used that term not in opposition to *ὑπερφυσικὸν,* but in opposition to the Rathmannian *παραστατικόν*; in the meantime, to avoid ambiguity and the cause of dispute, one could abstain from that term. Similarly, loc. cit. §§ 9 and 10. p. 265 b. on the term *τοῦ "essential"*, they warn that although it can be said in a sound sense that *the illuminating power pertains to the essence of the word, since otherwise not only constitutive, but also consecutive and necessarily connected powers are thought to pertain to the essence of a thing, it is by the name of essence*, NB. *broadly speaking; but since this term is ambiguous and liable to misrepresentation, another may be substituted in its place* and *stated, namely, that the power of illuminating, converting, etc., pertains to the whole perfection of the word, because, without this virtue being indicated, the Word of God cannot be perfectly described.* Cf. p. 225. b.

HUELSEMANN: "Instruments (e.g., the sacraments) exercise a power, when applied to a suitable subject, in the manner of an instrumental cause, *not physically indeed through the contact* of the agent, just as opium, rhubarb, poison, fire, etc., act physically on suitable subjects; but *morally,* by illuminating the mind, moving the will, purifying the affections, etc., just as Christ in raising Lazarus is said to have acted not physically but morally, that is, with respect to the patient subject. *For thus* 'morally' here must be taken, *not* as *opposed to a*

hyperphysical contact and motion, but as distinguished only from physical motion and contact, which is between material things." (*Praelect. in F. C.* p. 436. sq.)

QUENSTEDT: "Rathmann and Movius pretend that the word of God is *only an* <u>*ὄχημα*</u> *and vehicle* of the Holy Spirit, and therefore that the divine efficacy of the word of God itself *is not naturally* or intrinsic; but answer: Not so much the Word of God itself, strictly speaking, as the external *ministry* of the Word or the external and ministerial *oikonomia* of the Word is the *δχψα* or vehicle of the Holy Spirit; the Word itself, however, is spirit and life (John 6:63). Rathmann attempts to prove the *representative* and separable union of the Holy Spirit and the word from the German words of the litany: ‚Deinen Geist und Kraft zum Wort geben' (Give Your Spirit and Power to the Word), see Rathmann, *contra Dieder*, p. 15, and in the *Erinnerung* p. 34. But here also the ministerial voice of the word is understood to mean the *dispensation* of the Word or the external preaching of the Word." (L. c. f. 268.)

d) For it is that same infinite power which is essentially, by itself, and independently in God, and by which God illuminates and converts men, that has been communicated in the Word, and, as communicated in the Word, must nevertheless be regarded here as divine. Conf. *Jenem. Consil.* loc. cit. pag. 265. b. 266b–267a, and p. praeced. 242b, from which he recites some things in *Mus., Introd*. 1. c. Cap. V. p. 566. This assertion is proven from *Ephesians 1:19,* where that *power* or potency, by which God, through the word, *illuminates* and *converts* men*,* is said to be the same as that *excellent greatness of divine power and might,* which He displayed *when He raised Jesus from the dead.* And for this reason it is said *in Romans 1:16 that the Gospel is the power of God for salvation to everyone who believes,* not because the very word of the Gospel, in the nominative case and speaking properly, is the power of God itself, which does not differ from the essence of God in reality (for then the Gospel would be God himself); but because it is *a powerful instrument, by the usual metonymy, of which* Dr. *Glass. Philol*. S. L. V**.** Tract. I. p. 25., whom he quotes and follows with these words *Dannk.* in *Hodos. Chr. Phaen*. I. p. 95. (64.) For indeed, according to Glassius*, δὔναμις* is said*,* i.e.*, an organ or medium, through which God exerts His power in believers for bringing them to salvation and preserving them.* And the same thing is meant by what he says in *Gramm. S.* Tract I. Can. VII. p. 395. (27.) teaches that *the abstract* is put *for the concrete,* or *a noun for an adjective, with marked emphasis* and *energy;* so that *the gospel* is called *power,* i.e., *powerful and remarkably effective for the conversion and salvation of men.* Similarly*,* when Christ says in *John 6:63*: *My words are Spirit and life,* by which the divine power and efficacy of the divine Word (not only preached, but also written) is indicated, that is, in its order not only to signify, but to confer effectively the gifts of the Holy Spirit and spiritual life. The locution, however, is *metonymical*, not indeed of the signified for the sign, but of the effect for the cause; as our predecessors expressly taught in the Appendix. Consil. Ded. p. 308b.: It is such a metonymic expression (they are speaking of Christ's words: "the word that I speak is spirit and life") that the outward and inward word is called spirit and life, because it brings spirit and life with it. And a little later: If one properly distinguishes cause and effect, then the life-giving Word, which is the cause of spiritual life, and life itself, which is the effect of the life-giving Word, must always be distinguished. Compare *Glassius,* Lib. V. *Philol. S. Tr*. I. cap. I. n. 1. p. 3., *Tarnovius* in *John chap. VI*. P. 3. p. 555.,

Th. Thummius de Majest. Chr. θεανθρ. p. 252. and, who follows them, *A. Prueckner* in *Vindic*. ad h. 1. p. 624. By this, however, the efficacy, or active power, of the word is not denied, but asserted. For when the word is said to be the cause of the gifts of the Spirit and of spiritual life, it is necessarily attributed an active power, as the reason for the causation. Moreover, the efficacy of the preached and written word is also proven by the passage in *Romans 10:17,* where *faith* is said to be *ἐξ ἀχοής*, that is, from *doctrine, received through hearing* (the same principle applies to reading). However, the preposition is causal, and it argues a causal force in that which is heard (or read); and in *John 17:20,* where men are said *to be believers διά του λόγου, through the word,* the power of the preposition *διά,* by the word of God itself, preached through the apostles, is thus attributed the power to excite faith.

> QUENSTEDT: "The Word of God, when considered formally, is not to be added to the catalog of creatures, since it is a divine concept or the mind of God, the counsel of God, as it is described in St. Luke. If you say: the Word of God is either the creator or a creature, we answer that the opposition is not sufficiently accurate, since it is not necessary that everything which is not the creator be a creature of God. Creation is certainly not the creator himself, nor is it a creature, an instance used by the Saxon decision-makers, p. 238; therefore, some say that the divine nature is something of God, as Paul speaks, *τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ* 1 Cor. 2:11, to be *a* certain divine *emanation* (*απορροήν*). Divine power, communicated by the word of God, *is not a creature, ,* (L. c. f. 270.)

e) Of which we will speak more below in the Lectures on Regeneration, Conversion, and Renewal.

f) For *the power to illuminate in the Word comes from God's free will,* aus freiwilliger göttlicher Ordnung, as our *predecessors* write in loc. cit. p. 264a, and they repeat and emphasize it; they also prove it from *1 Cor. 1:21: "It pleased* God (and it was freely determined by God) *to save believers through the foolishness of preaching.*"

g) Indeed, that this power is *not* actually conjoined and united to *the letters and strokes of the words written on paper*, *the Jena theologians* confess in loc. cit. fol. 200.a, 240.a, 265a, 270b. However, they teach that *the sense of Scripture, whether it is in the minds of the apostles, expressed by them through preaching, written in a book, or in the minds of readers,* is conjoined, p. 240a, 267a, 273b.

> QUENSTEDT: *"He distinguishes* between the word of God *materially,* for the characters, points, letters, and syllables adhering to paper or parchment, by which the word of salvation is signified, or even for the sound and external voices formed in the air, passing and vanishing (which are rather the vehicle of the divine word, through which it is transferred to the ears and then to the heart of man, than the word of God itself), but *formally,* for the divine concept and sense expressed and exhibited by letters and syllables in writing and by voices in preaching. In this way it is said to be the word of God only improperly and *significantly*, but in this way it is *primarily and* properly the word of God, the wisdom of God, the mind of God, the counsel of God. We do not ascribe this divine power and efficacy to them, but to this. For we do not hold that the letters, characters, syllables, or voices themselves, as such, subjectively possess or have inherent in them some divine power that converts, regenerates, illuminates, etc." (L. c. q. 16. f. 246.)

h) Thus, against *Rathmann, Musaeus* taught that this *divine power is communicated to Scripture not only in its use through a mere presentation (παράστασις) and*

external assistance, so that when considered in itself and apart from use, it is destitute of the power to illuminate and convert human souls, ineffective and a dead letter; but that Scripture is always effective in itself and possesses the power to illuminate and convert men's minds, whether it is considered *in use or in itself outside of use*. *Introd*. 1. c. § 6. p. 567. and § 7. p. 571.

i) Indeed, by the power of that ordination, freely made, but never to be revoked, as the *Jena theologians* write in 1. c. p. 264 a.: "That by virtue of a voluntary ordinance made by God Himself the power of illumination, conversion, and salvation is always and inseparably united with the Word."

k) For that divine power, which is by its nature the very essence of God, is not communicated to the Scriptures, which are *the spoken word* of God, in such a way that it formally and subjectively inheres in them (*for the formal element of the divine Scriptures is the sense of the signs, not that archetype which is immanent in the divine mind, but the ectypal one, set forth, delineated, and represented by these signs concerning intelligible divine things;* according to the mind and words *of Huelsmann* in *Praelect. Form. Concord*. Art. VIII. S. I. Part. I. § 3. p. 432.). For this reason, the Jena scholars (loc. cit.) diligently and often warned that *the same power* indeed belongs *to God and to Scripture,* but *not in the same way:* for to God it belongs *essentially, primarily, originally, and independently;* whereas to *the Word* of Scripture it belongs *dependently*, *participatively,* or *by communication* (*mittheilungsweise*), see p. 225b, 264b. § 5. 267a § 14, 270b. Nevertheless, *the conjunction of the divine power with the word* must be acknowledged, concerning which our predecessors can be consulted, loc. cit. p. 270a–271a, where they also refer to the words *of Luther,* Tom. IV. J. L. f. 530b: *Scripture has the Holy Spirit as an inseparable companion.* Likewise the words *of the Wittenberg theologians* in the censure of Movia's Treatise: "*The Spirit is always joined with the Word,"* cf. p. 246b, p. 264a, 265b, 266a, which words are also cited by *Mus*. in his *Introduction*. p. 569, 570, and finally p. 577–578, teaches how the divine power of illuminating and converting human souls is joined to the sense of Scripture, both *outside the intellect* and *insofar as it is apprehended by the intellect:* namely, *in the intellect through its actual conjunction or union with the species of the things signified, impressed and expressed; to the sense of* Scripture, *which is present outside the* intellect, *insofar as God has so ordained by His most free will, that the sacred Scriptures, even outside the intellect, The Holy Spirit, by His divine power and ability to illuminate and convert the minds of men, be ever and everywhere present, and with the same reading, or when proposed by the voice of a teacher, simultaneously penetrate the human mind, united everywhere with the species of things signified, partly impressed and partly expressed, to exert Himself through them for conversion.*

> QUENSTEDT: *"The nature of the sacraments* and of the Word of God *is different*, because the nature of the sacraments consists in an action, which cannot exist without use. But the Word of God does not essentially consist in the act of meditation, reading, or preaching; these are only accidents of the Word, which remains forever even when those cease. Therefore the argument does not hold: *'Sacraments* are not without use, and so neither is *the Word* without use.' For the mode of operation is different." (L. c. f. 272.)

l) *Unless*, indeed, *a man's operation is hindered by the security of the flesh or by the thorns of pleasures or the cares of this world.* Cf. *Mus.* l. c. § 7. p. 571, 574. and *Antecessores* in *App. Consil. Ded*. p. 228. b., p. 241a. b.,

p. 265a., § 7. p. 269a, b., p. 270b., 271a., where at the last-mentioned place the words of *J. Brenz* in the Confession of Württemberg, chapter on the Gospel, are also explained. p. 407, where he states that *the Gospel, when contained only in writing or even pronounced with the voice, but outside its legitimate use, is not in itself efficacious:* these words are quoted and made his own by *Balduin*, Comm. in Ep. I. ad *Thess.* c. I. P. II. Q. I. p. 1127. and b. *Dannhauer* in *Hodos. Chr.* Ph. I. p. 64. (94.), namely, that they must be understood of *efficacy* considered *in the second act*, which has no place outside of the use of hearing, reading, meditation, etc. add p. 340a. 350a.

> QUENSTEDT: "This is the native power and nature of the divine Word, that it *persuades its truth and never fails to persuade,* unless its operation is shaken and hindered by a voluntary, acquired, and naturally added contumacy." (L. c. f. 250.)

m) Indeed, our predecessors so diligently and frequently impressed upon this matter, and the Rathmann controversy, the distinction between *God* and *His Word* as *a principal* and *instrumental cause,* that they could not have done more. See 1. c. p. 225.a. at the end, p. 227b. at the beginning, p. 228a, near the end, § 20. p. 231b. near the end, § 27. from the *Form. Conc*. p. 236a. in med., p. 240a. b., p. 242b. princ., p. 247b. in med., p. 253a, prine, and b. med., p. 254a. prine, and med., ex F. C. p. 267b. § 17, p. 34b. in med., p. 344a. prine, and med. Where, first and foremost, the passages at p. 240 and 343 are to be observed, and especially the passage at p. 267 § 16, which is also mentioned by *Mus., Introd*. § 9. p. 593., where a distinction is made between *a passive* and *a cooperative instrument,* and it is shown that Scripture, although rightly distinguished from passive instruments, cannot nevertheless be entirely denied to be *an instrument* (namely, a cooperative one); preceded by the symbolic books themselves, especially the *Augsburg Confession*. art. V., cf. loc. cit., *App. Consil. Dedek*. p. 243b., § 37. p. 272a. fin. And these learned doctors never abandoned or changed this opinion concerning the term of *the instrument* or *instrumental cause* in this matter, about properly applying the Word of God in relation to supernatural effects; indeed, rather, given the opportunity, they repeated and emphasized it, as appears from *J. Gerhard, Comm. in 1. Ep. Petri*, c. 1. v. 23. p. 136: "Regeneration," as the apostle describes it, is from the instrumental cause, which is the Word of God, etc. Himmel *Syntag. Disp*. XVIII. p. 20: *The instrumental cause* (*of repentance*) *is the Word of God*, etc. Cf. his *Colleg. Anal. Libri Conc. Disp*. XVIII. § 43., *Glassius, Philol. S.* in the place cited above, note *a., Gottfr. Cundisius,* preceded by *Hutterus* in *Comp*. L. IX. *de Lib. Arb*. Q. XVI. and XXI. p. 662. § 2.: *The Word of God is an organon for working* (conversion) etc., and p. 671.: *There are two causes of conversion: One principal efficient cause, the Holy Spirit, the other instrumental, the Word of God, which is the organon of the Holy Spirit, by which He effects the conversion of man,* b. *Christ. Chemnitz, Comm. ad Rom*. 1. v. 16. p. 38 and 43: *The Gospel is δύναμις του θεού, that is, a powerful and effective organ or instrument*, etc., *J. E. Gerhard* in *Isag. LL* of his father, L. XVIII. *de Poenitentia*, th. IX. p. 767: *The instrumental cause of repentance is the Word of God,* etc. However, if the Saxon theologians in the German work, A. 1629, published on the occasion of the Rathmann controversy, *Von der heiligen Schrift*, p. 141. sqq., do not seem to attribute the name and concept *of instrument* or *instrumental cause* to the Word of God in the same way,

it should be noted that this is said in reference to *passive instruments* (which Rathmann acknowledged as the only ones, namely), *which have no power in themselves* p. 141, *Instruments that are purely passive and* ἄεργα (mere powerless and passive instruments) pp. 142–43, such as are commonly called *instruments*, from whose number the Word of God is to be excluded, p. 146, Therefore, on the hypothesis that the word *"instrument,"* without a qualifier, would seem to designate *passive instruments*, those theologians added that the Word of God, in this stricter sense, is not an instrument, but if it must be called by that name, the word "instrument" must be taken *in the broader sense*, p. 146. Obviously, so that it does not denote passive instruments precisely, but also includes active ones. This very thing is also acknowledged and emphasized by *Musaeus*, when he accurately and carefully distinguishes between other *instruments*, *which are not connected* with *the principal cause except in use* (and which coincide with those called *passive*), e.g., *an axe, a hammer*, etc., and other things, *which always have the principal cause conjoined to them, both by supposition and by virtue, even outside of use;* and therefore also *always have the power of acting of the principal cause in themselves* (and are *active* instruments): such as the members of the human body, e.g., *the hand;* and refers the Holy Scripture *not to the former but to the latter class of instruments — since, just as it always has the Holy Spirit conjoined to it in subject and virtue even apart from use, it accordingly also always has within itself His power, as principal cause, of illuminating and converting, even apart from use. Introd*. 1. c. § 9. p. 588, 589, plainly in the same way as his predecessors in *App. Consil. Dedek*. p. 224, a. wrote: *The cutter is an instrument not joined, but separate; not living, but inanimate; and it does not act by an inherent power, but by one impressed from without, hence it is called, on hypothesis, especially by Rathmann, a passive instrument, although it does act. On the contrary, the hand in an animated body is a connected, living instrument, acting by an inherent and intrinsic power, hence it is called an active and cooperative instrument.* Cf. p. 267b, where the Word of God, or the sacred Scripture, is indeed exempted *from* the class of *passive* instruments and is rather counted among the *cooperative ones*. Indeed, our own writers, when disputing against the Schwenkfeldians and similar Enthusiasts—whose frequent objection is that they try to attack our view of the efficacy of Scripture—answer that the Word or Scripture is attributed, by this reasoning, with what is proper to God, by making a distinction between *the principal* and *instrumental cause;* the former being *God,* the latter *the Word of God.* See *Conr. Schlüsselburg. Catal. Haer*. Lib. IX. *de Stenckfeld*. p. 301. sqq., *Theodor. Thummium* in *Imp. Weigel. Err*. XΠ. p. 21., *Gerh.* in *Dispp, Acad*. Disp. I. contra Weigel. § 19. p. 827. and very recently the theologians of Lübeck, Hamburg, and Lüneburg in the *Lehr- und Schutzschrift* against the Guthmannian *Offenbarungs-Patron* P. Π.: p. 273, 287, 311, 313, 506 ff. But, granted that Scripture is an instrumental cause of spiritual effects, since it would seem that, by the nature of an instrumental cause, it must be shown how *Scripture is elevated beyond its native power by the principal cause to produce supernatural effects?* b*Musaeus* taught this in the same place, § 11. p. 595 ff., that *the Holy Scripture is not elevated by the virtue of the principal cause finally*

supervening upon it in its use from without (since it already has it intimately united to itself outside of its use), *but by this, that the Holy Spirit, by His own virtue of illuminating and converting, together with the Scripture, to which He has long since communicated it, actually influences the illumination and conversion of man at the same time, and by the influx of His nobler* (truly infinite) *virtue, assists it in producing effects more noble than* those which it *would produce* by its *own native and proper* (distinct from the virtue of the Holy Spirit) *virtue.* For this reason, also *J. Gerh.* writes in *Disp. de Gratuita Justif. Hom. Pecc. coram Deo,* § 18: "*It pleased God, for the divine effect of the conversion and salvation of men, to elevate the external Word as an instrumentally acting cause."* Nor did *Christ. Chemnitz* in *Disp. de Gratuita Justif. Hom. Pecc. coram Deo*, § 18, defends the same opinion, that *God uses the Word as an instrumental cause, and that the Word, although it does not touch the effect by its own power and virtue, is nevertheless raised by the principal cause beyond its natural power to produce it.* Compare, however, with what we have said thus far, *Musaeus, Ausführl. Erklärung*, Book I, Question X, pp. 57 ff., to 110.

QUENSTEDT: "The Word of God, if we wish to speak *precisely*, *is not so much an instrument as a medium,* since not every medium is an instrument. . . The Augsburg Confession does indeed use the word 'instrument' and calls the Word of God an instrument of conversion, but *as in the broad sense* and primarily *in the material sense*, namely, of the external writing, preaching, *οικονομίας* or dispensation, and ministry, not, however, properly in the sense of the internal power of the Holy Spirit communicated through the Word... For the power of God, which is preached from the gospel, is not other than the power of God Himself, but the very power of God. Who, then, would call this power of God an instrument?" (L. c. f. 270.)

HUELSEMANN: "What is the proper, natural, and ordinary power of the Word of God, as it is God's, beyond which it must *be elevated* in a person's conversion? What is natural to the Word of God, what is natural to the sacraments, what is natural to justifying faith, unless it is what God Himself has implanted in them by supernatural grace? Has anyone ever heard of a means ordained by God for the salvation of men, such as the Word of God—which Calvin openly confesses it to be—having to be elevated by God beyond its own proper, natural, and ordinary power in order to produce its effect? That the incorruptible seed, the living and eternal Word of God, must be elevated beyond its own proper and natural power? What, then, is that power and virtue superior to the power of the living and eternal Word of God, to which it is necessary for it to be elevated? Is there any power more powerful than the power of God, any potency more potent than the potency of God, by whatever name it is called, which is the power of God for salvation to every believer?" (*Dial*. p. 407.)

THE SAME: "Although every Word of God has a medicinal power and this is never completely removed, we nevertheless confess that it *is increased* by God *more or less, or not increased*, but left in the state of *ordinary* efficacy, see Psalm 86:10, Isaiah 5:5 ff." (*Praelect. Form. Conc*. p. 440.)

ANTHITHESIS:

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis*: I. *Of the Schwenkfeldians, Weigelians, Enthusiasts, Anabaptists*, *and other fanatics*, such as Theophrastus Paracelsus, *Andreas Osiander*, Fabian Teckel and Fankeri, William Gnapheus, *Herm. Rathmann*, and *Caspar. Movii,* who all distinguish the Word of God into an internal and an external, as a genus into two diverse and separable, and actually separate species. And they attribute divine efficacy only to the internal word (by which they understand the Son of God himself, or the Spirit of God coming from heaven and working in the heart of man, or even singular, immediate, and tacit divine revelations and angelic inspirations concerning matters of faith);

to the external word, however, like a human voice, a vanishing sound and a dead letter, they deny all power and efficacy and divine force, or attribute to it only an objective, significant, and representative, but not an effective, power. . . Rathmann asserts that the divine efficacy of the Word of God is external, separable at any moment, and merely *παραστατική* (i.e., *comes from without*), that the Holy Spirit, with His power, unites Himself to the Word (it is 'added to and joined'), finally in the mind, soul, or heart of man, and that this happens only in a legitimate or salutary use. See him *in der Erinnerung*, pp. 13, 44, 49, where he says, "The axe does not cut where the woodcutter does not first give the axe its force and momentum; the Scripture does not convert where the Holy Spirit does not bring the light of grace and His power to the Scripture." . . . 3. *The Socinians,* who also attribute no other efficacy to the written and preached word than that of signification. . . 4. *The Arminians,* who in the inept Bodecher c. 11. § 4. do not acknowledge any other virtue of the Holy Spirit than that which consists in the communication of cognizable matter and which is communicated to every man'. . . 5. *Most Calvinists,* who also embrace the distinction between the internal and external word of God. . . . *John Calvin*, Institutes, Book IV, chapter 14, section 17, says: "It should be noted that by the external action of the minister, God is signified and testified to be working inwardly, lest He be referred to the mortal man, which God claims for Himself alone." . 6. *Some of the same pontiffs*, who also place the efficacy of the divine word only in signification and representation; for thus Bellarmine, distinguishing between the external and internal sermon, lib. 1. de grat. et lib. arbitrio c. 13. col. 510. says: 'The external (sermon) only proposes the object, but does not infuse light into the mind to know it, nor inspire the affections to love it.' . . 7. *The Quakers* in England. 8. *John de Labadie."* (L. c. f. 251—255.) Zwingli: "To speak canonically or regularly, we see that among all peoples, external preaching by the apostles and evangelists or bishops *preceded* faith. We attribute this, however, solely to the Spirit. For we see, alas! quite many who hear the external preaching of the gospel , but do not believe, because the Spirit has become scarce. Therefore, wherever prophets or preachers of the word are sent, it is a sign of God's grace, that He wishes to manifest His knowledge to His elect. And to whom they are denied, it is a sign of imminent wrath." (To Charles, *A Reason of the Faith*, 1530. See, *Abgedrungener Unterricht von kirchlicher Vereinigung* von E. S. Cyprian. Vol. II, p. 34.)

n) See *Mus. Intr*. l. c. § 9. p. 580. sqq. Conf. antecessores in Append. Conf. Dedek. p. 266., where they praise that of Movia: *The Holy Spirit and the word of God are two distinct principles of conversion, but in the act of conversion they are joined, and stand as if for one cause; hence only one, unique, and undivided action of the word and the Holy Spirit can result.*

§ 40.

Furthermore, *thirdly*, among the properties of Holy Scripture [(a)] belongs its perfection, or [(b)] its sufficiency, by which it is able [(e)] to instruct us fully and perfectly [(d)] concerning all things that are necessary for a person seeking to obtain salvation, [(c)] both to be believed and to be done.

a) Rather, it follows from the fact that Holy Scripture is the first *principle* of knowing in theology, and therefore must be *adequate* to all things subject to the theological disposition. The same applies to what we indicated above,

§ 20 and note *d*, namely, that the Scripture which was divinely given to instruct men in the true religion for salvation must be *sufficient.* Cf. *Mus., Introd*. P. II. Cap. V. § 7. pp. 317–318.

b) Namely, in this place perfection and sufficiency coincide; *nor* is the consideration so much on *the number of books,* however many were ever written by holy men, some of which, as to the names of the authors or titles, are cited in the surviving books of Scripture, while the books themselves are thought to have perished; *but* the perfection of the surviving Scripture is regarded in relation *to its end,* as will appear from what follows. Although concerning those *books* which some say *are lost*, it should be noted that some have not truly perished, but still exist, albeit under different titles; as, for example, the words *of Nathan* and *Gad,* 1 Chronicles 29:29. cited, under the title of the books of Samuel, as well as the prophecy *of Abijah* the Shilonite and *Iddo,* 2 Chron. 9:29., and finally the visions *of Hozai,* 2 Chron. 33:19., under the name of the books of Kings, have probably survived. But if indeed some books written by holy men have truly perished, they were nevertheless 1) entrusted not to divine inspiration, but to human diligence; 2) they were historical rather than doctrinal; indeed, even if this 3) were conceded, that the books that perished were *divinely-inspired* (*θεόπνευστους*), the dogmas themselves, however, appear in other surviving books, not less correctly and fully, it is certain 4) that no book which had once, by the intention of the Holy Spirit, been received into the canon or norm, perished to the detriment of the canonical Scripture, or so that it would cease to be an adequate principle and norm of doctrine for faith and morals. Conf. *Gerhard, Conf. Cath*. L. Π. Art. I. Cap. IV. p. 254. sqq., to which they respond, what *Mus*. wrote in the continuation of the *Introduction*, to be published hereafter, *if God wills it*, Cap. IX.

c) For we have just said, and it is the constant opinion of our party, that *the perfection* of Scripture is to be considered in relation to its *end*. Things are said to be perfect for an end when they lack nothing necessary for achieving that end. The ultimate end of Scripture, however, is our salvation; the intermediate end is faith in Christ, with which holiness of life is necessarily joined, as we said in § 11.

> QUENSTEDT: "The Holy Scripture is called perfect, *not with absolute perfection,* comprehending all divine and supernatural knowledge; for this does not belong to the Church militant on this earth, to which the Scripture is directed; but *with* a *restricted* perfection, that is, in relation to those things which are necessary for a Christian to know in this life in order to believe rightly and to live holy and piously. Others call it *relative* perfection. . . We *do not* say with the papists, that the Scripture is *implicitly* perfect, or that it contains everything necessary for faith as *in a root, a seed, a universal principle,* or as *in an index,* so that although it does not itself contain everything, it nevertheless shows from where or where they are to be sought, by referring to the Church and its traditions, from which the deficiency of those dogmas that are desired can be supplied, in the way that *the* 'contained in' explains everything in the Scriptures. Bellarm. lib. 4. *de V. D*. c. 10., add *Stapletonus Relect. princ, fidei* c. 5. q. 5. art. 1., Cardinal Hosius, Jacques Davy, Bishop of Évreux, Tanner, etc. For thus any poor man would be implicitly rich, because he can indicate where the riches are, and any illiterate person who can show where the academy is, in which doctors teach, would be considered a scholar, and he who shows others a sumptuous table, laden with various delicacies, would be said to abound in food. By this very thing the Church is made perfect and sufficient for all the dogmas of salvation, whereas Scripture is

most imperfect, since it needs to refer us from itself to another doctor. For us, Holy Scripture is so perfect and sufficient that it contains within itself, rather than pointing beyond itself, everything necessary to know for salvation. A referential norm is not a norm, but that to which referral is made. For the Papists, however, Scripture is sufficient for everything, the dogmas of salvation, because it teaches that the Church is sufficient and perfect for all those things, and because it refers us to the perfection of the Church. But it would have been just as sufficient to have written only these two words: "Hear the Church," or rather, according to the papal analysis: "Hear the Pope of Rome." But he is not the one of whom Scripture says, "Hear ye him," Matt. 17:5. (*Theol. did.-pol.* P. I. c. 4. s. 2. q. 10. f. 147. sq.)

d) So that no other principle, or partial norm, e.g., unwritten traditions, is to be joined to it from the side; since all the dogmas of faith and morals, without exception, are contained in the Scriptures, some indeed *αυτολεξεί,* or *κατὰ ῥητὸν,* some *according to the letter, explicitly* and in the very words, some *according to the spirit, virtually* and *implicitly,* so that from those things which are read explicitly, they may be collected and known by a legitimate and easy consequence. Conf. b. *Gerh.* in Exeg. L. I. c. XVIII. § 366. p. m. 385., who also usefully reminds us of this: *that what was written, at any time in the church's history, presented a perfect canon, for the divine revelation in those books was perfectly set forth for that period.* And *thus, when only the Mosaic books existed, Scripture was perfect, with respect to that time of the church, when more revelations, which God willed to be committed to writing, did not yet exist.* L. c. § 366. p. 386.

QUENSTEDT: "Some things are contained in the Scriptures *expressly*, some *analogically*, some *explicitly,* some *implicitly,* some *γενικώς*, some *ειδικώς*, some *αυτολεξεί*, some *κατά πράγμα*. Whatever is necessary to know for salvation is contained in the Scripture by one of these methods." (L. c. f. 160.)

BEBEL: "From what has been said (of Irenaeus. l. c. 2.) it appears that some things contained in the Apostles' Creed are omitted here, and some things inserted here which are silent in the Apostles' Creed, which Irenaeus would not have done in the place where he speaks expressly of creeds, if he had believed that the creed commonly called the Apostles' was prescribed by the apostles as a perfect and perpetual rule and norm for the church. Therefore, Jodocus Coccius is in vain, in his *Thes. Cath. de Scr*. Art. 29., when he tries to prove from this passage of Irenaeus that the symbol of Christian faith was composed by the apostles. For either the church did not diligently preserve that apostolic tradition, or Irenaeus cited it in bad faith or at least negligently, for he did not quote it as it exists today, or, what is safest, it was not compiled by the apostles in its present form. Theophilus, bishop of Antioch, wrote three books against Autolycus the pagan: *σύμβολου καί αρραβώνα τής αληθείας,* as at the end of book 3. calls it; yet he nowhere mentions the Apostles' Creed in the form it has today, but only quotes and explains one or two articles here and there in fragments, so that I doubt whether the symbol commonly called Apostolic was at that time indeed regarded as a sufficient rule of faith." (Antiquit. eccles. I, 235. sq.)

GERHARD: "It has not yet been demonstrated with certainty whether the Apostles' Creed was compiled and composed by the apostles themselves before they departed to preach the gospel throughout the whole world—as the majority of ancient writers affirm—or whether it was, in fact, collected from the sermons and writings of the apostles by some other person and approved by the apostles." (Loc. de eccl. § 149.)

AUGUSTINE is said to have written in a sermon falsely ascribed to him: "That which is called *a symbol* in Greek is called *a collection* in Latin. A collection, because the collected articles of the Catholic faith are brought together into one symbol, which,

in its brevity, gathers the text that we will now, God willing, recite to you. Peter said: 'I believe in God, the Father almighty'; John said: 'Creator of heaven and earth'; James said: 'I believe also in Jesus Christ, his only Son, our Lord'; Andrew said: 'Who was conceived by the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary'; Philip said: 'He suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died, and was buried'; Thomas said: 'He descended into hell, on the third day he rose from the dead'; Bartholomew said: 'He ascended into heaven, is seated at the right hand of God the Father Almighty'; Matthew said: 'From there he will come to judge th , the living and the dead'; James, son of Alphaeus: 'I believe in the Holy Spirit, the holy catholic Church'; Simon the Zealot: 'the communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins'; Judas, son of James: 'the resurrection of the flesh'; Matthias concluded: 'life everlasting. Amen.'" (Opp. ed. Erasm. Tom. V. f. 280.)

GERHARD: "Nor can it be said that *opposites* are at least forbidden from being added, but not those things that are *different*, since *an opposite is not properly added* to a prior thing, but *abolishes* and supersedes it; a different thing is properly added. Opposites mutually destroy each other, but different things coexist. Indeed, God not only forbids His law from being abolished, but also from having anything added to it." (Loc. de S. S. § 48.)

QUENSTEDT: "He does not forbid *additions* that proceed from *divine will* and authority, but those that proceed from *human will*. For here God sets the law for man, not for Himself." (L. c. f. 1δ4.)

THE SAME: "The dogmas which the Papists call *ἄγραφα* [unwritten] and yet say are necessary for salvation, are these: the invocation of saints; solemn fasting; abstinence from meat; the suffrages of the living for the dead; voluntary vows of chastity and virginity; purgatorial fire; the sacraments of confirmation, extreme unction; the sacrifice of the Mass; the celibacy of priests, etc., from the review of John. Driedon's de ecclesiast. Script. l. 4. f. 282., who also adds there: ‚If in these we despise tradition, we will have no shield with which to defend the doctrine of the faith as it is now.' But it is next to madness to say that those things which have just been named are the very dogmas which Christ had to say and the apostles were not able to bear, to the same passage in John 16:12." (L. c. f. 160.)

THE SAME: "By the name of unwritten traditions they understand the pontifical dogmas and decrees necessary for salvation in belief and practice, which indeed proceeded from Christ and the apostles themselves, but which nevertheless are nowhere found in the books of the Old and New Testaments. These, I say, we reject as *ἀγραφους* traditions. *They distinguish* between the insufficiency of the dogmas themselves and the insufficiency of clarity and evidence or of an explicit proposition; the Jesuits wish to appear as if they are not adding traditions to Scripture for that reason, but for this one, or are asserting the necessity of the same for a better understanding alone; but this is *a pretext*, not a cause, a praetext, not the true reason. . . The Papists maintain that many things necessary for salvation are lacking in Scripture, as we have seen above; therefore they insist that a supplement and traditions, commonly called the unwritten word, are needed. . . . Costerus, in his Enchiridion, ch. 1, says: "Traditions, impressed on the heart of the church, in many parts surpass the Scriptures, which the apostles left us on parchment." Therefore, the unwritten traditions in the Roman church are held to be of much greater value than Scripture, and their authority is far greater than that of Scripture. Certainly Baronius, *Annals*, Vol. I, anno 53, n. II, did not hesitate to write: ‘Traditions excel above the Scriptures, since the Scriptures do not subsist unless they are supported by tradition, whereas traditions retain their own firmness without the Scriptures.’" (L. c. q. 11. f. 162. ff.)

THE SAME.: "In 2 Thess. 2:15: 'Hold fast to the traditions which you have been taught, whether by word or by our epistle,' Paul exhorts the Thessalonians to persevere in all the doctrine delivered by him, whether they had received it from his living voice in person or from the writing of one absent. Not all the books of the New Testament existed at that time, but who would conclude from this that there are unwritten dogmas in our time?" (L. c. f. 166.)

SCHERZER: "The same canon is perfect without any assumption of traditions (dogmatic; for concerning historical, exegetical, and ritual matters, insofar as they do not contradict Scripture, there is no dispute) with regard to the doctrine of faith and morals. For 1. 'Holy Scripture is able to make one wise for salvation,' etc., 2 Tim. 3:15–17. 2. 'These things are written that you may believe and through faith have eternal life,' John 20:31. I argue: That which makes perfect is perfect. For the cause cannot be nobler than the effect. Therefore, it does not need unwritten traditions. For either 3. those traditions transmit *something different* in faith and morals from what is written, or *the same thing.* If *the latter,* they are not necessary and, as far as doctrine is concerned, do not differ from the written word. If *the latter,* they are impious and to be rejected under the penalty of anathema (whether *against* Scripture or *besides* it, as παρά is taken Rom. 16:17, 1 Cor. 3:11, and the Vulgate itself Gal. 1:9 has: 'Scripture suffers no addition or diminution.' Deut. 12:32, Rev. 22:18. Therefore nothing can be added besides it), Gal. 1:9, nor do they acknowledge the authors *as theopneustic*. For they know well that *one* should not presume *to know* beyond what has been written (1 Cor. 4:6). 4. Christ (Matt. 15:9, 13) explicitly rejects human traditions. And 5. Paul meant "*nothing outside the prophets*" (Acts 26:22); just as *Peter* meant "*nothing apart from the Scriptures" (ουδέν έκτος των προφητών)* in Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 1. VI. f. 678. 6. That the faith of the transmitters has not always been safe (and therefore not certain), or Papias' Chiliasm teaches. And 7. the Papists have not been willing to publish their catalog of traditions in the colloquy at Ratisbon, Session 1, nor have they been able to do so to this day." (*System. th*. p. 22, sq.)

e) For it is said expressly in *2 Tim. 3:15, that the sacred Scriptures*, which Timothy *had known from childhood* (and thus the Scripture of the Old Testament, which then, when Timothy was a boy, was the only external thing), *to be able to make* him *σοφίσαι,* learned and *wise* unto *salvation, the faith which is in Christ Jesus;* where the most manifest proportion of the Scripture, as a perfect principle to its end, common to all the members of the Church, namely faith and salvation, is most evident. But if any one of those things which pertain to faith and are necessary for a man to know for his salvation were not contained in the Scriptures, then the Scripture, with respect to that very doctrine which it had omitted, would of course leave a man in ignorance or lead him into error, and could not make him wise unto salvation. The Apostle goes on also in the same passage and shows in verses 16 and 17 that the Holy Scripture is perfect in relation to the end proper to teachers. For he says that *Scripture,* just as it is *entirely divinely inspired*, is also entirely, that is, with respect to the whole of the doctrines it contains, *useful for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness;* but useful for these purposes not in any way, but so that *the man of God,* a minister and doctor of the church divinely called, may be *ἄρτιος, perfect* (*holding all the parts of his office,* according to *Estius)* for *every good work,* and thus for *teaching* all things that are necessary for faith; *to* solidly *refute* all opposing errors*;* to persuade *the avoidance* of all vices and *the cultivation* of morals, in respect to all kinds of virtues, —he may be ἐξηρτισμένος, *absolutely* or *perfectly* equipped and furnished; which could not happen unless Scripture itself contained all these things within itself and pointed to them sufficiently. Compare *Joh. 20:31*, where the things that John had written (not only concerning the deeds of Christ, but also concerning His doctrine, person, and office) *are said to have been written for* this purpose—that is, with this as their end—that men, by knowing these written things, *might believe that Jesus is the Christ*,

that Savior of the world and *that Son of God*, and *that believing they might have life through His name*. Scripture must therefore contain and teach without deficiency all things that are necessary to know for saving faith and salvation itself.

ANTITHESIS:

QUENSTEDT: "*Antithesis:* 1. *Of the Papists,* who contend that not all things necessary for salvation are contained in the Holy Scriptures, and therefore that unwritten traditions (ἄγραφους), by which the deficiency of Scripture is to be supplied, are to be admitted and received with 'equal devotion' along with Scripture itself. Thus the Council of Trent, Bellarmine, Costerus, and Melch. Canus. They also state that, 'from Scripture alone no heresy, no error, could ever have been, or still can be, sufficiently refuted without the presupposed infallible authority of the Church,' which was said by the Jesuits at the Colloquy of Ratisbon. 2. *The Novatians,* who with Vincent of Lérins, a semi-Pelagian monk, in the Commonitory c. 1, say that the canon of the Scriptures is sufficient, 'so that nevertheless it is sometimes necessary for it to be joined with tradition or the testimony of the Church.' .. Thus D. G. Calixtus, Dreier, Hornejus. . . 3. *Schwenkfeldians, Anabaptists, and Weigelians,* who hold that the doctrine of salvation is to be learned today not from Scripture alone, but also from private revelations and inspirations, which they imagine for themselves, and from conversations with angels. *4. The Socinians,* who assert that only those things are necessary for salvation to be known which are contained expressly (*ῥητῶς)* and in the very words of the Scriptures." (L. c. q. 10. f. 150.)

§ 41.

Finally, *fourthly*, among the attributes of Scripture there is a place for [(a)] perspicuity, or the fact that those things which are necessary for a person striving toward salvation,[(b)] both to be believed and to be done, are [(d)] set forth in Scripture in words [(c)] and phrases so clear and in accordance with received usage that any person [(e)] acquainted with the language [(f)] and possessed of even moderate judgment [(g)] and attentive to the words [(h)] can attain the true meaning of the words [(i)] as regards those things which are necessary for him to know, and can embrace the principal heads of doctrine themselves with a simple [(k)] apprehension of the mind, [(l)] and is capable of doing so: just as for the giving of assent in faith—once the word has been apprehended and assent rendered to the things signified—the understanding of man is led through Scripture itself and its supernatural light, [(m)] or the divine power joined to it.

a) For it is required for the beginning of knowledge and the formal object of any habit that it lead to the knowledge of the other things that are subject to the habit; according to what we have said in Chap. I. § 3, note I, and Chap. II. § 1, note *a.*

LUTHER: "Thus we say, by the judgment of Scripture all spirits must be tested in the face of the Church, for it must above all be established and most firmly held among Christians that the Holy Scriptures are *a spiritual light, far brighter than the sun itself,* especially in those things that pertain to salvation or necessity. But, since we have

long been persuaded to the contrary by that pestilent sophistical word, that the Scriptures are obscure and ambiguous, we are forced first to prove that very *first principle* of ours, by which all other things are to be proved, which among the philosophers would seem an absurd and impossible thing to do." (*De serv. arb. diatr*. Opp. ed. Schmidt. Vol. VII, 177. Hai. XVIII, 2157.)

b) For we are *not* here considering the *general* object of Scripture in its entirety, but its *special* and *primary* one, which was treated above in § 9. For otherwise, if one were to go through all that is found in the Scriptures, one must admit that much obscurity would be discovered, for example, in onomastics, chronology, genealogies, prophecies before the completion of the canon, etc., but not to the same extent in *the elementary doctrines of the faith. Cundis. Note to Comp. Hutt*. L. I. Q. VII. p. 31.

c) Indeed, the clarity of Scripture can be established as *threefold: one* from *the things* themselves*; another* from *the words;* and *a third* from *supernatural light.* But *the first* (which consists in the evidence of things, or clarity in relation to a distinct knowledge of them, either in and of themselves and from apprehended terms, or because of principles which are known in and of themselves, and with which they have a necessary connection) is not considered here. For although it has a place in some of the objects of Scripture that are subject to the light of nature, it has no place with respect to the mysteries of faith, in the transmission of which Scripture is chiefly occupied. But what some of our own have said, *that the things of Scripture are not obscure,* is to be understood in this way: that those things, although they are in themselves self-evident (as even these have said, *that the things of God are obscure*), are nevertheless presented clearly *in Scripture*, so that the sense of that expression comes back to the clarity of the words. Cf. *Gerh. Conf. Cath*. L. II. Spec. Art. I. Cap. III. p. 210. The *third* (which in its own way comes down to the authority and efficacy of Scripture) is treated toward the end of the §, and will be treated more fully in note *m.* Meanwhile, concerning *the second,* or *the clarity of the words,* it should be noted that it consists in the choice of the words themselves and their congruence with the things signified, and their connection and order with one another according to the common usage of speech, which therefore *Luther* called *the external clarity of Scripture*. *Lib. de Serv. Arb*, Vol. III. Jen. Lat. fol. 169a. Others call it *grammatical* perspicuity. See *Cundisius* from *Hoepfner,* note to Comp. Hutt. Q. VII. p. 30. *Musaeus* has discussed that threefold perspicuity of Scripture at greater length in Contin. *ἀνεχδότω Introd*. Cap. X.

LUTHER: "I certainly admit that there are many places in the Scriptures that are obscure and abstruse, *not because of the majesty of the things themselves,* but because of ignorance of the words and grammar, yet which in no way hinder the knowledge of all things in the Scriptures. For what else can lie hidden in the Scriptures more august, now that, with the seals broken and the stone rolled away from the sepulchre's door, that *supreme* mystery has been revealed—*that Christ*, the Son of God, became man, that God is three and one, that Christ suffered for us and will reign eternally? Are these not also known and sung at the crossroads? Take Christ out of the Scriptures, and what more will you find in them? Therefore, all the things contained in the Scriptures have been revealed, *even though some places are still obscure with unknown words.* It is truly foolish and impious, knowing that the things of Scripture are all set in the clearest light, to dictate obscure things because of a few obscure words. *If the words are obscure in one place, but clear in another,* the very same thing, most manifestly declared to the whole world, is said in the Scriptures both in clear words and still lies hidden in obscure ones;

it makes no difference whether the thing is in the light or, since in the meantime there are *many other* signs of it in the light. Who will say that a public fountain is not in the light, because those who are in an alley do not see it, when all who are in the marketplace do? . . . Therefore you and all the Sophists, go ahead and produce some mystery that is still obscure in the Scriptures; for that many things remain obscure to many *is not due to the obscurity of the Scriptures, but to the blindness* or slothfulness *of those* who do not act so as to see the most clear truth, just as Paul says of the Jews in 2 Cor. 4[:4]: A veil remains over their heart, and again: If our Gospel is covered up, it is covered up in those who are perishing, whose hearts the god of this world has blinded. With the same recklessness, one would blame *the sun* for a dark day, who himself had veiled his eyes or gone from the light into darkness and hidden himself. Let miserable men, therefore, cease to impute the darkness and obscurity of their own hearts to the most clear Scriptures of God by a blasphemous perversity. . . So also your examples, which you append not without suspicion and a sting, are irrelevant to the matter, such as those concerning the distinction of persons, the union of the divine and human natures, and the unpardonable sin, the ambiguity of which you say has not yet been resolved. If you are speaking of the questions agitated by the Sophists concerning these matters, what has the most innocent Scripture done to you, that you should object the abuse of wicked men to its purity? Scripture simply confesses the Trinity of God and the humanity of Christ and the unpardonable sin. *Here there is no obscurity or ambiguity.* As for *the ways in which* they have these things, Scripture does not say, as you imagine, nor is it necessary to know. The sophists here are dealing with their own dreams; argue with and condemn them, and acquit the Scriptures. But if you understand it of the very substance of the matter, again, do not argue with the Scriptures, but with the Arians, and with those for whom the Gospel is hidden, so that they do not see the most clear testimonies concerning the Trinity of the Godhead and the humanity of Christ through the work of Satan, their god. And to speak briefly: *The clarity of Scripture is twofold*, *as is its obscurity;* one *is external, found in the ministry of the word, and* the other *is in the knowledge of the heart. If you speak of the internal clarity, no one sees a single jot in the Scriptures unless he has the Spirit of God;* all have a blinded heart, so that, even if they can speak and know how to expound all of Scripture, they nevertheless feel or truly understand none of these things, nor do they believe in God, nor that they themselves are God's creatures, nor anything else, according to Psalm 14[:1]: The fool has said in his heart, 'There is no God.' *For the Spirit is required to understand the whole Scripture and any part of it.* If you speak *of the external*, *nothing at all is left obscure* or ambiguous, but all things are brought to light by the word in the most certain manner, and declared to the whole world, whatever they are in the Scriptures." (*De serv. arb. diatr*. Opp. Vol. VII, 124—127. Hal. XVIII, 2068—2072.)

d) At least in those places where, as they say, a certain doctrine of faith or morals is treated of *professedly*, or where its *seat* is contained, so that *it is a naked article of faith, there is no precept of life which is not somewhere set forth in the Scriptures in its own proper, clear, and perspicuous words*. *Gerhard*, *Conf. Cath*. L. II. Art. I. Ch. III. p. 209. For surely *in those things which are openly set forth in the Scriptures, all those things are found which contain faith and morals for living,* as *Augustine* says in Book II of *Contra Donatistas*, chapter IX, where he also adds: "*Admirably and salutarily has the Holy Spirit so arranged the Holy Scriptures, that in the more open places he might meet the hunger, and in the more obscure, wipe away disgust." For scarcely anything is to be gathered from those obscurities that is not found elsewhere stated more fully.*

QUENSTEDT: "God did not will that everything and every single thing in the Holy Scriptures be expounded equally clearly and distinctly, but that some things be handed down in a more recondite style: 1. so that our diligence in reading the Scriptures might be excited; 2. that the weariness and contempt of divine things might be removed (for things that are easily investigated

generally become cheap); 3. that human arrogance and pride might be subdued by labor; 4. that we might be admonished of our innate blindness; 5. that we might approach the reading of Scripture only with reverence, sanctification of ourselves, and preceding prayers, and 6. finally, that a stronger desire for another life and a higher academy might be kindled in us." (L. c. f. 173)

LUTHER: "But if anyone among them attacks you and says, 'We must have the interpretation of the Fathers; the Scripture is obscure'—you should answer that this is not true. *There is no clearer book written on earth than the Holy Scripture; it is compared to all other books*, *just as the sun is against all lights.* They speak such things only so that they may lead us away from the Scripture and exalt themselves as masters over us, so that we should believe their dream-preachings. It is a dreadful, great shame and blasphemy against the Holy Scripture and all Christendom to say that the Holy Scripture is obscure, and not so clear that it may be understood by everyone to teach and prove his faith. Note this: Should it not be a great shame that I or you would be called a Christian and not know what I believe? But if I know what I believe, then I know what is written in the Scripture, because the Scripture contains nothing more than Christ and Christian faith. Therefore, if faith only hears the Scripture, it is so clear and bright to it that it speaks without the glosses of all the fathers and teachers: "This is right; I believe that too." . . . *It is true that some of the Scripture's passages are obscure*, *but in them there is nothing other than what is found in other places in the clear, open passages . And this is where heretics come from: they take the obscure passages according to their own understanding and use them to fight against the clear passages and the foundation of the faith.* Then the Fathers fought against them with the clear passages, thereby illuminating the obscure ones and proving that what is said in the dark is the very same as what is said in the light... *Just be certain, without a doubt*, *that there is nothing brighter than the sun—that is, the Scripture; but if a cloud has come between, there is still nothing behind it but that same bright sun.* Therefore, if there is a dark saying in Scripture, do not doubt; it is certainly the same truth behind it that is clear elsewhere, and whoever cannot understand the darkness should stick to the light." (Exposition of Psalm 37, 1521, V, 456 ff. [*StL* 5, 334 f.])

e) For not only the regenerate and faithful, but also the unregenerate and impious, by virtue of the very clarity of words that signify by design—which presents itself equally to all readers—are capable of attaining knowledge of the sense signified by the words: the *literal* or *historical sense*, to be sure; but *not the salvific* or sense *of faith*, as will be said presently. And this was taught by *Musaeus* in the disputations *De conversione* held in the year 1647 and following, and subsequently re-edited in the year 1658 at Halle in Saxony, *Disp*. IV. § 27 ff., and in the *Tract. de Convers.* edited at Jena in the year 1661, *Disp*. IV. c. II. § 44 ff. p. 272 ff., and again in *der Ausführl. Erklärung* [the Detailed Explanation], Q. XLIV. p. 342 ff. to 397. He followed, however, in the footsteps of his predecessors, the blessed Doctors *Joh. Major* and *Joh. Gerhard*: of whom the former, in the year 1630, in his *Confut. Judicii* published by Valerianus M. *de Acathol. Regula Cred.*, Prop. III. Cap. I. Sect. III, p. 162, disputes ex professo concerning the opinion of Valerianus, which *grants the true sense of Scripture to no one unless he be at the same time illuminated and taught by the Holy Spirit*; and he himself (*J. Major*) on the contrary observes that *the true and indubitable sense of the Holy Scriptures is either conjoined with the assent of the heart and the fruit of conversion, or is destitute of the same: the latter can befall unbelievers, such as Jews; the former belongs only to the faithful*. And he adds notably: *Just as*

the Apostles, adorned with the immediate and extemporaneous gift of speaking in many tongues (πολυγλωττία) and with the Holy Spirit, set forth the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven to various peoples, so that they could be understood word for word by each of them and received in faith by the working of the Holy Spirit—although there was no lack of those who grasped the sense of the apostolic proclamation but denied their assent to what was said and thereby obtained no fruit from it, Acts 13—so many who are acquainted with the languages in which God willed His oracles to be preserved draw out and perceive from the words (N.B.) the true and genuine sense of Scripture in many passages; but the wicked impede and repel from themselves the fruit and effect of illumination through their unbelief (ἀπιστία) unto their own destruction. Furthermore, in § 9. p. 365 he writes: *Things being thus, Valerianus ought not to have stated so baldly and crudely that no one certainly attains the true sense of the Holy Scriptures unless he is inwardly illuminated and taught by the Holy Spirit.* And § 10.: *Applying therefore the critical mark of distinction, let us correct and chasten that proposition in this manner: Every person acquainted with the biblical language certainly attains the true sense of the Holy Scriptures which is produced by the meanings of the known words, even though he is neither taught nor illuminated inwardly by the Holy Spirit*. Then: *No one attains the true sense of the Holy Scriptures in those passages that treat of articles of faith in such a way as to give his assent to what is said and to derive fruit therefrom, unless the Holy Spirit moves and illuminates the heart from within*. *Gerhard*, however, in the year 1625 in *Exeg.* L. I., having in § 413 p. 447 distinguished between the *external clarity of Scripture* and the *interior clarity or illumination to be sought from the Holy Spirit*, thereafter in § 424 p. 461 responds to Bellarmine's *objection* against the perspicuity of Scripture—which he derived from the necessity of prayer for the attainment of the understanding of it, as indicated in *Ps. 119:18—by means of the distinction between knowledge of the letter and of the Spirit*: namely, that *for the literal knowledge of the articles of faith the external clarity* of Scripture suffices, whereas for *spiritual knowledge the interior illumination of the Holy Spirit, to be obtained through pious prayer*, *is required*. Indeed, the entire Theological College at Jena, together with the Theological Faculty at Wittenberg, in *The Refutation of Rathmann's Counter-Report*, num. 69. p. 365a., to the question: *Whether an unconverted Jew, without the prior and accompanying light of grace, can understand Holy Scripture according to the letter and determine the literal sense from it?* respond *in the affirmative*, and having adduced the examples of *Jerome, Graser*, and *Buxtorf*—who, in order to attain the true sense of the words of the Scripture of the Old Testament, consulted the Jews—finally add: *It is one thing to understand the words and the meanings of the terms, and to interpret them correctly: it is another thing to understand the subject matter, and to receive it rightly, apply it rightly, and grasp it in faith. For the latter, the gracious illumination and assistance of the Holy Spirit is required: but not for the investigation, explanation, and understanding of the literal sense*. And in the following num. 70. p. 365. b., after the midpoint: *If the Counter-Report intends that no unconverted person can attain the correct meaning which the words in Scripture carry and yield of themselves—that is, the grammatical and literal sense—unless the Holy Spirit approaches with His gracious light, then we do not agree with the Counter-Report but remain of the opinion which we have established (N.B.) as firm as earth and nails in the previous post. For the vocabulary items, and those things that interpret them and equip them for correct use—namely, lexicons, dictionaries, as well as grammatical books composed in Latin,*

Greek, Hebrew, Arabic, and other languages—are inventions of human ingenuity and belong among the gifts of nature, not among the gracious gifts of the Holy Spirit: for He has not been appointed (N.B.) nor poured out for the purpose of handing down the rules of grammar, and teaching how to look up roots among the Hebrews, or how to decline and conjugate, and how to form propositions and syllogisms in logic, but rather for the purpose of setting before us the articles of faith from Scripture and instructing us in saving truth. Many a man has the correct meaning of the words, but he does not have the blessed understanding of the mystery that belongs to faith; and therefore one must take care here (N.B.) to guard against equivocation. Moreover, concordant statements could additionally be adduced from *Aeg. Hunnius*, *Disp.* LXIV. Cap. III. § 6–8, Tom. V. Op. fol. 681; *Jac. Martini*, *LL. Th.* Disp. XI. § 29 and 30, § 100 ff.; Conr. Dietrich in *Inst. Catech. de Scr. S.* Q. XXX. resp. ad obj. I. pontif. p. m. 45.; the Theologians of Marburg, and in particular Joh. Steuber, *Disp.* VII. *de Aug. Conf.* art. XVIII. § 56 p. m. 154.; furthermore *Justus Feuerborn* in *Anti-Ostorodo*, Disp. II. § 3. p. 17; *H. Kromayer*, *Theol. Pos.-Pol.* A. I. antith. VI. p. 70.

f) Thus *Gerhard* writes: *We by no means affirm that Scripture is clear and perspicuous to everyone; but to those for whom there is no impediment, either from age or from ignorance of the language in which they read Scripture. Exeg*. 1. c. § 413. p. 447. 448. And *Jac. Martini*, in loc. cit. § 99 ff., warns *that not everyone understands the Scripture,* which arises *from a deprivation of two kinds of mediators, natural and supernatural;* among the natural, *the first* is *knowledge of languages.* Indeed, as *Musaeus* in *Dispp. de Convers.* 1647 ff., Disp. IV. § 37. teaches: *For those*, indeed, *who are ignorant of the languages in which the word of God was originally written, namely Hebrew and Greek, or who have not even learned to read, it is sufficient if they believe the dogmas of the faith, presented to them in their native language, to be true, and in the sense in which they are presented to them, revealed by God in the Holy Scriptures, an assent which the Holy Spirit Himself works, since the Word, even when preached in the vernacular, is effective in the hearts of men and testifies of itself that it is a divine word. For those*, however, *who are to be* instructed and *converted by the Word of God in those languages in which it was originally written, it is absolutely necessary that they know those languages, and, if not distinctly about the meaning of each passage of Scripture containing some doctrine of the faith, are simply certain of its meaning, they should nevertheless believe that those doctrines, which concern the foundation of salvation, are contained individually in the Holy Scriptures, so that they have no doubt about the sense of those passages* (apprehended through the very words, through their established meaning, by means of knowledge of the language)*; for otherwise they could not believe that these dogmas are true, since they are believed to be true for no other reason than that they were revealed by God, or because they are contained in the Scriptures in that sense.* Conf. predecessors in *App. Consil. Dedek*. l. c.

> LUTHER: "The sophists have said that Scripture is obscure; they have supposed that God's Word is inherently so obscure and speaks so strangely. But they do not see that the entire fault lies in the *languages*; otherwise, nothing would ever have been spoken more clearly than God's Word, if we understood the languages. A Turk must speak to me in a dark language, which yet a Turkish child of seven years can well understand,

because I do not know the language." (*Letter to the Councilmen of All Cities of Germany That They Establish and Maintain Christian Schools*, v. J. 1524. X, 551. Sq. [*StL* 10, 473])

g) This is what *Gerhard,* loc. cit., requires: *an impediment from age,* and thus that a defect of judgment not occur on account of age. But the same reason applies if those who are more advanced in years are of a child's judgment.

h) Indeed, he who does not attend to the very words, but indulges his own prejudices and twists the words of Scripture to them, can err even in the most clear places and in investigating the genuine sense; hence *Gerhard* in *Conf. Cath*. L. II. A. I. C. III. p. 209–210. requires *that no impediment be placed by a preconceived opinion.* Compare *Glassius*, *Glaubens-Grund* [Foundation of Faith], Chap. III, p. 103.

> QUENSTEDT: "To owls and bats the sun itself is dark, and the Word of God is dark to those who flee the Scriptures, as Tertullian sometimes calls the heretics. Therefore, the Scriptures or biblical speech are not inherently obscure, but become so by the fault of men, when the veil of the sins of the heart obscures the eyes, as says Theodore the abbot in Cassian, Book V, *Institutes*, Chapter 34. However, the fault of the person should not be imputed to the thing which is good in itself. Rivetus rightly comments in *Hos*. c. 14. Tom. II. Opp. p. 811b.: 'The Word of God is light, and is clear and perspicuous; but what happens to it is what happened to the Word the Son: 'The light shone in the darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not.' . . *The illumination of the Holy Spirit* is required, not one that brings light to *the Scriptures*, but one that makes clear the *eye* with which they are to be read. Whether a distinction is made between the native and relative, or comparative, clarity of Scripture, and that which is accepted in respect to the capacity of the human intellect. In describing the clarity and accessibility of Scripture, the reference must be made not to any intellect, however affected, even one preoccupied with heresy or errors and blinded by Satan; but to an intellect enlightened by the prevenient grace of the Holy Spirit, accompanied by the reading, hearing, or meditation of the divine Word; as the apostle declares (2 Cor. 2:15 sq., 3:5, and especially 4:3-4). For it is necessary that one who reads the Scriptures seek understanding from the same Spirit by whom they were inspired, through constant prayer." (L. c. q. 12. f. 171. sq.)

i) For although *not all* believers are *teachers,* nor do *all interpret,* according *to 1 Cor. 12:29,* they nevertheless have theologians, who, being learned from them (as from a clear principle), are fit to *teach and to refute*, according *to 2 Tim. 3:16-17*; and the rest of the faithful also have where they may *find eternal life*, the way that leads to life being perspicuously shown to them by the Scriptures themselves—*Joh. 5:39.*

k) This is what they elsewhere call *literal* or *historical knowledge*, and distinguish from *saving knowledge,* which pertains to the second operation of the mind and imports *a* proper *judgment* of the meaning of the words as truly divine, and thus a fully certain assent and divine faith (that the things signified are truly such as they are signified by the words). See. *Musesius* and the other authors cited in note *d.* in their respective places.

l) The perspicuity of the words of Scripture is proven, however, 1) from the very efficient and final cause of Scripture: for since God, the author of Scripture, had it compiled so that men *might be instructed* by its reading *for salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus,* according to *2 Tim. 3:15,* He himself, as *the creator of mind and language, could* undoubtedly *speak eloquently;*

therefore, it must also be believed that*, with supreme providence,* He *willed the divine to be free from ornament, so that all might understand what he spoke to all,* according to the words *of Lactantius*, Book VI of the *Divine Institutes*, chapter XXI., cf. *Gerh.* in *Exeg*. 1. c. § 415. p. 449., *Glassius*, *Glaubens-Grund*, Chap. III. p. 73. 74. And just as, in general, the chief virtue of speech intended for the instruction of others is clarity, so speech must be so arranged *not only so that you can understand, but so that you cannot fail to understand at all,* according to that *of Quintilian,* lib. II. *Instit. Orat*. c. Π., it must be acknowledged that the Holy Scripture, which was given by God Himself, the most perfect being, for πρὸς διδασκαλίαν, παιδείαν [for teaching, instruction], etc., possesses in all things necessary for knowledge a complete clarity, which it owes to its purpose. To which is added 2), that Paul*, in 1 Corinthians 14:8-9,* where he most diligently urges the church's teachers to present the doctrines of the faith in a clear and common style of speech, so that they may be easily understood by all, adds this reason: *For* he says, "*If the trumpet gives an uncertain sound, who will prepare himself for battle?" So also you, unless you speak with the tongue a word that is intelligible, how will what is said be understood? For you will be speaking into the air.* Therefore, unless we say that Scripture *speaks* not so much to the information of men as *into the air,* and to have it *like a trumpet giving an uncertain sound, from which no one is roused to battle,* and thus that the Scripture is in vain (which cannot be said without impiety), it must be admitted that the meaning of the words used in Scripture is known to readers according to the common use of speech, and therefore that the language of Scripture is clear. Cf. *Mus. Dispp. de convers*. 1647. seqq. habit., Disp. IV. § 28. Furthermore*,* 3) *Deut. 30:11* says: *"This commandment which I command you today is not too high for you, nor is it too far off." This means that the words are drawn from common usage* (and as it were from the mouths of men) and *are recorded in such a way that they can be easily understood* (since the human heart, or mind, is accustomed to a certain meaning of words). *For this proximity is explained in the preceding verses, that this word is not hidden, so that its understanding must be sought either from heaven or from the depths,* according to the interpretation of *Kromayer*, *Theol. Pos.-Pol*. Art. I. Thes. 6. p. 67. Therefore, although *the law,* of which God speaks through Moses, which is the rule for action, constitutes at least one part of Scripture, since Paul, divinely-inspired (*θεόπνευστος*), transfers these very things which were once said by God concerning the law to *the gospel concerning Christ and the righteousness of faith (Rom. 10:6, 8),* it must of course be admitted; that Scripture, with regard to the gospel as well as the law, is clear and perspicuous in its wording. Cf. what we shall say in the following note.

> QUENSTEDT: *"Distinguish:* 1. between the *Epistles* of Paul themselves and the *mysteries* about which Paul writes in his epistles. When Peter says in 2 Pet. 3:16*, 'in which are some things that are hard to understand,'* he is not speaking of Paul's epistles, but of the mysteries and doctrines contained in them. For the relative pronoun in Greek is not feminine, but neuter in gender; for it does not say "ἐν αἷς' but 'ἐν οἷς,' and therefore *'to en ois'* does not refer to the epistles, but to the immediately preceding *'peri touton,'* i.e. to the preceding things, is to be referred; a construction which Lorinus, Cornelius a Lapide, Estius, and Gagnæus also acknowledge here, . . . Peter, therefore, means to say that Paul, in almost all his epistles, wrote about these things, namely, those about which he himself had written here, i.e., about the final judgment and the destruction of the world. . . 2. The apostle does not say *πολλά,* not *πάντα,* but *τινὰ,* not many, nor all, but certain things in these, not in the epistles, as has been said, but that they are difficult to understand because of their mysteries; and so from the difficulty *of the matters,* an incorrect conclusion is drawn about the obscurity *of Scripture.* . . 3. Rather, this passage

is a plea for the clarity of Scripture; for St. Peter teaches that the letters of Paul are handled by the unlearned and unstable (*ἀστηρίκτοις*) because of the many *difficult* mysteries, so that the words are not wickedly twisted from a sufficiently clear meaning into a sense that is not genuine. He indicates, however, a twofold occasion for this distortion: one is ignorance, the other instability. Neither is from Scripture, from which the remedy for both is rather to be sought, which would be sought in vain if it were not in itself clear and solid." (L. c. f. 180. sq.)

THE SAME: *"Objection*. The passage 1 Cor. 13:12: 'For now we see through a glass, darkly.' . . . Answer 1.: Although Scripture is here compared to a glass and a riddle, it is not for that reason to be considered entirely obscure; for what we properly call a mirror presents a clear, distinct, and explicit likeness of the thing. . . 2. If obscurity is noted in that passage by the name of a riddle, it is not to be understood in terms of *the wording,* but *of the things* proposed in the Scriptures, which we are bound to believe, even though we do not yet understand them, but shall understand in the life to come. 3. The Apostle makes the knowledge 'by a mirror and in a riddle' common to all travelers, and does not even except himself and the other apostles. For he did not say, "*You* now see," but, *"we* now see through a mirror and in a riddle." Cf. 2 Cor. 3:18. Was the Scripture, then, obscure even to the apostle when he wrote this? ... 4. Knowledge and perception in a riddle and the vision through a mirror *are compared to the beatific vision;* and we readily concede that the former is obscure in comparison to the latter." (L. c. f. 180.)

m) This is, of course, what is said in *Ps. 19:9: the law of the Lord* (by which name is not understood precisely the law so called and contrasted with the gospel, but the *gospel* itself, as is clear from a comparison with *Rom. 10:18.* and therefore the whole doctrine that is treated in Scripture as its primary object, and of which this is the discourse) is said *to illuminate the eyes and to make the simple wise.* And in *Psalm 119:105, the Word of God is said to be a lamp for* one's *feet* and *a light* for one's *path*, namely, so that one may be *prudent* and keep oneself from the *path of falsehood,* according to verse 104. Again, in *2 Peter 1:19*, it is said that *the prophetic Word* (*the prophetic Scripture,* according to v. 20) *is to be attended to, as to a lamp shining (ὡς λύχνῳ φαίνοντι) in a dark place, until the day dawns and the morning star rises in our hearts.* For all things tend toward this: that we may understand that Scripture, in those things which ought to be manifest to man in his 'state *of the way,*' as they call it, is given so that he, not being led into error, may not fail to find salvation, and thus, with regard to the doctrine of faith and morals, to provide for the understanding (like the eye of the mind) what a lit and shining lamp provides for a traveler and his physical eyes: the ability to tread the right path, avoiding deviations and without stumbling. Scripture must therefore be clear not only *in itself* but also *to others*; and because two things are required for a person to correctly know the way of salvation: *first*, that one should simply perceive with the mind those things necessary for salvation; *second,* that one should embrace those things perceived as true and divinely revealed and give them assent in faith: Thus Scripture, which in this matter must act as a light and a shining lamp, must accomplish these two things: *first*, to present in words that are deliberately clear and intelligible those things which must be known by the intellect, so that they can be perceived by the simple apprehension of the mind; *second*, that when the thing signified is more sublime and the intellect itself is weaker, or plainly corrupt, so that he cannot by his own powers correctly judge what is signified by those words, nor give or elicit the assent he ought to give, Scripture itself, by its own power, as an illuminator, should lead the intellect to it and grant the faculty of knowing and assenting.

QUENSTEDT: "The Papists object that the Scriptures are sometimes called by the fathers easy, clear, open, on account of *the interpreter,* who is easy, clear, and open, and who is always present in the Church. Answer: Thus the riddles of the Sphinx could also be called clear and open, because Oedipus was able to solve them. Who does not see that, in this way, it is conceded that the Scripture is perspicuous only by accident? Well said Dannhauer, loc. cit.: 'Thus there is no difference between the written oracles of God and the Delphic, and the Scripture will be a Sphinx, the Pope an Oedipus.' (L. c. f. 183.)

DANNHAUER: " 'The Scripture,' says Gretser, 'is a lamp, not that it shines for us by itself, but because, *when it is explained by the church*, then at last it shines for us.' He explains the matter with an example: 'Metaphysics and mathematics make a man wise and illuminate the eyes; they are a lamp. But where does it shine for people? "'Do they shine in the huts and cottages of peasants? — By no means! But in the schools of philosophers and 'mathematicians; here they shine, here they illuminate, etc.' Thus Gretserus accuses the Holy Spirit of lying. For here it clearly calls a lamp, not a lantern; a lamp that shines, not one that is hidden; a lamp, not a color or a translucent substance, which, by the light of something else, illuminates whatever it is that is to be illuminated, and has no light of its own. If Scripture is a lamp only when it is illuminated by the Church, then the air could also be called a lamp, as could anything transparent. Our Aeg. Hunnius, though sophistically treated by Gretser, very well argues that by the same reasoning it could be said that the Arabic language is a light and a lamp for our people, and that this could then be interpreted thus: if it is understood by them to be lucid; so also the leaves of the Sibyl and the Delphic oracles could be called lamps. Indeed," the Jesuit will retort, "whatever illuminates the mind, if it is explained, can be called a lamp, a light. Therefore, nothing is any longer obscure in all literature, or rather in the world and beyond; thus the darkness of Egypt would have been lamps, and the outer darkness by which hell is described. The instance from metaphysics and mathematics is inapt; for both are in themselves obscure by their very acumen and do not give light, but receive it from the intellect; the contrary Scripture itself testifies." (*Hodos. phaen*. 1. L. p.,43.)

ANTITHESIS:

QUENSTEDT: *"Antithesis;* 1. *Of the Papists*, and indeed of *the crasser sort,* who contend that the whole of Scripture is so obscure, ambiguous, and flexible in every direction that almost no statement is to be found in it which cannot be bent to various and contrary senses; or if they sometimes assert that it is perspicuous, they mean this on account of the interpreter—easy, clear, and open—who is always present in the Church. Thus Martin Cromer, the Jesuits of Cologne, Ruard Tapper, whose insults and scoffs against Scripture are these: that Scripture is like a wax nose (which can be bent into any interpretation); like a sheath that admits any sword; like a leaden rule for the building of Lesbia; that it is an abbreviated word (since it needs the commentaries of); a Delphic sword, etc. b. *The milder party*, who, while admitting that many things are indeed clearly taught in the Scriptures, nevertheless assert that not all, but at least some of the articles of faith necessary for salvation are clearly presented in them. Such are Bellarmine, Costerus, Becanus, and Leonardus Marius. Gregor. de Valentia, *lib. 5. analys. fid. c. 2.*, says: 'Scripture, even on the greatest questions of faith, is so obscure and difficult to understand that even well-educated men, much less the common faithful, are easily led astray in its investigation and depart from it.' — 2. *Of the Enthusiasts and Weigelianes,* for whom Scripture is ambidextrous, flexible, an obscure lamp, a riddle sealed with seven seals, a scabbard, not the sword of the Spirit, the letter that kills, see Weigel's postil, part II, p. 185, Sebastian Franck in his proem to the paradoxes, 280. These are Weigel's words: ‘Scripture is ambidextrous; one can use it on both sides: however wrong a man may be, he can nonetheless wield Scripture against his opponent.' — 3. *of the Præ-Adamites*

founder, Isaac de la Peyrère, who says, 'many things in the Scriptures have been written with such carelessness and such great obscurity, that nothing more intricate, nothing more obscure can be read; that God has spoken to men in a perplexed and enigmatic manner, and that the same has been handed down in the writings.' See him in *System. Theol*. lib. IV. c. 1. p. 184., and against him Samuel Maresius in *praefat. apolog. pro auctoritate Scripturae* p. 8. Sqq.— 4. *Arminians,* who on the contrary contend that the Holy Scripture is so clear and perspicuous, that the illumination of the Holy Spirit and the light of special grace are not necessary for its salutary understanding. See Arnoldus *contra Tilenum* p. 441, 464. *Episcopius de perspicuit. Script*. thes. 8. says: 'that one cannot but perceive any sense of Scripture, even without being born again.' Cf. *Exam. censurae* c. 1. fol. 35. — 5. *The Socinians,* who also assert that man can 'understand the Holy Scripture with fruit by the help of his own intellect alone, without the special and internal grace and illumination of the Holy Spirit'; so Ostorodus, *Instit. Germ*. ch. 1, p. 3 ff., cf. *Catech. Racov*. p. 224 b. Smalzius, *contra Franz*. D. 3, *de persona Christi* fol. 81, and *refut. lib. de erroribus Arianorum* fol. 206, attributes to Christ 'a studiously affected ambiguity.' Enjedinus, in his *Explic. locorum* (p. 136), contends that the entire Gospel of John is obscure; his words in the same chapter are these: "If a discourse that is obscure, disjointed, in no way coherent, and composed of allegories is to be called sublime, I confess, John is sublime." (L. c. f. 173. sq.)

§ 42.

But since Scripture can be consulted by people, [(a)] even if they are inexperienced in the holy languages, Hebrew and Greek, [(b)] to know the doctrine of faith and morals, therefore it is useful for versions [(c)] of Scripture to exist in any language [(d)] and that men be encouraged to read them.[(e)]

a) For they are the end *for which* Scripture exists, see § 10 and notes *a and c.*

b) See § 41 and note *f.*

c) Or translations of the words of Scripture from a less familiar idiom into another, more familiar idiom or language, which the Greeks call *μετάφρασιν* [*metaphrase*].

ANTHITHESIS:

QUENSTEDT: *"The antithesis of the Papists,* who, however, do not themselves agree among themselves. For *at first* they condemned all versions of the Bible, denying altogether that Scripture ought to be translated into vernacular languages, because that would be more pernicious than salutary; so Peter Sutor, the Carthusian, in his book on the translation of the Bible, ch. 22. ‚the vernacular and mother tongue Bible' (for so he calls it), not only disapproves of the 'version,' but also promises, 'to show that it is inept, rash, and dangerous.' . . . Andradius, in his *Defensione fidei*, lib. IV, f. 241, says: "We can now expect nothing from the pervasiveness of the Holy Bibles and their translation into vernacular languages (if they are permitted everywhere), except the ruin of piety, the destruction of religion, and the perversion of the faith." . 'The Protestant Bibles must be purged not with pen, but with fire,' says Gretser, lib. II. de libb. prohib. c. 10. Later, however, the papists became *more moderate* and denied that their church prohibits vernacular versions, as Bellarmine states in Book II, *On the Old Testament*, chapter 15, according to whom, "the popes, the authors of the index of prohibited books, do not prohibit the vernacular translations themselves, but only circumscribe their use within certain limits." . . . But these two phalanxes of the papists differ more in words than in reality. For 1. both use the same arguments drawn from

the same disadvantages; why then should we not think that they conspire in friendship to the same end? 2. The authors of the latter opinion, hardly obscurely signify that it is not permitted for anyone to translate the Holy Scriptures into vernacular languages unless this has been granted to them by the Pope; but the Pope grants this to no one unless he knows that the person is so versed that the errors which lie hidden in the Vulgate version will be transferred along with them into the vernacular languages. In different words, therefore, Bellarmine says the same thing as the defenders of the former opinion. 3. Let no one think that the popes and their flatterers decree that it is in itself useful and expedient for Holy Scripture to be translated into the vernacular, if this is understood absolutely, and not comparatively. For if no vernacular translations of the Lutherans or Calvinists existed, all would unanimously pronounce that it is not expedient for that to be done. Finally, others of the Papists say that versions and their reading is permitted, but that the laity derive no benefit from them because of the obscurity of the Scripture." (*Theol. did.-pol*. P. I. c. 4. s. 2. q. 22. f. 330. sqq.)

d) As the church was to be planted and preserved through all the nations of the world and among peoples of any language. See *Matt. 28:19; Mark 16:15; Col. 3:11*.

e) Indeed, so that *the word of Christ may dwell in* them *richly (πλουσίως ἐνοικείτω*) and they may be able to *teach* and *admonish* one another. *Col. 3:16.* The arguments which we have brought in note c. to § 10 also apply here. Cf. *Mus*. praef. *Tr. de Convers*. 1660. ed. p. 7 ff., p. 21 ff. Although versions prepared by human study do not have canonical authority in the same way as the *divine-inspired* texts, insofar as they conform to them, they certainly contribute to attaining faith and its growth, and to excluding opposing errors.

§ 43.

But that the true sense [(a)] of the words of Scripture, especially the *literal*, [(b)] which of any one passage can be only one, [(c)] and then also the *mystical*, [(d)] wherever [(e)] it has a place, be rightly understood; and that not only the meaning of the clearer passages may be firmly held against the distortions of the heterodox, [(f)] but also that the more difficult passages [(g)] may be unfolded and understood for the advancement of spiritual knowledge, the rules of sound interpretation [(h)] must be observed.

a) Or the concept of the mind which the author of Scripture intended and wished to signify through the words.

b) For this is the sense of the words, speaking *absolutely*, which the author is said to intend and to signify proximately and immediately through the words; which, if taken properly, is called the *proper sense, and* if modified by some trope, *the figurative sense*. Compare *Glassius*, *Phil. S*. L. II. P. I. Tr. II. S. I. p. m. 260. sqq.

c) For it is customary in every language and in every mode of expression for an author, who speaks not to deceive but to teach or inform others, to intend by the same words placed in the same context to signify only one meaning. Therefore, since

God speaks to men in Scripture in a human manner and with words drawn from customary usage to teach them, it is rightly believed that in Scripture the literal sense of a single utterance is also one, not multiple. Cf. *Glassius*, *Phil. S.* 1. c. p. m. 268.

d) Which is *not* signified *immediately by the words* themselves*, but* by *the things* signified by those words, insofar as those things are types, shadows, figures, and signs or symbols of other things. It is also called the *spiritual* sense. Cf. *Glassius,* loc. cit., Tr. I. S. I. p. 249. And so it is also established that the *literal* sense is *prior* to the mystical *in nature* and *order,* according to the same author, 1. c. Tr. II. S. II. p. 289., who also deserves to be read in what follows, specifically on the *allegorical, typological, and parabolic* sense.

e) For in not every text of Scripture, nor in every single passage, is this twofold sense, both literal and mystical, to be sought and embraced; see *Glass,* 1. c. Tr. I. S. I. p. 248., and a distinction must be made, e.g.*, between innate* allegories*,* which are expressly delivered in the Scriptures themselves and are, properly speaking, the mystical sense of Scripture*,* and *derived ones,* i.e., accommodations of things signified by the words to other things, which are not, properly speaking, the senses intended by the Holy Spirit there. See the same. Tr. II. S. III. art. III. p. 291–292.

f) For although from the words of Scripture, which deal expressly with some dogma, when proposed in a known language, even the simplest people can conceive the true and determined sense without difficulty: it can, however, and sometimes does happen, that by the frauds of heretics the meaning of even the clearest words is perverted and made doubtful by contrived arguments (as is evident from examples of the words of the institution and of various passages which prove the divinity of Christ); To which, in order to respond correctly, the rules of good interpretation must be called to aid, and thus the true sense, conforming to those rules, must be distinguished from other false and fictitious ones.

g) See what we have said at § 41, notes *b* and *d.* And indeed, some passages of Scripture are obscure *in themselves* and when considered *separately*; others *in relation to others,* with which they seem to conflict. Both must be met by the aid of legitimate interpretation. See *Gerd. de interpr. Script*. § 64 ff.

h) For our own people do not decree that each individual's spirit is to be followed, but they do fully acknowledge the laws of good interpretation, both the *general ones* which right reason supplies as founded in nature and common to the interpretation of all writings; and the *special ones* which have been particularly noted in the Holy Scripture itself. And that the blessed *Luther* was observant of both*,* is shown by *Musaeus* in the *Praef. Tract. de Convers*, p. 37 ff., and *Vindic. Bibl. Germ. Glossat*. Disp. II. Th. 35, p. 111 ff.

§ 44.

The rules for interpreting Scripture, with regard to the literal sense, are reduced to these points:[(a)] I. that *the form and construction of words and phrases are to be carefully considered according to the usage of the sacred language;*[(b)]

II. that *the intention of the speaker is to be investigated from the antecedents and consequents*, *from the occasion*, *purpose*, *subject matter, and other causes*; [(c)] of which, as well as of other more specific rules that they contain, there is a more extensive discussion in the schools of exegetical theology. [(d)]

a) Thus *Franzius* included two precepts which pertain to the interpretation of Scripture, whom *Glomus* follows in *Phil. S*. Book II Part II Sect. I. p. 351. ff.

b) For just as any other language, so too Hebrew and Greek have their own character and idioms; for these, one should consult the sacred grammar and rhetoric of *Glassius* in *Phil. S*., as well as the lexicons, concordances, and the critical observations of learned scholars. For in this way, not only the *πολυσημία* [multiple meanings] of words, but also their *ἔμφασις* [emphasis], and not infrequently the occasion and means of resolving *ἐναντιοφάνειαι* [apparent contradictions], is recognized.

c) This was recognized and transmitted long ago by *Hilary* in Book IV. on the Trinity, p. m. 37, and Book IX, p. m. 116.

d) And among our own, besides *Gerhard, Franzius*, and *Glassius* (chapters 11 ff.), one can also see *Flaциŭ* in his *Clavis*, *Dannhauer* in his *Hermeneutic*, §., *Dan. Cramer* in his *Isag. ad Libb. Proph. et Apost.*, *Georg. Grossehäyn* in his *Epitome Hermeneut. s*, §., and others. The nature of this work does not permit adding more here.

§ 45.

First of all, however, that the mysteries of the faith, as handed down in the Scriptures, may be rightly recognized, [(a)] it must be observed that [(b)] *one must adhere to the proper and customary meaning of the words*, [(c)] *unless the manifest circumstances of the text*, *or the condition of the subject matter*, *or some other compelling reason compels one to descend to an improper meaning*. [(d)]

a) For this reason, we have thought it particularly important to emphasize this rule.

b) This rule is founded on the natural principle of understanding, by which we are instructed to attend to that sense which, according to the common use and meaning of words, all conceive or would conceive; for otherwise, no certainty will be given to our understanding. Cf. *Musaeus*, *Vindic. Bibl. Disp*. II. § 35. pp. 111, 112.

c) For even if the thing signified is more remote from human ingenuity and from the condition of other things to which we are accustomed, it must nevertheless be considered that this is proper to mysteries. Add to this St. Augustine's *De S. Coena contra Vorstium*, § 5, p. 2.

d) For if the analogy of faith, or clearer parallel passages, or the antecedents and consequents in the context, or the purpose of the speaker, or other circumstances most openly contradict the proper meaning of the words, or even, if the proper meaning of any word or phrase is admitted, a contradiction manifest and clearer than the sun itself presents itself—then the interpreter will indeed be compelled by necessity to depart from the proper meaning of the words.

§ 46.

Finally, just as from Holy Scripture, as a perspicuous principle, theological conclusions, and those things believed by divine faith, are rightly deduced, [(a)] so in such arguments, even those whose conclusion is *merely* [(b)] *theological*, not only the *formal principles* of reason [(c)] are undoubtedly usefully applied, [(d)] but also the *material* principles of reason [(e)] are rightly used; [(f)] provided that, when they are *particular* or singular, they are subordinated to a universal theological principle, [(g)] and that, in fact, only those *universal* principles of reason are used which are of absolute necessity, [(h)] so that the opposite would manifestly involve a contradiction. [(i)]

a) For our theologians have never denied this, even if they claim to use *Scripture alone* as their principle, norm, or rule; rather, they have asserted that whenever they wish to *prove* their doctrines from the Scriptures or to *refer* controversial questions *to* Scripture as a *norm*, they do so. For to *prove* is to deduce something from another, like a conclusion from premises. But to *a norm*, one does not so much refer those things which are formally affirmed or denied in what is the norm, as those about which a doubt has arisen as to whether they are consistent with what is formally contained there. Compare *Musaeus*, *Tract. de usu princ. Rat*. Book I, at the beginning, and Book II, Chapter XXX; also in *Tractatus de Conversione*, Disputation IX, Chapters II and III. Finally, Disputation I *against Masenius*, in which the agreement proposed by him is examined, § 29 ff., pp. 122 ff.

b) Or a pure *article* of faith. For there is less difficulty concerning those things which pertain to *mixed* articles of faith and are treated in philosophy from the light of reason, in addition to revealed theology. See, however, on this distinction of theological questions, *Mus., de usu princ. Rat*. Lib. I. Cap. VI. § 6., Cap. XIII. sqq. and Lib. II. Cap. I.

c) That is, those which pertain to the *form* of syllogisms and the disposition of the terms in figure and mood, and the rules of consequences. See *Mus., Tract. cit. Lib*. II. Cap. II.

d) For although not all theological discourse must be explicitly expressed in a syllogistic form, whenever the nature of a serious and solid discussion demands it, such effort should not be avoided. Otherwise it suffices to construct such discourses as are reducible to syllogistic form.

e) By which term are understood propositions known by the light of nature and having *metaphysical, physical,* or *moral evidentiary value*; which pertain to the matter of the arguments and constitute the *major* or *minor* from the premises. See *Mus.* loc. cit. Lib. II. C. II.

f) It follows, of course, that if these are correctly joined with a theological proposition, the conclusion is not only *true* and *certain,* but also one

of faith; which *Musaeus* shows in *Tract. de Convers*. Disp. VIII and IX. Cf. in this place what we said in note *g.* to § 35.

g) An example pertinent here is the one we have brought forward, loc. cit. To which can be joined also this, by which a man argues: *Every man is seriously loved by God, and has grace and salvation seriously offered to him. I am a man. Therefore I am seriously loved by God, etc.* Add to this, *Mus. Tr. de Convers.* pp. 593 and 594.

h) E.g. *Whoever has the perfections proper to God alone is the true God. But Christ has the perfections proper to God alone.* Therefore *Christ is the true God.* The minor must be proven from revelation. The major is known by the light of nature, but of absolute necessity, and implies a contradiction, if you say that someone has perfections which are actually the same as the divine essence, and yet does not have the divine essence, or is not the true God.

i) For otherwise, if the principles of reason are applied not absolutely, but *only relatively*, or in *a certain genus*, as universal and necessary, it easily happens that a conclusion is drawn which is repugnant to the mysteries or even the primary articles of faith; which is evident from the examples of the *Anti-Trinitarians* and others. See *Mus. de Usu Princ. Rat*. L. II. Cap. XIV. sqq. p. 451. sqq., item Tract. de Convers. Disp. IX. § 30. 31. p. 595. 596.

HOLLAZ: "*The principles of reason* are either organic or philosophical. The *organic* principles of reason are rightly applied to explaining and confirming the dogmas of faith and morals. From *philosophical* principles, the articles of faith mixed with them are known to some extent. But the pure articles of faith are demonstrated and known solely from Holy Scripture, as from a domestic, fundamental, and primordial principle. Meanwhile, it is permissible to employ *absolutely universal philosophical* principles in theological discourse as common, ministerial, and subservient principles to complete a fully expressed syllogism. — *Organic* principles are those pertaining to the instrumental disciplines of grammar, rhetoric, and logic. Other *philosophical* principles are *absolutely and infinitely universal*, which consist of an essential and simply necessary connection of terms, so that no instance, nor even the Scriptures, can undermine them, e.g.: It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time; whatever exists, exists necessarily; every spirit is immaterial, etc. Others are *limited and partial universals,* which, being true within a certain genus, by hypothesis, or according to the sphere of natural knowledge, nevertheless admit of limitation and can be contradicted by a particular instance, if not by nature, then certainly by one drawn from Scripture, e.g.: As many are the persons, so many are the essences; every human individual is in himself a person; every begotten is numerically different from the begetting one. — Without the use of *reason*, we can neither perceive, nor confirm, nor vindicate the dogmas of theology from the snares of our adversaries. For God did not reveal the wisdom of eternal salvation in His Word to brute beasts, but to men who use sound reason, and He seriously commanded them by precept to read, hear, and meditate on His word; Deut. 6:6. John 5:39. An understanding is therefore required as the receiving subject or the apprehending instrument. For just as without eyes we see nothing, without ears we hear nothing, so without reason we understand nothing. However, human reason is not the source or the primary element from which the proper and immediate principles of faith are derived. — *Organic principles* are employed as aids to acquiring the theological habit, since without them it is not possible to extract the sense or meaning of words (which is grammar), to examine figures and modes of speech (which is rhetoric), to perceive connections and consequences, or to form a discourse (which is logic). — Mixed articles of faith are those which consist not only of revelation, but also of the light of nature, which

are proven primarily and most safely up to *πληροφορία* [full assurance] of faith from sacred Scripture, and secondarily and less safely are deduced from the principles of reason. Thus, philosophers prove the existence and attributes of God in metaphysics and pneumatology from the principles of reason. — Concerning the pure articles of faith, reason left to itself knows nothing, but is blind and gropes in darkness toward the mysteries of faith. Of this spiritual blindness of the Gentiles, the Apostle admonishes man, 1 Cor. 2:14, saying: 'The natural man does not receive the things that are of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness to him, and he cannot understand them, because they are spiritually discerned.' The genuine argument of the Apostle here must be observed. The former is taken from the innate corruption of the human intellect after the Fall. Whatever the natural man (not enlightened by the Word of God) does not grasp, but rather rejects as absurd with a certain natural aversion, cannot be judged by the principles of reason. But the divine mysteries, etc. Therefore. The latter is argued from the nature of the mysteries. Whatever can only be judged spiritually (by the light of the Holy Spirit) is not to be assessed or decided by the judgment of reason. But the mysteries of faith, etc. Therefore. — In theological discourse it is shown that philosophical principles, as ministerial aids and in order to complete the syllogism, can be rightly applied by the following theological argument. And if the truth of Christ's human nature is to be proven against Marcion, a fundamental principle of theological demonstration is drawn from Holy Scripture:

Christ has a human body and soul. Matt. 26:27-28; Luke 24:39.

Therefore, Christ is a true man.

You say: Let the consequence, or the connection between the antecedent and the consequent, be proven.

I prove the consequence by applying the principle of reason:

Whoever has a human body and soul is a true man.

Christ has a human body and soul.

Therefore, Christ is a true man.

In this discourse, the truth of the theological conclusion is based on the minor proposition taken from the revealed Word of God, as its proper, fundamental, and primordial principle of demonstration. The major proposition is an absolutely universal principle of reason and concurs only as a common, secondary, and ministerial principle, flowing in of its own accord and superadded to complete the syllogism and to demonstrate the syllogistic validity (*δοκιμασίαν*)." (Exam. theol. Proleg. III. q. 4. p. 68. sqq.)

QUENSTEDT: "In this syllogism: A true man has a soul and a body; Christ is a true man: therefore Christ has a soul and a body, — the major is a principle of reason, the minor is from Scripture; but it is clear that the subject and predicate of the question are not joined by the power and force of the major, but by the force of the minor, in which is the conjunction of the terms, which are partly identical, even in their very sound, and partly at least in virtue and value, with the terms of the conclusion. For although man has a soul and a body, the Son of God nevertheless did not have a soul and a body before He began to be man. Therefore, the cause and principle of the conclusion is properly the minor, which is from Scripture. The major, however, is properly nothing but a *declaration* of the one term that is predicated in the minor, and thus a tool and aid for understanding the minor and drawing the conclusion." (*Th. did.-pol*. P. I. c. 3. s. 2. *πόρ*. 2. f. 64.)

HOLLAZ: "Although the mysteries of faith do not contradict the principles of reason, they are not to be judged by these. Medicine and jurisprudence do not contradict each other; yet neither does a physician from the course of law demonstrate a method for curing fever, nor does a jurist from anatomy seek a way to settle lawsuits. The art of painting and that of shoemaking do not conflict with each other, nor does the shoemaker presume to go beyond the shoe. Right reason, keeping within the limits of its object, does not contradict the mysteries of faith; but by accident it happens that corrupt reason, having stepped outside its sphere, enormously and wantonly resists divine revelation. (The Socinians object:) 'Every discourse ultimately resolves into this principle: It is impossible

for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time, which is the principle of reason. Thus, as the final resolution is made into this, so the final judgment is entrusted to reason.' Answer: That principle can be considered in two ways: 1. as being the common foundation of contradiction; 2. as being appropriated to divine things and confined to their nature. Although reason formally carries the judgment on the common foundation of contradiction, the real and proper judgment, however, belongs to Holy Scripture, insofar as that foundation of contradiction is appropriated to divine things. (The Socinians object:) 'Evangelical doctors very often use the principles of reason in theological syllogisms. Therefore, the Socinians cannot accuse them of an abuse of reason.' Answer: 1. The Evangelicals in theological syllogisms use the principles of reason that are absolutely universal, while their adversaries use principles that are particular, or at least limited and confined to the sphere of nature or of a finite being. 2. Evangelicals use the principles of reason, not as proper to theology, but as common to many sciences; not as ministerial and quasi-instrumental, supplying an aid to understanding and drawing a conclusion; not as primordial, from which the principle of demonstration is to be taken, but as superadded to show the syllogistic *validity* (*δοκιμασίαν*). Not attending to this, their adversaries arrogantly oppose the mysteries of faith divinely revealed. For example, they attack the mystery of the Trinity with this philosophical axiom: As many are the persons, as many are the essences. They assail the mystery of the Incarnation with this principle of reason: Every nature that is intelligent and complete in its being is a person. They deny the substantial presence of the body of Christ in the sacrament of the supper by this lemma: Every natural body is in one determinate place. These principles of reason, since they are confined to the sphere of nature and finite beings, are wrongly passed off as absolutely universal, nor are they applied without μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος [transition to another genus] to matters of mere faith. Reason is not the leader of theology, but its handmaid. Let Hagar the handmaid serve her mistress, not command: if she seeks dominion, let her be expelled from the sacred house." (L. c. p. 71.)

§ 47.

In norming the doctrine of faith and morals according to the Scriptures [(a)] there is no need for a peculiar *judge*, [(b)] properly and strictly speaking, who would render a sentence by virtue of authority [(c)] and be *visible*. [(d)] However, in order that truth and falsehood may nevertheless be rightly [(e)] judged, it is *partly* necessary to diligently examine what is proposed and comes to be judged, and to form the state of the question sincerely and accurately, [(f)] *partly* also to compare the known judgment with the Scriptures, so that it is *either* deduced from the clear and explicit words of Scripture, *or* by necessary consequence from the perspicuous and clear words of Scripture, understood according to the rules of good interpretation, while observing the laws of good consequence, [(g)] it is established, that it is truly contained in the Scriptures, or not contained, or that its opposite is contained. And this judgment, as it belongs to the *doctors* and ministers of the church, *when* individually, [(h)] and *then* gathered in council,[(i)] so it can also be exercised by *other Christians* [(k)] in their own way.

a) Or, that the Scripture, as a rule, be rightly applied to deciding questions which are disputed in theology, as if they were matters necessary to be believed or done.

b) For our theologians, who said that *Scripture* is *the judge* of controversies of faith, used the word 'judge' in *an improper* sense, for the reason of judging, or for the norm according to which a judgment is to be made, as it is not otherwise improper to take the law for a judge. Cf. Dr. *Seb. Niemann, Disp. pro loco in Fac. Theol. de Jud. Controv. fid*. V. sqq. ad XII.

QUENSTEDT: "In the strictest sense, the Holy Scripture cannot be called a judge, but the Holy Spirit is the supreme judge in controversies of faith; the Holy Scripture, however, is the voice of the supreme judge, by which the decision of the supreme judge on the disputed matter is communicated to the contending parties. Nothing, however, prevents the Scripture from being called judge in a broader sense, since the same thing is meant here, whether you say: The Holy Spirit, speaking in and through the Scripture, is the supreme judge, — or whether you say: Scripture is the supreme judge, because the Holy Spirit does not pronounce His judgment immediately, but through the Word or through the Holy Scripture; in which sense Aristotle said in *V. Nicom*, c. 4: To go to a judge is to go to the law. For a judge seems to be nothing other than the law personified.'" (*Theol. did.-pol*. P. I. c. 4. s. 2. q. 15. fol. 215.)

THE SAME: "The Papists object: When controversies arise about the Scripture itself, the Holy Scripture cannot be the judge of them, since no one can be a judge of himself and in his own cause, according to that rescript of Valens, Gratian, and Valentinian: 'The laws have removed the faculty of bearing witness in one's own cause.' *L. Omnibus. 10. c. de testibus*. — Answer: In the civil forum, indeed, no one can hold the parts of plaintiff, defendant, and judge. But in the divine judgment, God accuses through the law; He Himself is a suitable witness and judge. Christ says John 8:18: 'I am he that testifies of myself.' But He had said in v. 14.: 'Even if I testify about myself, my testimony is valid.' 2. When controversies arise about the Scripture itself, e.g., concerning its authority, canon, or interpretation, or when we are dealing with unbelievers outside the church, or with those who are in the church; if an unbeliever obstinately denies that Scripture is the Word of God: it is certain that Scripture cannot be a suitable judge or standard for this controversy, because every dispute must be conducted from the common principles of both parties; for as the philosophers teach: 'Those who wish to agree on the conclusion must first agree on the premise.' But such a dispute is not about some dogma of the faith, but about the very principle of the faith itself, which we suppose to be true, known, first, immutable, and indemostrable in this our assertion; and thus infidels are to be convinced not by the book of Scripture, but by nature, and by certain extrinsic motives are first to be led to the Holy Scriptures. If one disputes with a person in the Church about the authority of Scripture, he must be convinced by Scripture itself, and this controversy can be settled from Scripture, provided the state of the controversy is correctly established. The same must be said of the canon, which is not so much a dogma of faith as a principle of faith, one that is necessarily presupposed in the establishment of the dogmas of faith. Even in controversies about the interpretation of Scripture, Scripture itself ought to be used as the norm and rule. For it is beyond doubt that the metaphrastic interpretation must be brought into conformity with the original text. And that exegetical interpretation has Scripture itself as its norm is clear from the fact that it must be interpreted by the same Spirit by which it was originally dictated. It is also falsely supposed that Scripture is established as its own judge. It is sufficient if it is the judge of us and of our faith, for Scripture has no need of a judge, but we do." (L. c. f. 223.)

THE SAME: "Scripture is neither deaf to the hearing of causes nor mute in the proper utterance of judgment. Not deaf; for it somehow knows

the cause, as is clear from John 7:51." Not mute (unless in the papacy, where speaking the known language is forbidden); for it speaks, cries out, says, teaches, Mark 15:28; John 19:24; Romans 3:19, 4:3, 9:27. Cicero, indeed, in Book 3 of *De Legibus*, calls the law "a mute magistrate," and the magistrate "a speaking law[4]"; in which sense the same can be said of Scripture and pastors; for just as magistrates, if they speak according to the law, are the speaking law, so also pastors, when they speak from Scripture, will be the speaking Scripture. However, the edicts of princes and the holy Scripture itself can be called mute until they are made known by the voice of a herald, or through reading they explain their meaning to each person. A herald, however, is neither a judge of the edicts nor their interpreter, much less a supreme one." (L. c. f. 224.)

THE SAME: *"A distinction is made* between the judgment of the forum, or political, and the judgment of heaven, or ecclesiastical. The reasons of the church are not to be demanded for the ordering of the political state. The ecclesiastical ministry is one thing, and the political rule and magisterium are another. The Church is the invisible and spiritual kingdom of Christ, John 18:36, in which things are conducted not with carnal, but with spiritual weapons, 2 Cor. 10:3 ff. In the political forum it is absurd for one person to be at the same time accuser, judge, and witness, but in God and His Word all these things come together." (L. c. f. 235.)

THE SAME: "Distinction is made between the political rule of the Old Testament and the ecclesiastical rule of the New Testament; from the former to the latter there is no transition. For a different kingdom also has a different rule. Therefore it does not follow: In the Old Testament there was one supreme visible political judge; therefore in the New Testament there must also be one ecclesiastical one. The nature of the kingdom, or of the people of the Jews in the Old Testament and of Christians in the New Testament, is different. In the Old Testament the government was priestly; in the New Testament it is a royal priesthood, 1 Pet. 2:9." (L. c. f. 237.)

THE SAME: "The Papists are perpetually mistaken by a paralogism from ignorance of the syllogism, because they adapt what is said about human judgments in the cases and lawsuits of this world to divine judgments in the cause of faith. And what is said of inferior judges they transfer to the supreme judge; whereas it is the duty of an inferior judge to inspect, examine, and know the reasons and grounds of both contending parties. For since it is his duty to pronounce judgment according to the laws, he needs to investigate, so that, having examined the grounds, he may determine to which party the laws favor. The supreme judge, with the question simply put, can immediately answer either yes or no, without undertaking to examine the arguments of the parties, since the ultimate reason rests with him. 2. For Scripture, strictly speaking, does not indeed inspect the arguments and foundations of those who dispute, but it is not itself properly a judge, but rather the voice of the judge; the true judge is the Holy Spirit Himself, who speaks infallibly through it, and who truly does not ignore the arguments of both disputing parties, so much so that He has had them most clearly in view from all eternity. For even if the proposition were most true about a judge taken from among men, who is ignorant of things, the Holy Spirit, whom nothing ever hides or passes by, is not concerned with it. Add a third point: that where the parties are thus heard by the judge, it is a matter of fact, not of law." (L. c. f. 225. sq.)

ANTITHESIS:

PIUS IX.: "We, faithfully adhering to the tradition received from the beginning of the Christian faith, for the glory of God our Savior, the exaltation of the Catholic religion, and the salvation of Christian peoples, with the approval of the sacred council, teach and define as a divinely revealed dogma: that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra, that is, when, as the pastor and doctor of all Christians, he defines by his supreme apostolic authority a doctrine on faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, he possesses the infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to be instructed in defining doctrine on faith or morals; and therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are of themselves, that he possesses that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to be endowed for defining doctrine on faith or morals; and therefore that the definitions of the Roman Pontiff of this kind are of themselves, and not on the basis

of the assent of the Church, irreformable." (*Constitutio dogmatica prima de ecclesia Christi*, ed. in the *4th* session *of the* Vatican Council of 1870, which begins: "*Pastor aeternus*" [The Eternal Shepherd].")

c) Whom they otherwise call the *authoritative, decisive, absolute,* and *principal* judge , namely because by the force of the authority he possesses, he can oblige litigants to acquiesce in the sentence he has rendered, without further inquiry or hesitation. See loc. cit. § 18, *Gerh. Exeg*. L. I. § 452.

d) For our own theologians, indeed, admit that the *Holy Spirit* is, first of all, the *judge* of controversies in those things which are contained in Scripture in clear and explicit words, but in His own way also with regard to those things which are deduced from Scripture by consequence, and that *He is authoritative. Niemann,* loc. cit. § 20 ff. Of course, although it does not compel men by external force to assent to its decision, with respect to the *λόγον τὸν ἔξω* [the outward word], or so that they do not reject anything by an external act; nevertheless, when the sentence of Scripture is clear, as the voice of God, it is certain that the minds of men are convicted with respect to the *λόγον τὸν ἔσω* [the inward word], so that, unless the conscience protests, they can object to nothing.

e) Indeed, controversies concerning the very doctrines of faith and morals, which require definite knowledge, could all be judged and settled in this way, provided that, when the occasion for debate arises, the disputants bring pious, truth-loving, and learned minds to the table. For then, with prejudices, partisan zeal, and corrupt affections set aside, and the arguments of both sides weighed against the standard of Scripture, it would easily appear which is the true and which the false opinion, on account of the very clarity of Scripture itself, which speaks on these matters by design. But as for the other questions, which can be debated on both sides while preserving the faith, a judgment and conclusion on these should not be demanded or expected in the same way.

f) To this end, ambiguities of words and phrases should be carefully resolved, and what is conceded or undisputed should be separated from and removed from what is doubtful and controversial, and the question that remains should be expressed in the most proper and fitting terms and phrases.

g) Hence, what we said above § 44 ff. about the interpretation of Scripture and drawing conclusions recurs here.

h) For theirs is *to rightly handle (orthotomein) the word of truth,* 2 *Tim. 2:15, and to reject profane and foolish babblings, and stupid and unlearned questions,* v. 16. 23., to be equipped not only for *doctrine,* but also for *rebuke (έλεγχον), 2 Tim. 3:16–17.,* so that they can *convict those who contradict (τους αντιλέγοντας έλέγχειν), Titus 1:9, to shut their mouths (έπιστομίζειν αυτούς),* v. 11.

i) Indeed, the judgment of many gathered in *a synod*, if they are learned and pious, is not without reason preferred to the judgment of *one* or *another* acting *on* his *own*. And if a *universal* council could be held, presenting the unanimous votes of all Christians, it would surely be of the greatest weight. Meanwhile, the councils we have, since they do not possess the privilege of infallibility, just like individual doctors are granted the judgment *of discretion,* not *an* authoritative *decision*. For they cannot oblige the intellect to assent and acquiesce in their decisions unless they have demonstrated the conformity of their decisions with the Scriptures.

HUELSEMANN: "The immediate subject, to whom the authority to judge on matters of faith has been delegated by the Holy Spirit, or, which is the same thing, to expound the opinion already delivered by the Holy Spirit in the Scriptures, by words equivalent or homogeneous to the words of the Holy Spirit or of the Scriptures, and to whom infallibility is promised for judging in this way, are not the church's teachers alone, whether in or out of a council, nor are they individual Christians, and least of all a single doctor, whether Roman, Antiochian, or any other bishop. This proposition is to be proven from all those sayings and from the definition of the subject of which they all speak, to whom the promise of infallibility is made and the faculty of publishing and expounding the judgment of the Holy Spirit is given. For it is most false that any of those sayings has for *its* subject the promise to a single doctor, or to the doctors alone taken together, but it has for its object the entire assembly of the faithful, embracing the sheep with their pastors, Matt. 16:18; 18:20. Eph. 4:11–13; John 14:16; 1 Tim. 3:16; and elsewhere." (*Praelect. in F. C*., p. 211 sq.)

k) For if they are instructed with the aids necessary for explaining the Holy Scriptures and handling theological controversies, they are able to judge controversies with sufficient accuracy. For the less learned, it is sufficient, if, informed by the clear passages of Scripture on those things necessary to know, they remember that they must beware of all things that disagree with them; although they themselves are not sufficient for the more accurate examination of controversies. For the admonition of *Philip Melanchthon* in his *Resp. ad Art. Bavar*, Tom. I. Opp. p. 370, is to be observed: *Let there be such modesty of character that they modestly uphold honorable opinions, and indeed those divinely delivered, even if they cannot refute every deception that is constructed against them.* Cf. *Chemn.* P. III. LL. p. 82. and *de Fundam. SS. Coenae* c. X. p. 160.

LUTHER: "To recognize and judge doctrine belongs to all and every Christian, and so that he is accursed who infringes upon this right in the slightest. For Christ himself has established this right in many and indisputable passages, e.g., Matthew 7[:15]: ,'Beware of false prophets, who come to you in sheep's clothing.' He certainly says this word against the teachers of the *people* and commands them to avoid their false teaching. But how can they *avoid* them without *recognizing* them*?* And how can they recognize, where they have no power to *judge?* Now, however, he not only gives them the *power* to judge, but also *commands* them; that this single passage can be sufficient against all popes, all fathers, all councils, and all the sayings of schools, which have attributed the right to judge and to conclude solely to the bishops and clergy, and have godlessly and sacrilegiously robbed the people, that is, the Church, the Queen, of it. . . Just as everyone believes, rightly or wrongly, *at their own peril*, so it is right for everyone to take care to believe *correctly*; for common sense and the necessity of salvation also dictate that the judgment on doctrine must necessarily rest with the listener... It cannot be denied that the tyranny of this stolen right has endured for more than a thousand years. For even at the Council of Nicaea, which was still the best of them, they already began to make laws and to assume such a right. And from that time until now it has become so entrenched that nothing is more common or more firmly established, because it can be proven by the multitude of people and long custom, than this right; so that today there is hardly anyone who does not consider it wholesome, just, and divine. But here you see that it is pure church plunder and godlessness against the most obvious and unconquerable Scripture of God." (*Against King Henry of England*. 1522. XIX, 424. sqq.)

THE SAME: "All the warnings that St. Paul gives, Rom. 16:17-18; 1 Cor. 10:15; Gal. 8:4-5. Col. 2:8, and everywhere, likewise all the sayings of the prophets, where they teach to avoid human doctrine, do nothing other than take from the teachers the right and power to judge all doctrine, and lay it with a solemn command, under penalty of the loss of their souls, upon the hearers; so that they not only have the right and power to judge all that is preached, but are obligated to judge, under divine majesty's displeasure." (*Ground and Reason from Scripture that a Christian Assembly or Congregation Has the Right and Power to Judge All Doctrine*. 1523. X, 1799. ff.)

GERHARD: "Bellarminus replies: 'Since the people are uneducated, they cannot judge the doctrine of the pastor in any other way than by comparing it with the doctrine of the predecessors and the ordinary pastors.' Resp.: That this is false is shown by the example of the Bereans, who daily searched the Scriptures, diligently inquiring whether these things were so as they were presented by Paul and Barnabas (Acts 17:11); they established as the rule of judgment not the doctrine of the ordinary pastors, but the Holy Scriptures, by which name they are commended by the Holy Spirit. That ignorance of the people, of which Bellarmine speaks, originates in the papacy from the prohibition of reading the Holy Scripture, for which sacrilege its authors will one day have to render a severe account. We, however, invert Bellarmine's argument: If the ignorance of the people does not prevent it from being able to compare the doctrine of pastors with the doctrine of its predecessors or of ordinary pastors, then it certainly will not prevent it from being able to compare the doctrine of pastors with the doctrine of Christ, the prophets, and the apostles, as set forth in the Scriptures, and to discern the true prophet from the false by this standard. But the former is true; therefore, so is the latter. The connection of the major is proven, because Christ, the prophets, and the apostles can teach just as clearly, and indeed did teach just as clearly, as the ordinary pastors. Since Christ, the prophets, and the apostles, in their ministry of teaching on this earth, preached not only to the learned but also to the common people, and in such a way that they could understand their teaching, how then could the writings of the prophets and apostles be so obscure and perplexed that the common people could in no way judge doctrine from them? Surely the prophets and apostles wrote nothing other than what they preached by word of mouth. — "But," says Bellarmine, "if the people could judge for themselves about the doctrine of the pastor, they would have no need of preachers." Resp.: What, indeed, is the *connection* in this syllogism? Both are commanded by God: that the people should judge the doctrine of the pastor, which Bellarmine himself had previously conceded in so many words, and that there should nevertheless be certain and ordinary ministers in the church, 'for are all doctors?' 1 Cor. 12:29; Eph. 4:11. It is one thing to inquire into the truth of doctrine and to discern heresies from orthodoxy, false prophets from true doctors—a *general* calling that pertains to all Christians; it is another to teach publicly in the Church, which is a *special* calling. We do not make pastors from the sheep, but we command them to be and remain sheep; in the meantime, we do not want them to be brute sheep, who cannot and should not discern between pastors and wolves. The Papists make brute sheep of their hearers, who are to follow the pastor without any discretion, even if he leads them to the most noxious pastures or even turns into a wolf; they make of the hearers parrots dependent on the nod of the prelates, and of the prelates angels who are to be plainly infallible and *unaccountable (ἀνυπεύθυνοι)*. . . . The reason, which Bellarmine adds, is plainly antichristian: 'When a regular pastor (he says) and some other person who preaches, not being called, teach contrary things, the people must absolutely follow their pastor rather than the other one, who is not a pastor, even if it should happen that the pastor errs.' But it is false that the people must follow the ordinary pastor, even when he errs; for this is nothing other than to command the sheep to follow their shepherd even to pernicious pastures, so that they may prefer darkness to light, error to truth, and human institutions to divine authority. Bellarmin does indeed concede, 'it is not credible

that God would permit an ordinary pastor to err so as to deceive the simple people'; but it is to no avail that one disputes whether it can happen, concerning that of which it is manifestly certain it has happened; that ordinary pastors have more often erred and deceived the simple people cannot be denied without remarkable impudence; We therefore press Bellarmine here and ask, whether the people ought to follow ordinary pastors even when they err? If he were to answer in the affirmative, he would make it manifest that he has sold his labor to him who in 'If the Pope,' *dist. 40*, thus roars: ‚If the Pope, forgetful of his own and his brethren's salvation, is found to be negligent, useless and remiss in his works, and furthermore silent about what is good, which is more to his own detriment, and nevertheless leads countless peoples in droves with him, first as a captive of hell, with whom he will be eternally scourged with many plagues: no mortal dares to correct his faults there; because he who is to judge all will not be judged by any." (*Loc. de minist. eccl*. § 88.)

§ 48.

It can be defined [(a)] that the Holy Scripture [(b)] is inspired [(d)] by God, [(c)] delivered through the prophets and apostles,[(e)] partly in the Hebrew, partly in the Greek language,[(f)] to sinful man [(g)] concerning all things necessary to be believed and done, [(h)] instructing him, so that he may obtain faith [(i)] in Christ, and, being reconciled to God, may live a holy life, and at last [(k)] obtain eternal life by the grace of God.

a) Cf. *Mus., Introd*. P. II. Cap. II. § 24. p. 278.

b) See above § 2, note *a,* p. 92. Nor is it difficult to see that the *generic* concept of Scripture is rightly established here, which is common to Holy Scripture and other writings. If one were to substitute the *word of God* for the generic term, it would certainly be understood as the *external* word and *verbal sign.* See *Mus.*, loc. cit., pp. 279, 281.

c) What is said here and what follows pertains to the *specific difference*, taken from the causes of Scripture; among which the first to appear is the *principal efficient* cause, God. See above § 3.

d) Thus it is indicated partly the *causality* of the principal efficient cause, partly the *formal* cause of Scripture. See § 4 and § 8.

e) Which are the *less principal efficient* cause. See § 6.

f) They pertain to the *matter from which*, or to the material of Scripture. See § 7.

g) Who is the *end to which* the Scripture is directed. See § 10.

h) These are the primary *object* of Scripture. See § 9.

i) Which is the *intermediate end for which* [*finis cujus*]. See § 11.

k) Which is the *ultimate end*. See loc. cit.

TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME ONE.

M. Joh. Casp. Zeumeri *The Life of Johann Wilhelm Baier,*
Preface III

PROLEGOMENA

CHAPTER I. On the nature and constitution of theology 1
where specifically on natural theology 6
of the revealed 30
CHAPTER II. On the Principle of Revealed Theology, or on Holy Scripture 79